Compatibilism is impossible

[bahman]

I think we can agree on the fact that the brain is a set of neurons that interact with each other. Any mental state, the physical state of the brain, leads into another mental state by following the laws of physics. This is a deterministic chain of causality. Free will on another hand is the ability to initiate or terminate a chain of causality. This is true since we are dealing with two options in an undecided situation which requires an agent to choose one of the options and initiate a chain of causality. This, initiating or terminating a causal chain, is impossible in a physical/deterministic world. Therefore compatibilism is impossible.

[phyllo]

Compatibilism basically says that there are no uncaused events.

Therefore, free-will is only ever free from external constrain or coercion.

That's compatibilist free-will.

[bahman]

Compatibilism basically says that there are no uncaused events.

Therefore, free-will is only ever free from external constrain or coercion.

That's compatibilist free-will.

What I am arguing is that free will is impossible in a deterministic world.

[Iwannaplato]

Compatibilism basically says that there are no uncaused events.

Therefore, free-will is only ever free from external constrain or coercion.

That's compatibilist free-will.

What I am arguing is that free will is impossible in a deterministic world.

Yes,
but you are not actually countering the main compatibilist position, which is what he was pointing out.

[attofishpi]

Compatibilism basically says that there are no uncaused events.

Therefore, free-will is only ever free from external constrain or coercion.

That's compatibilist free-will.

What I am arguing is that free will is impossible in a deterministic world.

Anything that is deterministic is computable, consciousness is not.

[bahman]

Compatibilism basically says that there are no uncaused events.

Therefore, free-will is only ever free from external constrain or coercion.

That's compatibilist free-will.

What I am arguing is that free will is impossible in a deterministic world.

Yes,
but you are not actually countering the main compatibilist position, which is what he was pointing out.

That is the definition of compatibilism from Wiki: "Compatibilism is the belief that free will and determinism are mutually compatible and that it is possible to believe in both without being logically inconsistent."

What he says, "Compatibilism basically says that there are no uncaused events.", applies to a deterministic world but it cannot resolve the problem of free will in a deterministic world. He also says, "Free will is only ever free from external constraint or coercion.", that I doubt it is true.

[bahman]

Compatibilism basically says that there are no uncaused events.

Therefore, free-will is only ever free from external constrain or coercion.

That's compatibilist free-will.

What I am arguing is that free will is impossible in a deterministic world.

Anything that is deterministic is computable, consciousness is not.

Consciousness to me is the ability of the mind to experience. What is it to you?

[phyllo]

That is the definition of compatibilism from Wiki: "Compatibilism is the belief that free will and determinism are mutually compatible and that it is possible to believe in both without being logically inconsistent."

What he says, "Compatibilism basically says that there are no uncaused events.", applies to a deterministic world but it cannot resolve the problem of free will in a deterministic world. He also says, "Free will is only ever free from external constraint or coercion.", that I doubt it is true.

This is what you wrote:

Free will on another hand is the ability to initiate or terminate a chain of causality.

That is considered a possibility from the point of view of libertarian free-will.

But compatibilists have come to the conclusion that it's impossible to initiate/terminate a chain of causality. It never happens. Therefore, free-will reduces down to a more limited freedom from external constraint or coercion.

Compatibilism would be impossible if initiating/terminating chains was possible.

[Trajk Logik]

I think we can agree on the fact that the brain is a set of neurons that interact with each other. Any mental state, the physical state of the brain, leads into another mental state by following the laws of physics.

But how does it do that? Isn't that the hard problem? What is a physical state relative to a mental state?

This is a deterministic chain of causality. Free will on another hand is the ability to initiate or terminate a chain of causality. This is true since we are dealing with two options in an undecided situation which requires an agent to choose one of the options and initiate a chain of causality. This, initiating or terminating a causal chain, is impossible in a physical/deterministic world. Therefore compatibilism is impossible.

I don't see the difference. If determinism is a chain of causality and free will is the ability to start or end a chain of causality, then it's all causation/determinist, isn't it?

