Kant: Phenomena vs Noumena [B294-B310]

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Veritas Aequitas
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Kant: Phenomena vs Noumena [B294-B310]

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Since Kant's Phenomena vs Noumena crops up regularly, I thought it would be more effective if I were to present it directly from what Kant wrote about the issues.

I have presented the 2nd part of the Chapter here;
Kant: Phenomena vs Noumena [B306-B310]
viewtopic.php?f=5&t=39987

The following is the first part of the chapter related to Phenomena vs Noumena [CPR B294-B314];

..............
Kant CPR B294-B314 [N K Smith Translation]
A235 B294
WE have now not merely explored the territory of Pure Understanding, and carefully surveyed every part of it, but have also measured its extent, and assigned to everything in it its rightful place.
This domain {Pure Understanding} is an island, enclosed by Nature itself within unalterable Limits.
A236 B295
It [Pure Understanding] is the land of Truth -- enchanting name! - surrounded by a wide and stormy ocean, the native home of Illusion, where many a fog bank and many a swiftly melting iceberg give the deceptive appearance of farther shores, deluding the adventurous seafarer ever anew with empty hopes, and engaging him in enterprises which he can never abandon and yet is unable to carry to completion.

Before we venture on this sea, to explore it in all directions and to obtain assurance whether there be any Ground for such hopes, it will be well to begin by casting a glance upon the map of the land {the Understanding} which we are about to leave, and to enquire {a Critical Enquiry},
first, whether we cannot in any case be satisfied with what it [this present land] contains are not, indeed, under compulsion to be satisfied, inasmuch as there may be no other territory upon which we can settle [upon]; and,
secondly, by what title we possess even this domain {of Understanding}, and can consider ourselves as secured against all opposing claims.
................

Commentary:
Prior to the above, Kant had expounded the concept of Phenomenon as supported by the Understanding [the intellect] in combination with intuition [sensibility] as what is really real can possibly real.

Driven by cognitive dissonance, the intellect [as Pure Understanding /intellect] is driven to go out on its own, but Kant warned this 'no man's land' is surrounded by illusions.

If anyone insist the noumenon is unknowable but is really real, then he had been pulled by Pure Intellect into being deceived by illusions.
Last edited by Veritas Aequitas on Sat Jun 03, 2023 7:39 am, edited 2 times in total.
Veritas Aequitas
Posts: 12247
Joined: Wed Jul 11, 2012 4:41 am

Re: Kant: Phenomena vs Noumena [B294-B310]

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

contd ..

Although we have already given a sufficient answer to these questions in the course of the Analytic, a summary statement of its solutions may nevertheless help to strengthen our conviction, by focusing the various considerations in their bearing on the questions now before us.

We have seen that everything which the Understanding derives from itself is, though not borrowed from Experience, at the disposal of the Understanding solely for use in Experience. A237 B296
The Principles of Pure Understanding,
whether Constitutive a priori, like the Mathematical Principles,
or merely Regulative, like the Dynamical,
contain nothing but what may be called the Pure Schema of Possible Experience.

For Experience obtains its Unity only from the Synthetic Unity which the Understanding originally and of itself confers upon the Synthesis of Imagination in its Relation to Apperception;
and the Appearances, as data for a Possible Knowledge, must already stand a priori in Relation to, and in agreement with, that Synthetic Unity.

But although these Rules of Understanding are not only true a priori, but are indeed the source of all Truth (that is, of the agreement of our Knowledge with Objects), inasmuch as they contain in themselves the Ground of the Possibility of Experience viewed as the sum of all Knowledge wherein Objects can be Given to us,
we are not satisfied with the exposition merely of that which is true,
but likewise demand that account be taken of that which we desire to know.

If, therefore, from this Critical Enquiry we learn nothing more than what, in the merely Empirical employment of Understanding,
we should in any case have practised without any such subtle enquiry,
it would seem as if the advantage derived from it by no means {not at all; certainly not} repays the labour expended. B297

The reply may certainly be made that in the endeavour to extend our Knowledge a meddlesome curiosity is far less injurious than the habit of always insisting, before entering on any enquiries,
upon antecedent proof of the Utility {usefulness} of the enquiries an absurd demand,
since prior to completion of the enquiries we are not in a position to form the least conception of this utility, even if it were placed before our eyes. A238

There is, however, one advantage which may be made comprehensible and of interest even to the most refractory and reluctant learner,
the advantage, that while the Understanding, occupied merely with its Empirical employment, and not reflecting upon the sources of its own Knowledge, may indeed get along quite satisfactorily,
there is yet one task to which it is not equal, that, namely,
of determining the Limits of its {Understanding} employment, and
of knowing what it is that may lie within and
what it is that lies without its {Understanding} own proper sphere.
This {determining the limits} demands just those deep enquiries which we have instituted.

If the Understanding in its Empirical employment cannot distinguish whether certain questions lie within its horizon or not,
it can never be assured of its claims or of its possessions,
but must be prepared for many a humiliating disillusionment, whenever, as must unavoidably and constantly happen, it oversteps the Limits of its own domain, and loses itself in opinions that are baseless and misleading.

If the assertion, that the Understanding can employ its various Principles and its various Concepts solely in an Empirical and never in a Transcendental manner, is a Proposition which can be known with certainty, it will yield important consequences. B298

The Transcendental Employment of a Concept in any Principle is its application to Things-in-General and Things-in themselves;
the Empirical Employment [of a concept] is its application merely to Appearances; that is, to Objects of a Possible Experience. A239
That the latter [Empirical Employment] application of Concepts is alone feasible is evident from the following considerations.
We demand in every Concept,
first, the Logical Form of a Concept (of Thought)-in-General, and
secondly, the Possibility of giving it an Object to which it may be applied.

