I’m reading the just published book The Servile Mind - How Democracy Erodes The Moral Life by Kenneth Minogue. I’m at page166 tonight. http://www.amazon.com/Servile-Mind-Demo ... 718&sr=1-1
Thanks to having read Projects & Values - An Ethic for Today, I’m accompanied on my read by Mr. Baron
http://www.rbphilo.com/projval.html
In his book, Professor Minogue describes what he calls “the sevile mind.” In Mr. Baron’s book, he describes what I’ll call “the individualist mind.” I have a bunch of questions to reflect upon during my read which arise from the juxtaposition of these two “minds.”
Both minds appear in this forum. For example, ( of the servile mind), increasingly, the gay activist’s intolerance toward the religious person’s opposition to homosexuality begins with the “homophobia” label and proceeds to delegitimize both the opinion and the person of the speaker. History would suggest that with the necessary political power, the gay activist (exhibiting the tendency to obliterate the opposition) would promptly shoot the unrepentant religious person. viewtopic.php?f=7&t=4480&hilit=tom+brock
In contrast, the individualist mind, such as Mr. Baron, would stop at a toleration of Pastor Brock's opinion coupled with a respect for his personhood and his right to free speech.
Here is a remarkable paragraph on individualism and the law for you to think about (p. 160):
“Individualism could only have arisen in a civilization that had long domesticated the idea of living under law. Individualism and law are correlates, inseparable partners. The reason is that law, by contrast to custom, and by contrast also with the arbitrary character of the despotisms often associated with custom, is abstract, and an abstract rule requires compliance rather than obedience. Whereas custom adumbrates a whole manner of life, rules and principles leave open the mood and the manner in which compliance takes place. The person who looks to be frustrated by the application of a rule looks for a loophole, but a loophole is not a violation of the rule, or a rejection of it. It is the discovery of an unusual implication of the rule in new circumstances. The abstract character of law thus opens up scope for innovation in every sphere of life.”
In his book, Mr. Baron implicitly recognizes law as an abstraction , rather than law as an absolute command. Here is the relevant text:
“Not so! states Richard Baron, a philosopher residing in London. In a significant new book, Projects & Values – An Ethic for Today (Authors OnLine, 2006),4 Baron presents a profound question of the conflict between morality and law in a simple example:
If for example someone was a witness in a court case and he could only answer a lawyer’s question by betraying a friend’s confidence, then a rule that we should respect the confidences of our friends would clash with a rule that we should tell the truth in a court of law. One way to resolve the conflict would be to consider the underlying guiding concepts, in this case the concepts of friendship and of honesty, and to see whether one had greater force than the other. If the witness decided that friendship had greater force except in the most extreme circumstances, then he would respect the confidence and not give a truthful answer to the lawyer’s question.5”
http://www2.mnbar.org/benchandbar/2007/ ... _court.htm
And now I’ll return to the Professor, with Mr. Baron looking on.
The Servile Mind - How Democracy Erodes The Moral Life
Re: The Servile Mind - How Democracy Erodes The Moral Life
Firstly, am I right in assuming that the passage on individualism is from the book by Richard Baron? It looks like quite an interesting read (actually, both do).
Secondly, I'm interested in what you think about how the abstract character of law, perhaps along with 'opening up scope for innovation', can also bring about a similarly abstract understanding of the 'individual' (akin to Nietzsche's idea of a sort of 'lord and master of all values'). I don't know whether the book makes this point (or even opposes it) but it seems to me that if a subject is aware of an abstract law which requires application in a particular context, this subject can come to see itself as a sort of 'point of convergence' of law; something that is itself also abstract but produces concrete activity.
Put simply, does it follow from the abstract nature of law that any subject who attempts to understand themselves by and through it will only ever arrive at an abstract understanding of this 'self' despite being able to act within the physical world? Is the 'subject' akin, in fact, to Foucault's idea of how it is 'produced' by relations of power (in this case, law)?