This is ignoring the fact that prior causes are part of you making a decision, and continue after you've made it in the consequences of your decision. You don't make decisions in a vacuum. Your life experiences and the current situation will determine what options you have in any given moment.

Free will is the illusion that because you have options initially leads you to believe that any of those options are valid in some situation, but you always end up choosing one option by reasoning, and would always choose that option given the same information and the same situation.

Compatibilism basically says that there are no uncaused events.

Therefore, free-will is only ever free from external constrain or coercion.

That's compatibilist free-will.

What I am arguing is that free will is impossible in a deterministic world.

Free will as an idea or illusion can exist in a deterministic world.

Compatibilism basically says that there are no uncaused events.

Therefore, free-will is only ever free from external constrain or coercion.

That's compatibilist free-will.

What I am arguing is that free will is impossible in a deterministic world.

Anything that is deterministic is computable, consciousness is not.

What is consciousness?

Consciousness to me is the ability of the mind to experience. What is it to you?

It seems to me that the mind is an experience. Consciousness, mind and experience are one and the same.

[Iwannaplato]

What I am arguing is that free will is impossible in a deterministic world.

Yes,
but you are not actually countering the main compatibilist position, which is what he was pointing out.

That is the definition of compatibilism from Wiki: "Compatibilism is the belief that free will and determinism are mutually compatible and that it is possible to believe in both without being logically inconsistent."

What he says, "Compatibilism basically says that there are no uncaused events.", applies to a deterministic world but it cannot resolve the problem of free will in a deterministic world. He also says, "Free will is only ever free from external constraint or coercion.", that I doubt it is true.

Wiki is not the best source. Anyway there are several compatibilisms. From Stanfords encyclopedia of philosophy under Compatibilism

2.1 Freedom According to Classical Compatibilism
According to one strand within classical compatibilism, freedom is nothing more than an agent’s ability to do what she wishes in the absence of impediments that would otherwise stand in her way. For instance, Hobbes offers an exemplary expression of classical compatibilism when he claims that a person’s freedom consists in his finding “no stop, in doing what he has the will, desire, or inclination to doe [sic]” (Leviathan, p.108). On this view, freedom involves two components, a positive and a negative one. The positive component (doing what one wills, desires, or inclines to do) consists in nothing more than what is involved in the power of agency. The negative component (finding “no stop”) consists in acting unencumbered or unimpeded. Typically, the classical compatibilists’ benchmark of impeded or encumbered action is compelled action. Compelled action arises when one is forced by some external source to act contrary to one’s will.

For the classical compatibilist, then, free will is an ability to do what one wants. It is therefore plausible to conclude that the truth of determinism does not entail that agents lack free will since it does not entail that agents never do what they wish to do, nor that agents are necessarily encumbered in acting. Compatibilism is thus vindicated.

But how convincing is the classical compatibilist account of free will? As it stands, it cries out for refinement. To cite just one shortcoming, various mental illnesses can cause a person to act as she wants and do so unencumbered; yet, intuitively, it would seem that she does not act of her own free will. For example, imagine a person suffering from a form of psychosis that causes full-fledged hallucinations. While hallucinating, she might “act as she wants unencumbered,” but she could hardly be said to be acting of her own free will. Consequently, the classical compatibilist owes us more. To see how it might be supplemented, we turn to a distinctively incompatibilist way of undermining classical compatibilism

[bahman]

That is the definition of compatibilism from Wiki: "Compatibilism is the belief that free will and determinism are mutually compatible and that it is possible to believe in both without being logically inconsistent."

What he says, "Compatibilism basically says that there are no uncaused events.", applies to a deterministic world but it cannot resolve the problem of free will in a deterministic world. He also says, "Free will is only ever free from external constraint or coercion.", that I doubt it is true.

This is what you wrote:

Free will on another hand is the ability to initiate or terminate a chain of causality.

That is considered a possibility from the point of view of libertarian free-will.

Ok. So what? All I am showing is that if options are real then one needs to initiate a chain of causality.

But compatibilists have come to the conclusion that it's impossible to initiate/terminate a chain of causality.

No, compatibilists just assume that free will and determinism are compatible. They cannot show that it is impossible to initiate or terminate a chain of causality.

