JTB - Traditional Versus Modern View

[Veritas Aequitas]

In my discussion with Peter Holmes, there is an issue with the definition of what is knowledge.
I have often accept knowledge as JTB [subject to Gettier] and Peter would reject such a definition.

Here is my explanation to why there is a confusion.

Here's a link to my paper on the failure of the JTB account of knowledge: Justified true belief: knowledge and the myth of propositions.
http://www.peasum.co.uk/435531068

I have read your paper.
I believe your views are too narrow and shallow which are very restricted to your chosen kind of epistemology [of Analytic Philosophy].

I have always viewed knowledge from its most widest perspective in alignment with reality - all there is.
In my case, knowledge can be justified to be defined as Justified True Beliefs and I have always qualified as subject to Gettier's Problem [which is confusing as explained below].

But on a more thorough reading of what is knowledge, I noted I have conflated

• 1. the Analytic Philosophy view of what is knowledge [as adopted by you]
  with
  2. what is the proper philosophical view of knowledge.

The Refutation of JTB due to Gettier is based on the Traditional View of What is Knowledge which is Justified True Beliefs is allegedly attributed to Plato. It is stated, while Plato discussed JTB, he rejected this definition as knowledge.

The Traditional View of JTB is;

The concept of justified true belief states that in order to know that a given proposition is true, one must not only believe the relevant true proposition, but also have justification for doing so. In more formal terms, an agent S knows that a proposition P is true if and only if:

• P is true
  S believes that P is true, and
  S is justified in believing that P is true

and JTB has the following characteristics, i.e.

• A. attributed to 'personal' knowledge and
  B. grounded on very flimsy definitions of the terms 'Justified' 'True' and 'Belief.'

Explanations of the Terms

• 1. Personal Knowledge
  Personal knowledge is very subjective and in modern times has no credibility to truth unless justified properly within a credible FSK.
  
  2. "Belief" in Traditional JTB
  What is belief within the Traditional JTB is merely the common views, i.e. opinions by an individual.
  
  3. Theories of Justification
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Justifica ... tification
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Justifica ... stemology)
  • Justification (also called epistemic justification) is a concept in epistemology used to describe beliefs that one has good reason for holding. -wiki
  • "Justification" involves the reasons why someone holds a belief that one should hold based on one's current evidence.[1] Justification is a property of beliefs insofar as they are held blamelessly. In other words, a justified belief is a belief that a person is entitled to hold.
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Justifica ... _knowledge

Here is the typical example of Gettier's Problem to refute the Traditional JTB;

• A woman sees a group of people and mistakes one of them, a stranger, for her friend.
  So she believes her friend is there.
  And as it happens, her friend really is there, but hidden. So what she believes is the case. But does she know her friend is there?

If the Traditional JTB characteristics [1-3] as defined above, I agree the woman do not have knowledge [JTB] her friend is there.

But the above way of defining and toying with 'what is knowledge' is very childish. Note the crude definition of 'belief' above. The list of justification do not include anything akin to how justification is done within Science.
What is needed to is define belief and perform justification process within philosophy-proper.
The traditional view of justification is this, "In other words, a justified belief is a belief that a person is entitled to hold" wtf is that?

It is very common sense, to ensure her belief is more solid, the women should have gone over to the group to confirm her friend is there or obtain other evidences, e.g. CCTV, other methods of verification etc. such that is acceptable to a jury in court.

The Philosophy-proper - the Modern Way of Defining Knowledge.

• 1. I have defined what is fact or knowledge as whatever is produce from a specific FSK.
  
  2. To facilitate communication, the fact and knowledge produced is within a continuum of degree of veracity from high to low.
  
  3. This continuum correspond the gradation to truth from opinions, beliefs and knowledge.
  
  4. The degree of veracity of knowledge in this case correlate to the degree of the credibility of the justification process undertaken process opinions and beliefs to produce justified knowledge.
  
