Kant vs. Schopenhauer

[Veritas Aequitas]

I am often presented with the following from Schopenhauer as if it is absolutely true and correct.

This was pointed out before of course

Fundamental error: Kant did not distinguish between the concrete, intuitive, perceptual knowledge of objects and the abstract, discursive, conceptual, knowledge of thoughts.

I have responded to the above critique of Kant but it had been ignored.
This OP is a ready reference and response to the above sort of bald claims.

....................
There had been many critiques and challenges to Kant's philosophies since it was first presented.
However, none in my knowledge had been able to refute [or debunked] Kant's concept of the illusory thing-in-itself.
While many critiques and challenges did open up new vista of knowledge for further deliberations, all the critiques against Kant's thing-in-itself are strawman[s].

Kant anticipated the following 'virus' pandemic,

Even the wisest of men cannot free himself from them {the illusions - things-in-themselves}.
After long effort he perhaps succeeds in guarding himself against actual error; but he will never be able to free himself from the Illusion, which unceasingly mocks and torments him. CPR B397

Schopenhauer critiqued Kant's denial of the positive existence & knowability of the thing-in-itself and he postulated a Will-in-Itself.
Schopenhauer was infected with the thing-in-itself virus.

How?
Here's ChatGpt [with reservations] answer.

Yes, there have been Kantian scholars who have defended Kant's conception of the thing-in-itself against Schopenhauer's critiques. One notable defender is Henry E. Allison, a prominent Kant scholar. Allison has written extensively on Kant's philosophy and has engaged with Schopenhauer's criticisms.

In his book "Kant's Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense," Allison provides a detailed defense of Kant's theory of the thing-in-itself. He argues that Schopenhauer's interpretation of Kant's thing-in-itself as the Will misses the mark and misrepresents Kant's philosophy. According to Allison, Kant's thing-in-itself is not a positive entity or substance, like Schopenhauer's Will, but rather a limiting concept necessary for Kant's critical philosophy.

Allison contends that Kant's thing-in-itself is a concept that signifies the limit of human cognition, beyond which we cannot have knowledge. It is not something that can be known or experienced directly, but rather a regulative principle that guides our understanding of phenomena. Allison emphasizes that Kant's aim was to establish the limits of human knowledge and to delineate the boundaries of what can be known through experience.

Furthermore, Allison argues that Schopenhauer's interpretation overlooks the crucial distinction Kant makes between appearances (phenomena) and things-in-themselves. According to Allison, Schopenhauer collapses this distinction and conflates the two, which leads to a misrepresentation of Kant's philosophy.

Other Kantian scholars have also engaged with Schopenhauer's criticisms, providing various interpretations and defenses of Kant's philosophy. However, Allison's work is particularly noteworthy for its thorough and detailed examination of Kant's transcendental idealism and its defense against Schopenhauer's critiques.

References:
Henry E. Allison, "Kant's Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense" (Yale University Press, 2004).
Henry E. Allison, "Kant's Transcendental Idealism and Empirical Realism" (Oxford University Press, 2004).
Henry E. Allison, "Kant's Theory of Freedom" (Cambridge University Press, 1990).

Others Kantians who had countered Schopenhauer;

Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi: In his "Letters on the Doctrine of Spinoza," Jacobi criticized Schopenhauer's interpretation of Kant and argued that Kant's concept of the thing-in-itself was not intended to be a mysterious unknowable entity but rather a placeholder for the limits of human knowledge.

Eduard von Hartmann: In his "Philosophy of the Unconscious," Hartmann attempted to reconcile Kant and Schopenhauer by suggesting that the unconscious Will described by Schopenhauer was the same as the thing-in-itself described by Kant. However, this interpretation was not widely accepted.

Hermann Cohen: In his "Kantian Idealism," Cohen focused on defending the transcendental nature of Kant's philosophy against Schopenhauer's more empirical approach. He argued that Schopenhauer's Will-in-itself was a flawed attempt to conceptualize the thing-in-itself.

So do not just throw in an unsupported statement against Schopenhauer and hope to get away with it.

[Veritas Aequitas]

On the Critique of Schopenhauer's Will-in-itself;

•Friedrich Paulsen: He argued that the Will cannot be the ultimate reality because it still relies on the Kantian categories of space and time. These categories are part of the phenomenal world, not the noumenal world beyond it.