It never happens. Therefore, free-will reduces down to a more limited freedom from external constraint or coercion.

That is not a proper definition of free will and I doubt we have that.

Compatibilism would be impossible if initiating/terminating chains was possible.

No, compatibilism is not true if free will is true given my definition.

[bahman]

I think we can agree on the fact that the brain is a set of neurons that interact with each other. Any mental state, the physical state of the brain, leads into another mental state by following the laws of physics.

But how does it do that?

Do you mean how matter moves based on the laws of nature?

Isn't that the hard problem?

No, the hard problem of consciousness is related to the phenomena of how an unconscious matter could become conscious in a given configuration.

What is a physical state relative to a mental state?

Physical state is a general term for state of matter but mental state only applies to the brain.

This is a deterministic chain of causality. Free will on another hand is the ability to initiate or terminate a chain of causality. This is true since we are dealing with two options in an undecided situation which requires an agent to choose one of the options and initiate a chain of causality. This, initiating or terminating a causal chain, is impossible in a physical/deterministic world. Therefore compatibilism is impossible.

I don't see the difference. If determinism is a chain of causality and free will is the ability to start or end a chain of causality, then it's all causation/determinist, isn't it?

No, under determinism there is only one chain of causality which starts from the Big Bang and never finishes.

This is ignoring the fact that prior causes are part of you making a decision, and continue after you've made it in the consequences of your decision. You don't make decisions in a vacuum. Your life experiences and the current situation will determine what options you have at any given moment.

Yes, I am assuming that options are real. This means that there are two states of affairs available to choose from. This is not allowed in a deterministic world since given a state of affairs there is only one state of affairs available to choose from.

Free will is the illusion that because you have options initially leads you to believe that any of those options are valid in some situation, but you always end up choosing one option by reasoning, and would always choose that option given the same information and the same situation.

That is not always the case. Think of a situation in which you cannot forecast the market. Reasoning has no place in such a situation. Can you invest in the market? Of course, you can although you cannot forecast the market.

Compatibilism basically says that there are no uncaused events.

Therefore, free-will is only ever free from external constrain or coercion.

That's compatibilist free-will.

What I am arguing is that free will is impossible in a deterministic world.

Free will as an idea or illusion can exist in a deterministic world.

What?

[bahman]

Yes,
but you are not actually countering the main compatibilist position, which is what he was pointing out.

That is the definition of compatibilism from Wiki: "Compatibilism is the belief that free will and determinism are mutually compatible and that it is possible to believe in both without being logically inconsistent."

What he says, "Compatibilism basically says that there are no uncaused events.", applies to a deterministic world but it cannot resolve the problem of free will in a deterministic world. He also says, "Free will is only ever free from external constraint or coercion.", that I doubt it is true.

Wiki is not the best source. Anyway there are several compatibilisms. From Stanfords encyclopedia of philosophy under Compatibilism

2.1 Freedom According to Classical Compatibilism
According to one strand within classical compatibilism, freedom is nothing more than an agent’s ability to do what she wishes in the absence of impediments that would otherwise stand in her way. For instance, Hobbes offers an exemplary expression of classical compatibilism when he claims that a person’s freedom consists in his finding “no stop, in doing what he has the will, desire, or inclination to doe [sic]” (Leviathan, p.108). On this view, freedom involves two components, a positive and a negative one. The positive component (doing what one wills, desires, or inclines to do) consists in nothing more than what is involved in the power of agency. The negative component (finding “no stop”) consists in acting unencumbered or unimpeded. Typically, the classical compatibilists’ benchmark of impeded or encumbered action is compelled action. Compelled action arises when one is forced by some external source to act contrary to one’s will.

For the classical compatibilist, then, free will is an ability to do what one wants. It is therefore plausible to conclude that the truth of determinism does not entail that agents lack free will since it does not entail that agents never do what they wish to do, nor that agents are necessarily encumbered in acting. Compatibilism is thus vindicated.