Lastly, I'm about to start re-reading Benjamin's 'Critique of Violence' (and have been reading Zizek's 'Violence') and am interested in how 'law' operates in that text and how it might be applied, critically, to the texts from which you've quoted. From what I can remember, Benjamin posits two different types of violence; however, both are related to law. The first, 'mythic violence' is violence which takes place within predefined legal parameters and is understood to have issued from outside of the subject (i.e. from moral principles, from religion); the second, 'divine violence' is more interesting in that it serves as the violence of the law itself i.e. it is the violence that enables the law to operate as a law and not merely as suggestions or guidelines. It is seen to have issued from the subject themselves. The two seem to be similar to Nietzsche's 'slave' and 'master' morality although perhaps without the same connotations.
If we take this into account, we have a single 'law' (or legal context) but it has different effects on subjects (perhaps simultaneously). The violence 'of' law (divine violence) places subjects in a position in which they are expected to obey, while the violence 'in' law (mythic violence) occurs as a transgression, though not necessarily with the character of creating a new law.
I think that we could argue that 'The Individual' (I use capitals because I am referring to a sort of abstracted concept of an ideal subject rather than any specific physical manifestation) may have come into being through an act of divine violence - a sort of Sartrean 'abandoning' insofar as it is simply thrust into existence. However, it could also be that it came about as an instrument in a more complicated series of demands and needs (the Foucauldian subject) and if this is so then it may have been created 'in the name of' something that is either greater than, or assumed to be greater than, it. If this is the case then it is mythic violence inasmuch as subjects granted themselves the status of 'individuals' in order to better realize a particular network of power relations (i.e. capitalism).
Secondly, I'm interested in what you think about how the abstract character of law, perhaps along with 'opening up scope for innovation', can also bring about a similarly abstract understanding of the 'individual' (akin to Nietzsche's idea of a sort of 'lord and master of all values'). I don't know whether the book makes this point (or even opposes it) but it seems to me that if a subject is aware of an abstract law which requires application in a particular context, this subject can come to see itself as a sort of 'point of convergence' of law; something that is itself also abstract but produces concrete activity.
Put simply, does it follow from the abstract nature of law that any subject who attempts to understand themselves by and through it will only ever arrive at an abstract understanding of this 'self' despite being able to act within the physical world? Is the 'subject' akin, in fact, to Foucault's idea of how it is 'produced' by relations of power (in this case, law)?
Lastly, I'm about to start re-reading Benjamin's 'Critique of Violence' (and have been reading Zizek's 'Violence') and am interested in how 'law' operates in that text and how it might be applied, critically, to the texts from which you've quoted. From what I can remember, Benjamin posits two different types of violence; however, both are related to law. The first, 'mythic violence' is violence which takes place within predefined legal parameters and is understood to have issued from outside of the subject (i.e. from moral principles, from religion); the second, 'divine violence' is more interesting in that it serves as the violence of the law itself i.e. it is the violence that enables the law to operate as a law and not merely as suggestions or guidelines. It is seen to have issued from the subject themselves. The two seem to be similar to Nietzsche's 'slave' and 'master' morality although perhaps without the same connotations.
If we take this into account, we have a single 'law' (or legal context) but it has different effects on subjects (perhaps simultaneously). The violence 'of' law (divine violence) places subjects in a position in which they are expected to obey, while the violence 'in' law (mythic violence) occurs as a transgression, though not necessarily with the character of creating a new law.
I think that we could argue that 'The Individual' (I use capitals because I am referring to a sort of abstracted concept of an ideal subject rather than any specific physical manifestation) may have come into being through an act of divine violence - a sort of Sartrean 'abandoning' insofar as it is simply thrust into existence. However, it could also be that it came about as an instrument in a more complicated series of demands and needs (the Foucauldian subject) and if this is so then it may have been created 'in the name of' something that is either greater than, or assumed to be greater than, it. If this is the case then it is mythic violence inasmuch as subjects granted themselves the status of 'individuals' in order to better realize a particular network of power relations (i.e. capitalism).