  5. Therefore what is knowledge is Justified True Beliefs.
  
  6. Scientific Knowledge is opinions, beliefs that are justified from the Scientific Framework and System. Such knowledge at present is has the highest rating as knowledge and justification.

Now that I have explained the difference between the Traditional View of JTB and Knowledge as JTB within a FSK, I don't need to mention Gettier at all. This is why when I expressed what is knowledge as JTB from my perspective and yet mentioned 'Gettier' you got confused.

Is my 'The Philosophy-proper Way of Defining Knowledge' as JTB is qualified within the conditions stipulated above, acceptable?

Views?

[Veritas Aequitas]

Here are some modern views on JTB as knowledge;

• Paul Boghossian argues that the justified true belief account is the "standard, widely accepted" definition of knowledge.
  Robert Nozick suggested a clarification of "justification" which he believed eliminates the problem: the justification has to be such that were the justification false, the knowledge would be false.
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Belief#Ju ... rue_belief

Knowledge as JTB is the best we presently have:

The definition of knowledge as justified true belief is the best we presently have.
However, the canonical tripartite analysis of knowledge does not do justice to it due to a Platonic conception of a priori truth that puts the cart before the horse. Within a pragmatic approach,
I argue that by doing away with a priori truth, namely by submitting truth to justification, and by accordingly altering the canonical analysis of knowledge, this is a fruitful definition.
So fruitful indeed that it renders the Gettier counterexamples vacuous, allowing positive work in epistemology and related disciplines.
https://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?pid=S0 ... xt&tlng=pt

Another view on favoring JTB;

In this paper we analyze the foundations of epistemology from a constructive Brouwerian position. In particular, we consider the famous tripartite account of knowledge as justified true belief, JTB, traditionally attributed to Plato as well as counter-examples by Russell and Gettier.
We show that from an intuitionistic perspective, when the constructive character of truth is taken into account, both Russell and Gettier examples no longer refute the principle that JTB yields knowledge.
Moreover, we argue that JTB yields knowledge could be accepted given some natural constructivity assumptions.
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/a ... 7717301155

[PeteJ]

It seems quite obvious to me that JTB is not certain knowledge. Certain knowledge requires the identy of knower and known. An example would be 'I Am'.

But this idea is 'mystical', so scholastic thinkers are stuck with no possibility of certainty and have to propose that justified belief is knowledge. As you say, the result is a muddle.

Descartes saw the problem, hence his axiom.

[odysseus]

PeteJ wrote
It seems quite obvious to me that JTB is not certain knowledge. Certain knowledge requires the identy of knower and known. An example would be 'I Am'.

But this idea is 'mystical', so scholastic thinkers are stuck with no possibility of certainty and have to propose that justified belief is knowledge. As you say, the result is a muddle.

Descartes saw the problem, hence his axiom.

Or, you could reconsider basic thinking here. Certainty makes sense only if knowledge itself makes sense. certainty being only a measure of knowledge, and absolute one, but the meaning of certainty is that of certain knowledge. So put aside certainty for now, and ask about knowledge. We find is a relationship between S and P, so in order to make sense of this at all, S has to be made clear, as does P. Of course, this is where all the confusion comes from: the attempt to describe (see all those Gettier attempts at solutions, the barn facsimile, the severed head--trying to establish a causally satisfying solution) a relationship such that one begins without even "knowing" what is being related. S??? P??? What is a self such that a self knows at all? And P: once you acknowledge P as being there at all, you see that you have done the acknowledging through the justifying, not independently of this. And an independent affirmation of P is just outrageous question begging: How did this get affirmed????? Oh, you know it to be there? Well. what is knowledge? Etc., etc., ad nauseum.
Analytic philosophy is, and always has been, a grand question begging project, for it decided to turn its back on Kant. It never refuted Kant, just ignored him, but in the process, trivialized what it was doing.

P??? There is no P; or, not THAT kind of P.