Can anyone help me with furthering this Heideggerian work

[nothingdoing]

This is all very crudely presented but an expert might still be able to get at it a bit, please help. It is possible, to be sure, that I make no advance, but I think there is something that goes, however modestly, past Heidegger's vision.

--
Source: On the Essence of Truth in the beginning somewhere about sense

(note: the often used phrase 'being in language' might be revised to read 'being in sense', to avoid ambiguity for future workers)

Def. logy logos: (logos, “account, explanation, narrative”), itself a verbal noun from λέγω (legō, “I say, speak, converse, tell a story”).



In the beginning was the word and the word was with god. The sense of account, of explanation, of narrative the sense of conveyance of conceptual meaning : human sense as fundamental essence : sense of intelligibility and understanding

the sense of sight of sound , haptic sense : the overmastering of all these is by 'sense' as such

so this is metaphysics : what is the yoke of 'sense' as such : where from?

An important step: realize that there is no sense before the 'sense' overmasters

then we can see 'sense' is a metaphysical fruit hanging out of the 'garden of Eden', as it were / which is code for the zone prior to the overmastering of 'sense' and the dawn of Dasein (should one say "as such"?)

'sense' is at bottom nothing but alienation (did Foucault understand this directly, in this way, with his famous utterance?)

'sense' is then 'perceptual lens' and recycling plant of sight touch etc. 'in Eden' - this suggests the reality of the golden age, and suggests that spirituality is the reenactment of this condition / this is a passing phase - and the irritation of noting the 'error' of spiritual enlightenment comes into focus - or the suggestion that once the problem is solved, the mastery of world, we are to go back? Renouncing the apparatus of 'sense'

----
This will - lead us to be able to - show that 'self and mind' in the psychoanalytic sense used by Bollas, for instance, are analogous to the external sense of ,subject and object' in an operative and clear way.

[Bill Wiltrack]

.



here ya go...


Read this.







.......................................






Good luck.



Oh, and by the way, who are you?


Where did you come from?





Heidegger was flawed and would never make it upon this forum.


I adore truth.


Could you tell me the truth about you?


Where did you come from?


Why are you here?


What do you expect to find out?


Are you here to attack one of us?





Have you ever heard of Adolf Hitler?




Cheers...









...................................................





.

[Arising_uk]

Do you know no shame Bill?

[nothingdoing]

I'd prefer if clownish people kept their narrow mentation to themselves, from now hence. Will check back for more worthy responses tomorrow. Thanks.

Only those who either have already deeply studied Heidegger and Plato, or those willing to learn through a proper bout of entanglement in the garden of theory are called forth.

Well, if anyone is interested in any aspect of Heidegger's philosophy, not as history or research, but in order to make something of the material in the present, please respond.

And so you are entreated to partake of the furioso of mental fanfare the mad gallop of the thinker and the austerity of staying with the question.

[chaz wyman]

This is all very crudely presented but an expert might still be able to get at it a bit, please help. It is possible, to be sure, that I make no advance, but I think there is something that goes, however modestly, past Heidegger's vision.

--
Source: On the Essence of Truth in the beginning somewhere about sense

(note: the often used phrase 'being in language' might be revised to read 'being in sense', to avoid ambiguity for future workers)

Def. logy logos: (logos, “account, explanation, narrative”), itself a verbal noun from λέγω (legō, “I say, speak, converse, tell a story”).



In the beginning was the word and the word was with god. The sense of account, of explanation, of narrative the sense of conveyance of conceptual meaning : human sense as fundamental essence : sense of intelligibility and understanding

the sense of sight of sound , haptic sense : the overmastering of all these is by 'sense' as such

so this is metaphysics : what is the yoke of 'sense' as such : where from?

An important step: realize that there is no sense before the 'sense' overmasters

then we can see 'sense' is a metaphysical fruit hanging out of the 'garden of Eden', as it were / which is code for the zone prior to the overmastering of 'sense' and the dawn of Dasein (should one say "as such"?)

'sense' is at bottom nothing but alienation (did Foucault understand this directly, in this way, with his famous utterance?)

'sense' is then 'perceptual lens' and recycling plant of sight touch etc. 'in Eden' - this suggests the reality of the golden age, and suggests that spirituality is the reenactment of this condition / this is a passing phase - and the irritation of noting the 'error' of spiritual enlightenment comes into focus - or the suggestion that once the problem is solved, the mastery of world, we are to go back? Renouncing the apparatus of 'sense'

----
This will - lead us to be able to - show that 'self and mind' in the psychoanalytic sense used by Bollas, for instance, are analogous to the external sense of ,subject and object' in an operative and clear way.