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Richard Baron
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Re: The Servile Mind - How Democracy Erodes The Moral Life
No, that's not me. But it is very interesting.ala1993 wrote:Firstly, am I right in assuming that the passage on individualism is from the book by Richard Baron?
The question that strikes me as most interesting in all this is, what are the conditions for liberty and individualism? Those conditions probably do include habits of conduct that make us behave reasonably to one another, and the habits probably need to be internalized: it is no good if people behave reasonably by checking the book of laws all the time and acting against their natural inclinations because the book says they should.
As to where democracy fits into all this, I have a lot of sympathy with the republican (=neo-Roman, not GOP) concept of liberty. The government needs to hold office at our pleasure. If we cannot throw it out at regular intervals, then even if it remains benign, we will be at permanent risk of tyranny and will self-censor so as not to provoke it.
Re: The Servile Mind - How Democracy Erodes The Moral Life
1. Conflicting values occur often. Which one is more important is often difficult to decide.
When a wife sees her husband packing his burglar tools is she obliged to call the police to prevent a crime from happening ?
It is not necessarily morals against laws but also laws against laws and morals against morals.
Why laws against laws ?
Because many laws leave room to interpretation.
2. Being able to get rid of a government seems to be a good thing. And yet, in countries like Italy governments were dismissed or resigned themselves so often that the resulting political vacuum had a paralizing effect.
General de Gaulle made a contitution which reinforced the position of the president, in order to avoid the danger of political instability.
And in Germany a constructive vote of mistrust (konstruktives Misstrauensvotum) was introduced: the parliament can get rid of a government only if it is able to form a new one instead.
When a wife sees her husband packing his burglar tools is she obliged to call the police to prevent a crime from happening ?
It is not necessarily morals against laws but also laws against laws and morals against morals.
Why laws against laws ?
Because many laws leave room to interpretation.
2. Being able to get rid of a government seems to be a good thing. And yet, in countries like Italy governments were dismissed or resigned themselves so often that the resulting political vacuum had a paralizing effect.
General de Gaulle made a contitution which reinforced the position of the president, in order to avoid the danger of political instability.
And in Germany a constructive vote of mistrust (konstruktives Misstrauensvotum) was introduced: the parliament can get rid of a government only if it is able to form a new one instead.
Re: The Servile Mind - How Democracy Erodes The Moral Life
I was just thinking ... what if morality can take the shape of law? By this, I mean when a 'custom' or moral principle stands opposed to 'the law' but is adhered to so vehemently and consistently that it comes to function as a law in and of itself. An example of this might be found in the discrepancy between the principle that a wrong must always be righted either by the person wronged or by their friends or family; in this case, physical violence is permmitted (and often strongly encouraged), despite such violence being illegal. In this case, 'the law' is seen either as merely a guideline or as an attempt to stand in the way.
'The law' might be derived in part from morality - however, I'm not talking about that but rather about moral principles that operate in the same manner as the law. Once a principle becomes part of 'the law' then it cannot operate 'as if' it is law because it is part of it.
(I hope this doesn't seem too opaque - I can't seem to express it any more clearly).
'The law' might be derived in part from morality - however, I'm not talking about that but rather about moral principles that operate in the same manner as the law. Once a principle becomes part of 'the law' then it cannot operate 'as if' it is law because it is part of it.
(I hope this doesn't seem too opaque - I can't seem to express it any more clearly).
Re: The Servile Mind - How Democracy Erodes The Moral Life
Written or codified laws are just one part of laws.
There are also unwritten or customary laws.
There are also laws based on precedence: because judges rule in a certain way this practice becomes un unwritten law.
There are also unwritten or customary laws.
There are also laws based on precedence: because judges rule in a certain way this practice becomes un unwritten law.
