Moral Manipulation & the Problem of Evil

[Conde Lucanor]

Oh, I'd go even farther, and say that moral rules can *always* be true or false, because they are backed by moral reality. In contrast, the Atheist cannot view moral rules as true or false, or good or bad...just as choices.

I am afraid I didn't make myself clear. I mistakenly assumed that you were familiar with Thomas Paine's argument. I didn't mean to say that between two humans a statement about moral rules is true or false. I meant that a statement about receiving a message from the divinity is either true or false, therefore it doesn't work as a revelation to the second person getting the message, for whom it's just a claim from another common human being. So they are not god's rules, but rules claimed to come from a god. Faith in them is faith in the word of another man or woman. Your "moral reality" is then as mundane as of anyone else, even that of atheists.

If the Divine Being reveals something, He can, presumably speak clearly, and if necessary, guarantee understanding. After all, He created "understanding."

Two problems: one, a mind is a necessary condition for understanding, therefore, if god created understanding at a given moment in time, you would have to accept that god does not have a mind of his/her own (which would make him/her understand). You would be denying an essential attribute of this deity: being a person.

Second problem: as explained above, revelation only works as revelation if it is between god and one person or god and a group of people. It's meant to be empirical knowledge. Claims made among people themselves will not constitute revelation. So unless you could prove that god has communicated personally with each and every individual on Earth, you cannot assert that god has revealed him/herself and handed in moral rules valid for all human beings. A simple survey can easily show that millions and millions of people on Earth have never talked to this god, and a small, but still important fraction won't even accept the existence of such being. Intepretations of the "word of god" in sacred texts vary from individual to individual, from group to group, from place to place and from time to time. So nothing seems to support the idea that "god has talked to his/her people" in the strict sense. There is, of course, a logical workaround to this, but you just have shut the door completely to it by asserting that god can "speak clearly, and if necessary, guarantee understanding." Don't you see that he/she has not being able to guarantee understanding? What does this say about his/her "all-powerful" features?

What you're really pointing to is the fact that belief systems conflict; but that's only a problem if you expect everybody to possess exactly the *same* revelation, and in the same degrees, and everybody to be right. No belief system expects that, save Universalism. So you've now discredited the Unitarians...but that's about it.

Oh, well, but that's precisely the whole point and you just have discredited your own god. I mean, are you telling me that this god doesn't "expect everybody to possess exactly the *same* revelation, and in the same degrees, and everybody to be right"? You have just accepted that your god's message is not meant to be universal and that if that were expected there would be a problem. That even legitimizes atheism from the religious point of view. It should make sense to theists, right? That god wanted us atheists to be around, not believing the nonsense from preachers. I wonder why would Christians contradict their god's desires.

You've got a number of errors here, at least if you're trying to describe Christian Theism. One is that in at least free-will Theism (which was the subject of the original article) God does not create evil: rather, evil is the product of severed relationship between human beings and God, one brought about by their rebellion.

By admitting that there can be something not created or not allowed by god, you are willing to sacrifice at least one or two of the attributes that are considered essential to your god's nature: being all-powerful, and being the First cause. Remember when you said that god could "guarantee" understanding if required? I guess because he/she is all-powerful, right? But what happened between those lines and this one that suddenly made him/her unable to guarantee unsevered relationships? Unless it is not required, unless the moral rules are mere choices without any intrinsic moral value (either good or bad), because, after all, this god doesn't ..."expect everybody to possess exactly the *same* revelation, and in the same degrees, and everybody to be right". The problem of the existence of evil is central to the unsolved paradoxes of free-will theism, because if things turn out different from what god wanted or had expected to happen, the attributes that define him/her as a deity fall like shattered pieces to the ground: he/she becomes not all-powerful, not all-knowing.

Secondly, people do not redeem themselves: rather, the Creator sent His Son to do that -- that's fundamental to Christianity. As for "all-powerful" and "all-knowing," Christians believe both, but neither makes a problem for their view. The only way it becomes a problem is if you've got a Strong Determinist view of Providence. So congratulations, now you've challenged the Ultra-Calvinists: unfortunately for you, they're an extremely small and marginal group who hold to unconventional theology.

