FSRK = Language Games?

[Veritas Aequitas]

I am not saying the FSRK is precisely the same as Language Games in forms but merely in substance, i.e. the principles involved.

The later-Wittgenstein argued, against formal logic, that categories such as game could not be characterized using necessary and sufficient conditions but were, instead, defined by family resemblances.

His notion of a language-game preserves the common Thought as Language metaphor, but challenges the notion that meaning can be given in terms of the objective world.

A language-game is a Self-contained system of thought and action and is based on a "form of life" that can only be characterized in terms of what people do and think, how they live - and not in objective mind- and body- free terms.
Philosophy in the Flesh

My FSRK is also a self-contained [with a Framework] System of thought and action that based on a "form of life" that can only be characterized in terms of what people do and think, how they live - and not in objective mind- and body- free terms.

In a way, the language game is a embodied human-based linguistic FSRK that generate linguistic knowledge.

As such, those who agree with the later-Wittgenstein should be able to reconcile to the concept of a language game in terms of principles to that of an FSRK of which the scientific FSRK is the most credible and objective.

Discuss??
Views??

[Veritas Aequitas]

Notes:

Here is one interpretation of 'On Certainty' which aligns with my FSRC.

Wittgenstein’s On Certainty and Relativism
Martin Kusch
I shall give my own interpretation of On Certainty in relation to epistemic relativism.
I now shall try to give a brief summary of these arguments.
I begin with the “pro” case and shall focus on three authors, Paul Boghossian, Anthony Grayling and Rudolf Haller.

Features of an Epistemic System or Practice
(1) Dependence: A belief has an epistemic status (as epistemically justified or unjustified) only relative to an epistemic system or practice (=SP). (Cf. Williams 2007, p. 94).
(2) Plurality: There are, have been, or could be, more than one such epistemic system or practice.
(3) Exclusiveness: SPs are exclusive of one another.

SP is not exactly the same with my FSRC, but the fundamental is the same, i.e. there is the Framework and System underlying it.

You [FDP] asked me to refer to A C Grayling's video re Wittgenstein, but according to Kusch, Grayling is in the pro Epistemic Relativism and Practice camp which I argue aligns with my FSRC;

Grayling and Haller cite the following paragraphs in evidence:

65. When language-games change, then there is a change in concepts, and with the concepts the meanings of words change.
95. The propositions describing this world-picture might be part of a kind of mythology.
99. And the bank of the river consists partly of hard rock, subject to no alteration or only to an imperceptible one, partly of sand, which now in one place now in another gets washed away, or deposited.
166. The difficulty is to realize the groundlessness of our believing.
256. On the other hand a language game does change with time.
336. But what men consider reasonable or unreasonable changes.

§§65, 99, 256, and 336 all emphasize the occurrence of fundamental change: in language-games, concepts, word meaning, and rationality.
This for Grayling is “classically strong relativism” since it “constitutes a claim that the framework within which claims to knowledge and challenges of doubt equally make sense is such that its change can reverse what counted as either” (2001, p. 308).
§§94, 95, and 166 in turn raise the question “what if the background—e.g. your picture of the world—[were] different?” (Haller 1995, p. 229)
Does not Wittgenstein imply that there is nothing that can be said about such a scenario?
At least nothing evaluative?
It appears that “we remain without any ground for the decision between conflicting judgements based on different world pictures.” (Haller 1995, p. 230)
Boghossian suggests that it is first and foremost paragraphs §§609-612 that express a commitment to epistemic relativism (2006, p. 107):

609 Suppose we met people who … instead of the physicist … consult an oracle.
610 … —If we call this ‘wrong’ aren’t we using our language-game as a base from which to combat theirs?
611 Are we right or wrong to combat it? Of course there are all sorts of slogans which will be used to support our proceedings.
612 Where two principles clash that cannot be reconciled with one another, then each man declares the other a fool and heretic.
613 I said I would ‘combat’ the other man,—but wouldn’t I give him reasons? Certainly; but … at the end of reasons comes persuasion.
614 (Think what happens when missionaries convert natives.)

