Why search for moral objectivity?

[FlashDangerpants]

There's a lot of conversation going in circles hereabouts, I propose we point the circle the other way round for a little while to see if we can break it.

So my question is not imediately one of what would make morality objective, but rather one of why we would want to have the objectivity at all, what function does objectivity perform for us that we value it so? If we can be sure of that point, I believe we can show a good reason why we would discard as worthless some of the pseudo-objectivity options that are placed before us such as this whole KFC thing.

As an opener, I offer this: We value objectivity because it provides a reliable basis for saying not only that X is so, but also that not X is not so, and that this is useful because the objective quality of the proposition is what makes it something which both parties to the conversation can validate by reference to the same evidence.

So I propose that if somebody offers a version of moral objectivity that does not support the conclusion that people with the wrong moral beliefs can be shown the error of their beliefs by reference to the same data that informs us they are mistaken, then objectivity has been diluted somehow and the value of this ersatz alternative is reduced, perhaps to zero.

Ergo, any proposed solution to Pete's notorious "what could make morality objective" question must in my view be able to pass this test before it could possibly be considered a candidate to answer that other question.

There should probably be other tests. What can we think of?

[Impenitent]

in the hope to alleviate moral certainty behind the current conflict

-Imp

[phyllo]

Why search for moral objectivity?

Because moral objectivity is the best behavior in any situation. It's like knowing the best move in a game.

[FlashDangerpants]

Why search for moral objectivity?

Because moral objectivity is the best behavior in any situation. It's like knowing the best move in a game.

Is that what I want? Or do I secretly just want for my own set of preferences to be the ones that everyone has to live by?

I've certainly never witnessed anybody who is looking for this moral certainty thiung who shows any appetite for finding out their own beliefs aren't already correct. So is it not perhaps the case that we want the objectivity because it allows us to say other people are wrong, but we might not want it so much if it says we are wrong?

[Gary Childress]

Why search for moral objectivity?

Because moral objectivity is the best behavior in any situation. It's like knowing the best move in a game.

Is that what I want? Or do I secretly just want for my own set of preferences to be the ones that everyone has to live by?

I've certainly never witnessed anybody who is looking for this moral certainty thiung who shows any appetite for finding out their own beliefs aren't already correct. So is it not perhaps the case that we want the objectivity because it allows us to say other people are wrong, but we might not want it so much if it says we are wrong?

Fair point. Can the idea of moral subjectivity be a way of hiding our own immorality by dispensing with the idea that there is any universal morality?

[Atla]

Throughout history, it never even occured to 90%+ of people that morality could be anything other than objective. Such a concept, such a possibility didn't even exist for them. Wanting it / valuing it / searching for it, didn't enter the picture for them.

[phyllo]

Is that what I want? Or do I secretly just want for my own set of preferences to be the ones that everyone has to live by?

If you're only concerned about your own preferences then you're not talking about morality, because morality is also about what other people need and want.

I've certainly never witnessed anybody who is looking for this moral certainty thiung who shows any appetite for finding out their own beliefs aren't already correct. So is it not perhaps the case that we want the objectivity because it allows us to say other people are wrong, but we might not want it so much if it says we are wrong?

I have found that people often seek justice and fairness even when it 'costs' them personally. That's also true for people who have historically searched for objective morality.

But maybe you live in an area where that is not the case. I don't know.

[promethean75]

My instinct and training in psychology tells me there are additional reasons for the attraction to moral objectivity felt by philosophers.

If u'll notice, only being at odds in ethical theory will a philosophical matter be taken personally. For instance, u'd never be angry at me or disappointed or embarrassed (for u or me) if we were in disagreement over Kripke's criticism of Wittgenstein. But if one or the other of us was a thief or a rapist or a republican, the other would be immediately at odds with the other in more than just some arbitrary impersonal way... like over a dispute in logic or the rules of inference.

This being the case, the philosopher wants what he believes is true and good to be objective so u too can believe it and know it. But why? Becuz disagreement in ethics creates that personal feeling of contempt between those who disagree here. It isn't simply a theoretical matter but a real, lived existential matter. Your neighbor decides to have an abortion. U call her a murderer and never talk to ger again. Here, if anywhere, is objective agreement more desired than anywhere else. If u could only have one and only one philosophical agreement with your neighbor, it'd be about sumthin like murder and abortion is wrong.

I surmise that the drive behind objectivity in the most important matters philosophical is actually the expression of the social instinct to cooperate before and instead of attacking, if possible.

When a philosopher offers u his moral theory, what he's really saying is 'here are my boundaries' and 'u can agree with me and stay off my shit list, if u choose'.

Guy couldn't care less whether or not he has the objective truth. Not really. What he wants is others to abstain from doing and/or endorsing things that offend him... like having abortions, or eating animals, or owning guns, or homosexuality, etc.

And while he can't be indubitably certain that these things are bad, he is most absolutely certain that they offend him, and that is enough.

[FlashDangerpants]

Because moral objectivity is the best behavior in any situation. It's like knowing the best move in a game.

Is that what I want? Or do I secretly just want for my own set of preferences to be the ones that everyone has to live by?

I've certainly never witnessed anybody who is looking for this moral certainty thiung who shows any appetite for finding out their own beliefs aren't already correct. So is it not perhaps the case that we want the objectivity because it allows us to say other people are wrong, but we might not want it so much if it says we are wrong?

Fair point. Can the idea of moral subjectivity be a way of hiding our own immorality by dispensing with the idea that there is any universal morality?

So far as I can see, anybody who proposes any particular type of moral theory can at that time sweep whatever they like under the carpet as they go and objective/subjective divides are neither here nor there.