So, some Chistians believe one thing and some others think something else. That's OK, it just keeps proving my point that there's not such thing as "revelation" and that it doesn't look like this god has any capabilities of ensuring understanding, or that this god thinks it's required. While Christians and theists in general keep scratching their heads to find an answer to what is "fundamental" to their doctrines, they surely have no argument for claiming that they are in better position that an atheist for understanding the concepts of good and wrong and where they come from. In fact, they are in a worst position, since their claims are not even testable, nor logical by definition.

The Atheist saint, David Hume, conclusively proved you can't get an "ought" from an "is." The Atheist has only "is" statements to work from. He can say, "My society prefers not to genitally mutilate little girls"; but if they begin to do it, and all he depends on is cultural conditions, psychology and sociology, he is forced to reverse his moral position on that action and say "It's good to mutilate little girls." In other words, his Naturalist suppositions give him no tools for working on moral issues; they just make him a conformist.

You got wrong here a couple of things. First, theists also have only available "is" statements. Other inputs not mediated by society (revelation), because of their mystical, personal, unsocialized nature, become instantly relativistic when they are intended to apply to others. In order to convert my personal god-related convictions into everyone's convictions, I must necessarily communicate with others and express the universality of my claims("these rules come from god"), but the widespread coexistence of conflicting "revelations", all of which can be explained by cultural conditions, eliminates any pretension of universality from theism. You have acknowledged yourself, perhaps unintentionally, moral relativism in the ranks of theism.

Your second mistake comes by confusing social acceptance, social obligation, preference and moral duty, all of which deal with the notions of good and bad, but at different levels in different contexts. Is it the same to say "My society prefers not to genitally mutilate little girls", than to say "My society dictates not to genitally mutilate little girls"? Is it the same to say "My society accepts genital mutilation of little girls", than to say "My society dictates genital mutilation of little girls"? Different contexts in which "beginning to do something" and "being forced to do something", have different meanings. That crashes your conformism theory.

Your third mistake is to assert that an atheist has only available Naturalism and a deterministic view of society. If that were the case, history would be closed to the subject and actually, no one would be able to explain change, evolution in society, as a result of human agency. But Existentialism and Humanism show that an atheist has also available other views in which humans control their own destiny. I'm not claiming they are right (that's not the purpose of this debate), but that there are reasonable explanations to the concepts of good and wrong without the need for a god.

Nations, cultures, social groups, clans, tribes, factions...all are contingent groups. They have not always existed in their present form, nor does it seem likely they will continue to do so. They also believe in different and even conflicting values (philosophers call this fact "irreconcilable moral pluralism," and it's a generally recognized premise of moral philosophy) So any morality premised on such groups is also contingent, changeable, and ultimately uninformative to us of what we should or shoud not (morally) do.

Again, only a morality that transcends the sociological contingency level can inform us about morality. And Atheism has no such thing.

We can use your own words for religious groups: they all are contingent groups. They have not always existed in their present form, nor does it seem likely they will continue to do so. They also believe in different and even conflicting values (philosophers call this fact "irreconcilable moral pluralism," and it's a generally recognized premise of moral philosophy) So any morality premised on such groups is also contingent, changeable, and ultimately uninformative to us of what we should or shoud not (morally) do. And as explained before, religion cannot trascend its sociological contingency. Only the mystical experience, which remains personal, is left without any universal value.

Because societies do not do what God wants. Many of them do evil...in fact, all do on some points.

So, not all-powerful. There goes his/her essential attributes as a god. No god.

Of course they will *have* them, but some of them will clearly be wrong. And one doesn't even have to be a Theist to know that.

But all we need to know is that they have them without ever having contact with your all-powerful, all-knowingly, personal god, to realize that morality does not come from him/her. And if it came from this deity, and these people were evil (or "clearly wrong", as you say), you would be forced to assert that this evilness was imposed on them by god, without ever giving them a choice. God, the creator and sponsor of evilness. Isn't it problematic for theists?

As for your prison thing, there are multiple explanations for it, even if true. One is that many people in the West claim to be "Christian" only nominally, but to distinguish themselves from, say Muslims or Atheists. Another is that prisoners realize that claiming religious belief plays well for parole officers. Another is that the main organizations that work for the reform of prisoners -- and indeed, the prison reform movement itself -- are Christian, so you would expect post-incarceration conversions. You would have to show that these individuals *were* all Christians in some full sense already *before* they committed a criminal act, which is implausible beyond belief. But hey, if you can get the proof, go for it.

