Skepdick wrote: ↑Thu Apr 01, 2021 10:36 am
Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Thu Apr 01, 2021 8:34 am
Most hermeneutic thinkers are firm believers in universal reason that allows for translation between all languages and cultures.
In computer science this is what
compilers do. Software systems which translate different languages into one, common, language.
In a video
Philosophy & Taking Time Seriously Rorty argues that Philosophers still have a role to play in society, but it's not the traditional role they've usually assumed. I think Philosophers (those who understand how the semantic games language games work) are well-suited to play the part of mediators/compilers - translating between people's private languages.
So Philosophy's very function must be the deliberate reification of the
Perenial ideal.
From Rorty's
Mirror of Nature, I noted he did not foresee the end of philosophy. His hope was, only Moral Philosophy is to continue in the Conversation, not the traditional or Modern Philosophy.
Nevertheless Rorty did not expect the End of Philosophy, i.e. his various views;
Whichever happens, however, there is no danger of philosophy's "coming to an end."
Religion did not come to an end in the Enlightenment, nor painting in Impressionism.
Even if the period from Plato to Nietzsche is encapsulated and "distanced" in the way Heidegger suggests, and
even if twentieth-century philosophy comes to seem a stage of awkward transitional backing and filling (as sixteenth-century philosophy now seems to us),
there will be something called "philosophy" on the other side of the transition.
For even if problems about representation look as obsolete to our descendants as problems about hylomorphism look to us, people will still read Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Wittgenstein, and Heidegger.
What roles these men will play in our descendants' conversation, no one knows.
Whether the distinction between systematic and edifying philosophy will carry over, no one knows either.
Perhaps philosophy will become purely edifying, so that one's self-identification as a philosopher will be purely in terms of the books one reads and discusses, rather than in terms of the problems one wishes to solve.
Perhaps a new form of systematic philosophy will be found which has nothing whatever to do with epistemology but which nevertheless makes normal philosophical inquiry possible.
These speculations are idle, and nothing I have been saying makes one more plausible than another.
The only point on which I would insist is that
philosophers' moral concern should be with continuing the conversation of the West,
rather than with insisting upon a place for the traditional problems of modern philosophy within that conversation.
Whilst I agree with Rorty in various of his views, I do not agree with him totally.
I have a different view on 'what is philosophy' from that of Rorty's.
In addition, I noted Rorty did not full grasp Kant's philosophy and wrongly put Kant [based on the views of the
neo-Kantians] into the same camp [on certain issue re representation] as the classical analytic philosophers.
Point is the majority of
neo-Kantians that Rorty critiqued were entrapped by the irresistible illusions that Kant warned about,
Even the wisest of men cannot free himself from them [the illusions].
After long effort he perhaps succeeds in guarding himself against actual error; but he will never be able to free himself from the Illusion, which unceasingly mocks and torments him.
CPR B397