SO the heading is " can anyone...". What "WORK" are you referring to?

All I see is a hastily typed collection of disconnected bullet points, with very little of Heidegger in evidence.

You seem to confuse one or two Biblical references to logos and spirit which do not relate to H's existential philosophical enquiry.
Do you have a question about H?

[nothingdoing]

"SO the heading is " can anyone...". What "WORK" are you referring to?"

The work of firing blanks with Plato's tribe:

"Yes, but discourse should have a limit.
Yes, Socrates, said Glaucon, and the whole of life is the only limit which wise men assign to the hearing of such discourses."

Or, perchance, not firing blanks, if I understand Heidegger's meaning.

"You seem to confuse one or two Biblical references to logos and spirit which do not relate to H's existential philosophical inquiry.
Do you have a question about H?"

I am hoping that you can tell me something more about my confusion, since I am confused and don't only confuse one or two things. I think because my confusion is so great we should only treat one particular instance of it, and so let it reveal itself in its gangrenous putridity, provided we can stand the sight of it, by way of finding some modest entré. If you are agreeable to this plan this is how I suggest to proceed:

Let's start from scratch. Because I don't want to reproduce a correct copy of the text for its own sake, in order to answer by rote on a quiz, but to bring the subject of the inquiry into immediate sight (meaning that if we do, indeed, hearken insight into the Greek words, it is primarily for the sake of how we use them here and now).

The first question I should like to treat, provided you think it sensible (though it is not necessary that you follow my understanding of this trope from the start since that is what we aim to achieve in the actual coarse of questioning), but it takes the form of a generality, is: "How do we understand the journey - specifically following Plato's seventh letter - to the 'fifth' category, that he names there?" The reason I want to start with this is that I think it is analogous or homologous - transports to the same place - to the cave metaphor and so to what Heidegger calls potential, which I take to stand behind this fifth, the fifth - the sight of beings - which itself stands among the Forms under the sheltering horizon of Alethea. This may be wrong, that is what you can show me by traveling the way with me, pointing out the most notable sights along the way if any should seem remarkable to you.

Since the first question is general we need a particular entry to it:

So the first question is "What is meant by 'the name' of a thing?"

"A circle is a thing spoken of, and its name is that very word which we have just uttered."

In order to expedite: I ask this with something specific in mind - is the name the word on paper or the sound when spoken, or something else? (Remembering - if it seem pertinent - that some people claim that the Romans only spoke texts, and never thought them quietly as we do.) Parenthetically, this seems more then a trivial point to me, as it involves the whole trajectory of the cave metaphor, when the problem is transformed to that idiom.




The part of the Seventh Letter that seems appropriate to the questioning is bellow. It is - notably - possible that this is too truncated, and so something important will escape us. Socrates, and the oracle, advises us to heed limits.

"On this point I intend to speak a little more at length; for perhaps, when I have done so, things will be clearer with regard to my present subject. There is an argument which holds good against the man ventures to put anything whatever into writing on questions of this nature; it has often before been stated by me, and it seems suitable to the present occasion.

For everything that exists there are three instruments by which the knowledge of it is necessarily imparted; fourth, there is the knowledge itself, and, as fifth, we must count the thing itself which is known and truly exists. The first is the name, the, second the definition, the third. the image, and the fourth the knowledge. If you wish to learn what I mean, take these in the case of one instance, and so understand them in the case of all. A circle is a thing spoken of, and its name is that very word which we have just uttered. The second thing belonging to it is its definition, made up names and verbal forms. For that which has the name "round," "annular," or, "circle," might be defined as that which has the distance from its circumference to its centre everywhere equal. Third, comes that which is drawn and rubbed out again, or turned on a lathe and broken up-none of which things can happen to the circle itself-to which the other things, mentioned have reference; for it is something of a different order from them. Fourth, comes knowledge, intelligence and right opinion about these things. Under this one head we must group everything which has its existence, not in words nor in bodily shapes, but in souls-from which it is dear that it is something different from the nature of the circle itself and from the three things mentioned before. Of these things intelligence comes closest in kinship and likeness to the fifth, and the others are farther distant.