Meanwhile, the evidence for the good done by Theism is absolutely overwhelming, and Atheism's record, at least in politics, is a disgrace of human rights abuses. I would that we could stick to the empirical: there I'd be guaranteed to make my case.

OK, I get it: when confronted with the "statistical evidence" of the harm done by theists, then additional evidence is required of their commitment to their faith and the direct relation between their beliefs and actions. There goes again down the sink hole the all-powerfulness of god, his/her desire to "guarantee understanding", etc. And when confronted with "statistical evidence" of the harm done by atheists, well, it goes without saying that there's no need to get empirical about their commitment to their atheism, right? And no need to find a direct relation between their atheism and their actions, right?

But the true facts are that claiming that Stalin or Polpot committed genocidal acts in the name of atheism is the same as claiming that Hitler, Reagan, Bush and Blair carried out their genocidal acts in the name of theism (although Bush actually went on record saying it was). And yet all the sacred wars campaigns carried out by Christianity for centuries, the abuse of power, the use of torture, the support of slavery, all of that, was made in the name of Christ. They guaranteed a priest was there to make it official. No wonder why, since god him/herself carried out genocides of his/her own in biblical times.

But honestly: I don't buy any "no true Scotsman" fallacy, nor any statistical fallacy, nor any generalization fallacy, not yours, not anyone's. People is just good and bad, no matter what they believe in. If there was any chance religion improved mankind in terms of doing good and erradicating evilness, I would be the first one to support it, regardless of my atheism. But that't not the case, it doesn't make much difference. No one is automatically morally superior to anyone, nor are his/her right doings guaranteed, just by affiliation to any group. That's empirical.

Consider the plausibility, for example, of anyone saying, "I was a drunk, a wife-beater and a criminal. I gambled uncontrollably. I was foul mouthed sexually addicted and derelict. I was a miser with my money, an abuser with my children, dishonest at my work, and a perverter of justice. I lied to all my friends, stole from the government, and cheated on anyone who ever trusted me. In short, I was a hater of everything that interfered with my self-interest. But when I discovered Atheism, I was gloriously delivered, and now I'm a happy man..."

Show me one like that, and I'll show you a thousand saved by faith in Jesus Christ.

That's empirical.

BUt the question of this forum is why an all-benevolent god will bring to the world drunks, wife-beaters and criminals. If he/she just wanted it, then there goes down the drain his/her essential godly attribute of being all-benevolent. If he/she couldn't help it, then there goes down the drain his/her essential godly attribute of being all-powerful. If he/she just let everyone to choose for themselves, then infinite power and infinite knowledge go down the sink hole, too.

Show me one god that can stand the analysis. That's logical and empirical.

[Arising_uk]

...
Again, only a morality that transcends the sociological contingency level can inform us about morality. And Atheism has no such thing. ...

Actually it does, Ayn Rands Objectivism is a good example of such a thing.

[Conde Lucanor]

Want to show that one can get quantitative about God and his influence in the world because he has promised benefits to those who leave a door open to a relationship with him. By definition benefits are extended to our material world as well and therefore MUST be quantifiable. One such quantity should be a lessening of criminality for theists compared to non-theists, which should be certifiable by statistical means. Turns out it actually is.

That would be a statistical fallacy. At best, you can find correlation, but correlation does not imply causation. If it did, theists will have a hard time explaining how come most of the prison inmates believe in god. That's why in your next sentence you feel compelled to accomodate the criteria to the causation you want to find.

Conde is using a skewed incorrect set of statistics, which turns out to be a very common and popularized misconception. These wrong statistics are based on questionnaires and interviews, e.g., where a prisoner states that s/he beliefs in God or has practiced religion for the reasons mentioned by IC and also let's say because his grandmother took him to church twice when he was a juvenile.

My understanding is that prisoners are just asked what is their religious affiliation. What's important to look in the statistics is that whatever religion they choose, they imply belief in a deity.

turns out the exact and exclusive criteria that must be used to obtain a very strong correlation is persons in prison who have been active members of a church and been actively attending mass or services right up to their prison term.