In the absence of such Object, it [concept] has no meaning and is completely lacking in Content, though it [concept] may still contain the Logical Function which is required for making a Concept out of any data that may be presented.

Now the Object cannot be Given to a Concept otherwise than in Intuition; for though a Pure Intuition can indeed precede the Object a priori, even this Intuition can acquire its Object, and therefore Objective Validity, only through the Empirical Intuition of which it is the mere Form.
Therefore all Concepts, and with them all Principles, even such as are Possible a priori, relate to Empirical Intuitions, that is, to the data for a Possible Experience.
Apart from this Relation [to empirical intuitions] they [concepts] have no Objective Validity, and in respect of their [concepts] Representations are a mere play of Imagination or of Understanding. B299

Take, for instance, the Concepts of Mathematics, considering them first of all in their Pure Intuitions.
Space {re pure intuition} has three dimensions; between two points there can be only one straight line, etc.

A240
Although all these Principles, and the Representation of the Object with which this Science [re Mathematics ] occupies itself, are generated in the mind completely a priori, they would mean nothing, were we not always able to present their meaning in Appearances, that is, in Empirical Objects.
We therefore demand that a Bare 1 Concept be made Sensible, that is, that an Object corresponding to it be presented in Intuition.
Otherwise the Concept would, as we say, be without sense, that is, without meaning.

The mathematician meets this demand by the Construction of a figure, which, although produced a priori, is an Appearance present to the Senses.
In the same Science [Mathematics?] the Concept of Magnitude seeks its support and Sensible meaning 2 in number, and this in turn in the fingers, in the beads of the abacus, or in strokes and points which can be placed before the eyes.

The Concept itself is always a priori in Origin, and so likewise are the Synthetic Principles or formulas derived from such Concepts; but their employment and their Relation to their professed Objects can in the end be sought nowhere but in Experience, of whose Possibility they contain the Formal Conditions. B300

That this is also the case with all Categories and the Principles derived from them, appears from the following consideration.
We cannot define any one of them [categories and principles] in any real 3 fashion, that is, make the Possibility of their Object understandable, 4 without at once descending to the Conditions of Sensibility, and so to the Form of Appearances to which, as their sole Objects, they must consequently be limited. A241
For if this Condition [of Sensibility] be removed, all meaning, that is, Relation to the Object, falls away;
and we cannot through any example make comprehensible to ourselves what sort of a Thing is to be meant by such a Concept.*

The Concept of Magnitude-in-General can never be explained except by saying that it is that Determination of a Thing whereby we are enabled to think how many times Unity is posited in it.
But this how-many-times is based on successive repetition, and therefore on Time and the Synthesis of the homogeneous in Time.

Reality, in contradistinction to negation [non-Reality], can be explained only if we think Time (as containing 1 all being) as either filled with being or as empty.
If I leave out Permanence (which is Existence in all Time), nothing remains in the Concept of Substance save only the Logical Representation of a Subject, a Representation which I endeavour to realise 2 by representing to myself something which can exist only as Subject and never as Predicate
Last edited by Veritas Aequitas on Sat Jun 03, 2023 7:36 am, edited 1 time in total.
Veritas Aequitas
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Re: Kant: Phenomena vs Noumena [B294-B310]

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

contd B301-B305


A243 B301
But not only am I ignorant of any Conditions under which this Logical pre-eminence may belong to anything; I can neither put such a Concept to any use, nor draw the least Inference from it.
For under these Conditions no Object is determined for its employment, and consequently we do not know whether it signifies anything whatsoever.

If I omit from the Concept of Cause, the Time in which something follows upon something else in conformity with a Rule, I should find in the Pure Category nothing further than that it is something from which we can conclude to the Existence of something else.
In that case not only would we be unable to distinguish Cause and Effect from one another, but since the Power to draw such Inferences requires Conditions of which I know nothing, the Concept would yield no indication how it applies to any Object.

The so-called Principle, ‘that everything accidental has a Cause,’ presents itself indeed somewhat pompously, as Self-sufficing in its own high dignity.
But if I ask what is understood by accidental, and you reply, "That the not-being of which is Possible,"
I would gladly know how you can determine this Possibility of its not-being,
if you do not represent a Succession in the Series of Appearances and in it a being which follows upon not-being (or reversewise), that is, a change. A244 B302
For to say that the not-being of a Thing does not contradict itself, is a lame appeal to a Logical Condition, which, though necessary to the Concept, is very far from being sufficient for real Possibility.

I can remove in Thought every existing Substance without contradicting myself, but I cannot infer from this their Objective contingency in Existence, that is, that their 1 non-Existence is Possible.

As regards the Concept of Community, it is easily seen that inasmuch as the Pure Categories of Substance and Causality admit of no explanation determinant of the Object, neither is any such explanation Possible of reciprocal Causality in the Relation of Substances to one another (commercium).

So long as the definition of Possibility, Existence, and Necessity is sought solely in Pure Understanding, they cannot be explained save through an obvious tautology.

For to substitute the Logical Possibility of the Concept (namely, that the Concept does not contradict itself) for the Transcendental Possibility of Things (namely, that an Object corresponds to the Concept) can deceive and leave satisfied only the simpleminded.* #


From all this it undeniably follows that
the Pure Concepts of Understanding can never admit of Transcendental 1 but always only of Empirical employment,
and that the Principles of Pure Understanding can apply only to Objects of the Senses under the Universal Conditions of a Possible Experience, never to Things-in-General without regard to the Mode in which we are able to intuit them.