The same applies to straight as well as to circular form, to colours, to the good, the, beautiful, the just, to all bodies whether manufactured or coming into being in the course of nature, to fire, water, and all such things, to every living being, to character in souls, and to all things done and suffered. For in the case of all these, no one, if he has not some how or other got hold of the four things first mentioned, can ever be completely a partaker of knowledge of the fifth. Further, on account of the weakness of language, these (i.e., the four) attempt to show what each thing is like, not less than what each thing is. For this reason no man of intelligence will venture to express his philosophical views in language, especially not in language that is unchangeable, which is true of that which is set down in written characters.

Again you must learn the point which comes next. Every circle, of those which are by the act of man drawn or even turned on a lathe, is full of that which is opposite to the fifth thing. For everywhere it has contact with the straight. But the circle itself, we say, has nothing in either smaller or greater, of that which is its opposite. We say also that the name is not a thing of permanence for any of them, and that nothing prevents the things now called round from being called straight, and the straight things round; for those who make changes and call things by opposite names, nothing will be less permanent (than a name). Again with regard to the definition, if it is made up of names and verbal forms, the same remark holds that there is no sufficiently durable permanence in it. And there is no end to the instances of the ambiguity from which each of the four suffers; but the greatest of them is that which we mentioned a little earlier, that, whereas there are two things, that which has real being, and that which is only a quality, when the soul is seeking to know, not the quality, but the essence, each of the four, presenting to the soul by word and in act that which it is not seeking (i.e., the quality), a thing open to refutation by the senses, being merely the thing presented to the soul in each particular case whether by statement or the act of showing, fills, one may say, every man with puzzlement and perplexity.

Now in subjects in which, by reason of our defective education, we have not been accustomed even to search for the truth, but are satisfied with whatever images are presented to us, we are not held up to ridicule by one another, the questioned by questioners, who can pull to pieces and criticise the four things. But in subjects where we try to compel a man to give a clear answer about the fifth, any one of those who are capable of overthrowing an antagonist gets the better of us, and makes the man, who gives an exposition in speech or writing or in replies to questions, appear to most of his hearers to know nothing of the things on which he is attempting to write or speak; for they are sometimes not aware that it is not the mind of the writer or speaker which is proved to be at fault, but the defective nature of each of the four instruments. The process however of dealing with all of these, as the mind moves up and down to each in turn, does after much effort give birth in a well-constituted mind to knowledge of that which is well constituted. But if a man is ill-constituted by nature (as the state of the soul is naturally in the majority both in its capacity for learning and in what is called moral character)-or it may have become so by deterioration-not even Lynceus could endow such men with the power of sight.

In one word, the man who has no natural kinship with this matter cannot be made akin to it by quickness of learning or memory; for it cannot be engendered at all in natures which are foreign to it. Therefore, if men are not by nature kinship allied to justice and all other things that are honourable, though they may be good at learning and remembering other knowledge of various kinds-or if they have the kinship but are slow learners and have no memory-none of all these will ever learn to the full the truth about virtue and vice. For both must be learnt together; and together also must be learnt, by complete and long continued study, as I said at the beginning, the true and the false about all that has real being. After much effort, as names, definitions, sights, and other data of sense, are brought into contact and friction one with another, in the course of scrutiny and kindly testing by men who proceed by question and answer without ill will, with a sudden flash there shines forth understanding about every problem, and an intelligence whose efforts reach the furthest limits of human powers. Therefore every man of worth, when dealing with matters of worth, will be far from exposing them to ill feeling and misunderstanding among men by committing them to writing. In one word, then, it may be known from this that, if one sees written treatises composed by anyone, either the laws of a lawgiver, or in any other form whatever, these are not for that man the things of most worth, if he is a man of worth, but that his treasures are laid up in the fairest spot that he possesses. But if these things were worked at by him as things of real worth, and committed to writing, then surely, not gods, but men "have themselves bereft him of his wits." "

[Bill Wiltrack]

.







................................................



Come on. What do you really want?



What are you here for?




Do you really want to learn more about Heidegger, or are you here to attack someone? To belittle someone?


Would that make you feel better?



Heidegger's central notion was of unconcealment throughout his life as a philosopher and its importance and continuity in his thinking, his life, and his philosophy.


You want to know more about Heidegger?


You want to understand more about Heidegger?



Practice Heidegger.


Live it.


LIVE his philosophy.




THEN you will understand him more...




.

[Impenitent]

.







................................................



Come on. What do you really want?



What are you here for?




Do you really want to learn more about Heidegger, or are you here to attack someone? To belittle someone?


Would that make you feel better?