Re: The Servile Mind - How Democracy Erodes The Moral Life
I respectfully suggest that Mr. Baron’s concept of the effect of humility on creativity is erroneous. It is historically disproved by the many original intellectual achievements by practicing Christians. For example, Gregor Mendel was a monk. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gregor_Mendel I suggest that viewing the universe as a created universe is more fruitful in causing wonder and awe, the source of philosophy and science, than are any of the competing views of the origin of the universe.
Comments are solicited!
Baron on humility:
“Ethics that emphasize virtues do not however have to fit well with seeing our own projects as meritorious, nor need they promote associated values. A religion that identified humility or submission as a virtue would be likely to be hostile to the pursuit of projects that we had devised. It would instead be likely to identify a project that was already laid down for us, to live in a given way and ultimately to achieve some specified goal such as union with God. If we accepted that humility and submission were virtues (and I do not), then we would be likely simply to accept the prescribed project and not to give serious consideration to alternatives. We might be encouraged to choose the prescribed project freely, but we would not be invited to make other choices. Autonomy is negated when it is reduced to the opportunity to make a free choice from a list that contains only on item.” (Emphasis added)
From the section “Virtue ethics and our own projects” in Projects & Values - An Ethic For Today, p.121
Minogue on humility:
“The basic individualist notion that man is essentially a creature of the passions came in fact from Christianity, which is the direct and essential progenitor of European individualism. The Christian distinction between the spiritual and the secular powers lies at the heart of Western civic pluralism. It no doubt seems odd that a religion of humility warring against the snares of the world should have evolved anything so apparently fatal in our time to religious observance as individualism. Yet such inversions and reversals are in fact a staple of human experience, no less than of the theological imagination. The Weberian derivation of capitalism from Calvinism (to the extent that it is convincing) is merely one example of this: an unworldly attention to spiritual salvation led, remarkably, to success in laying up treasure in the world below.
Christianity is the source not only of individualism, but of the spiritual egalitarianism that individualism also involves...” (Emphasis added) The Servile Mind, p. 165
____________________________
“Humility in a higher and ethical sense is that by which a man has a modest estimate of his own worth, and submits himself to others.”
“To guard against an erroneous idea of humility, it is necessary to explain the manner in which we ought to esteem our own gifts in reference to the gifts of others, if called upon to make a comparison.”
“A man, however, may generally esteem some good in his neighbour which he does not himself possess, or acknowledge some defect or evil in himself which he does not perceive in his neighbour, so that, whenever anyone subjects himself out of humility to an equal or to an inferior he does so because he takes that equal or inferior to be his superior in some respect.”
“The four cardinal virtues are prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance, and all other moral virtues are annexed to theses either as integral, potential, or subjective parts. Humility is annexed to the virtue of temperance as a potential part, because temperance includes all those virtues that refrain or express the inordinate movements of our desires or appetites. Humility is a repressing or moderating virtue opposed to pride and vainglory or that spirit within us which urges us to great things above our strength and ability, and therefore it is included in temperance just as meekness which represses anger is a part of the same virtue. From what we have here stated it follows that humility is not the first or the greatest of the virtues.”
“Humility, inasmuch as it seems to keep the mind and heart submissive to reason and to God, has its own function in connection with faith and all the other virtues, and it may therefore be said to be a universal virtue.”
“The vices opposed to humility are,
pride: by reason of defect, and
a too great obsequiousness or abjection of oneself, which would be an excess of humility. This might easily be derogatory to a man's office or holy character; or it might serve only to pamper pride in others, by unworthy flattery, which would occasion their sins of tyranny, arbitrariness, and arrogance.
The virtue of humility may not be practised in any external way which would occasion such vices or acts in others.”
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/07543b.htm
Comments are solicited!
