Conde Lucanor wrote: ↑Mon May 10, 2021 3:43 am
Since you keep going in circles: "Humans exist, but ultimately they actually don't exist", let me put it this way: do humans exist as non-spatiotemporal objects?
Actually it is your ignorance that think I am going in circle.
I should be one who is complaining you are not getting out of the circle.
So you'll agree then that physicalism, metaphysical realism and scientific realism are still doing fine? They are mentioned in SEP as subjects of current discussions.
As stated, surely one is not that dumb without referring to the context and one's philosophical knowledge.
Physicalism, metaphysical realism and scientific realism are still active philosophical topics and in general not recognized and considered defunct like logical positivism.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Sun May 09, 2021 6:31 am
Kant would not be regarded as 'Godfather of cognitive science' if cognitive scientists had not benefited from Kant's ideas which they transposed into their work.
The claim that Kant is the 'Godfather of cognitive science' appears to be constrained to the circles of Kant's fans. Any serious account of modern cognitive sciences doesn't even mention Kant as an intellectual reference:
Nah, it is not restricted to Kant's fan but the fact that the concepts and themes introduced by Kant are incorporated in various theories of cognitive science.
Here is a quickie reference; there are loads more..
Three ideas define the basic shape (‘cognitive architecture’) of Kant’s model and one its dominant method. They have all become part of the foundation of cognitive science.
These three ideas are fundamental to most thinking about cognition now. Kant’s most important method, the transcendental method, is also at the heart of contemporary cognitive science.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-mind/
Off-hand, Lakoff and Varela therein the list are fans of Kant.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Sun May 09, 2021 6:31 am
If you research further, you will note Kant contributed greatly and very much to philosophy and other fields of knowledge.
Kant contributed to idealism. Peddling idealism is peddling anti-realism, a reactionary view that goes contrary to the advances of science. It is pure nonsense.
Your claims above is based on ignorance. That you claim it is 'pure nonsense' is purely a fundamentalist and dogmatic view.
Kant transcendental idealism supports science.
Wherein it is stated in the CPR that it is anti-science?
Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Sun May 09, 2021 6:31 am
Re the main themes, I had stated you can test me or get some expert to test me on that.
I have drawn up more than 50 very detailed Flowcharts re each chapter/theme and an overall summary and ensure all the flowcharts cohere into one main summary chart.
From this it is unlikely I will miss out on the main, sub- and sub-sub-themes of the CPR.
I applaud your hard work, but unfortunately, this by no means is yet an indication that you have secured a proper understanding of what CPR entails.
That is your opinion which is obviously biased because you adopt the opposite view, i.e. a transcendental realist on Kant's view whereas I am a genuine Kantian transcendental idealist.
In addition, you have not read Kant's CPR thoroughly, thus has no credibility to make the above judgment.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Sun May 09, 2021 7:36 am
You inferred wrongly, i.e.
Berkeley was against mind-independent things, thus he was an idealist.
Since Kant distance himself from Berkeley’s idealism, therefore Kant was a realist, i.e. an empirical realist.
First there are many types of idealism, as such, that Kant distanced himself from Berkeley do not imply Kant was a realist in that sense.
Kant was mainly an idealist, i.e. a transcendental idealist, which is different from Berkeley’s subjective idealism.
Point is a transcendental idealist is also an empirical realist in another sense.
I never said Kant had moved to the camp of non-idealist realists. What I said, as Kant himself said, is that his version of idealism, apparently distinguished from that of Berkeley, implies a realistic stance against his anti-realism, in other words he opposes a kind of objective idealism to subjective idealism. This is something Stang addressed in his article:
Kant extensively revised certain sections of the Critique for the second edition (B), published in 1787. It is widely accepted that a main consideration in these revisions was to avoid the misunderstanding of his view that had led to the Feder-Garve review. However, some scholars think that, on this point, there is a difference in doctrine between the A and B editions: made aware of the problematic Berkeleyan consequences of the first edition, Kant endeavored to develop a more realistic view in the B Edition.[14] Other scholars think the difference is largely a matter of presentation: in the B edition, Kant highlights the more realistic aspects of his view and downplays its phenomenalistic sides, but the view is basically the same (e.g., Allison 2004).
Hey.. you got it wrong.
"A more realistic view in the B-Edition" above do not imply "realism" in any sense or "a realistic stance against his [Bekerley's] anti-realism."
Note the phrase above, i.e.
the more realistic aspects of his view.
I have argued Kant's stance is dominantly 'idealistic' i.e. transcendental idealism with its sub-version of empirical realism.
Empirical realism is not philosophical realism at all.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Sun May 09, 2021 7:36 am
You stated,
“So this notion of realism shows two aspects: one about existence of things, and another one about the objectivity (mind-independence) of those things.”
If you are not a philosophical realist [mind independent reality], then what sort of ‘realism’ stance do you adopt?
There is no middle-way, you are either a philosophical realist or anti-philosophical_realist.
