FDP has a Cognitive Moral Deficit in Morality

[FlashDangerpants]

I am relying what is the typical definition of a moral skeptic.

You don't understand it either way.

[Atla]

I have argued,
There are Two Senses of 'What is Fact'
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39587
1. The FSRC sense,
2. The philosophical realist's sense which is grounded on an illusion.

Example;
Empathy [in a way, not totally] is an objective moral FSRC fact.
Empathy exists as a neural state and potential within the brain and human self.
Therefore there are objective moral FSRC fact within the brain and human self.

1. Wrong, your entire philosophy is fundamentally broken. Even if an FSRC-antirealism is the case, that doesn't mean that we don't still have to divide morality into subjective and objective views on morality. That's why Google gives 0 hits.

(2. You don't know it's an illusion, you just hope so, so anyone who is competent will know just from this too that you're incompetent.)

[Skepdick]

1. Wrong, your entire philosophy is fundamentally broken. Even if an FSRC-antirealism is the case, that doesn't mean that we don't still have to divide morality into subjective and objective views on morality. That's why Google gives 0 hits.

Your entire existence seems wrong.

Distinctions matter. Some distinctions matter more than others.

You seem to think that the subjective/objective distinction matters more than the moral/immoral distinction.

[Atla]

You are actually much worse off than I ever realised.

If he studies morality intensely for 19 more years, and we support him all the way, he might just in the end reach the level of moral understanding, that the average adolescent automatically reaches. Better late then never.

[Atla]

1. Wrong, your entire philosophy is fundamentally broken. Even if an FSRC-antirealism is the case, that doesn't mean that we don't still have to divide morality into subjective and objective views on morality. That's why Google gives 0 hits.

Your entire existence seems wrong.

Distinctions matter. Some distinctions matter more than others.

You seem to think that the subjective/objective distinction matters more than the moral/immoral distinction.

Word salad

[Skepdick]

Word salad

When are you going to grab the dressing, salad brain?

[Atla]

Word salad

When are you going to grab the dressing, salad brain?

word salad

[Veritas Aequitas]

Other than what is detailed in S4.7 in the OP

The final sections of Boyd's S4.7 summarized why;
FDP has a Cognitive Moral Deficit in Morality

We are now in a position to see why the morally unconcerned person, the person for whom moral facts are motivationally irrelevant, probably suffers a cognitive deficit with respect to moral reasoning.

Such a person would have to be deficient in sympathy [empathy], because the motivational role of sympathy [empathy] is precisely to make moral facts motivationally relevant.

In consequence, she or he would be deficient with respect to a cognitive capacity (sympathy [empathy]) which is ordinarily important for the correct assessment of moral facts.

The motivational deficiency would, as a matter of contingent fact about human psychology, be a cognitive deficiency as well.

FDP is a self-declared Moral Skeptic;

That in itself might be a problem, because we are in danger of agreeing on some stuff and I am a moral skeptic of some sort....
viewtopic.php?p=559314#p559314

Moral skepticism is a class of meta-ethical theories all members of which entail that no one has any moral knowledge.
Many moral skeptics also make the stronger, modal claim that moral knowledge is impossible.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_skepticism

As per the definition of 'moral skepticism' FDP would thus be "morally unconcerned person" the person for whom moral facts are motivationally irrelevant, thus according to the article in OP and the summary above, suffers a cognitive [perceptual] moral deficit.

In addition, FDP is a moral fact denier, i.e. deny moral facts exist at all, while Boyd argued and indicated above, there are moral facts.

FDP keep insisting I have misinterpreted Boyd but he did not give sufficient justifications instead relied on some cherry picked sentences which are not significant to the issue plus picking other side issues.

FDP, I suggest you scrutinize every sentence of S4.7 and show me where I am wrong.

[Atla]

Other than what is detailed in S4.7 in the OP

The final sections of Boyd's S4.7 summarized why;

facepalm

Richard Boyd wrote in the essay "How to be a moral realist" the following: "We are now in a position to see why the morally unconcerned person, the person for whom moral facts are motivationally irrelevant, probably suffers a cognitive deficit with respect to moral reasoning."

Richard Boyd, in his essay "How to be a moral realist," argues that individuals who are morally unconcerned, meaning they do not find moral facts to be motivationally relevant, likely suffer from a cognitive deficit in moral reasoning. This implies that there may be a deficiency in their ability to engage with moral concepts or make morally informed decisions due to their lack of motivation from moral considerations. Boyd suggests that moral motivation plays a crucial role in moral reasoning and decision-making, and individuals who lack such motivation may not fully grasp or engage with moral reasoning in the same way as those who do find moral facts to be motivationally relevant.

Does that mean that everyone who denies objective moral facts, is morally unconcerned?

No, not necessarily. Richard Boyd's argument doesn't directly imply that everyone who denies objective moral facts is morally unconcerned. Rather, he suggests that individuals who are morally unconcerned, meaning they do not find moral facts to be motivationally relevant, may suffer from a cognitive deficit in moral reasoning.

There can be various reasons why someone denies the existence of objective moral facts. Some people might deny them because they adhere to moral relativism, moral subjectivism, or other philosophical positions. Others might simply not have considered the question deeply or may not be aware of philosophical debates about the nature of morality.

It's possible for individuals who deny the existence of objective moral facts to still be morally concerned or motivated by other considerations, such as social norms, personal values, or empathy. So, while Boyd's argument highlights a potential cognitive deficit in those who lack moral motivation, it doesn't necessarily imply that everyone who denies objective moral facts falls into this category.