Baron on humility:
“Ethics that emphasize virtues do not however have to fit well with seeing our own projects as meritorious, nor need they promote associated values. A religion that identified humility or submission as a virtue would be likely to be hostile to the pursuit of projects that we had devised. It would instead be likely to identify a project that was already laid down for us, to live in a given way and ultimately to achieve some specified goal such as union with God. If we accepted that humility and submission were virtues (and I do not), then we would be likely simply to accept the prescribed project and not to give serious consideration to alternatives. We might be encouraged to choose the prescribed project freely, but we would not be invited to make other choices. Autonomy is negated when it is reduced to the opportunity to make a free choice from a list that contains only on item.” (Emphasis added)
From the section “Virtue ethics and our own projects” in Projects & Values - An Ethic For Today, p.121
Minogue on humility:
“The basic individualist notion that man is essentially a creature of the passions came in fact from Christianity, which is the direct and essential progenitor of European individualism. The Christian distinction between the spiritual and the secular powers lies at the heart of Western civic pluralism. It no doubt seems odd that a religion of humility warring against the snares of the world should have evolved anything so apparently fatal in our time to religious observance as individualism. Yet such inversions and reversals are in fact a staple of human experience, no less than of the theological imagination. The Weberian derivation of capitalism from Calvinism (to the extent that it is convincing) is merely one example of this: an unworldly attention to spiritual salvation led, remarkably, to success in laying up treasure in the world below.
Christianity is the source not only of individualism, but of the spiritual egalitarianism that individualism also involves...” (Emphasis added) The Servile Mind, p. 165
____________________________
“Humility in a higher and ethical sense is that by which a man has a modest estimate of his own worth, and submits himself to others.”
“To guard against an erroneous idea of humility, it is necessary to explain the manner in which we ought to esteem our own gifts in reference to the gifts of others, if called upon to make a comparison.”
“A man, however, may generally esteem some good in his neighbour which he does not himself possess, or acknowledge some defect or evil in himself which he does not perceive in his neighbour, so that, whenever anyone subjects himself out of humility to an equal or to an inferior he does so because he takes that equal or inferior to be his superior in some respect.”
“The four cardinal virtues are prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance, and all other moral virtues are annexed to theses either as integral, potential, or subjective parts. Humility is annexed to the virtue of temperance as a potential part, because temperance includes all those virtues that refrain or express the inordinate movements of our desires or appetites. Humility is a repressing or moderating virtue opposed to pride and vainglory or that spirit within us which urges us to great things above our strength and ability, and therefore it is included in temperance just as meekness which represses anger is a part of the same virtue. From what we have here stated it follows that humility is not the first or the greatest of the virtues.”
“Humility, inasmuch as it seems to keep the mind and heart submissive to reason and to God, has its own function in connection with faith and all the other virtues, and it may therefore be said to be a universal virtue.”
“The vices opposed to humility are,
pride: by reason of defect, and
a too great obsequiousness or abjection of oneself, which would be an excess of humility. This might easily be derogatory to a man's office or holy character; or it might serve only to pamper pride in others, by unworthy flattery, which would occasion their sins of tyranny, arbitrariness, and arrogance.
The virtue of humility may not be practised in any external way which would occasion such vices or acts in others.”
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/07543b.htm
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artisticsolution
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Re: The Servile Mind - How Democracy Erodes The Moral Life
Hi Tomtbieter wrote: I suggest that viewing the universe as a created universe is more fruitful in causing wonder and awe, the source of philosophy and science, than are any of the competing views of the origin of the universe.
Comments are solicited!
Okay, just remember...you asked for comments! I am all for wonder and awe....but what makes you think if we have 'truth" we can't still have wonder and awe? Creativity takes all forms...not just Christian. Do you doubt creativity coming from heathens?
"A religion that identified humility or submission as a virtue would be likely to be hostile to the pursuit of projects that we had devised."
I think you need to take a closer look at this sentence.. a religion that identified humanity or submission as virtue would not be humble nor submissive if it were hostile toward someone else's projects, would it? It's the totalitarian concept of religion (i.e.Christianity) that is important here. If someone claims the merits of humility and submission then isn't it up to that person to practice what they preach instead of claiming theirs is the only "right" way?And if there is a list of acceptable "right" choices to make then how can one humble themselves to another at all...how does a list of acceptable choices show submission or humbleness? How does choosing truth rather than "wonder and awe" make one less worthy or uncreative for that matter?