..............
Re FDP

The point is this;

1. You condemned my FSRC as useless, nonsense, stupid[?] ..
2. You are banking hard on W's language game to support your arguments [where relevant].
3. You seem to think very highly of W as the founder of your favored OLP.
4. I argue W's language is basically a subset of my FSRC.
5. Thus in condemning my FSRC you are also condemning W's language game in which you are relying to support your argument.
6. I accused you of not understanding W's On Certainty's fundamental and main theme.

[Iwannaplato]

I am not saying the FSRK is precisely the same as Language Games in forms but merely in substance, i.e. the principles involved.

The later-Wittgenstein argued, against formal logic, that categories such as game could not be characterized using necessary and sufficient conditions but were, instead, defined by family resemblances.

His notion of a language-game preserves the common Thought as Language metaphor, but challenges the notion that meaning can be given in terms of the objective world.

A language-game is a Self-contained system of thought and action and is based on a "form of life" that can only be characterized in terms of what people do and think, how they live - and not in objective mind- and body- free terms.
Philosophy in the Flesh

My FSRK is also a self-contained [with a Framework] System of thought and action that based on a "form of life" that can only be characterized in terms of what people do and think, how they live - and not in objective mind- and body- free terms.

In a way, the language game is a embodied human-based linguistic FSRK that generate linguistic knowledge.

As such, those who agree with the later-Wittgenstein should be able to reconcile to the concept of a language game in terms of principles to that of an FSRK of which the scientific FSRK is the most credible and objective.

Discuss??
Views??

1) I think the OP wouild be made much clearer if you gave examples. I mean specific examples. Choose a non- linguistic FSK. PIck a very specific term or category in that FSK. Bird ---> Owl or whatever. Then show how Wittgensteins model of a language game fits the way Ornithology or Biology works better than other ways of thinking of taxonomy or whatever category term is used by the FSK in question. Then show how Wittgenstein's idea of form of life fits, for example, the methodology and practices of the people working with that FSK.
2) I think beyond this the OP needs to be worded more clearly, I found the later Wittgenstein very interesting and useful, and I am familiar with his terms. Still, I found the OP ambiguous and unclear. So, I think even the abstract portions of the OP could use some work.
3) I have a guess as to what you mean, but rather than me going off on that guess, I hope you will either follow my suggestions 1 and 2 or in some other way make the OP more clear. If my guess is correct, well, I think it's interesting and possibly useful. But rather than muddy the water with guesses, I'm asking for clarification and in a way that best suits me. But whatever steps are taken to make the OP more concrete and clear would be appreciated, including perhaps also some careful step by step comparison. One concept at a time in the comparison.

[Veritas Aequitas]

1) I think the OP wouild be made much clearer if you gave examples. I mean specific examples. Choose a non- linguistic FSK. PIck a very specific term or category in that FSK. Bird ---> Owl or whatever. Then show how Wittgensteins model of a language game fits the way Ornithology or Biology works better than other ways of thinking of taxonomy or whatever category term is used by the FSK in question. Then show how Wittgenstein's idea of form of life fits, for example, the methodology and practices of the people working with that FSK.

My point is Wittgenstein's model of language fits with a generic human-based embodied Framework and System of Realization and Knowledge [FSRK].
Wittgenstein's 'forms of life' denote different contexts in life.

Similarities of Language-game Model with FSRK in terms of fundamental principles [AI-with reservations]:

• Self-contained and context-dependent: Both scientific frameworks and language-games are self-contained systems with their own rules and conventions. Their meaning and validity are understood within specific contexts and communities.
  Dynamic and evolving: Both frameworks and language-games evolve over time as new evidence, ideas, and practices emerge. This evolution reflects the ongoing dialogue and interaction within the community.
  Social and collaborative: Both are inherently social and collaborative endeavors. Scientists build upon previous work and engage in critical discussion to refine frameworks. Similarly, language-games are shaped by how individuals interact and communicate within their communities.

