Equality

[Immanuel Can]

You misunderstand Hume. His morals, like Schopenhauers were based on compassion, or as Hume I think said, sentiment. Remember, Hume also argued that you couldn't prove any causality, that didn't stop Hume believing in it nor did it stop him being an ethical man. He couldn't prove is to ought, he didn't care either.

You're not right about Hume. Hume thought that Emotivism was the patch-up for the Guillotine. However, I don't think there's any serious philosopher who believes Emotivism anymore. It's just another set of ungrounded substantive claims. I has no durability in the face of skepticism.

Hume "cared."

And Hume did think he'd "solved" the Guillotine by Emotivism. But he was simply rejoicing too soon. Subsequent moral theorists have torn his assumptions to shreds. Some of them (like Searle) still hope for a solution to the Guillotine; but everyone pretty much agrees that Hume didn't have one. As of this moment, the Guillotine stands, and is a major problem in modern moral theory.

Now, whether Hume was an ethical man or not is not on topic: he may have been quite nice as a person, but we know he did not discover any rational warrant for a claim that such behavior was necessary. He could also have chosen to be a rotter, as, I understand, was Shopenhauer, despite his elaborate theorizing on compassion. Good people can have a bad moral theory, just as bad people can have a good one that they simply choose to ignore in practice. Not personal conduct, but rational warrant is the issue here.

Ad hominem: definition: arguing against a person when you should be arguing against the logic of his statements. It's a fallacy because even honest men occasionally make mistakes and inadvertently "lie," and inveterate liars spend much of their time telling truths or partial truths. It's the statement, not the man that decides which it is.

[Tusok]

It seems that MartinM has asked a question and already knew the answer. The many subsequent posts have volleyed equality and many other concepts around quite vigorously.

But the fundamental question Martin raised was valid. To what extent do we try and create a society of equals, knowing full well that no two people are ever completely "equal."

Our civilization began in the form of tiny tribes, extended families. A leader could emerge, and one of the duties of any leader is the settling of disputes. This is, in its most base form, an equalizing duty. Why should any leader care about settling disputes, or making sure that resources are doled out equally to his members? Because disparities in resources means a weaker tribe. By keeping all his members relatively equal, the value of the tribe as a whole is greater.

It may be possible that Martin is right about Europe. Can they become so focused on making its members equal that they spend more resources on being equal than are freed up by having a stronger society? No one knows. We can imagine vignettes that could highlight either position, but in truth, we won't know for a long time.

It doesn't hurt to ask the right questions, however. And in this case the right question is, how much equality is enough?

[uwot]

Hume "cared."

He's not here to ask. Anyway, you missed a bit:

The first problem always is, "Do I have the right grounds?"

Only if you are attempting to build an edifice in the Euclidean manner. You do not need 'grounds' to behave with compassion towards your fellow human being. It is perfectly legitimate for somebody to equate their compassion with 'ethical' behaviour. If you insist that doing so is inconsistent with some weltanschauung, that is entirely your prerogative. Just as it is for others to say, so what?

In the case of "human rationality," if that is the grounds that is offered, it ought to have a means of showing what ethical precepts are consistent with it. All I asked is for someone to spell out that "step 2." Everybody said, "We don't even agree to the grounds -- namely that human beings are rational."

Who offered human rationality and at the same time denied it?

[Ginkgo]

In the case of "human rationality," if that is the grounds that is offered, it ought to have a means of showing what ethical precepts are consistent with it. All I asked is for someone to spell out that "step 2." Everybody said, "We don't even agree to the grounds -- namely that human beings are rational." Okay, I said. We're one step further away from any solution.

Immanuel, in terms of Kantian ethics it makes no difference if 99% of people agree that human rationality cannot be the grounding source of ethics. In exactly the same way as it makes no difference if 99% of people agree there is no basis for God being the grounding source of ethics. It is irrelevant to the truth or falsity of the claims. Truth or falsity in this respect is not determined by popular opinion. Consider premise two:

Rationality teaches..? (say what and how that thing is taught)

In this respect we are saying that how and why a thing is taught is dependent on the culture (cultural relativism). This is something that can be subject to popular opinion. In other words, the grounding of such a theory depends on the shifting grounds of the culture. I am not disagreeing with you on this.

What I am saying is that there is an alternative theory that is equally grounded as the one you are putting forward. It is equally grounded because it is derived from the same teleological, substantive and apriori procedures you suggest. It doesn't matter what people agree to in terms grounding, be it human rationality or God. Again,what I am saying is you need to extend your premise 2 to allow for Kantian ethics. In other words, allow the same luxury you would extend to the ethics grounded in the Supreme Being. Why? Because both theories us the same methodology.