•Johannes Volkelt: He argued that the Will is simply an interpretation of the feeling of life, not a fundamental reality. This interpretation relies on the Kantian categories, making it ultimately subjective and not objective.

•Leonard Nelson: He argued that the Will is a concept derived from experience, not an innate force. This makes it incompatible with Schopenhauer's claim of a universal Will-in-itself.

[Atla]

I am often presented with the following from Schopenhauer as if it is absolutely true and correct.

This was pointed out before of course

Fundamental error: Kant did not distinguish between the concrete, intuitive, perceptual knowledge of objects and the abstract, discursive, conceptual, knowledge of thoughts.

I have responded to the above critique of Kant but it had been ignored.
This OP is a ready reference and response to the above sort of bald claims.

....................
There had been many critiques and challenges to Kant's philosophies since it was first presented.
However, none in my knowledge had been able to refute [or debunked] Kant's concept of the illusory thing-in-itself.
While many critiques and challenges did open up new vista of knowledge for further deliberations, all the critiques against Kant's thing-in-itself are strawman[s].

Kant anticipated the following 'virus' pandemic,

Even the wisest of men cannot free himself from them {the illusions - things-in-themselves}.
After long effort he perhaps succeeds in guarding himself against actual error; but he will never be able to free himself from the Illusion, which unceasingly mocks and torments him. CPR B397

Schopenhauer critiqued Kant's denial of the positive existence & knowability of the thing-in-itself and he postulated a Will-in-Itself.
Schopenhauer was infected with the thing-in-itself virus.

How?
Here's ChatGpt [with reservations] answer.

Yes, there have been Kantian scholars who have defended Kant's conception of the thing-in-itself against Schopenhauer's critiques. One notable defender is Henry E. Allison, a prominent Kant scholar. Allison has written extensively on Kant's philosophy and has engaged with Schopenhauer's criticisms.

In his book "Kant's Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense," Allison provides a detailed defense of Kant's theory of the thing-in-itself. He argues that Schopenhauer's interpretation of Kant's thing-in-itself as the Will misses the mark and misrepresents Kant's philosophy. According to Allison, Kant's thing-in-itself is not a positive entity or substance, like Schopenhauer's Will, but rather a limiting concept necessary for Kant's critical philosophy.

Allison contends that Kant's thing-in-itself is a concept that signifies the limit of human cognition, beyond which we cannot have knowledge. It is not something that can be known or experienced directly, but rather a regulative principle that guides our understanding of phenomena. Allison emphasizes that Kant's aim was to establish the limits of human knowledge and to delineate the boundaries of what can be known through experience.

Furthermore, Allison argues that Schopenhauer's interpretation overlooks the crucial distinction Kant makes between appearances (phenomena) and things-in-themselves. According to Allison, Schopenhauer collapses this distinction and conflates the two, which leads to a misrepresentation of Kant's philosophy.

Other Kantian scholars have also engaged with Schopenhauer's criticisms, providing various interpretations and defenses of Kant's philosophy. However, Allison's work is particularly noteworthy for its thorough and detailed examination of Kant's transcendental idealism and its defense against Schopenhauer's critiques.

References:
Henry E. Allison, "Kant's Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense" (Yale University Press, 2004).
Henry E. Allison, "Kant's Transcendental Idealism and Empirical Realism" (Oxford University Press, 2004).
Henry E. Allison, "Kant's Theory of Freedom" (Cambridge University Press, 1990).

Others Kantians who had countered Schopenhauer;

Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi: In his "Letters on the Doctrine of Spinoza," Jacobi criticized Schopenhauer's interpretation of Kant and argued that Kant's concept of the thing-in-itself was not intended to be a mysterious unknowable entity but rather a placeholder for the limits of human knowledge.

Eduard von Hartmann: In his "Philosophy of the Unconscious," Hartmann attempted to reconcile Kant and Schopenhauer by suggesting that the unconscious Will described by Schopenhauer was the same as the thing-in-itself described by Kant. However, this interpretation was not widely accepted.

Hermann Cohen: In his "Kantian Idealism," Cohen focused on defending the transcendental nature of Kant's philosophy against Schopenhauer's more empirical approach. He argued that Schopenhauer's Will-in-itself was a flawed attempt to conceptualize the thing-in-itself.

