My thesis is that Isaiah Berlin's agreement and adoption [not completely] of Kant's theory of categories can be extended to the concept of a Framework and System of Realization of Reality and Knowledge [FSRC].
From the above, Berlin can meet midway with the concept of the FSRC, i.e.Berlin’s approach combined a sceptical empiricism with neo-Kantianism to offer a defence of philosophy. Like Vico and Wilhelm Dilthey, as well as neo-Kantians such as Heinrich Rickert and Wilhelm Windelband, Berlin insisted on the fundamental difference between the sciences and the humanities.
...
In the case of non-philosophical questions, even if the answer is unknown, the means for discovering the answer is known, or accepted, by most people. Thus questions of empirical fact can be answered by observation. Other questions can be answered deductively, by referring to established rules: this is the case, for example, with mathematics, grammar and formal logic. For example, even if we do not know the solution to a difficult mathematical problem, we do know the rules and techniques that should lead us to the answer.
Berlin related this view to Kant’s distinction between matters of fact and those conceptual structures and categories that we use to make sense of facts.
Philosophy, being concerned with questions that arise from our attempts to make sense of our experiences, involves consideration of the concepts and categories through which experience is perceived, organised and explained.
While Kant saw these organising categories as fixed and universal, Berlin believed that they are, to different degrees, varying, transient or malleable. ‘All our categories are, in theory, subject to change’ (2002b, 144, note 1).
No categories are wholly prior to, or independent of, experience, even though in practice some of them are pragmatically fixed, whether by the world or by our minds or both. Rather, the ideas in terms of which we make sense of the world are closely tied up with our experiences: they shape those experiences, and are shaped by them, and as experience varies from one time and place to another, so do basic concepts.[2]
Recognition of the basic concepts and categories of human experience differs both from the acquisition of empirical information and from deductive reasoning, for the categories are logically prior to, presupposed by, both.
Philosophy, then, is the study of the ‘thought-spectacles’ through which we view the world; and since at least some of these change over time, at least some philosophy is necessarily historical.
Because these categories are so important to every aspect of our experience, philosophy – even if it is always tentative and often seems abstract and esoteric – is a crucially important activity, which responds to the vital, ineradicable human need to describe and explain the world of experience.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/berlin/#ConcPhil
Whatever is experienced & knowledge is contingent upon the human-based Framework and System of Categories thus FSC;
on the other hand I have extended to the FSC back the FSR.
I have not read enough of Berlin to assess whether his philosophy could extend to the FSR and Kant impliedly had.
FDP, I believe this view of Berlin's contradict with your view of what is fact?Berlin related this view to Kant’s distinction between matters of fact and those conceptual structures and categories that we use to make sense of facts.
In this case, what is fact is influenced by the subject.
The irony is FDP maintained that Rorty insisted Kant made a mistake, his recommended Berlin gladly accepted Kant's ideas.
The above is a rough presentation, thus need more details.
Discuss??
Views??