[Immanuel Can]

I think we're closer to agreement here than it may appear to outside readers, Ginko.

What I am saying is that there is an alternative theory that is equally grounded as the one you are putting forward. It is equally grounded because it is derived from the same teleological, substantive and apriori procedures you suggest.

I would argue that there are *many* grounded theories, not just one. But their "groundedness" does not guarantee their truthfulness, which is a different issue. One can have a theory grounded in an incorrect ontology.

What I do suggest, though, is that any Atheist who turns around and insists on a moral precept (one of which would be "equality,") has no grounds he can supply to explicate the obligatory nature of equality rights. After all, he believes that the universe is Material or Naturalistic, and thus that there are is no reality to "spooky" properties like values. They are just things some people happen to have -- epiphenomena of physical processes -- which, like a vestigial tail, would simply be a rather bizarre byproduct of evolution -- perhaps destined to persist or perhaps destined to be eliminated by progressive development; but in any case, values would be simply incidental and in no way obligatory for anyone.

If they don' think this is true, there's a really simple way for them to prove me wrong: just logically connect some statement about the physical world to a conclusion demanding a particular value (perhaps "equality," but whatever). Then they'd show me to be wrong -- assuming they get their logic formally correct, which is a purely mechanical matter and should not give them trouble if they know logic.

So far no one has done that. But I can wait.

It doesn't matter what people agree to in terms grounding, be it human rationality or God.

Oh, I agree. We're talking about groundedness, and the truth-issue can wait for a moment.

Again,what I am saying is you need to extend your premise 2 to allow for Kantian ethics. In other words, allow the same luxury you would extend to the ethics grounded in the Supreme Being. Why? Because both theories us the same methodology.

Kantian ethics is not what you seem to think it is. You need to read Allan Wood. Serioiusly, he's really good on this, and he'll convince you that Kant was a teleologist, not a pure rationalist. So Kant is not a special case, but sits in the same group of theories as Consequentialism, Utilitarianism, and Pragmatism, in the sense that unless you have reason to believe Kant's ontological assumptions you do not have reason to accept his theory.

Are you a Kantian?

[henry quirk]

"That doesn't follow, Henry, unless the argument I'm making requires some premise involving belief in God. It doesn't. As I say, an Atheist could make it perfectly well. It would be just as challenging for Atheism."

Again: I disagree. Clearly, *your position is 'grounded' in GOD. It follows then any argument you offer (in defense of that position) extends out from 'that'.

#

"Richard Dawkins is just one publicly-recognized Atheist who admits that the inability to ground values is characteristic of Naturalism as well"

And he's right. Thing is: you're in the same boat. He can't ground a value in nature (which is verifiably real) and you can't ground a value in God (whose existence has yet to be verified).

#

"what will you do with *them*?"

Nuthin'. My 'atheism' (such as it is) is 'mine' and owes nuthin' to Dawkins or the others.









*this may be a good time for all parties involved to restate, in compact form, his or her positions on equality and the foundation(s) for value...I suspect confusion is creeping into the thread and folks (myself included) may be losing sight of what any other participant is trying to say

[henry quirk]

"one has to sense a 'difference,' before it can be 'quantified.'"

And, most of the time, difference is apparent. Two men, one lean and muscled and tanned; the other fat and soft and pale...the difference (the inequality) between the two is obvious. Two women, one eloquently, intelligently, conversing; the other stumbling over every misused word...the difference (the inequality) between the two is obvious.

#

"I thought we were here speaking as philosophers"

I'm no philosopher...never claimed to be.

Irrelevant anyway...since when is it 'philosophical' to view a potentially fictional 'universal' level as superior to a demonstrably real human level?

#

"No, the value is arbitrary"

Again: I disagree. Again: you've offered nuthin' to change my mind.

[uwot]

We're talking about groundedness, and the truth-issue can wait for a moment.

Both the Blessed Henry and I have never argued that the way we treat other people is 'grounded' in any logical necessity.

...values would be simply incidental and in no way obligatory for anyone.

In the real world, values are enforced; according to Henry, by the guy with the biggest stick. I happen to think that lots of people with a variety of sticks, can impose some sort of collective, democratic will. I think that is demonstrably the case, even though it is not a flawless system. It certainly isn't grounded in logic or even any particular objective truths about the world. I suspect that makes me some sort of pragmatist, but as you can probably gather, ethics isn't my metier. Like I said, I don't care.
So: ontology is entirely irrelevant to my human intercourse. I'm still waiting to see what it's got to do with yours. I get the feeling it could take a while. Would it speed things up if I agreed to agree with every word you have so far written? Or must everyone concur?