The classic example of a language-game is the so-called "builder's language" introduced in §2 of the Philosophical Investigations:

The language is meant to serve for communication between a builder A and an assistant B. A is building with building-stones: there are blocks, pillars, slabs and beams. B has to pass the stones, in the order in which A needs them. For this purpose they use a language consisting of the words "block", "pillar" "slab", "beam". A calls them out; — B brings the stone which he has learnt to bring at such-and-such a call. Conceive this as a complete primitive language.[6][7]

Later "this" and "there" are added (with functions analogous to the function these words have in natural language), and "a, b, c, d" as numerals. An example of its use: builder A says "d — slab — there" and points, and builder B counts four slabs, "a, b, c, d..." and moves them to the place pointed to by A. The builder's language is an activity into which is woven something we would recognize as language, but in a simpler form. This language-game resembles the simple forms of language taught to children, and Wittgenstein asks that we conceive of it as "a complete primitive language" for a tribe of builders.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Language_ ... )#Examples

The purpose of the above language-game is to understand reality and being pragmatic within reality for some human reasons.

The above example is a human-based embodied builder-FSRK, i.e. a self-contained system with its own rules and conventions [linguistic and otherwise]. Their meaning and validity are understood within specific contexts [forms of life] with the specific builder community.

The fundamental principles [not the forms] within the above builder-FSRK is the same with the science-biology FSRK, i.e. a self-contained system with its own rules and conventions [linguistic and otherwise]. Their meaning and validity are understood within specific contexts [forms of life] with the specific science-biology community only.

It is not only with science-biology the generic FSRK is applicable [imperatively] to every realization of reality and field of knowledge.
The 'language-game' [specific terms] of science-biology FSRK is not applicable to the science-physics-FSRK or other non-science-FSRKs.

2) I think beyond this the OP needs to be worded more clearly, I found the later Wittgenstein very interesting and useful, and I am familiar with his terms. Still, I found the OP ambiguous and unclear. So, I think even the abstract portions of the OP could use some work.

see above elaborations

[FlashDangerpants]

The whole premise of this thread gives me the dry heaves, but Seeing as this is relevant to other matters, VA might as well develop a proper understanding of Wittgenstein, language games, and conveniently for me ... why Wittgenstein said the big problems of philosophy (including the noumenal/phenomenal thing) are all just the product of misunderstandings within that arena.

So here's an A.C. Grayling lecture at Cambridge Uni on exactly that stuff.

[Veritas Aequitas]

The whole premise of this thread gives me the dry heaves, but Seeing as this is relevant to other matters, VA might as well develop a proper understanding of Wittgenstein, language games, and conveniently for me ... why Wittgenstein said the big problems of philosophy (including the noumenal/phenomenal thing) are all just the product of misunderstandings within that arena.

So here's an A.C. Grayling lecture at Cambridge Uni on exactly that stuff.

I have listened to the whole video and copied the whole transcripts.
What is in this video supported my point that Wittgenstein's Language Game is exactly what I present as an embodied human-based FSRC.

Here are some relevant notes that support the concept of a FSRC.

...................
"it was a phase predicated on the idea that he had been quite badly wrong in the Tractatus about how language has meaning
in order to see how wrong the tractatus was and why therefore it is necessary to revise the view about the nature of language and how it works

he meant that just in just the way that a game is an activity which has its own rules which explains how you use the the pieces in the game ..
think for example of chess or backgammon it's a kind of self-constituting enterprise where what you mean by using a piece in the game is set by the tradition of use by the behavior that you associate with it

so really you you would as a solo language user never be in a position to know whether you are using terms with the same content the same meaning as on an earlier occasion unless you were a member of a linguistic community which could check and control your uses of expressions
unless you were a member of a rule-following community of speakers who together constitute the meanings of the expressions they use and govern their respective uses of those expressions

you can see the connection between the rule following considerations and the private language argument they are in a way the reverse and obverse of the same point because the reason why a language cannot be logically private is that language is a rule government activity and rules can only exist in a public setting can only be followed can it be recognized as genuinely normative in a public setting

that the discourses of ethics and religion constitute their own meaning because they constitute a game a language game woven into a way of living a form of life having therefore they're validating their own meanings giving them their own semantic content making sense because this game has its own constitutive rules

the reason why a language cannot be logically private is that language is a rule government activity and rules can only exist in a public setting can only be followed can it be recognized as genuinely normative in a public setting

that that that is my account of Wittgenstein on games and that is my account of the game that wickenstein was playing namely to protect those things that he regarded as important ethics and religion from the encroachments of a reductive scientific attitude to them in his early work and in the later work by saying that ethical talk and religious talk validate themselves because they give themselves their meaning in the language games and forms of life that they constitute"
.................