Accordingly the Transcendental Analytic leads to this important conclusion, that the most the Understanding can achieve a priori is to anticipate the Form of a Possible Experience-in-General.
And since that which is not Appearance cannot be an Object of Experience, the Understanding can never transcend those Limits of Sensibility within which alone Objects can be Given to us. A247

Its [the Understanding] Principles are merely Rules for the exposition of Appearances;
and the proud name of an Ontology that presumptuously claims to supply, in Systematic doctrinal Form, Synthetic a priori Knowledge of Things-in-General (for instance, the Principle of Causality) must, therefore, give place to the modest title of a mere Analytic of Pure Understanding. B304

Thought is the act which relates Given Intuition to an Object.
If the Mode 2 of this Intuition is not in any way Given, the Object is merely Transcendental, and the Concept of Understanding has only Transcendental Employment, namely, as the Unity of the Thought of a Manifold-in-General.

Thus no Object is determined through a Pure Category in which abstraction is made of every Condition of Sensible Intuition the only kind of Intuition Possible to us.
It then expresses only the Thought of an Object-in-General, according to different Modes.

Now the employment of a Concept involves a Function of Judgment 1 whereby 2 an Object is Subsumed under the Concept, and so involves at least the Formal Condition under which something can be Given in Intuition.
If this Condition of Judgment (the Schema) is lacking, all Subsumption becomes impossible.

For in that case nothing is Given that could be Subsumed under the Concept.
The merely Transcendental employment of the Categories is, therefore, really no employment at all, 3 and has no Determinate Object, not even one that is determinable in its mere Form. A248
It therefore follows that the Pure Category does not suffice for a Synthetic a priori Principle, that the Principles of Pure Understanding are only of Empirical, never of Transcendental employment, and that outside the field of Possible Experience there can be no Synthetic a priori Principles. B305

It may be advisable, therefore, to express the situation as follows.
The Pure Categories, apart from Formal Conditions of Sensibility, have only Transcendental meaning;
nevertheless they {pure categories} may not be employed transcendentally,
such employment being in itself impossible,
inasmuch as all Conditions of any employment in Judgments 4 are lacking to them {the pure categories},
namely, the Formal Conditions of the Subsumption of any ostensible5 [stated or appearing to be true, but not necessarily so] Object under these Concepts.

Since, then, as Pure Categories merely,
they are not to be employed Empirically, and
[they] cannot be employed transcendentally,
they cannot, when separated from all Sensibility, be employed in any manner whatsoever, that is, they cannot be applied to any ostensible Object.

They [Pure Categories] are the Pure Form of the employment of Understanding in respect of Objects-in-General, that is, of Thought; but since they are merely its Form, through them {the pure categories} alone no Object can be Thought or Determined.*

1But we are here subject to an Illusion from which it is difficult to escape.
The Categories are not, as regards their Origin, grounded in Sensibility, like the Forms of Intuition, Space and Time; and they {categories} seem, therefore, to allow of an application extending beyond all Objects of the Senses.
Last edited by Veritas Aequitas on Sat Jun 03, 2023 7:36 am, edited 1 time in total.
Veritas Aequitas
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Re: Kant: Phenomena vs Noumena [B294-B310]

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

B306-B310

B306
As a matter of fact they [Categories] are nothing but Forms of Thought, which contain the merely Logical Faculty of uniting a priori in one-Consciousness the Manifold Given in Intuition;
and apart, therefore, from the only Intuition that is Possible to us, they {Categories} have even less meaning than the Pure Sensible Forms.
Through these [Pure Sensible] Forms an Object is at least Given, whereas a Mode of combining the Manifold -- a Mode peculiar to our Understanding by itself, in the absence of that Intuition wherein the Manifold can alone be Given, signifies nothing at all.

At the same time, if we entitle certain Objects, as Appearances, Sensible entities 2 (Phenomena),
then since we thus distinguish the Mode in which we intuit them from the nature that belongs to them in-themselves,
it is implied in this distinction that we place the latter [in-themselves], considered in their own nature,
although we do not so intuit them, or that we place other Possible Things, which are not Objects of our Senses but are Thought as Objects merely through the Understanding,
in opposition to the former [Phenomena, sensible entities],
and that in so doing we entitle them Intelligible Entities 1 (Noumena).

The question then arises, whether our Pure Concepts of Understanding have meaning in respect of these latter [Noumena], and so can be a way of knowing them.2

At the very outset, however, we come upon an ambiguity which may occasion serious misapprehension.
The Understanding, when it entitles an Object in a {certain} Relation mere Phenomenon,
at the same time forms, apart from that Relation, a Representation of an Object-in-itself; and so comes to represent itself as also being able to form Concepts of such Objects. B307

And since the Understanding yields no Concepts additional to the Categories,
it {Understanding} also supposes that the Object-in-itself must at least be Thought through these Pure Concepts [Categories],
and so is misled into treating the entirely indeterminate Concept of an Intelligible entity, namely, of a something-in-General outside our Sensibility,
as being a Determinate Concept of an entity that allows of being known in a certain [purely Intelligible] manner by means of the Understanding.

If by 'Noumenon' we mean a Thing so far as it is not an Object of our Sensible Intuition, and so abstract from our Mode of intuiting it, {then} this is a Noumenon in the negative sense of the term.

But if we understand by it an Object of a non-Sensible Intuition, we thereby presuppose a special Mode of Intuition, namely, the intellectual, which is not that which we possess, and of which we cannot comprehend even the Possibility. This would be 'Noumenon' in the positive sense of the term.