That will be the criteria only for people that are active members of a religious organization, but it goes without saying that people can believe in god, be theists, without going to a protestant or catholic church. What matters in the numbers is that they imply belief in a deity, so there's correlation between theism and imprisonment, although it does not imply causation. One can expect that such number most likely reflects the same proportion between theists and atheists in society, so it will mean nothing, except for the fact of an important shift that makes the proportion of imprisoned atheists smaller than expected.

This of course also supports my argument that it is possible to quantitatively establish the influence of God in this world, as is perfectly logical based on his promises.

The world is a mess. If that's because of god's influence...

[Immanuel Can]

...between two humans a statement about moral rules is true or false. I meant that a statement about receiving a message from the divinity is either true or false, therefore it doesn't work as a revelation to the second person getting the message, for whom it's just a claim from another common human being. So they are not god's rules, but rules claimed to come from a god. Faith in them is faith in the word of another man or woman. Your "moral reality" is then as mundane as of anyone else, even that of atheists.

if god created understanding at a given moment in time, you would have to accept that god does not have a mind of his/her own (which would make him/her understand).

You would be denying an essential attribute of this deity: being a person.

I mean, are you telling me that this god doesn't "expect everybody to possess exactly the *same* revelation, and in the same degrees, and everybody to be right"? You have just accepted that your god's message is not meant to be universal and that if that were expected there would be a problem. That even legitimizes atheism from the religious point of view. It should make sense to theists, right?

I'm going to deal with all this at once, since it all partakes of a series of misunderstandings about the Christian claims re: Divine revelation, and I can straighten out a bunch of them at one go.

The Christian position, very simply put, is this: God can speak if He so chooses; and He does. By His Spirit, He can also make human beings capable of understanding. He speaks in inspired writings, in nature itself, and in the private spirits of every human being through the voice of conscience. He also speaks through the actions of the human beings who respond to His revelation, and pre-eminently, He has spoken to us in His Son. "Through many ways and different manners," says the Bible.

So every person has reason to understand that God is speaking in some of these forms to him/her. And we are responsible to God for the light that we have, not what we do not or could not know. Those who respond in faith get more light each time they do. So increase of understanding is also possible to all human beings.

Yet "understanding" is not necessarily "agreement": human beings have free will to accept or reject the "understanding" thus imparted to them, and to choose whether they wish to live in or out of step with God. We remain free agents, because revelation is not "forced" upon any of us. We can choose our allegiances. The nature of genuine relationship is such that it cannot be forced; there must be a choice to associate with God or not, and even God Himself honours such a choice, because without it relationship itself is ersatz. And relationship with Him is the primary good in God's revelation.

As for testable claims, anyone who has accepted God's offer of salvation knows very well experientially the truth of the offer. However, so that others may remain free to choose on their own judgment, this experience is not forced on anyone without their will. So it cannot constitute some sort of arid "empirical" datum that can be shared with the skeptical mind. Rather as Anselm put it, Christians "believe in order to know." They do not merely say, "I'll believe it after I see it." Yet having experienced it, they do indeed know it.

So you can expect this: that God will speak to you about his truth -- if it's not right now, then perhaps he has already, earlier than now, or perhaps you will find He will soon -- and you will have a chance to respond in free will. He may even, in His kindness, give you multiple entreaties. Afterward, you may expect Him to honour your choice.

A pause: I will be back. I have to do something right now. But I'm interested, and will still finish responding to your message shortly.

[Immanuel Can]

Immanuel Can wrote:
...
Again, only a morality that transcends the sociological contingency level can inform us about morality. And Atheism has no such thing. ...

Actually it does, Ayn Rands Objectivism is a good example of such a thing.

No, it's not. Rand never proved what she claimed in this regard. She never gave any explanation or rationalization at all of why Objectivism is ontologically or deontologically necessary. She had some sneaking realization she had a problem with Is-Ought fallacy -- in fact, in "The Virtue of Selfishness" she explicitly identifies it as a problem; but instead of showing how to overcome it she just fudged it and said Is is the same as Ought. Hume would have had her head for this, since he definitively showed that in fact no "is" comes bundled with a justification of "ought." Consensus among modern philosophers is decidedly with Hume on that issue.

Rand simply made a mistake, actually didn't understand the question, or else was not being honest. Take your pick, I suppose.

In short, Rand didn't prove her position: she just expected us to take her word for it. But so far, no one can explain why a duty falls on anyone to buy into Objectivism. What's amazing to me is how her followers today never seem to call her on it. They often seem so delighted to be Randians that they pass over her glaring mistakes.