But how convincing is the classical compatibilist account of free will? As it stands, it cries out for refinement. To cite just one shortcoming, various mental illnesses can cause a person to act as she wants and do so unencumbered; yet, intuitively, it would seem that she does not act of her own free will. For example, imagine a person suffering from a form of psychosis that causes full-fledged hallucinations. While hallucinating, she might “act as she wants unencumbered,” but she could hardly be said to be acting of her own free will. Consequently, the classical compatibilist owes us more. To see how it might be supplemented, we turn to a distinctively incompatibilist way of undermining classical compatibilism

I think the author mixes will with free will.

[Iwannaplato]

That is the definition of compatibilism from Wiki: "Compatibilism is the belief that free will and determinism are mutually compatible and that it is possible to believe in both without being logically inconsistent."

What he says, "Compatibilism basically says that there are no uncaused events.", applies to a deterministic world but it cannot resolve the problem of free will in a deterministic world. He also says, "Free will is only ever free from external constraint or coercion.", that I doubt it is true.

Wiki is not the best source. Anyway there are several compatibilisms. From Stanfords encyclopedia of philosophy under Compatibilism

2.1 Freedom According to Classical Compatibilism
According to one strand within classical compatibilism, freedom is nothing more than an agent’s ability to do what she wishes in the absence of impediments that would otherwise stand in her way. For instance, Hobbes offers an exemplary expression of classical compatibilism when he claims that a person’s freedom consists in his finding “no stop, in doing what he has the will, desire, or inclination to doe [sic]” (Leviathan, p.108). On this view, freedom involves two components, a positive and a negative one. The positive component (doing what one wills, desires, or inclines to do) consists in nothing more than what is involved in the power of agency. The negative component (finding “no stop”) consists in acting unencumbered or unimpeded. Typically, the classical compatibilists’ benchmark of impeded or encumbered action is compelled action. Compelled action arises when one is forced by some external source to act contrary to one’s will.

For the classical compatibilist, then, free will is an ability to do what one wants. It is therefore plausible to conclude that the truth of determinism does not entail that agents lack free will since it does not entail that agents never do what they wish to do, nor that agents are necessarily encumbered in acting. Compatibilism is thus vindicated.

But how convincing is the classical compatibilist account of free will? As it stands, it cries out for refinement. To cite just one shortcoming, various mental illnesses can cause a person to act as she wants and do so unencumbered; yet, intuitively, it would seem that she does not act of her own free will. For example, imagine a person suffering from a form of psychosis that causes full-fledged hallucinations. While hallucinating, she might “act as she wants unencumbered,” but she could hardly be said to be acting of her own free will. Consequently, the classical compatibilist owes us more. To see how it might be supplemented, we turn to a distinctively incompatibilist way of undermining classical compatibilism

I think the author mixes will with free will.

The authors, plural, are experts who disambiguates those and other terms/concepts in the wider article, written in an excellent online resource to, among other things, the various ways free will and determinism are conceived in philosophy.
The article doesn't disagree with you over whether libertarian free will is compatible with determinism, but it certainly has a better explanation of the use of the terms in philosophy than you are presenting. But hey, you wanna keep fighting from definitions and thinking you are presenting compatibilism correctly and refuting it, you just go right on ahead and tilt at those windmills.
Here's a link to the article:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/

[bahman]

Wiki is not the best source. Anyway there are several compatibilisms. From Stanfords encyclopedia of philosophy under Compatibilism

I think the author mixes will with free will.

The authors, plural, are experts who disambiguates those and other terms/concepts in the wider article, written in an excellent online resource to, among other things, the various ways free will and determinism are conceived in philosophy.
The article doesn't disagree with you over whether libertarian free will is compatible with determinism, but it certainly has a better explanation of the use of the terms in philosophy than you are presenting. But hey, you wanna keep fighting from definitions and thinking you are presenting compatibilism correctly and refuting it, you just go right on ahead and tilt at those windmills.
Here's a link to the article:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/

Well, I had a quick look at the article. It would take me a long time to discuss the article here arguing with what I agree or disagree. I have an issue with the definition of free will that you cited, namely the classical definition: "For the classical compatibilist, then, free will is an ability to do what one wants." This to me is the definition of will rather than free will.