The Doctrine of Sensibility is likewise the Doctrine of the Noumenon in the negative sense,
that is, of Things which the Understanding must think without this reference to our Mode of Intuition,
therefore not merely as Appearances but as Things-in-Themselves.

B308
At the same time the Understanding is well aware that in viewing Things in this manner {as things-in-themselves}, as thus apart from our Mode of Intuition, it cannot make any use of the Categories.
For the Categories have meaning only in Relation to the Unity of Intuition in Space and Time; and even this Unity they can determine, by means of general a priori connecting Concepts, only because of the mere Ideality of Space and Time.
In cases where this Unity of Time is not to be found, and therefore in the case of the Noumenon,
all employment, and indeed the whole meaning of the Categories, entirely vanishes;
for we have then no means of determining whether Things in harmony with the Categories are even Possible.
On this point I need only refer the reader to what I have said in the opening sentences of the General Note appended to the preceding chapter. 1 [above, p. 252.]

The Possibility of a Thing can never be proved merely from the fact that its Concept is not Self-contradictory, but only through its being supported by some corresponding Intuition.
If, therefore, we should attempt to apply the Categories to Objects which are not viewed as being Appearances,
we should have to Postulate an Intuition {special} other than the Sensible,
and the Object would thus be a Noumenon in the positive sense. [as an Object of a non-Sensible Intuition]

Since, however, such a type of Intuition, Intellectual Intuition, forms no part whatsoever of our Faculty of Knowledge,
it follows that the employment of the Categories can never extend further than to the Objects of Experience. B309

Doubtless, indeed, there are Intelligible entities corresponding to the Sensible entities;
there may also be Intelligible entities to which our Sensible Faculty of Intuition has no Relation whatsoever;
but our Concepts of Understanding, being mere Forms of Thought for our Sensible Intuition, could not in the least apply to them {intelligible entities}.
That, therefore, which we entitle 'Noumenon' must be understood as being [re intelligible entities] such only in a negative sense.

If I remove from Empirical Knowledge ALL Thought (through Categories), no Knowledge of any Object remains.
For through mere Intuition {only} nothing at all is Thought, and the fact that this affection of Sensibility is in me does not [by itself] amount to a Relation of such Representation to any Object. A254
But if, on the other hand, I leave aside all Intuition, the Form of Thought still remains that is, the Mode of determining an Object for the Manifold of a Possible Intuition.

The Categories accordingly extend further than Sensible Intuition,
since they think Objects-in-General, without regard to the special Mode (the Sensibility 1) in which they [categories] may be Given.
But they [categories] do not thereby determine a greater sphere of Objects.
For we cannot assume that such Objects can be Given, without presupposing the possibility of another kind of Intuition than the Sensible; and we are by no means justified in so doing. B310

If the Objective Reality of a Concept cannot be in any way known,
while yet the Concept contains no Contradiction
and also at the same time is connected with other Modes of Knowledge that involve Given Concepts which it [concept] serves to Limit,
I entitle that Concept, Problematic.

The Concept of a Noumenon that is, of a Thing which is not to be Thought as Object of the Senses but as a Thing-in-itself, solely through a Pure Understanding is not in any way contradictory.
For we cannot assert of Sensibility that it [sensibility] is the sole possible kind of Intuition.

Further, the Concept of a Noumenon is necessary, to prevent Sensible Intuition from being extended to Things-in-Themselves, and thus to Limit the Objective Validity of Sensible Knowledge. A255

The remaining Things, 1 to which it {sensible intuition} does not apply, are entitled Noumena, in order to show that this Knowledge cannot extend its domain over everything which the Understanding thinks.

But none the less we are unable to comprehend how such Noumena can be Possible, and the domain that lies out beyond the sphere of Appearances is for us Empty.

That is to say, we have an Understanding which problematically extends further,
but we have no Intuition,
indeed not even the Concept of a Possible Intuition,
through which Objects outside the field of Sensibility can be Given, and
through which the Understanding can be employed assertorically {something is the case, factually} beyond that field.
Atla
Posts: 6607
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Re: Kant: Phenomena vs Noumena [B294-B310]

Post by Atla »

Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sat Jun 03, 2023 7:25 am Since Kant's Phenomena vs Noumena crops up regularly, I thought it would be more effective if I were to present it directly from what Kant wrote about the issues.

I have presented the 2nd part of the Chapter here;
Kant: Phenomena vs Noumena [B306-B310]
viewtopic.php?f=5&t=39987

The following is the first part of the chapter related to Phenomena vs Noumena [CPR B294-B314];

..............
Kant CPR B294-B314 [N K Smith Translation]
A235 B294
WE have now not merely explored the territory of Pure Understanding, and carefully surveyed every part of it, but have also measured its extent, and assigned to everything in it its rightful place.
This domain {Pure Understanding} is an island, enclosed by Nature itself within unalterable Limits.
A236 B295
It [Pure Understanding] is the land of Truth -- enchanting name! - surrounded by a wide and stormy ocean, the native home of Illusion, where many a fog bank and many a swiftly melting iceberg give the deceptive appearance of farther shores, deluding the adventurous seafarer ever anew with empty hopes, and engaging him in enterprises which he can never abandon and yet is unable to carry to completion.

Before we venture on this sea, to explore it in all directions and to obtain assurance whether there be any Ground for such hopes, it will be well to begin by casting a glance upon the map of the land {the Understanding} which we are about to leave, and to enquire {a Critical Enquiry},
first, whether we cannot in any case be satisfied with what it [this present land] contains are not, indeed, under compulsion to be satisfied, inasmuch as there may be no other territory upon which we can settle [upon]; and,
secondly, by what title we possess even this domain {of Understanding}, and can consider ourselves as secured against all opposing claims.
................