[Arising_uk]

I can only think that you've not read "The Virtue of Selfishness: A New Concept of Egoism" as she pretty much addresses your points but you are right she thought Hume wrong as she thought morality a necessity arising from rationality. I can see that the Christian theist would be unhappy with her thoughts as she rejected the concept of altruism as the correct moral position.

[Conde Lucanor]

...between two humans a statement about moral rules is true or false. I meant that a statement about receiving a message from the divinity is either true or false, therefore it doesn't work as a revelation to the second person getting the message, for whom it's just a claim from another common human being. So they are not god's rules, but rules claimed to come from a god. Faith in them is faith in the word of another man or woman. Your "moral reality" is then as mundane as of anyone else, even that of atheists.

if god created understanding at a given moment in time, you would have to accept that god does not have a mind of his/her own (which would make him/her understand).

You would be denying an essential attribute of this deity: being a person.

I mean, are you telling me that this god doesn't "expect everybody to possess exactly the *same* revelation, and in the same degrees, and everybody to be right"? You have just accepted that your god's message is not meant to be universal and that if that were expected there would be a problem. That even legitimizes atheism from the religious point of view. It should make sense to theists, right?

I'm going to deal with all this at once, since it all partakes of a series of misunderstandings about the Christian claims re: Divine revelation, and I can straighten out a bunch of them at one go.

The Christian position, very simply put, is this: God can speak if He so chooses; and He does. By His Spirit, He can also make human beings capable of understanding. He speaks in inspired writings, in nature itself, and in the private spirits of every human being through the voice of conscience. He also speaks through the actions of the human beings who respond to His revelation, and pre-eminently, He has spoken to us in His Son. "Through many ways and different manners," says the Bible.

Sorry, but it looks like you have devoted no time to straighten anything. Those claims are just rephrasing of sentences to which I already answered with objections which are not being addressed at all, only that this time you concealed the obvious logical contradictions behind metaphors, like the one related to god's speech. That he "speaks in inspired writings" ignores my objection about the mundane reality in which these concepts of "divine inspiration" are constructed. It is your faith, what you choose to believe, but there's no possibility for you to establish rational grounds in which those propositions become objective truths. They are propositions of blind faith. One of such propositions deals with the nature of the deity, which includes the attributes of being all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-benevolent. Simple logical analysis and empirical confirmations show that these notions are problematic, being the existence of evil one of such troublesomes contradictions in the doctrine.

Resorting to "what your faith says" does not mean addressing my objections from a rational, objective, truth-seeking perspective, especially if we are debating the source of "objective values" and relativism. Perhaps you have nothing else but your faith to grab, that's OK, but then the objectivism and universalism of theist values remain unsupported. Your faith is just another faith from many that are going around.

So you can expect this: that God will speak to you about his truth -- if it's not right now, then perhaps he has already, earlier than now, or perhaps you will find He will soon -- and you will have a chance to respond in free will. He may even, in His kindness, give you multiple entreaties. Afterward, you may expect Him to honour your choice.

Although very unlikely, if such a thing happened, I would have to distrust that voice coming from somewhere. How can I trust something absurd by definition, and that shows no consistency whatsoever in the actions and words attributed to him/her. I mean, his/her existence would be finally supported by empirical confirmation (revelation), but at the same time the evidence would show him/her as the ultimate deceiver, a con artist.

[Immanuel Can]

theists also have only available "is" statements. Other inputs not mediated by society (revelation), because of their mystical, personal, unsocialized nature, become instantly relativistic when they are intended to apply to others. In order to convert my personal god-related convictions into everyone's convictions, I must necessarily communicate with others and express the universality of my claims("these rules come from god"), but the widespread coexistence of conflicting "revelations", all of which can be explained by cultural conditions, eliminates any pretension of universality from theism. You have acknowledged yourself, perhaps unintentionally, moral relativism in the ranks of theism.

Not at all. Just read my previous response carefully, and you'll see. Theists can have "oughts" because they have an Authoritative basis for doing so. Atheists acknowledge no authority beyond the human, and humans only have authority if they happen to have power. That's why Nietzsche's analysis of power, to the effect that all moralizing hides "the will to power." When mankind has no authority higher than themselves, power rules -- end of story.