You seem to think one cannot be an idealist and at the same time a realist. Plato is a well-known idealist who was also a realist. I'm a materialist realist.
Now I ask you: Berkeley believed there isn't a realm of objects separate from the realm of mind, that there's only the realm of mind. What do you think Kant believed?
Where did I say, one cannot be an idealist and at the same time a realist.
Note this thread I raised;
A Realist is also an Idealist
viewtopic.php?f=5&t=32913
Plato was an empirical idealist and at the same time a material realist which is the same as you, i.e. you are a material-realist and at the same time an empirical-idealist.
Berkeley believed existence is perception;
Wiki on Berkeley wrote:All knowledge comes from perception; what we perceive are ideas, not
things in themselves; a thing in itself must be outside experience; so the world only consists of ideas and minds that perceive those ideas; a thing only exists so far as it perceives or is perceived.[59] Through this we can see that consciousness is considered something that exists to Berkeley due to its ability to perceive.
"'To be,' said of the object, means to be perceived, 'esse est percipi'; 'to be', said of the subject, means to perceive or 'percipere'."
One refutation of his idea was: if someone leaves a room and stops perceiving that room does that room no longer exist? Berkeley answers this by claiming that it is still being perceived and the consciousness that is doing the perceiving is
God. (This makes Berkeley’s argument hinge upon an omniscient, omnipresent deity.) This claim is the only thing holding up his argument which is "depending for our knowledge of the world, and of the existence of other minds, upon a
God that would never deceive us."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Be ... aterialism
Both Berkeley and Kant do not believe the things-in-themselves exist as real things.
However Kant justifications of what is real is very complex [within the whole of the CPR] and is totally different from Berkeley's, especially not depending on God as the ultimate.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Sun May 09, 2021 7:36 am
I believe you are a philosophical realist aka a transcendental realist which is also an empirical idealist in another sense.
I don't endorse Kant's classifications, and given that he was a bit misguided about what philosophers like Berkeley were up to, I think it would be wise to completely ignore him on that. Empirical idealism is associated with Berkeley and I'm not even close to endorsing such a thing.
You are merely guessing what Berkeley's is up to.
Note the quote I referenced to Berkeley's main argument. Have you even read Berkeley's book?
You are ignorant that you are the one who is endorsing
empirical idealism as a material realist. This is because what is empirical to you is depending only upon sense-data in the mind, thus your empirical is idealistic.
Actually Berkeley can be an empirical realist but a theological-realist resorting to God as the ultimate.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Sun May 09, 2021 7:36 am
Nope, the position I am defending is that of Transcendental Idealism which is Kant’s central theme which is not Berkeley’s subjective idealism.
Kant’s as with Allison and my view was not ontological agnosticism.
For Kant what is the thing-in-itself is merely an intelligible or transcendental object which is in a way an intellectual object which can never be real in any sense of reality.
That may be your view, I'm not sure that it is Allison's, but it is certainly not the view of all scholars about what Kant's TI entails.
Transcendental Idealism and Ontological Agnosticism
Therefore, on this interpretation, transcendental idealism, as a doctrine exclusively about how things are known (i.e. as they appear), and justified by arguments which refuse such knowledge any traction on things in themselves, is free from any ontological commitments since its denial of knowledge of things in themselves amounts to an agnosticism about how things are.
In other words, appearances have a purely epistemic, non-ontological status since they reflect transcendental idealism’s disavowal of any claims concerning things as they are. This is what constitutes transcendental idealism’s ontological agnosticism.
Importantly, this is also what allows transcendental idealism to be distinguished from something like Berkeley’s subjective idealism, for the fact that transcendental idealism restricts knowledge to appearances does not mean that it restricts all things to appearances.
I have read the above article thoroughly.
I don't think you have read it thoroughly.
The author, Dustin Mcwherter, belongs to the transcendental realists camp which has an "ontological" bias, thus the transcendental realists imposed 'ontology' in their reading of Kant's CPR.
As I had mentioned, transcendental realists actually acknowledge Kant rejected ontology in the CPR. He stated in the abstract and many times elsewhere in the article.
Within these debates, Kant’s rejection of ontology (of the kind exemplified by Wolff and Baumgarten) has received comparatively little treatment, although it is often acknowledged.
The fact is Kant's CPR is grounded on the absence of any traditional ontological elements.
If there is any reference of 'ontology' to the CPR, it has nothing to do with the traditional ontology as it is generally understood, note Allison,
Allison wrote:Uncontroversially, Kant’s doctrine of transcendental ideality involves a denial of the traditional ontologies of space and time (the alternatives available to Transcendental Realism), but it does not follow from this that it is itself an alternative ontology.
It may also be seen as an alternative to ontology, according to which space and time are understood in terms of their epistemic functions (as forms or conditions of outer and inner sense, respectively) rather than as “realities” of one sort or another. Allison 2004 Chapter 5 -Intro
Note the overriding 'Copernican Revolution' of Kant
precludes any elements of traditional ontology to his Transcendental Idealism and the whole theme of the CPR.