Commentary:
Prior to the above, Kant had expounded the concept of Phenomenon as supported by the Understanding [the intellect] in combination with intuition [sensibility] as what is really real can possibly real.

Driven by cognitive dissonance, the intellect [as Pure Understanding /intellect] is driven to go out on its own, but Kant warned this 'no man's land' is surrounded by illusions.

If anyone insist the noumenon is unknowable but is really real, then he had been pulled by Pure Intellect into being deceived by illusions.
Let's take VA's word here, that Kant was using "noumenon" in a purely negative/non-real sense.

Kant even seems to contradict himself here, by talking about Nature and how it encloses the island of Pure Understanding. If the noumenon can only ever be used in a negative/non-real sense, then there is no Nature at all, it's actually non-existent. There's just the Pure Understanding, and it has no outside.

A wide and stormy ocean isn't nothing, it's a wide and stormy ocean. Illusory and posited, yes, but that doesn't mean that it's non-existent.

Thinking that the noumenon is unknowable but really real, is of course the most reasonable view. That's why in the modern usage, the noumenon doesn't imply something inherently negative/non-real.

Or maybe VA simply misunderstood Kant. Or maybe Kant was simply contradicting himself.
Peter Holmes
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Re: Kant: Phenomena vs Noumena [B294-B310]

Post by Peter Holmes »

Atla wrote: Sat Jun 03, 2023 8:50 am
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sat Jun 03, 2023 7:25 am Since Kant's Phenomena vs Noumena crops up regularly, I thought it would be more effective if I were to present it directly from what Kant wrote about the issues.

I have presented the 2nd part of the Chapter here;
Kant: Phenomena vs Noumena [B306-B310]
viewtopic.php?f=5&t=39987

The following is the first part of the chapter related to Phenomena vs Noumena [CPR B294-B314];

..............
Kant CPR B294-B314 [N K Smith Translation]
A235 B294
WE have now not merely explored the territory of Pure Understanding, and carefully surveyed every part of it, but have also measured its extent, and assigned to everything in it its rightful place.
This domain {Pure Understanding} is an island, enclosed by Nature itself within unalterable Limits.
A236 B295
It [Pure Understanding] is the land of Truth -- enchanting name! - surrounded by a wide and stormy ocean, the native home of Illusion, where many a fog bank and many a swiftly melting iceberg give the deceptive appearance of farther shores, deluding the adventurous seafarer ever anew with empty hopes, and engaging him in enterprises which he can never abandon and yet is unable to carry to completion.

Before we venture on this sea, to explore it in all directions and to obtain assurance whether there be any Ground for such hopes, it will be well to begin by casting a glance upon the map of the land {the Understanding} which we are about to leave, and to enquire {a Critical Enquiry},
first, whether we cannot in any case be satisfied with what it [this present land] contains are not, indeed, under compulsion to be satisfied, inasmuch as there may be no other territory upon which we can settle [upon]; and,
secondly, by what title we possess even this domain {of Understanding}, and can consider ourselves as secured against all opposing claims.
................

Commentary:
Prior to the above, Kant had expounded the concept of Phenomenon as supported by the Understanding [the intellect] in combination with intuition [sensibility] as what is really real can possibly real.

Driven by cognitive dissonance, the intellect [as Pure Understanding /intellect] is driven to go out on its own, but Kant warned this 'no man's land' is surrounded by illusions.

If anyone insist the noumenon is unknowable but is really real, then he had been pulled by Pure Intellect into being deceived by illusions.
Let's take VA's word here, that Kant was using "noumenon" in a purely negative/non-real sense.

Kant even seems to contradict himself here, by talking about Nature and how it encloses the island of Pure Understanding. If the noumenon can only ever be used in a negative/non-real sense, then there is no Nature at all, it's actually non-existent. There's just the Pure Understanding, and it has no outside.

A wide and stormy ocean isn't nothing, it's a wide and stormy ocean. Illusory and posited, yes, but that doesn't mean that it's non-existent.

Thinking that the noumenon is unknowable but really real, is of course the most reasonable view. That's why in the modern usage, the noumenon doesn't imply something inherently negative/non-real.

Or maybe VA simply misunderstood Kant. Or maybe Kant was simply contradicting himself.
Nicely put. And then, if the noumenon exists, how can we know it's unknowable? Why must it be? And if it doesn't exist, then it can't be contrasted with phenomena. Iow, if there are no noumena, of what are phenomena phenomena?

Ploughing through Kant's almost impenetrable contortions takes me back to the time when I thought I ought to.
Last edited by Peter Holmes on Sat Jun 03, 2023 10:00 am, edited 1 time in total.
Veritas Aequitas
Posts: 12247
Joined: Wed Jul 11, 2012 4:41 am

Re: Kant: Phenomena vs Noumena [B294-B310]

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Peter Holmes wrote: Sat Jun 03, 2023 9:09 am
Atla wrote: Sat Jun 03, 2023 8:50 am
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sat Jun 03, 2023 7:25 am Since Kant's Phenomena vs Noumena crops up regularly, I thought it would be more effective if I were to present it directly from what Kant wrote about the issues.