Maybe that is not what Richard meant to imply but that is what I took from the paragraph...but then again...what the hell do I know...I had to look up most the words in this difficult to read post...lol.
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Richard Baron
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Re: The Servile Mind - How Democracy Erodes The Moral Life
Hello Tom
You will not be surprised to hear that I side with artisticsolution, and against Minogue, on this one. Minogue may have a point about the history that has actually occurred. That is, Christianity may have played helpful roles. But consider an alternative history in which Christianity, and other monotheistic religions, gained no traction in Europe. There are of course lots of alternative histories, depending on what Roman emperors and assorted huns and goths do or don't do. But it is not obvious to me that we would have ended up in a worse place than that in which we have in fact ended up. Even if we confine ourselves to our actual history, we can trace a great deal of our current vision of the state back to authors for whom the Roman republic and various classical writers, notably Aristotle and Cicero, was primary points of reference (although one cannot imagine away their Christian context, of course, nor fully disentangle the influences). See for example Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought.
You will not be surprised to hear that I side with artisticsolution, and against Minogue, on this one. Minogue may have a point about the history that has actually occurred. That is, Christianity may have played helpful roles. But consider an alternative history in which Christianity, and other monotheistic religions, gained no traction in Europe. There are of course lots of alternative histories, depending on what Roman emperors and assorted huns and goths do or don't do. But it is not obvious to me that we would have ended up in a worse place than that in which we have in fact ended up. Even if we confine ourselves to our actual history, we can trace a great deal of our current vision of the state back to authors for whom the Roman republic and various classical writers, notably Aristotle and Cicero, was primary points of reference (although one cannot imagine away their Christian context, of course, nor fully disentangle the influences). See for example Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought.
Re: The Servile Mind - How Democracy Erodes The Moral Life
Tonight I finished reading the book.
The servile mind represents a significant threat to the dynamic of Western individualism and the ethic of projects that Richard's book, PROJECTS & VALUES, so ably describes and justifies. The abiding thought I have is that if Richard reads Minogue's book, he'll agree with 99% of it and he'll become a conservative dedicated to the defense of his individualist philosophy.
And now I'll start drafting a review of Minogue's book and return to my slow reading of Richard's new book.
The servile mind represents a significant threat to the dynamic of Western individualism and the ethic of projects that Richard's book, PROJECTS & VALUES, so ably describes and justifies. The abiding thought I have is that if Richard reads Minogue's book, he'll agree with 99% of it and he'll become a conservative dedicated to the defense of his individualist philosophy.
And now I'll start drafting a review of Minogue's book and return to my slow reading of Richard's new book.
Re: The Servile Mind - How Democracy Erodes The Moral Life
Here is a representative sample of what the book is about. http://www.newcriterion.com/articles.cf ... -mind-5318
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artisticsolution
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Re: The Servile Mind - How Democracy Erodes The Moral Life
Thomas James Bieter! tsk tsk! (don't know if your middle name is James...scolding just sounds better using someone's full name) Really! This type of conservative sidestepping-the-truth, shortsighted, agenda filled propaganda really gets my dander up. It really irritates me when I feel I can't trust the writer from the get go...I mean at first he seems sane...and I can even cautiously agree to some of the things he is saying...but in the back of my mind I know it is only a matter of time before the writer is going to take leave of his senses and start spouting nonsense. I can just feel it in my bones...the little hairs on the nape of my neck stand up and I know it's coming...and sure enough...this guy did not disappoint! Don't you see it too? It's the Bush mentality only sneaky Bush mentality. Trying to use his intelligence to condone and justify bigoted bull crap.tbieter wrote:Here is a representative sample of what the book is about. http://www.newcriterion.com/articles.cf ... -mind-5318
Here's what I heard:
"Freedom is what makes America great.
We gave women and minorities too much freedom and our world changed for the worse.