Heidegger's central notion was of unconcealment throughout his life as a philosopher and its importance and continuity in his thinking, his life, and his philosophy.


You want to know more about Heidegger?


You want to understand more about Heidegger?



Practice Heidegger.


Live it.


LIVE his philosophy.




THEN you will understand him more...




.

you realize that you have just told this person to become a nazi ...

show us another picture

-Imp

[Arising_uk]

you realize that you have just told this person to become a nazi ...

-Imp

What a ridiculous statement imp, I'm surprised at you.

[Arising_uk]

Heidegger's central notion was of unconcealment throughout his life as a philosopher and its importance and continuity in his thinking, his life, and his philosophy.

Where'd you plagiarize this one from Bill?

Care to say what you understand by his notion?

[John]

Heidegger's central notion was of unconcealment throughout his life as a philosopher and its importance and continuity in his thinking, his life, and his philosophy.

Where'd you plagiarize this one from Bill?

Shares more than a passing resemblance to this quote from Wiki doesn't it?

Mark Wrathall argued that Heidegger pursued and refined the central notion of unconcealment throughout his life as a philosopher. Its importance and continuity in his thinking, Wrathall states, shows that he did not have a 'turn'.

[nothingdoing]

In any-case, all this petty blather aside, should anyone want to explore the raveling of the trip, by questioning, to the sight of the capacities of our current being, feel free to send me a message.

Those silly beggars of statements about 'existentialism', which was, by the way, repugnant to Heidegger, and chitchat on whether or not Heidegger had a turn or if truth as unconcealment was more or less central then some other bit, however interesting to the burgeoning member of the Heidegger society, are not of much interest to me, except that they be attacked as living dialectic and not as apodictic encyclopedic fodder. To put it in a figure, the journey from the Piraeus to the Agora and back to the Sea is what one might direct oneself to.

[chaz wyman]

In any-case, all this petty blather aside, should anyone want to explore the raveling of the trip, by questioning, to the sight of the capacities of our current being, feel free to send me a message.

Those silly beggars of statements about 'existentialism', which was, by the way, repugnant to Heidegger, and chitchat on whether or not Heidegger had a turn or if truth as unconcealment was more or less central then some other bit, however interesting to the burgeoning member of the Heidegger society, are not of much interest to me, except that they be attacked as living dialectic and not as apodictic encyclopedic fodder. To put it in a figure, the journey from the Piraeus to the Agora and back to the Sea is what one might direct oneself to.

You will not get anywhere pretending that H did not peddle an existentialist philosophy.
The concept of Dasein was almost a carbon copy of mainly French existentialism.
If he really claimed it was 'repugnant' it was either because he wanted to distance himself from a philosophy he was mimicking; or because he wanted to colonise territory claimed by the left with his own right wing agenda.

[nothingdoing]

That's all wrongheaded. Sartre watered his - decidedly left wing - mélange of ideas & work with what he found in Heidegger's Being and Time. Having an influence on an existentialist philosopher is not being one! Foucault - who can hardly count as right wing - died saying he owed everything to Heidegger.

You might as well put an automatist's prejudice machine against Anglo-American academics like Simon Critchley who hold the passport & papers of barbarous and murderous regimes. Being verbally against - whilst enjoying the fruit of - a monstrous regime. Yet, unlike these armchair critics we see today, Heidegger, at peril to himself and his legacy as is clear, attempted to use his influence as a famous and popular professor against a growing immensity of hate.

This tomfoolery about philosophical history has nothing to to with the fundamental work at hand. So, alas, I must take my leave. Thanks for the time.

[chaz wyman]

That's all wrongheaded. Sartre watered his - decidedly left wing - mélange of ideas & work with what he found in Heidegger's Being and Time. Having an influence on an existentialist philosopher is not being one! Foucault - who can hardly count as right wing - died saying he owed everything to Heidegger.

Do you have a reference for that?


You might as well put an automatist's prejudice machine against Anglo-American academics like Simon Critchley who hold the passport & papers of barbarous and murderous regimes. Being verbally against - whilst enjoying the fruit of - a monstrous regime. Yet, unlike these armchair critics we see today, Heidegger, at peril to himself and his legacy as is clear, attempted to use his influence as a famous and popular professor against a growing immensity of hate.

Is that why he volunteered and joined the Nazi party?


This tomfoolery about philosophical history has nothing to to with the fundamental work at hand. So, alas, I must take my leave. Thanks for the time.