I have presented the 2nd part of the Chapter here;
Kant: Phenomena vs Noumena [B306-B310]
viewtopic.php?f=5&t=39987

The following is the first part of the chapter related to Phenomena vs Noumena [CPR B294-B314];

..............
Kant CPR B294-B314 [N K Smith Translation]
A235 B294
WE have now not merely explored the territory of Pure Understanding, and carefully surveyed every part of it, but have also measured its extent, and assigned to everything in it its rightful place.
This domain {Pure Understanding} is an island, enclosed by Nature itself within unalterable Limits.
A236 B295
It [Pure Understanding] is the land of Truth -- enchanting name! - surrounded by a wide and stormy ocean, the native home of Illusion, where many a fog bank and many a swiftly melting iceberg give the deceptive appearance of farther shores, deluding the adventurous seafarer ever anew with empty hopes, and engaging him in enterprises which he can never abandon and yet is unable to carry to completion.

Before we venture on this sea, to explore it in all directions and to obtain assurance whether there be any Ground for such hopes, it will be well to begin by casting a glance upon the map of the land {the Understanding} which we are about to leave, and to enquire {a Critical Enquiry},
first, whether we cannot in any case be satisfied with what it [this present land] contains are not, indeed, under compulsion to be satisfied, inasmuch as there may be no other territory upon which we can settle [upon]; and,
secondly, by what title we possess even this domain {of Understanding}, and can consider ourselves as secured against all opposing claims.
................

Commentary:
Prior to the above, Kant had expounded the concept of Phenomenon as supported by the Understanding [the intellect] in combination with intuition [sensibility] as what is really real can possibly real.

Driven by cognitive dissonance, the intellect [as Pure Understanding /intellect] is driven to go out on its own, but Kant warned this 'no man's land' is surrounded by illusions.

If anyone insist the noumenon is unknowable but is really real, then he had been pulled by Pure Intellect into being deceived by illusions.
Let's take VA's word here, that Kant was using "noumenon" in a purely negative/non-real sense.

Kant even seems to contradict himself here, by talking about Nature and how it encloses the island of Pure Understanding. If the noumenon can only ever be used in a negative/non-real sense, then there is no Nature at all, it's actually non-existent. There's just the Pure Understanding, and it has no outside.

A wide and stormy ocean isn't nothing, it's a wide and stormy ocean. Illusory and posited, yes, but that doesn't mean that it's non-existent.

Thinking that the noumenon is unknowable but really real, is of course the most reasonable view. That's why in the modern usage, the noumenon doesn't imply something inherently negative/non-real.

Or maybe VA simply misunderstood Kant. Or maybe Kant was simply contradicting himself.
Nicely put. And then, if the noumenon exists, how can we know its unknowable? Why must it be? And if it doesn't exist, then it can't be contrasted with phenomena. Iow, if there are no noumena, of what are phenomena phenomena?

Ploughing through Kant's almost impenetrable contortions takes me back to the time when I thought I ought to.
Don't give silly excuses.
I have presented what Kant had written [.. I had parsed the sentences and paragraph to facilitate understanding], despite the apparent difficult, actually it is possible to comprehend Kant if you are patient.

If you are bringing the idea of noumenon into your argument [the feature that is just-is] then you have to understand [not necessary agree] how Kant refute the noumenon as really real in a mind-independent mode and put it in its proper context for use.

So try and read it till you understand [may take a few rounds], I can assist if you have problem with it.

In this case, Kant is alluding to a evolutionary default it is common that there is an opposite [..binary] to many things.
If there is an 'up' there must be a 'down'
If there is an 'effect' there must be a 'cause'
If there is an 'in' there must be an 'out'
and so on, thus,
If there is a 'phenomenon' there must be an 'noumenon'

but such conceptions are highly contextual and can be misleading if we are to be dogmatic about it.
For example, the people in UK perceived themselves as looking up, so the people in Australia must be looking down, thus 'down-under' attributed to any thing Australian which is stupid if taken literally and dogmatically. This need to be ironed out with contexts.

Because of this 'if p then not-p' evolutionary default principle, this lead the p-realists to infer [speculate based on the principle] the existence of a real noumenon as opposite from a real evident phenomenal.

Because it is seemingly logical, Kant went along with the idea that this intelligible object may be unknown, since there is no empirical evidences for its existence.
However in acceptance of this idea of the noumenon, the use of it must follow strict rules as explained by Kant in the above. You got to read it.

Kant went along with this idea of the noumenon, because despite ultimately proving it is an illusion, it is a useful illusion for idealization.
I have not mentioned it, Kant in the CPR the noumenon is a useful illusion as an idealization to motivate science to a never ending progress, i.e. in the negative sense, but the noumenon should never be reified as something positively real like its counterpart, phenomena.

For example, the perfect circle, perfect square, pure water, etc. are noumenon which cannot be realized as empirical phenomena, but the idea of perfection drives science to improve toward the impossible to achieve perfections [the ideals].

I recommend you read the above.
If you can understand it clearly [not necessary agree with] it will definitely benefit your thinking skills. It is not easy because it is only a part and not the complete whole.
Peter Holmes
Posts: 3711
Joined: Tue Jul 18, 2017 3:53 pm

Re: Kant: Phenomena vs Noumena [B294-B310]

Post by Peter Holmes »

Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sat Jun 03, 2023 9:46 am
Peter Holmes wrote: Sat Jun 03, 2023 9:09 am
Atla wrote: Sat Jun 03, 2023 8:50 am
Let's take VA's word here, that Kant was using "noumenon" in a purely negative/non-real sense.

Kant even seems to contradict himself here, by talking about Nature and how it encloses the island of Pure Understanding. If the noumenon can only ever be used in a negative/non-real sense, then there is no Nature at all, it's actually non-existent. There's just the Pure Understanding, and it has no outside.