Nb. Sir Henry's post appeared as I was writing the above.

this may be a good time for all parties involved to restate, in compact form, his or her positions on equality and the foundation(s) for value...I suspect confusion is creeping into the thread and folks (myself included) may be losing sight of what any other participant is trying to say

Bloody good idea. I hope what I have said goes some way to doing just that. (Sorry, Your Lordship, for involving you, but people listen to you.)

[henry quirk]

"I happen to think that lots of people with a variety of sticks, can impose some sort of collective, democratic will"

I agree. As I've said up-thread, 'the one(s) with the biggest stick(s) (or more wisely applied smaller stick(s)) make the rules'.

#

"people listen to you"

Not really, no.

People 'argue' with me: most of the time, they argue based on what they 'think' I'm sayin, not because of what I actually say.

##

My position on equality…

Equality is a (sometimes useful) fiction.

Again...

Lil Jimmy Sparkles is born smart, beautiful, and healthy.

Lil Johnny Shit is born dumb, ugly, and sickly.

From the start: demonstrably there is no *equality.


My position on the 'ground' of value...

Always, it is the valuer him- or her-self who is the ground.

He or she may dress up (or inflate) that idiosyncratic valuing, making appeals to the 'good' or GOD or 'whatever', but, in every case, a value assigned rests solely on the preferences, choices, and biases of the valuer. Sometimes that value assignment is sane (in alignment with what is 'real'); often that value assignment is insane (out of alignment with what is real).


My position on 'power' or 'might'...

Get yourself some...exercise it (and yourself) wisely...if you can't, at least, self-defend: you are food for predators


My position on 'crazy'...

It's contagious: defend your head.

[thedoc]

My position on 'crazy'...

It's contagious: defend your head.

Sanity is much over-rated, and not nearly as much fun.


Did you ever see the movie "Jeremiah Johnson"? The older 'mountain man' acted crazy, so that the Indians would leave him alone.

[Immanuel Can]

Again: I disagree. Clearly, *your position is 'grounded' in GOD. It follows then any argument you offer (in defense of that position) extends out from 'that'.

You've got what we call a category mistake here, Henry, which is a basic fallacy in logic. You've mistaken the category "motive" for the category "method." My motivation, personally speaking, might well be my Theism, of course; but my motivation for offering the argument does not show anything about whether or not the methodology I'm describing is right or wrong.

To give an illustration, when I fix my car, cook my dinner, or shave my face, I don't do it in some sort of special "Theistic" way that is different from how you would go about these same tasks. The tasks themselves are neutral with regard to my Theism or your Atheism. My "motive" for shaving could be that I'm going on a date; your "motive" could be that you are preparing to give a public speech: but it won't make a difference to the fact that we both shave by dragging a razor across our faces.

The "method" we're both adopting, in the present case, is straightforward logic. So there's no controversy there: we are going to adopt the same method. Our methodology is equally accessible to you and to me, and works precisely the same way for both of us, regardless of motive.

Additionally, in the matter of deciding whether or not Atheism grounds a commitment to equality, the foundational belief is already agreed upon by both of us -- that is, that we are assuming Atheism, not Theism as our subject matter; so there is no controversy there either. We can agree that no Theistic premises are going to involved in any syllogism or argument we discuss. We're entirely agreed so far.

Well, nothing more than that is necessary for my argument to stand -- which explains very nicely why Hume or Dawkins can make precisely the same case as I'm making, even though they completely disagree with my motives, and in fact would deplore them.

The method can stay universal, even if our motives are admittedly different.

[uwot]

Blah, blah, blah..

Yes, yes, yes, the axiomatic premises of any atheistic ethical argument cannot be demonstrated logically (can they in any field?).
Now what?

[Immanuel Can]

Yes, yes, yes, the axiomatic premises of any atheistic ethical argument cannot be demonstrated logically (can they in any field?).

Actually, this isn't even close to what I said.

Now what?

I can't imagine. There's no logical connection between what I said and what you claim to have understood me to be saying, so where do we go from that?

[henry quirk]

"The older 'mountain man' acted crazy, so that the Indians would leave him alone."

Yep...good movie...note, he 'acted' crazy...he wasn't necessarily crazy and whatever 'crazy' he exhibited was of his own crafting.

#

"Sanity is much over-rated"

That depends on how you wanna define 'sane'.

[aiddon]

In a game of chess they would have gone home by now.