My principle of reality [FSRC];
All of reality, existence, facts, truths, justification, knowledge, description, and objectivity are contingent [conditioned] upon an embodied human-based Framework and System of Realization of Reality and Cognition [Knowledge] [FSRC].
Conceptual Relativism is;
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/relativism/#ConRel
4.2 Conceptual Relativism
Conceptual Relativism is a narrowly delineated form of Relativism where ontology, or what exists, rather than ethical and epistemic norms, is relativized to conceptual schemes, scientific paradigms, or categorical frameworks.
In this sense, conceptual Relativism is often characterized as a metaphysical doctrine rather than as variant of epistemic or cultural Relativism.
The underlying rationale for this form of Relativism is the anti-realist thesis that the world does not present itself to us ready-made or ready-carved; rather we supply different, and at times incompatible, ways of categorizing and conceptualizing it [the world & reality].
Reflection on the connections between mind and the world, rather than empirical observations of historic and cultural diversity, is the primary engine driving various forms of conceptual Relativism, but data from anthropology and linguistics are also used in its support.
The thought, at least since Kant, is that the human mind is not a passive faculty merely representing an independent reality; rather, it has an active role in shaping, if not constructing, the “real”.
The conceptual Relativist adds, as Kant did not, that human beings may construct the real in different ways thanks to differences in language or culture.
In the 20th century, a variety of positions sympathetic to conceptual Relativism were developed.
Quine’s ontological relativity, Nelson Goodman’s “irrealism” with its claim of the plurality of “world-versions” and Hilary Putnam’s conceptual relativity are prominent examples.
What these authors have in common is an insistence that there could be more than one “right” way of describing what there is, that incompatible “manuals of translation” and “world-versions” can be equally correct or acceptable.
Quine’s thesis of ontological relativity, probably the most influential of 20th century approaches to conceptual relativity, is expressed both in an epistemic as well as in a stronger metaphysical form.
Quine supports an epistemic thesis when he claims that incompatible scientific theories can account equally adequately for the data available to us (his underdetermination thesis) and that “there are various defensible ways of conceiving the world”, (Quine 1992: 102).
But his thesis of the indeterminacy of translation makes the stronger claim that different incompatible manuals of translation, or conceptual schemes, can account for one and the same verbal behavior and the indeterminacy resides at the level of facts rather than our knowledge, a position that leads to unavoidable ontological relativity.