A wide and stormy ocean isn't nothing, it's a wide and stormy ocean. Illusory and posited, yes, but that doesn't mean that it's non-existent.

Thinking that the noumenon is unknowable but really real, is of course the most reasonable view. That's why in the modern usage, the noumenon doesn't imply something inherently negative/non-real.

Or maybe VA simply misunderstood Kant. Or maybe Kant was simply contradicting himself.
Nicely put. And then, if the noumenon exists, how can we know its unknowable? Why must it be? And if it doesn't exist, then it can't be contrasted with phenomena. Iow, if there are no noumena, of what are phenomena phenomena?

Ploughing through Kant's almost impenetrable contortions takes me back to the time when I thought I ought to.
Don't give silly excuses.
I have presented what Kant had written [.. I had parsed the sentences and paragraph to facilitate understanding], despite the apparent difficult, actually it is possible to comprehend Kant if you are patient.

If you are bringing the idea of noumenon into your argument [the feature that is just-is] then you have to understand [not necessary agree] how Kant refute the noumenon as really real in a mind-independent mode and put it in its proper context for use.

So try and read it till you understand [may take a few rounds], I can assist if you have problem with it.

In this case, Kant is alluding to a evolutionary default it is common that there is an opposite [..binary] to many things.
If there is an 'up' there must be a 'down'
If there is an 'effect' there must be a 'cause'
If there is an 'in' there must be an 'out'
and so on, thus,
If there is a 'phenomenon' there must be an 'noumenon'

but such conceptions are highly contextual and can be misleading if we are to be dogmatic about it.
For example, the people in UK perceived themselves as looking up, so the people in Australia must be looking down, thus 'down-under' attributed to any thing Australian which is stupid if taken literally and dogmatically. This need to be ironed out with contexts.

Because of this 'if p then not-p' evolutionary default principle, this lead the p-realists to infer [speculate based on the principle] the existence of a real noumenon as opposite from a real evident phenomenal.

Because it is seemingly logical, Kant went along with the idea that this intelligible object may be unknown, since there is no empirical evidences for its existence.
However in acceptance of this idea of the noumenon, the use of it must follow strict rules as explained by Kant in the above. You got to read it.

Kant went along with this idea of the noumenon, because despite ultimately proving it is an illusion, it is a useful illusion for idealization.
I have not mentioned it, Kant in the CPR the noumenon is a useful illusion as an idealization to motivate science to a never ending progress, i.e. in the negative sense, but the noumenon should never be reified as something positively real like its counterpart, phenomena.

For example, the perfect circle, perfect square, pure water, etc. are noumenon which cannot be realized as empirical phenomena, but the idea of perfection drives science to improve toward the impossible to achieve perfections [the ideals].

I recommend you read the above.
If you can understand it clearly [not necessary agree with] it will definitely benefit your thinking skills. It is not easy because it is only a part and not the complete whole.
Thanks. I have read and studied Kant.

If the noumenon is an illusion, then there's no reason to think that we humans can have no access to it. That's to entertain a fantasy, if only to reject it - but then always to have it there as a tease.

So your claim - that facts emerge from and are conditioned on a human-based framework and system of knowledge - is false. If there's no reality to which we can't have access, then we can have access to reality. And that's the very empirical evidence that makes, for example, natural science so credible and reliable. (As others have repeatedly explained, your whole argument is realist.)
Atla
Posts: 6607
Joined: Fri Dec 15, 2017 8:27 am

Re: Kant: Phenomena vs Noumena [B294-B310]

Post by Atla »

Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sat Jun 03, 2023 9:46 am Don't give silly excuses.
I have presented what Kant had written [.. I had parsed the sentences and paragraph to facilitate understanding], despite the apparent difficult, actually it is possible to comprehend Kant if you are patient.

If you are bringing the idea of noumenon into your argument [the feature that is just-is] then you have to understand [not necessary agree] how Kant refute the noumenon as really real in a mind-independent mode and put it in its proper context for use.

So try and read it till you understand [may take a few rounds], I can assist if you have problem with it.

In this case, Kant is alluding to a evolutionary default it is common that there is an opposite [..binary] to many things.
If there is an 'up' there must be a 'down'
If there is an 'effect' there must be a 'cause'
If there is an 'in' there must be an 'out'
and so on, thus,
If there is a 'phenomenon' there must be an 'noumenon'

but such conceptions are highly contextual and can be misleading if we are to be dogmatic about it.
For example, the people in UK perceived themselves as looking up, so the people in Australia must be looking down, thus 'down-under' attributed to any thing Australian which is stupid if taken literally and dogmatically. This need to be ironed out with contexts.

Because of this 'if p then not-p' evolutionary default principle, this lead the p-realists to infer [speculate based on the principle] the existence of a real noumenon as opposite from a real evident phenomenal.

Because it is seemingly logical, Kant went along with the idea that this intelligible object may be unknown, since there is no empirical evidences for its existence.
However in acceptance of this idea of the noumenon, the use of it must follow strict rules as explained by Kant in the above. You got to read it.

Kant went along with this idea of the noumenon, because despite ultimately proving it is an illusion, it is a useful illusion for idealization.
I have not mentioned it, Kant in the CPR the noumenon is a useful illusion as an idealization to motivate science to a never ending progress, i.e. in the negative sense, but the noumenon should never be reified as something positively real like its counterpart, phenomena.

For example, the perfect circle, perfect square, pure water, etc. are noumenon which cannot be realized as empirical phenomena, but the idea of perfection drives science to improve toward the impossible to achieve perfections [the ideals].