[Veritas Aequitas]

FDP is a moral skeptic and deny objective moral facts thus has a cognitive moral deficit as claimed in Boyd's S4.7.

[Skepdick]

Word salad

When are you going to grab the dressing, salad brain?

word salad

Shame, ChatGPT is stuck. Maybe we should give it a kick?

[Atla]

FDP is a moral skeptic and deny objective moral facts thus has a cognitive moral deficit as claimed in Boyd's S4.7.

Funnily enough, VA's God [with reservations] claims two opposite things, in response to the same question (in bold):

1.

What is the most general meaning of moral skepticism?

The most general meaning of moral skepticism is the philosophical position that questions or doubts the possibility of objective moral truths or the existence of moral knowledge. Moral skeptics may hold various views regarding morality, but they typically argue that moral claims lack a foundation in objective reality, or that our moral judgments are ultimately subjective or culturally relative. Moral skepticism can manifest in different forms, such as moral nihilism (the belief that moral claims are meaningless or nonexistent), moral relativism (the belief that moral judgments are relative to cultural, societal, or individual perspectives), or moral subjectivism (the belief that moral judgments are based solely on individual feelings or attitudes).

Do moral skeptics who deny objective moral facts, have a cognitive moral deficit?

No, moral skeptics who deny the existence of objective moral facts do not necessarily have a cognitive moral deficit. Instead, their position reflects a philosophical stance on the nature of morality and moral knowledge. Moral skepticism arises from a variety of philosophical considerations, including epistemological concerns about how we acquire moral knowledge, metaphysical considerations about the nature of reality, and the interpretation of moral language and concepts.

Moral skeptics may argue that our moral judgments are based on subjective preferences, cultural influences, evolutionary processes, or other non-objective factors. They may also question the coherence or justification of claims to objective moral truths. However, this skepticism does not imply a cognitive deficit. It represents a philosophical position that engages with complex questions about the nature of morality and our ability to make moral judgments. It's important to recognize that holding a moral skeptic position doesn't imply a deficiency in cognitive faculties but rather reflects a particular viewpoint on the nature of morality and moral knowledge.

Did Richard Boyd claim that moral skeptics who deny objective moral facts have a cognitive moral deficit?

No, Richard Boyd did not claim that moral skeptics who deny objective moral facts have a cognitive moral deficit. In fact, Boyd's influential work in metaethics, particularly his theory of moral realism known as "moral naturalism," does not entail such a claim.

Boyd's moral naturalism posits that moral properties are natural properties that can be investigated empirically. He argues that moral facts are real and objective, but they are grounded in natural properties rather than supernatural or metaphysical entities. Boyd's position is a form of moral realism, which asserts the existence of objective moral truths.

It's essential to distinguish between Boyd's position and the concept of moral skepticism. While Boyd defends moral realism, moral skepticism involves questioning or denying the existence of objective moral facts. Moral skeptics may adopt various positions, including moral nihilism, moral relativism, or moral subjectivism, but their skepticism doesn't inherently imply a cognitive deficit.

In summary, Richard Boyd's moral naturalism aligns with moral realism and does not entail the belief that moral skeptics have a cognitive moral deficit.

----------------------------------------

2.

Did Richard Boyd claim that moral skeptics who deny objective moral facts have a cognitive moral deficit?

Richard Boyd, a prominent philosopher, did indeed argue that moral skeptics who deny the existence of objective moral facts may have a cognitive moral deficit. Boyd's position, which he outlines in his influential work "How to be a Moral Realist," suggests that there are good reasons to believe in the existence of objective moral facts, and that those who deny them may be lacking in some cognitive capacity or understanding.

Boyd's argument is complex and nuanced, but he essentially contends that our moral intuitions and practices strongly suggest the existence of objective moral truths. He argues that moral skepticism, while intellectually defensible to some extent, fails to adequately account for the compelling nature of moral experience and judgment.

However, it's important to note that Boyd's argument does not necessarily imply a moral deficiency on the part of skeptics, but rather a deficit in their understanding or appreciation of moral reality as he sees it. His position is subject to debate and criticism, as is typical in philosophy. Different scholars and philosophers may have different interpretations of Boyd's arguments and their implications for moral skepticism.

Well he's dead now so we can't ask him.

[Atla]

When are you going to grab the dressing, salad brain?

word salad

Shame, ChatGPT is stuck. Maybe we should give it a kick?

Yeah you should give your ChatGPT a kick, and then post its responses as if they were yours. Your comments would make 5000% more sense.

[Skepdick]

word salad

Shame, ChatGPT is stuck. Maybe we should give it a kick?

Yeah you should give your ChatGPT a kick, and then post its responses as if they were yours. Your comments would make 5000% more sense.

Have you considered using ChatGPT in the following manner?

"Hey, ChatGPT please can you explain this complex idea in a way my salad brain can comprehend it...."

There's no shame in using Artificial Intelligence to augment your Natural Stupidity.

[Atla]

Shame, ChatGPT is stuck. Maybe we should give it a kick?

Yeah you should give your ChatGPT a kick, and then post its responses as if they were yours. Your comments would make 5000% more sense.

Have you considered using ChatGPT in the following manner?

"Hey, ChatGPT please can you explain this complex idea in a way my salad brain can comprehend it...."

You copy-pasted that line from your ChatGPT tab, didn't you. But not even ChatGPT can do that for you.