The qualia problem does not exist-here's why
Posted: Fri Sep 01, 2023 10:36 pm
The alleged qualia problem is at the heart of the so-called problem of consciousness. I studied this at college over 30 years ago, so bear with me. The qualia problem was used as a critique of mind-body identity by my (brilliant) idealist tutor (Professor Howard Robinson) at the University of Liverpool. He stated that materialist concepts of the mind could not explain qualia (perceptions of objects, taste sensation, sounds etc.) It is true we know what causes qualia-electrical signals between neurons, but that does not explain what a qualia is. A qualia is not knowledge of a neuron firing. It is, supposedly, a 'mental picture' of a red shirt or whatever.
This notion creates a separate 'mental phenomenon' that in turn creates room for notions of the soul, dualism, or in Professor Robinson's case idealism. It also underlines our (I believe false) notion that we have this mysterious 'consciousness' which is seemingly impossible to explain.
Imagine, however, a super-being that does not perceive red shirts and the taste of orange juice. Instead, it is just aware of where the various neurons are in the brain that give rise to such perceptions in humans and it is aware when neurons are firing in certain patterns. Knowing these patterns enables the super-being to navigate its way around the world, putting on red t-shirts and deciding to drink orange juice. After all, it can learn, just like a human, what happens when it puts on a shirt, it knows the undesirable 'cold' neuron patterns stop firing. The super-being, however, has no qualia or perceptions of t-shirts or orange juice. The super-being has perception on an entirely materialist basis with no question of anything giving rise to a 'mental substance'.
Fine, you may say, but we are not super-beings, and we do have qualia. But what if qualia are just a crude, macro form of what the super-being perceives?
Let's imagine the super-being is analogous to another super-being that only sees things at an atomic level and never perceives things as rocks, trees, rivers etc. No one would say a human has some metaphysically different perception of the world than a being that can see things at a more microscopic level.
The analogy suggests, in my view, that our original qualia-free super-being is simply experiencing the contents of their mind at a much deeper level than a mere human who experiences the neurons firing as an experience of a red shirt appearing in their mind.
The objection might be made that their knowledge of the position of neuron patterns is in itself a 'qualia experience', but to me, this would be redundant. The super-being does not need human language to tell themselves where the neurons are firing or 'mental pictures' of them. Their awareness is just of the firing they can sense what the patterns are and this sense creates other patterns of firing as they respond to stimuli by initiating behaviour. Labelling this a 'conscious experience' is unnecessary. As Ryle might say why double up an experience to make it a 'qualia experience' or a 'conscious experience' once you are not making mental pictures or saying things to yourself in your mind in human language?
This thought experiment, I believe, creates a plausible model of consciousness. Whether biological reality quite accords with the idea of qualia as macro-representations of neurons firing is not so important. Once we have one logically correct materialist model of the mind, we know at least that it is possible to find a coherent basis for discovering a materialist model that is fully in accordance with the empirics of biology.
This notion creates a separate 'mental phenomenon' that in turn creates room for notions of the soul, dualism, or in Professor Robinson's case idealism. It also underlines our (I believe false) notion that we have this mysterious 'consciousness' which is seemingly impossible to explain.
Imagine, however, a super-being that does not perceive red shirts and the taste of orange juice. Instead, it is just aware of where the various neurons are in the brain that give rise to such perceptions in humans and it is aware when neurons are firing in certain patterns. Knowing these patterns enables the super-being to navigate its way around the world, putting on red t-shirts and deciding to drink orange juice. After all, it can learn, just like a human, what happens when it puts on a shirt, it knows the undesirable 'cold' neuron patterns stop firing. The super-being, however, has no qualia or perceptions of t-shirts or orange juice. The super-being has perception on an entirely materialist basis with no question of anything giving rise to a 'mental substance'.
Fine, you may say, but we are not super-beings, and we do have qualia. But what if qualia are just a crude, macro form of what the super-being perceives?
Let's imagine the super-being is analogous to another super-being that only sees things at an atomic level and never perceives things as rocks, trees, rivers etc. No one would say a human has some metaphysically different perception of the world than a being that can see things at a more microscopic level.
The analogy suggests, in my view, that our original qualia-free super-being is simply experiencing the contents of their mind at a much deeper level than a mere human who experiences the neurons firing as an experience of a red shirt appearing in their mind.
The objection might be made that their knowledge of the position of neuron patterns is in itself a 'qualia experience', but to me, this would be redundant. The super-being does not need human language to tell themselves where the neurons are firing or 'mental pictures' of them. Their awareness is just of the firing they can sense what the patterns are and this sense creates other patterns of firing as they respond to stimuli by initiating behaviour. Labelling this a 'conscious experience' is unnecessary. As Ryle might say why double up an experience to make it a 'qualia experience' or a 'conscious experience' once you are not making mental pictures or saying things to yourself in your mind in human language?
This thought experiment, I believe, creates a plausible model of consciousness. Whether biological reality quite accords with the idea of qualia as macro-representations of neurons firing is not so important. Once we have one logically correct materialist model of the mind, we know at least that it is possible to find a coherent basis for discovering a materialist model that is fully in accordance with the empirics of biology.