For an example, look at what Jacobi has been doing for the last couple of months with his "Christian civilization" thread. The whole point of that is to eventually identify the Western pivot to individualism in place of communitarian obligations that took place in the Enlightenment era, and then to roll that back so that there canbe a new commitment to coumminty and the preservation of races. I may be skipping ahead by 3 or 4 hundred pages, but the point of it all is for you to come to the realisation that nazi shit is good shit. Sadly the train is too boring to ever reach the destination.

Jacobi can attempt all that without having the slightest idea what moral objectivity is because the idea of such objectivity is quite artificial really.

[FlashDangerpants]

Throughout history, it never even occured to 90%+ of people that morality could be anything other than objective. Such a concept, such a possibility didn't even exist for them. Wanting it / valuing it / searching for it, didn't enter the picture for them.

Those people lived in little mud villages where everyone just knew that everything their priest or imam told them was true and there was no need or right to ever doubt anything. Indoor toilets didn't enter the picture for them. Theior concerns were entirely parochial.

But you make a point. They had moral certainty even without resorting to any distinction between objectivity and subjectivity, because they had a whole set of moral beliefs that were impervious to doubt. That inubitable moral claim might be that once a man sold his 12 year old daughter to a neighbour then she became that man's property and her duties in the bedroom were those of a wife. But if you told them that was wrong, you would get dipped upside down in a river until you stopped saying evil things.

We often confuse these moral positions which we are unable to doubt with the product of objective observation. Is there a pressing subset of our moral beliefs that must not be doubted for fear of cognitive dissonance perhaps, and do we look to the concept of objectivity to enclose that set of beliefs in curtain walls?

[Skepdick]

There's a lot of conversation going in circles hereabouts, I propose we point the circle the other way round for a little while to see if we can break it.

So my question is not imediately one of what would make morality objective, but rather one of why we would want to have the objectivity at all, what function does objectivity perform for us that we value it so? If we can be sure of that point, I believe we can show a good reason why we would discard as worthless some of the pseudo-objectivity options that are placed before us such as this whole KFC thing.

As an opener, I offer this: We value objectivity because it provides a reliable basis for saying not only that X is so, but also that not X is not so, and that this is useful because the objective quality of the proposition is what makes it something which both parties to the conversation can validate by reference to the same evidence.

So I propose that if somebody offers a version of moral objectivity that does not support the conclusion that people with the wrong moral beliefs can be shown the error of their beliefs by reference to the same data that informs us they are mistaken, then objectivity has been diluted somehow and the value of this ersatz alternative is reduced, perhaps to zero.

Ergo, any proposed solution to Pete's notorious "what could make morality objective" question must in my view be able to pass this test before it could possibly be considered a candidate to answer that other question.

There should probably be other tests. What can we think of?

You are chasing your own tail.

All you've done with your "validate by reference to the same evidence" is you've re-invented verificationism.

How could we validate by reference that morality is not objective?

The pursuit of moral objectivity is identical with the pursuit of objective meaning because the general case of X and not-X is the fundamental instrument of the philosopher. The ability to draw distinctions.

Tests? What's the difference between a test and a non-test? This still falls into the X vs non-X pattern.

Round and round the marry go round...

[FlashDangerpants]

Is that what I want? Or do I secretly just want for my own set of preferences to be the ones that everyone has to live by?

If you're only concerned about your own preferences then you're not talking about morality, because morality is also about what other people need and want.

I've certainly never witnessed anybody who is looking for this moral certainty thiung who shows any appetite for finding out their own beliefs aren't already correct. So is it not perhaps the case that we want the objectivity because it allows us to say other people are wrong, but we might not want it so much if it says we are wrong?

I have found that people often seek justice and fairness even when it 'costs' them personally. That's also true for people who have historically searched for objective morality.

But maybe you live in an area where that is not the case. I don't know.

I've also seen people pursue justice or fairness when it costs them personally, that is a commonplace thing that you see every day if you pay any attention at all. But who are these people who have searched for objective morality only to find out their own prior beliefs had been mistaken?

I submit that if you find any example, it will be undermined by some attempt to reconcile their prejudices with the findings of the theory. For example, see Kant on the question of whether it is moral to shoot a dog.

[phyllo]

I've also seen people pursue justice or fairness when it costs them personally, that is a commonplace thing that you see every day if you pay any attention at all. But who are these people who have searched for objective morality only to find out their own prior beliefs had been mistaken?

Happen to people who find God or find religion or switch religions. They certainly don't retain all their prior beliefs.

I submit that if you find any example, it will be undermined by some attempt to reconcile their prejudices with the findings of the theory.

This seems to suggest that people don't change their beliefs.

[FlashDangerpants]

I've also seen people pursue justice or fairness when it costs them personally, that is a commonplace thing that you see every day if you pay any attention at all. But who are these people who have searched for objective morality only to find out their own prior beliefs had been mistaken?

Happen to people who find God or find religion or switch religions. They certainly don't retain all their prior beliefs.

I submit that if you find any example, it will be undermined by some attempt to reconcile their prejudices with the findings of the theory.

This seems to suggest that people don't change their beliefs.

Do people really change core beliefs very often? And if so, what is the actual mechanism involved? Do they discover some authentic new truth about the universe that compels them to alter their beliefs or do they just get persuaded of something?

[Skepdick]

Do people really change core beliefs very often? And if so, what is the actual mechanism involved? Do they discover some authentic new truth about the universe that compels them to alter their beliefs or do they just get persuaded of something?

How's persuasion even supposed to work? Why should anything anyone says change anyone's beliefs about anything without some a priori assumption on the quality of beliefs?

If morality isn't objective - what's wrong with having "false" beliefs?