Therefore, freedom should be limited for the likes of women/immigrants/minorities/etc. to ensure our world remains pleasant (pleasant to me that is...the author and the privileged)."
I hate that conservative argument! It always starts off like a great idea is about to be spoken and then loses it's ethical and logical footing somewhere along the line. It's like fingernails on a chalkboard to me. I am surprised you can't see the more unethical slyness this author uses to make his argument! It's Bush/Cheney philosophy gift wrapped! Ugh!
Re: The Servile Mind - How Democracy Erodes The Moral Life
In a democratic state, political opponents are expected to advance their ideas, arguments, and policies in the “marketplace of ideas” with civility and without using violence. The ultimate value is argument, i. e. meeting speech with speech, not silencing or destroying one’s opponent.
Rev. Al Sharpton may be ignorant of this fundamental principle of constitutional democracy.
Sharpton, a liberal, wants to silence Russ Limbaugh, a conservative, and the undisputed leader in talk radio.
Sharpton announced that he will attempt to use government coercion to silence Limbaugh. His tool is a charge of “racism” and the labeling of Limbaugh as a racist:
http://www.examiner.com/conservative-in ... h-limbaugh
When I read about Sharpton’s announced plans, I remembered the following paragraph in Professor Minogue’s magisterial book:
“And justifiably: a notable paradox of twenty-first-century Western life is that while our moral sentiments tend to follow the principle of “anything goes,” institutional life has never been more tightly controlled. Tolerance is a foundational liberal virtue, but bad trouble awaits the slightest hint of attitudes that might be described as racist, sexist, discriminatory, xenophobic,or homophobic - a bestiary to which additions keep on being made. Intolerance is thought to be the fertile mother of vices. Speech must be free, but not discriminatory speech. Rights grow in every corner of life, yet every liberation we acquire augments the march of regulation.” p. 145
http://www.amazon.com/Servile-Mind-Demo ... 492&sr=1-1
If Sharpton was as honest as Honest Abe, he would admit that an accusation of racism is a racial hustler’s stock in trade.
__________________________
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Action_Network
http://www.rushlimbaugh.com/home/today.guest.html
Rev. Al Sharpton may be ignorant of this fundamental principle of constitutional democracy.
Sharpton, a liberal, wants to silence Russ Limbaugh, a conservative, and the undisputed leader in talk radio.
Sharpton announced that he will attempt to use government coercion to silence Limbaugh. His tool is a charge of “racism” and the labeling of Limbaugh as a racist:
http://www.examiner.com/conservative-in ... h-limbaugh
When I read about Sharpton’s announced plans, I remembered the following paragraph in Professor Minogue’s magisterial book:
“And justifiably: a notable paradox of twenty-first-century Western life is that while our moral sentiments tend to follow the principle of “anything goes,” institutional life has never been more tightly controlled. Tolerance is a foundational liberal virtue, but bad trouble awaits the slightest hint of attitudes that might be described as racist, sexist, discriminatory, xenophobic,or homophobic - a bestiary to which additions keep on being made. Intolerance is thought to be the fertile mother of vices. Speech must be free, but not discriminatory speech. Rights grow in every corner of life, yet every liberation we acquire augments the march of regulation.” p. 145
http://www.amazon.com/Servile-Mind-Demo ... 492&sr=1-1
If Sharpton was as honest as Honest Abe, he would admit that an accusation of racism is a racial hustler’s stock in trade.
__________________________
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Action_Network
http://www.rushlimbaugh.com/home/today.guest.html
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chaz wyman
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Re: The Servile Mind - How Democracy Erodes The Moral Life
tbieter wrote:A serial killer gets a state-paid Ph.d.
http://www.city-journal.org/2011/21_2_o ... udies.html
Excellent. Money well spent. The academic community will be taking about his PhD for years to come. he himself is likely to be able to use this study as part of his rehabilitation.
So rather than dump him out on the street at the end of his sentence with nothing. There is a greater chance that he will be able to offer society something useful.