Your second mistake comes by confusing social acceptance, social obligation, preference and moral duty, all of which deal with the notions of good and bad, but at different levels in different contexts. Is it the same to say "My society prefers not to genitally mutilate little girls", than to say "My society dictates not to genitally mutilate little girls"? Is it the same to say "My society accepts genital mutilation of little girls", than to say "My society dictates genital mutilation of little girls"? Different contexts in which "beginning to do something" and "being forced to do something", have different meanings. That crashes your conformism theory.

Not a whit. You still haven't explained why you oppose mutilating little girls, except to say that you are either personally disinclined or fearful of your society's majority opinion in that regard. But if you *were* so inclined, what reason would you have for not doing it?

Your third mistake is to assert that an atheist has only available Naturalism and a deterministic view of society. If that were the case, history would be closed to the subject and actually, no one would be able to explain change, evolution in society, as a result of human agency.

Non sequitur. Your argument does not follow from your premise. "Evolution" is not a moral construct; it's posited only as a factual description. It's an "Is", not any kind of "Ought."

But Existentialism and Humanism show that an atheist has also available other views in which humans control their own destiny. I'm not claiming they are right (that's not the purpose of this debate), but that there are reasonable explanations to the concepts of good and wrong without the need for a god.

Neither of those can show they are a) true, and if they were, that they are b) morally compulsory. They are mere human constructs, by their own confession, and thus cannot be made to oblige anyone at all. If "value" starts and stops with humanity or with human choice, then the human "choice" to ignore them cannot be indicted at all. They've got no moral teeth.

We can use your own words for religious groups: they all are contingent groups...They also believe in different and even conflicting values (philosophers call this fact "irreconcilable moral pluralism," and it's a generally recognized premise of moral philosophy) So any morality premised on such groups is also contingent, changeable, and ultimately uninformative to us of what we should or shoud not (morally) do.

I would agree...except for one case: if a "religion" as you call them, should be included which actually reflected substantially the true will of the Supreme Being, then you'd simply have a situation of many false answers and one right one. And before you jump to the conclusion that it is unforgivably presumptuous to think that could ever happen, consider that that situation is not actually unusual at all. There are many false answers to "what is 2+2": an infinite number of false answers, I might add. But the proliferation of false answers does not go one step in the direction of showing no right one exists. There may be none; but there may be one. But as Aristotle showed, there will not be two.

Immanuel Can wrote:
Because societies do not do what God wants. Many of them do evil...in fact, all do on some points.

So, not all-powerful. There goes his/her essential attributes as a god. No god.

Non sequitur. You're assuming that God would rather take away free will than allow anyone to choose freely what they will believe or do. This is incorrect. But the fault is not in God, but in your assumption.

But all we need to know is that they have them without ever having contact with your all-powerful, all-knowingly, personal god, to realize that morality does not come from him/her. And if it came from this deity, and these people were evil (or "clearly wrong", as you say), you would be forced to assert that this evilness was imposed on them by god, without ever giving them a choice. God, the creator and sponsor of evilness. Isn't it problematic for theists?

Non sequitur again. The existence of multiple views does not go one step in the direction of proving that all these views are legitimate and equal. Some could be partially right but partially wrong, and some could be badly wrong...and still one could be right.

You've also got a bizarre view of, as you call it "evilness," as if that were some kind of created entity instead of what it really is -- a rejection of negation of right relationship to the Supreme Being, and so not a "thing" but an "anti-thing." God creates good; evil is not a separate-but-equal created entity, as in Taoism, say, but rather is a natural byproduct of the rejection of the good as God has created it.

But the true facts are that claiming that Stalin or Polpot committed genocidal acts in the name of atheism is the same as claiming that Hitler, Reagan, Bush and Blair carried out their genocidal acts in the name of theism...

This time what you have is a fallacy called "false analogy." It's not just that you would have to prove Reagan, Bush and Blair to be genuine Christians, but that you would have to show they were acting "Christianly" at the moment they made their particular decisions. An Atheist, however, has no objective moral restraints placed on him, so when Stalin, Pol Pot or Mao undertook to murder millions, loudly professing their Atheism as they did so, they were not acting as "bad" Atheists. There are no such things, since Atheism is inherently amoral (if not necessarily immoral). Thus you are comparing a group of people who may have acted *contrary* to what they should have done (a la Theism, which prohibits murder, selfishness, dishonesty, etc.), according to their moral system, with those who were acting in perfect consistency with what their moral system (Atheism) permits.