So do not just throw in an unsupported statement against Schopenhauer and hope to get away with it.

How is this relevant to the abstract vs concrete critique? Okay Kant was an idiot for sticking to a negative thing-in-itself and Schopenhauer was an idiot for sticking to a positive thing-in-itself. That didn't touch on the abstract vs concrete issue, did it.

[Veritas Aequitas]

How is this relevant to the abstract vs concrete critique? Okay Kant was an idiot for sticking to a negative thing-in-itself and Schopenhauer was an idiot for sticking to a positive thing-in-itself. That didn't touch on the abstract vs concrete issue, did it.

The topic is Kant vs. Schopenhauer.

Every time I mentioned Kant, you throw in Schopenhauer as the authority to discredit Kant re the thing-in-itself.

This is about meta-abstraction above the typical abstract vs concrete issue.
To Kant, the thing-in-itself is a meta-abstraction that is abstracted from experience and observations, stripped off all differences, and therefrom extrapolated as a mind-independent thing, i.e. the Will-in-itself.

You cannot deny, you have been idiotically sticking to the positive thing-in-itself, i.e. the mind-independent noumena that science is discovering about. This is why [as usual] you throw in Schopenhauer to support your claim.

What is wrong with 'sticking' to [assuming] a negative thing-in-itself?
Geometry assumed the negative noumena like the perfect triangle, circle, etc. but understand these are impossible in empirical reality but are taken as ideals merely to act as guides.

[Atla]

How is this relevant to the abstract vs concrete critique? Okay Kant was an idiot for sticking to a negative thing-in-itself and Schopenhauer was an idiot for sticking to a positive thing-in-itself. That didn't touch on the abstract vs concrete issue, did it.

The topic is Kant vs. Schopenhauer.

Every time I mentioned Kant, you throw in Schopenhauer as the authority to discredit Kant re the thing-in-itself.

This is about meta-abstraction above the typical abstract vs concrete issue.
To Kant, the thing-in-itself is a meta-abstraction that is abstracted from experience and observations, stripped off all differences, and therefrom extrapolated as a mind-independent thing, i.e. the Will-in-itself.

You cannot deny, you have been idiotically sticking to the positive thing-in-itself, i.e. the mind-independent noumena that science is discovering about. This is why [as usual] you throw in Schopenhauer to support your claim.

What is wrong with 'sticking' to [assuming] a negative thing-in-itself?
Geometry assumed the negative noumena like the perfect triangle, circle, etc. but understand these are impossible in empirical reality but are taken as ideals merely to act as guides.

I never mentioned Schopenhauer on the thing-in-itself. What are you on about?

The thing-in-itself is not a meta-abstraction. That's word salad, at least in today's philosophical language.

[Harbal]

I am often presented with the following from Schopenhauer as if it is absolutely true and correct.

Put him on ignore.

[Wizard22]

I have responded to the above critique of Kant but it had been ignored.
This OP is a ready reference and response to the above sort of bald claims.

....................
There had been many critiques and challenges to Kant's philosophies since it was first presented.
However, none in my knowledge had been able to refute [or debunked] Kant's concept of the illusory thing-in-itself.
While many critiques and challenges did open up new vista of knowledge for further deliberations, all the critiques against Kant's thing-in-itself are strawman[s].

My interpretation of Kant's "Thing-in-Itself" was/is always a matter of the Subject-Object divide, as an extension of his "Categorical Imperative".

Is the human body, brain, or mind an object, or a subject, or both, or neither???

Kant, accurately in my opinion, words the thing-in-itself as an object-subject relationship. This is now being discovered by Cognitive Science as part of the Bicameral Mind theory, that the brain is "internally divided" as it "sees itself", hence: Self-Consciousness. So Kant was right and correct, just far ahead of his time.

Also, I'd like to learn German to read Kant in his native tongue. It's the only real way to dig deep into the Kantian mind.

[Harbal]

Also, I'd like to learn German

I hope FlashDangerpants and Flannel Jesus appreciate the gift you have just handed to them.

[Veritas Aequitas]

I have responded to the above critique of Kant but it had been ignored.
This OP is a ready reference and response to the above sort of bald claims.