There is no difference with the above Wittgenstein's Language Game with my concept of a Framework and System of R & C, i.e.
The FSRC must have its own specific self-contained constitution, rules, processes and other necessary requirements.

The science FSRC is different from a political, historical, linguistic FSRC.
Even within the scientific FSRC, there are specific sub-FSRC e.g. Physics, Chemistry, Biology, etc. that has their own specific constitution in generating their own realities and meanings.

[Veritas Aequitas]

why Wittgenstein said the big problems of philosophy (including the noumenal/phenomenal thing) are all just the product of misunderstandings within that arena.

So here's an A.C. Grayling lecture at Cambridge Uni on exactly that stuff.

According to Grayling, Wittgenstein was not directly familiar with Kant except indirectly on the hearsays from Schopenhauer. So there is no way Wittgenstein could have seriously dealt with the the noumenal/phenomenal issue.

So far, most of your counters are beating around the bushes without any solid counters that deal directly with the issue.

[Peter Holmes]

The whole and radical point about the language game idea is that it separates what we say - which is always woven into what we do - from the way things are. Hence the 'defence' of ethics and religion.

But the mention of religion - the existence of religious language games - should ring loud warning bells for VA.

In my opinion, the very autonomy of language games is what prevents their being co-opted in support of realism or antirealism or idealism. But the 'background' against or within which we act and speak is always real in the later Wittgenstein - in my opinion. Which is why philosophical 'problems', such as the existence of the external world, are just puzzles caused by misunderstandings of language.

[FlashDangerpants]

why Wittgenstein said the big problems of philosophy (including the noumenal/phenomenal thing) are all just the product of misunderstandings within that arena.

So here's an A.C. Grayling lecture at Cambridge Uni on exactly that stuff.

According to Grayling, Wittgenstein was not directly familiar with Kant except indirectly on the hearsays from Schopenhauer. So there is no way Wittgenstein could have seriously dealt with the the noumenal/phenomenal issue.

So far, most of your counters are beating around the bushes without any solid counters that deal directly with the issue.

Wittgenstein didn't actually specify the noumenal/phenomenal thing, I pointed at that so you would understand why I brought the matter up. It falls under the same umbrella as all the other big questions of philosophy for this matter, so if you aren't addressing the W guy's actual case you aren't really doing anything.

[Veritas Aequitas]

The whole and radical point about the language game idea is that it separates what we say - which is always woven into what we do - from the way things are. Hence the 'defence' of ethics and religion.

What exactly is 'the way things are?'

1. The only way to 'the way things are' is via language games.
2. Language games are played by humans.
3. There is no way 'the way things are' can be separated from the human factor.

You are chasing illusions if you insist 'the way things are' are absolutely independent of some elements of the human factor.

But the mention of religion - the existence of religious language games - should ring loud warning bells for VA.

What warning?

Wittgenstein mentioned ethics and religion has their own language games.
Human-based Language games are the same as human-based FSRC.
A human-based FSRC is objective [intersubjective] in varying degrees, scientific FSRC the most credible and objective.
Therefore, ethics and religion are objective in varying degrees relative to the scientific FSRC.

In my opinion, the very autonomy of language games is what prevents their being co-opted in support of realism or antirealism or idealism. But the 'background' against or within which we act and speak is always real in the later Wittgenstein - in my opinion. Which is why philosophical 'problems', such as the existence of the external world, are just puzzles caused by misunderstandings of language.

Language games are autonomous and specific to a game, but it cannot be absolutely autonomous from human influence at all.
Realism claim language games are absolutely autonomous from "the way things are"
Therefore, by definition a language games are always grounded in anti-realism.

If, "the 'background' against or within which we act and speak is always real in the later Wittgenstein"
how can you justify that background is real?
You have no choice but to rely on some sort FSRC or language game of reality.
The most reliable FSRC to justify what is real is the scientific FSRC.
Therefore, the background you speak of is in reality influenced by the human factor.

To speak of a background that is absolutely autonomous of the human factor is chasing illusions.