A belief system must be judged by the actions of those who obey it; not by what those who are disobeying may do with it.

No one is automatically morally superior to anyone, nor are his/her right doings guaranteed, just by affiliation to any group.

Precisely. That is why a belief system must be judged by those who are obedient to it, not by those who disregard it.

BUt the question of this forum is why an all-benevolent god will bring to the world drunks, wife-beaters and criminals. If he/she just wanted it, then there goes down the drain his/her essential godly attribute of being all-benevolent. If he/she couldn't help it, then there goes down the drain his/her essential godly attribute of being all-powerful. If he/she just let everyone to choose for themselves, then infinite power and infinite knowledge go down the sink hole, too.

The writer of the article that commences this thread has several mistakes in his critique of Theism. Perhaps it's time we discussed a couple of them. One of them is that he thinks that according to Theism "value of choice" or "having the capacity to perform evil acts, but refraining" are primary goods that God aims at. He's totally wrong about that. The former is a merely instrumental "good," and the latter, while it is decidedly preferable to refrain from doing evil, is not the primary good either. The primary good is actually genuine relationship with God, which requires the instrumental good of free choice and ensues in the refraining from doing evil; but the latter two are secondary goods, not primary ones. He's missed the point. And thus his critique misses Theism entirely.

But this is not surprising, and he shouldn't be entirely blamed for his oversight; the Bible says that those who are unwilling to exercise faith in the existence of God and the kindness of His intentions find it impossible to see further; and the author has clearly positioned himself not as a seeker but a mere cynic, so he cannot be expected to see very far.

[QMan]

Want to show that one can get quantitative about God and his influence in the world because he has promised benefits to those who leave a door open to a relationship with him. By definition benefits are extended to our material world as well and therefore MUST be quantifiable. One such quantity should be a lessening of criminality for theists compared to non-theists, which should be certifiable by statistical means. Turns out it actually is.

That would be a statistical fallacy. At best, you can find correlation, but correlation does not imply causation. If it did, theists will have a hard time explaining how come most of the prison inmates believe in god. That's why in your next sentence you feel compelled to accomodate the criteria to the causation you want to find.

Conde is using a skewed incorrect set of statistics, which turns out to be a very common and popularized misconception. These wrong statistics are based on questionnaires and interviews, e.g., where a prisoner states that s/he beliefs in God or has practiced religion for the reasons mentioned by IC and also let's say because his grandmother took him to church twice when he was a juvenile.

My understanding is that prisoners are just asked what is their religious affiliation. What's important to look in the statistics is that whatever religion they choose, they imply belief in a deity.

turns out the exact and exclusive criteria that must be used to obtain a very strong correlation is persons in prison who have been active members of a church and been actively attending mass or services right up to their prison term.

That will be the criteria only for people that are active members of a religious organization, but it goes without saying that people can believe in god, be theists, without going to a protestant or catholic church. What matters in the numbers is that they imply belief in a deity, so there's correlation between theism and imprisonment, although it does not imply causation. One can expect that such number most likely reflects the same proportion between theists and atheists in society, so it will mean nothing, except for the fact of an important shift that makes the proportion of imprisoned atheists smaller than expected.

This of course also supports my argument that it is possible to quantitatively establish the influence of God in this world, as is perfectly logical based on his promises.

The world is a mess. If that's because of god's influence...

Conde:
That would be a statistical fallacy. At best, you can find correlation, but correlation does not imply causation.

Qman:
You are a bit presumptuous here Conde. An experienced person in that field has no problem dealing with spurious correlations. In addition, this is not a guess or hypothesis but actual work done and conclusions arrived at by experienced scientists who thoroughly examined the fallacious methods and conclusions that had traditionally been in use and that you based your assumptions on.

Conde:
If it did, theists will have a hard time explaining how come most of the prison inmates believe in god. That's why in your next sentence you feel compelled to accommodate the criteria to the causation you want to find.

My understanding is that prisoners are just asked what is their religious affiliation. What's important to look in the statistics is that whatever religion they choose, they imply belief in a deity.