....................
There had been many critiques and challenges to Kant's philosophies since it was first presented.
However, none in my knowledge had been able to refute [or debunked] Kant's concept of the illusory thing-in-itself.
While many critiques and challenges did open up new vista of knowledge for further deliberations, all the critiques against Kant's thing-in-itself are strawman[s].

My interpretation of Kant's "Thing-in-Itself" was/is always a matter of the Subject-Object divide, as an extension of his "Categorical Imperative".

Is the human body, brain, or mind an object, or a subject, or both, or neither???

Kant, accurately in my opinion, words the thing-in-itself as an object-subject relationship. This is now being discovered by Cognitive Science as part of the Bicameral Mind theory, that the brain is "internally divided" as it "sees itself", hence: Self-Consciousness. So Kant was right and correct, just far ahead of his time.

Also, I'd like to learn German to read Kant in his native tongue. It's the only real way to dig deep into the Kantian mind.

I believe the idea of subject-object is too ubiquitous to be significant for Kant's thing-in-itself.

Kant claimed the object and subject are interrelated, i.e. subject<->object, in a way complementary.
As such, in a more refined perspective [not common nor conventional sense] there is no such thing as a thing-in-itself that is absolutely independent of the subject.

To insist a thing-in-itself exists are a real thing is delusional, but nevertheless the thing-in-itself can be thought and can be at most a useful illusion.

Kant is claimed by some to the be the father of cognitive science [based on his principles of cognition], but the 'thing-in-itself' itself has no relevance to the anti-realist version of cognitive science.

The Bicameral Mind theory is an interesting theory and likely to relate to Kant's principle of the transcendental ego or "I-think" not the "I-AM" of Descartes.

[Wizard22]

To insist a thing-in-itself exists are a real thing is delusional, but nevertheless the thing-in-itself can be thought and can be at most a useful illusion.

Kant is claimed by some to the be the father of cognitive science [based on his principles of cognition], but the 'thing-in-itself' itself has no relevance to the anti-realist version of cognitive science.

On the contrary, to Kant, the thing-in-itself is the only thing that can possibly be real.

Because it is the Synthesis between sensory perception and "thingness"/Being/Becoming.

The Synthesis is experienced as Cognition.

[FlashDangerpants]

Also, I'd like to learn German

I hope FlashDangerpants and Flannel Jesus appreciate the gift you have just handed to them.

That fruit is hanging so low it's more of a carrot.

[FlashDangerpants]

My interpretation of Kant's "Thing-in-Itself" was/is always a matter of the Subject-Object divide, as an extension of his "Categorical Imperative".

Why didn't VA call you out for that CI drivel? Can't he spot you are a fraud?

[Wizard22]

Says the pea-brain who doesn't understand Berkeley's contributions to Sense-Perception...

Double-digit IQ, you don't belong on a philosophy forum.

[Veritas Aequitas]

To insist a thing-in-itself exists are a real thing is delusional, but nevertheless the thing-in-itself can be thought and can be at most a useful illusion.

Kant is claimed by some to the be the father of cognitive science [based on his principles of cognition], but the 'thing-in-itself' itself has no relevance to the anti-realist version of cognitive science.

On the contrary, to Kant, the thing-in-itself is the only thing that can possibly be real.

Because it is the Synthesis between sensory perception and "thingness"/Being/Becoming.

The Synthesis is experienced as Cognition.

Did you read Kant's CPR thoroughly?
Show me the texts that Kant asserted the thing-in-itself is the only thing that can possibly be real as opposed to the objective reality of phenomena.

[Wizard22]

Did you read Kant's CPR thoroughly?
Show me the texts that Kant asserted the thing-in-itself is the only thing that can possibly be real as opposed to the objective reality of phenomena.

https://philosophynow.org/issues/31/Kan ... _in_Itself

So the world reaches us already mediated through these tools of understanding. And what follows from that is that we can have no direct knowledge of the world as it is before this mediation has happened. The world as it is before mediation Kant calls the noumenal world, or, in a memorable phrase, Das Ding an sich, a phrase which literally means “The thing in itself”, but whose sense would be more accurately caught by translating it as “the thing (or world) as it really is”(as distinct from how it appears to us). He calls the world as it appears to our senses (after mediation through our tools of understanding) the phenomenal world.