[Veritas Aequitas]

why Wittgenstein said the big problems of philosophy (including the noumenal/phenomenal thing) are all just the product of misunderstandings within that arena.

So here's an A.C. Grayling lecture at Cambridge Uni on exactly that stuff.

According to Grayling, Wittgenstein was not directly familiar with Kant except indirectly on the hearsays from Schopenhauer. So there is no way Wittgenstein could have seriously dealt with the the noumenal/phenomenal issue.

So far, most of your counters are beating around the bushes without any solid counters that deal directly with the issue.

Wittgenstein didn't actually specify the noumenal/phenomenal thing, I pointed at that so you would understand why I brought the matter up. It falls under the same umbrella as all the other big questions of philosophy for this matter, so if you aren't addressing the W guy's actual case you aren't really doing anything.

Not doing anything?
If you are banking strong on W, you are not doing enough depth and width.

I don't have much respect for Wittgenstein's philosophy except that to show people like you that p-realism is not tenable and Wittgenstein had moved from his earlier p-realism to antirealism in his On Certainty.

W admitted his Tractatus was badly wrong, his Philosophical Investigations what that right as well, and his On Certainty was not exactly right.
W merely produce some good tidbits but nothing seriously novel. From what Grayling reported and what I have read, W's life was a mess and his philosophy disorganized, full of non-sequitor and erratic.
Kant on the other hand was very rational, logical, systematic, organized and focus of completeness.

I argued above;
1. The only way to 'the way things are' is via language games.
2. Language games are played by humans.
3. There is no way 'the way things are' can be separated from the human factor.

So don't prop W on the pedestal of philosophy.

[Veritas Aequitas]

VA reformulates his false main premise by alluding to Wittgenstein, as follows.

1. The only way to 'the way things are' is via language games.
2. Language games are played by humans.
3. There is no way 'the way things are' can be separated from the human factor.

When I pat my dog or cook an egg, neither feature of 'the way things are' has anything to do with a language game. Language games involve language, which we use to talk about the way things are - or were.

This language game detour is another dead end.

When you state "When I pat my dog or cook an egg" each colored elements in that sentence belongs to a specific language game.

For example each element or 'patting a dog' can be described in millions of ways but you chose to do it in your own specific way within a language game.
There are many layers [in a hierarchy] to what is reality.
The manner you use an element within the a language game will influence your realization of reality.

Note how different people from different environments, cultures, background are influenced by their exposure to the language games they participate-in in their realization of reality.
E.g. Some from different cultures will realize the females merely as an object rather than a person. There is no absolute reality that dictates a female [or a thing] must be this or that specifically, so what is realized as a reality is conditioned upon the language games used or FSRC conditioned upon.

For example 'patting a dog' in different language games, it could be;
- touching furs, meat and bone
- pat a pet
- testing whether the dog is meaty enough to be eaten, etc.
- hundreds of FSRC will realize hundred of reality of it.
- also note the psychological conditions of the subject in each case.
- etc. etc.

Each of the above will have a critical impact on your realization of reality of patting, dog and patting a dog. [note the nuances from crude to refine]

Your problem is you are stuck with a dogmatic and constipated definition of 'what is reality' of the primordial sense, but note;
There are Two Senses of Reality
viewtopic.php?t=40265
Your sense of reality is the illusory kind, not the realistic one.

[FlashDangerpants]

When you state "When I pat my dog or cook an egg" each colored elements in that sentence belongs to a specific language game.

Sorry, are you saying that according to Wittgenstein's theory this is the case or have you just stolen the theory and now you secretly thinkg it's one of your KFCs?

[FlashDangerpants]

When you state "When I pat my dog or cook an egg" each colored elements in that sentence belongs to a specific language game.

You forgot to clarify if you are saying that according to Wittgenstein's theory this is the case or have you just stolen the theory and now you think it's one of your KFCs?

If it's the former, I think you need to read your wittgenstein sources more carefully as the attempt to take on the big W guy that you seem to be engaged in right now is founded apparently on misunderstandings.

[Skepdick]

If it's the former, I think you need to read your wittgenstein sources more carefully as the attempt to take on the big W guy that you seem to be engaged in right now is founded apparently on misunderstandings.

Isn't it so peculiar how it's always your understanding that you consider as paragon?