Qman:
I thought I made that amply clear. The questioning of the inmates and questionnaire design was wrong in the past. Most inmates claim they belief in God for the spurious reasons listed by IC and maybe because they had at one time in their life been inside a church or said a prayer, or started praying now that they are in prison. Those are obviously not valid reasons to claim that you belief in God and/or are an active religious person. Obviously, it would be completely erroneous to draw statistical conclusions based on that and it needed to be corrected.

Conde:
That will be the criteria only for people that are active members of a religious organization, but it goes without saying that people can believe in god, be theists, without going to a protestant or catholic church.

Qman:
There is no reason that prevents the scientist from statistically dealing with the various religious subgroups including focusing just on Christians. But of course, the criterion must be that they were active at time of imprisonment.

This then confirms my hypothesis. In addition, this is extendable to other social ills like use of obscene speech, pornographic material and habits, gambling, drinking, divorce, child abuse and so on. The hypothesis is of course based on the fact that the divine benefit the theist receives and his/her response to the divine influence results in an interior psychological transformation akin to the interior heaven promised by Christ. As an atheist you have no access to that fact and are limited to evaluate it statistically as we are discussing here if you are capable of being objective and unbiased in regard to that. As a theist you have access to that fact because you are experiencing it yourself. As is clear from many of the discussions here you always must guard against theists in name only. Obviously that's why you won't get a 100 % correlation but nevertheless a statistically significant one. As I pointed out in other threads this would make a good Master's thesis for an ambitious humanities or social science student.

Conde:
The world is a mess. If that's because of god's influence...

Qman:
This off-the-cuff remark is of course nonsense. The world is our responsibility and we make the mess. Also, what do you expect if at every turn you reject God's influence and help?

[Immanuel Can]

I can only think that you've not read "The Virtue of Selfishness: A New Concept of Egoism" as she pretty much addresses your points but you are right she thought Hume wrong as she thought morality a necessity arising from rationality. I can see that the Christian theist would be unhappy with her thoughts as she rejected the concept of altruism as the correct moral position.

ArisingUK:

I have. In fact, it's on my desk right now. She doesn't. Go see.

I'm not "unhappy" with Rand. In some ways, I like her take on economics; there is value in muscular individualism. But liking aspects of her agenda is quite different from believing she legitimated her ethics. She did not.

But hey, if you think she did, prove it: post her legitimation, as you perceive it, in your next message. Give us her syllogism proving "ought" appears from "is."

[Arising_uk]

I have. In fact, it's on my desk right now. She doesn't. Go see.

I'm not "unhappy" with Rand. In some ways, I like her take on economics; there is value in muscular individualism. But liking aspects of her agenda is quite different from believing she legitimated her ethics. She did not.

But hey, if you think she did, prove it: post her legitimation, as you perceive it, in your next message. Give us her syllogism proving "ought" appears from "is."

Unfortunately my Kindle has decide to expire. Give me a while whilst I get a replacement then sure I'll make an attempt.

[Immanuel Can]

Sure. I'm in no hurry.

But let me help you out, since your Kindle is on the fritz.

This is her treatment of the issue Hume raises:

...the validation of value judgments is to be achieved by reference to the facts of reality. The fact that a living entity is determines what it ought to do. So much for the issue of the relation between "is" and "ought." (VOS, 18) Emphasis hers.

I admit that this is embarrassingly little; but hey, I didn't write it, she did.

So it's clear from her frank identification of the Is/Ought that she knows of the problem, but is there any hint in here she really understands it? Is her response a substantive rebuke to Hume, or is it little more than a cavalier dismissal of the fundamental issue he raised? And if it's just a dismissal, is she being oblivious or deliberately dishonest?

If there is any explanation that makes a compelling legitimation out of this I'm certainly open to hearing it. I can see none right now.

[Immanuel Can]

C'mon, all you Randians.

I know you're out there; I can hear you coughing uncomfortably...

Step up and defend the old gal.

Damsel in distress....Surely some one can save her...

What can you find from her that's any better on the Is/Ought issue?

[uwot]

I'm not a Randian, but, Immanuel Can, I'm not sure what the issue is. Isn't your argument essentially that there is a god, so you ought to behave in some particular way?

[Ginkgo]

I'm not a Randian, but, Immanuel Can, I'm not sure what the issue is. Isn't your argument essentially that there is a god, so you ought to behave in some particular way?

Yes, it is the same problem with all deontological ethical theories