As I had claimed Philosophical Realism [aka Metaphysical Realism] (mind-independence) is grounded on chasing after an illusion.
To date, no philosophical realist has been able to prove Philosophical Realism is realistic and tenable.
Despite grounded on an illusion, Philosophical Realists are so ignorant and arrogant in relying on such an illusion to insist Morality is not Objective.
Here is why Philosophical Realism aka Metaphysical Realism is illusory and no way can such an ideology can reflect reality [FSK-ed].
There is no way philosophical realists can avoid the above dilemma.Challenges to Metaphysical Realism
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win ... challenge/
According to metaphysical realism, the world is as it is independently of how humans or other inquiring agents take it to be. The objects the world contains, together with their properties and the relations they enter into, fix the world’s nature and these objects exist independently of our ability to discover they do. Unless this is so, metaphysical realists argue, none of our beliefs about our world could be objectively true since true beliefs tell us how things are and beliefs are objective when true or false independently of what anyone might think.
Many philosophers believe metaphysical realism is just plain common sense. Others believe it to be a direct implication of modern science, which paints humans as fallible creatures adrift in an inhospitable world not of their making. Nonetheless, metaphysical realism is controversial. Besides the analytic question of what it means to assert that objects exist independently of the mind, metaphysical realism also raises epistemological problems: how can we obtain knowledge of a mind-independent world? There are also prior semantic problems, such as how links are set up between our beliefs and the mind-independent states of affairs they allegedly represent. This is the Representation Problem.
Anti-realists deny the world is mind-independent. Believing the epistemological and semantic problems to be insoluble, they conclude realism must be false. In this entry I review a number of semantic and epistemological challenges to realism all based on the Representation Problem:
The Manifestation Argument: the cognitive and linguistic behaviour of an agent provides no evidence that realist mind/world links exist;
The Language Acquisition Argument: if such links were to exist language learning would be impossible;
The Brain-in-a-Vat Argument: realism entails both that we could be massively deluded (‘brains in a vat’) and that if we were we could not even form the belief that we were;
The Conceptual Relativity Argument: it is senseless to ask what the world contains independently of how we conceive of it, since the objects that exist depend on the conceptual scheme used to classify them;
The Model-Theoretic Argument: realists must either hold that an ideal theory passing every conceivable test could be false or that perfectly determinate terms like ‘cat’ are massively indeterminate, and both alternatives are absurd.
The above article merely considered two anti-realists camps from the analytical traditions but did not cover those from the non-analytical traditions.5. Summary
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win ... lenge/#Sum
We have considered a number of semantic challenges to Realism, the thesis that the objects and properties that the world contains exist independently of our conception or perception of them.
These challenges have come from two camps:
(1) neo-verificationists led by Dummett who assimilate belief in mind-independent world to a belief in a verification-transcendent conception of truth which they profess to find unintelligible, and
(2) pragmatists led by Putnam who also question the intelligibility of the realist’s mind-independent world but for reasons independent of any commitment to verificationism.
Nope!On all fronts, debate between realists and their anti-realist opponents is still very much open.
From the non-analytical tradition of the Kantian approach, Philosophical Realism [mind-independence] as an ideology is a dead-duck.
For many realists, the Correspondence Theory of Truth in justifying Philosophical Realism is an embarrassment, so they reject it outright.If realists could provide a plausible theory about how correspondences between mental symbols and the items in the world to which they refer might be set up, many of these challenges could be met.
Alternatively, if they could explain how, consistently with our knowledge of a mind-independent world, no such correspondences are required to begin with, many of the anti-realist objections would fall away as irrelevant.
Regardless, the fundamental of Philosophical Realism it is by default separated by a Reality Gap which require some sort of correspondence or mirroring [explicit or implicit] to the ultimate mind-independent reality [noumenon or thing-by-itself] they assumed to exists.
To console oneself of the above is self-ignorance and self-delusion.In the absence of such explanations it is still entirely reasonable for realists to believe that the correspondences are in place, however, and there can, indeed, be very good evidence for believing this.
Ignorance of Nature’s reference-fixing mechanism is no reason for denying it exists.
The philosophical realism dilemma is fundamentally a psychological problem and can only be resolved psychologically, not epistemologically nor ontologically.
My Point:
There is no way Philosophical Realists can prove Philosophical Realism is realistic and tenable because it is grounded on an ideology from an evolutionary default of external_ness to facilitate basis survival.
The problem of the dilemma of Philosophical Realism is more of a psychological issue than epistemological or ontological issue.
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