Philosophy Now Forum

Nearly four decades ago, Saul Kripke articulated a semantic version of scepticism, according to which no finite goings-on, either mental or behavioural, can establish what someone means by an expression.
Link

In his landmark study of Wittgenstein, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private
Language, Kripke takes Wittgenstein to claim that “There can be no such thing as
meaning anything by any word” (1982: 55). This is scepticism in the ontological
sense – there are no meanings – rather than the epistemological sense – we don’t
know what those meanings are.
The core thesis can be restated in various ways to make its relationship to
key theoretical notions more explicit. The following forms emphasise the bearing
of the thesis on the notion of sentence meaning and speaker meaning respectively.
(1) No sentence expresses any proposition.
(2) No speaker means any proposition by their utterances

FlashDangerpants wrote: ↑Wed Jun 14, 2023 2:24 pm I guess I haven't been reading all that much of VA's output recently as the tiresome rut he is stuck in just isn't worth the bother. But I seem to have missed something here, is anyone able to share any insight into why he's suddenly veering into Kripkenstein territory? It seems far beyond his talent tbh.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Wed Jun 14, 2023 2:04 am

Nearly four decades ago, Saul Kripke articulated a semantic version of scepticism, according to which no finite goings-on, either mental or behavioural, can establish what someone means by an expression.
Link

In his landmark study of Wittgenstein, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private
Language, Kripke takes Wittgenstein to claim that “There can be no such thing as
meaning anything by any word” (1982: 55). This is scepticism in the ontological
sense – there are no meanings – rather than the epistemological sense – we don’t
know what those meanings are.
The core thesis can be restated in various ways to make its relationship to
key theoretical notions more explicit. The following forms emphasise the bearing
of the thesis on the notion of sentence meaning and speaker meaning respectively.
(1) No sentence expresses any proposition.
(2) No speaker means any proposition by their utterances

Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language - Kripke

Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Wed Jun 14, 2023 2:32 pm Meaningless

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Wed Jun 14, 2023 2:04 am

Nearly four decades ago, Saul Kripke articulated a semantic version of scepticism, according to which no finite goings-on, either mental or behavioural, can establish what someone means by an expression.
Link

In his landmark study of Wittgenstein, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private
Language, Kripke takes Wittgenstein to claim that “There can be no such thing as
meaning anything by any word” (1982: 55). This is scepticism in the ontological
sense – there are no meanings – rather than the epistemological sense – we don’t
know what those meanings are.
The core thesis can be restated in various ways to make its relationship to
key theoretical notions more explicit. The following forms emphasise the bearing
of the thesis on the notion of sentence meaning and speaker meaning respectively.
(1) No sentence expresses any proposition.
(2) No speaker means any proposition by their utterances

Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language - Kripke

Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Wed Jun 14, 2023 2:32 pm

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Wed Jun 14, 2023 2:04 am

Nearly four decades ago, Saul Kripke articulated a semantic version of scepticism, according to which no finite goings-on, either mental or behavioural, can establish what someone means by an expression.
Link

In his landmark study of Wittgenstein, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private
Language, Kripke takes Wittgenstein to claim that “There can be no such thing as
meaning anything by any word” (1982: 55). This is scepticism in the ontological
sense – there are no meanings – rather than the epistemological sense – we don’t
know what those meanings are.
The core thesis can be restated in various ways to make its relationship to
key theoretical notions more explicit. The following forms emphasise the bearing
of the thesis on the notion of sentence meaning and speaker meaning respectively.
(1) No sentence expresses any proposition.
(2) No speaker means any proposition by their utterances

Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language - Kripke

Meaningless