A crucial difference between scientific realists and constructionists is that
whereas the realists see nature and society as the causes that explain the outcomes of scientific enquiry,
for the constructionists the activity of scientists and engineers and of all their human and non-human allies is the cause, of which various states of nature and societies are the consequence.
(Callon & Latour 1992: 350–1).
The above are not frivolous philosophical points but the fundamentals had been argued seriously amongst philosophers since philosophy first emerged.https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rela ... #RelAboSci
Social Constructionism
Social constructionism is a particularly radical form of conceptual Relativism with implications for our understanding of the methodology and subject matter of the sciences.
According to social constructionism, Nature as studied by scientists does not come carved at its joints (to use Pato’s metaphor from Phaedrus: 265d–266a).
Reality—with its objects, entities, properties and categories—is not simply “out there” to be discovered only by empirical investigation or observation;
rather, it is constructed through a variety of norm-governed socially sanctioned cognitive activities such as interpretation, description, manipulation of data, etc.
Social constructionism has relativistic consequences insofar as it claims that different social forces lead to the construction of different “worlds” and that there is no neutral ground for adjudicating between them.
The “Science Studies” approach of Bruno Latour is a prime example of constructionism with relativistic consequences.
Latour and Woolgar (1986) have argued that so-called “scientific facts” and the “truths” of Science emerge out of social and conceptual practices and inevitably bear their imprints.
This is because the very idea of a mind-independent reality open to scientific study, or as they call it “out-there-ness”, itself is the consequence of scientific work rather than the cause.
A crucial difference between scientific realists and constructionists is that
whereas the realists see nature and society as the causes that explain the outcomes of scientific enquiry,
for the constructionists the activity of scientists and engineers and of all their human and non-human allies is the cause, of which various states of nature and societies are the consequence.
(Callon & Latour 1992: 350–1).
Scientific theories are also products of socially constituted practices.
They are contextually specific constructions which bear the mark of the situated contingency and interest structure of the process by which they are generated.
(Knorr-Cetina 1981: 226).
So called “scientific facts” and “natural kinds”, the primary subjects of scientific investigation are, at least in part, the products of the contingent social and epistemic norms that define the very subject matter of Science.
It may be argued that the view, if taken literally, entails a counter-intuitive form of backward causation to the effect that,
for instance,
the scientific facts about dinosaur anatomy 50 million years ago were caused in the 20th century when a scientific consensus about dinosaur anatomy was formed (see Boghossian 2006a).
But constructionism, at least in its most extreme form, accepts this consequence,
insisting that there are indeed no facts except for socially constructed ones, created and modified at particular times and places courtesy of prevailing theoretical and conceptual frameworks.
Note Protagoras [420-490 BCE].
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