Apology to Alexis Jacobi

[Gary Childress]

I apologize for becoming vicious in my replies.

[Wizard22]

Gary, I feel you have a good heart, but are severely misguided...

Alexis, what say you? What is your final ruling here?

[Alexis Jacobi]

I did not notice anything that seems vicious.

And as per the usual I would make the observation that it is less our *heart* that matters and more the cold and hard set of value-definitions that we recognize and value.

One of the issues and it is a big one today is the notion that what an individual experiences and *feels* is a primary value set in and of itself. What feels right and what seems right is not necessarily really right.

Intellect in this sense stands over emotion and feeling. I do recognize that I say that because I have been influenced to think this way by accepting a metaphysics that is not widely appreciated nor accepted.

[promethean75]

"What feels right and what seems right is not necessarily really right."

Could there ever even be a case of someone believing what is really right without it 'feeling' or 'seeming' right?

Isn't what is 'really right' just a dominant feeling or judgement (at the time) itself?

What i mean is, how could u know that u got to the 'necessarily really right' and not just another feeling or seeming right?

That's my beef with Socrates, and N's beef too. Pretending there is such a thing as pure sagelike indifference for the sake of truth. Socrates cared less for 'finding the truth' and more for the skill of debate and the feeling of intellectual superiority and authority that provides. He was an erotic. It was all sport to him.

All philosophers past the age of twenty seven or so are ruled intellectually by their passions... the philosophies that attracted them the most and to which they began to identify (with) are what create the prejudices and biases that will structure all their philosophical thinking. So anytime they come upon a question of what is 'necessarily really right', that strong philosophical orientation they are predisposed to and impassioned by, will be the standard of measure. Buy it always feels and seems right, whatever it may be.

[Alexis Jacobi]

I do not think I have a perspective or position that could answer the question or the problem. If I refer to, and believe in, the reality and existence of metaphysical moral categories, and these are non-tangible and only accessible through the realization of some sort of metaphysical spark that *self-ignites* and awakens some *realization* that cannot but be faced, recognized and responded to, I would be speaking in terms you cannot accept.

So then I guess it resolves down to *communities of shared value* and also those education-processes that produce thinking people. People who have ideas about values, define and defend them with their various arguments, and agree to live in community of some sort.

What I think we have to see is that we are now, quite obviously, in the midst of wide-scale and far-ranging value conflicts.

Who can encapsulate what is happening or why? Anyone who *sees* (and says anything) does so in accord with defined values. And people do not, and perhaps cannot, agree.

[Walker]

I apologize for becoming vicious in my replies.

Apology accepted, without rubbing your nose in it. 'Nuff said.

[Alexis Jacobi]

Not quite right: no apology was offered because none were needed.

[Walker]

Not quite right: no apology was offered because none were needed.

On the contrary ...

I apologize ...

[Walker]

Not quite right: no apology was offered because none were needed.

Perhaps you should apologize to Gary for attempting to invalide his personal, introspective perceptions by saying no apology was necessary to whatever he's referencing, although as a sensitive and kindly soul he likely thinks no apology from you for the attempted invalidation is necessary, especially in an environment that aims to objectively falsify assumptions, hypotheticals, and premises.

[Alexis Jacobi]

I have a different ethical framework, I think, from you. If I say to someone apologizing "No apology asked for or needed" that undercuts (to use an expression) the need for an apology. If the apologizer still feels they must apologize that is their own business. I do not have anything to do with it.

This: "Perhaps you should apologize to Gary for attempting to invalidate his personal, introspective perceptions by saying no apology was necessary" is according to my ethical system, absurd.

I would not do that because it turn Gary into some sort of child. I do not really care a rat's ass about his feelings. Nor should anyone.

Please note that there are ethical principles in operation here, but different to those you hold to.

AJ: Not quite right: no apology was offered because none were needed.

Sorry, I meant to write that no apology was accepted because none were required. My mistake.

[Walker]

Not quite.

- Gary's need to apologize is his own need.
- The apology is a request for, forgiveness.
- Gary perceives that he must be forgiven, by you.

- You deny him forgiveness by invalidating his need.
- This denies him what he needs.

- And, why would you do that?
- Because you need to tell Gary you're above being affected by what Gary thinks is vicious.
- Gary couldn't possible ruffle your balance, could he.
- You want that known.

- You invalidate Gary in the name of self-concept, when it's so easy not to.

Btw: I rarely if ever apologize but when I do, it's pure sincerity, as asking forgiveness should be; as Gary did ... or so I would like to think.

[Walker]

Upside Down Apology

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lwfuUyTMpVY

[Alexis Jacobi]

…

That’s called codependency, Walker.

[Iwannaplato]

I did not notice anything that seems vicious.

And as per the usual I would make the observation that it is less our *heart* that matters and more the cold and hard set of value-definitions that we recognize and value.

Aren't our values, ultimately founded on heart, feeling emotions? Do they determine at the core what we choose to value/prioritize? From there reason works out application, and then also implication: if we value X, then Y is a threat to that. From what non-emotional vantage do we form a base?

I would not do that because it turn Gary into some sort of child. I do not really care a rat's ass about his feelings. Nor should anyone.

I can understand this in the sense of: I don't care what he feels when trying to work out what is a well justified argument. But not in general. In fact it seems to go against traditional ideas in the West, and elsewhere. Certainly those influenced by the monotheisms and really any of the larger religions, even if those religions also participated in not giving a damn about certain people.

For example, Christian charity, as you once responded when I was challenging Wizard's implied concern about people he also seems to despise.

[Alexis Jacobi]

Aren't our values, ultimately founded on heart, feeling emotions? Do they determine at the core what we choose to value/prioritize? From there reason works out application, and then also implication: if we value X, then Y is a threat to that. From what non-emotional vantage do we form a base?

I draw a distinction between feelings and sentiments. For example people today are obsessed by their *feelings* -- emotions. But in contrast, and just for an example, the best poets work in the realm of ideas and sentiments.

It would be in my view enormously wrong to negate *the heart* in the sense it is often meant. But there is another side to the *heart* and I refer to the Latin concept of intellectus.

(Latin intelligere — inter and legere — to choose between, to discern; Greek nous; German Vernunft, Verstand; French intellect; Italian intelletto).

The faculty of thought. As understood in Catholic philosophical literature it signifies the higher, spiritual, cognitive power of the soul. It is in this view awakened to action by sense, but transcends the latter in range. Amongst its functions are attention, conception, judgment, reasoning, reflection, and self-consciousness. All these modes of activity exhibit a distinctly suprasensuous element, and reveal a cognitive faculty of a higher order than is required for mere sense-cognitions. In harmony, therefore, with Catholic usage, we reserve the terms intellect, intelligence, and intellectual to this higher power and its operations, although many modern psychologists are wont, with much resulting confusion, to extend the application of these terms so as to include sensuous forms of the cognitive process. By thus restricting the use of these terms, the inaccuracy of such phrases as "animal intelligence" is avoided. Before such language may be legitimately employed, it should be shown that the lower animals are endowed with genuinely rational faculties, fundamentally one in kind with those of man. Catholic philosophers, however they differ on minor points, as a general body have held that intellect is a spiritual faculty depending extrinsically, but not intrinsically, on the bodily organism. The importance of a right theory of intellect is twofold: on account of its bearing on epistemology, or the doctrine of knowledge; and because of its connexion with the question of the spirituality of the soul.