I recommend you read the above.
If you can understand it clearly [not necessary agree with] it will definitely benefit your thinking skills. It is not easy because it is only a part and not the complete whole.
As I see it, the greatest failing of Kant was, that he entirely failed to differentiate between the abstract noumenon and the concrete noumenon.

Perfect circles and perfect squares are abstract concepts that cannot refer to anything real in the noumenal world - true.

But the Moon or Betelgeuse are concrete, directly unknowable things in the noumenal world.
Iwannaplato
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Re: Kant: Phenomena vs Noumena [B294-B310]

Post by Iwannaplato »

Is it a merely noumenal (and thus false) assumption that other people experience things?
IOW do we assume that sure they go into REM sleep, but they do not experience what we do when we sleep: dreams. Where we see images and have feelings, which cannot be observed from the outside?

If it is alright to conclude that other people have subjective experiences, rather than just things impinge on their bodies, why can't we conclude that there are other noumena?

We used to think animals were mere machines: in the scientific community. At best one was considered to be being problematically speculative to assume animals had feelings, intentions, desires and so on: subjective experience.

Then, slowly, over time, the scientific community allow us to conclude via similarities between us and animals that they likely had a subjective life.

That's a conclusion that some unobservable process is present and real: a noumenon.

Or must a true antirealist be a solipsist?
Veritas Aequitas
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Re: Kant: Phenomena vs Noumena [B294-B310]

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Peter Holmes wrote: Sat Jun 03, 2023 9:58 am Thanks. I have read and studied Kant.
In my assessment, if you have read and studied Kant, you have not understood [not necessary agree with] Kant's main thesis with the CPR.
If the noumenon is an illusion, then there's no reason to think that we humans can have no access to it. That's to entertain a fantasy, if only to reject it - but then always to have it there as a tease.
Not sure of your point.
According to Kant, the noumenon is an illusion, but it is a very useful illusion thus there is necessity and reason to hold on to this illusion.
There is no need for humans to access to its reality, because that is a non-starter to consider the illusory noumenon as really real.

The point is P-realists [like you] insist the noumenon is the most real, i.e. an objective reality existing out there independent of human opinions, beliefs, judgments or description.
This is why according to Kant you are merely reifying an illusion as real.
So your claim - that facts emerge from and are conditioned on a human-based framework and system of knowledge - is false. If there's no reality to which we can't have access, then we can have access to reality. And that's the very empirical evidence that makes, for example, natural science so credible and reliable. (As others have repeatedly explained, your whole argument is realist.)
As I have stated, there are two senses of reality, facts and objectivity, i.e.

1. FSK-ed reality, truths, and objectivity
2. P-realist mind-independent reality.

Your P-realist mind-independent reality is fake and illusory.
My FSK-ed reality [e.g. scientific reality, facts, truth] is realistic and very useful, therefore we need to recognize this FSK-ed reality [of various objectivity] to facilitate humanity to progress.

Yes, I am an empirical-realist, not a philosophical realist. If you have read Kant thoroughly you would understand this point. Do you?
Atla
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Joined: Fri Dec 15, 2017 8:27 am

Re: Kant: Phenomena vs Noumena [B294-B310]

Post by Atla »

Hey I think I like this Schopenhauer guy
Fundamental error: Kant did not distinguish between the concrete, intuitive, perceptual knowledge of objects and the abstract, discursive, conceptual, knowledge of thoughts.
Veritas Aequitas
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Re: Kant: Phenomena vs Noumena [B294-B310]

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Here is why the noumenon as an intelligible object [see above] cannot be real to us at all because we do not have the relevant intuition to make it real for us.
A280 B336
For the Intelligible would require a quite peculiar Intuition which we do not possess,
and in the absence of this [Intuition] [the intelligible] would be for us nothing at all;
and, on the other hand, it is also evident that Appearances could not be Objects-in-Themselves. [intelligible]
Atla
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Joined: Fri Dec 15, 2017 8:27 am

Re: Kant: Phenomena vs Noumena [B294-B310]

Post by Atla »

Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sat Jun 03, 2023 10:22 am Here is why the noumenon as an intelligible object [see above] cannot be real to us at all because we do not have the relevant intuition to make it real for us.
A280 B336
For the Intelligible would require a quite peculiar Intuition which we do not possess,
and in the absence of this [Intuition] [the intelligible] would be for us nothing at all;
and, on the other hand, it is also evident that Appearances could not be Objects-in-Themselves. [intelligible]
If you're convinced that the food you eat everyday is nothing at all, then why do you keep putting it into your mouth?
Veritas Aequitas
Posts: 12247
Joined: Wed Jul 11, 2012 4:41 am

Re: Kant: Phenomena vs Noumena [B294-B310]

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

The evolutionary default of philosophical realism is so forceful that Kant warned;
There will therefore be Syllogisms which contain no Empirical premisses, and by means of which we conclude from something which we know* to something else of which we have no Concept,
and to which, owing to an inevitable Illusion, we yet ascribe Objective Reality.

These conclusions {transcendental Ideas, God, Soul & The World, } are, then, rather to be called pseudo-Rational 2 than Rational,
although in view of their Origin they may well lay claim to the latter title {rational},
since they {conclusions} are not fictitious and have not arisen fortuitously, but have sprung from the very nature of Reason.
They {conclusions} are sophistications not of men but of Pure Reason itself.

Even the wisest of men cannot free himself from them {the illusions}.
After long effort he perhaps succeeds in guarding himself against actual error; but he will never be able to free himself from the Illusion, which unceasingly mocks and torments him. B397
Most of the wisest of men who came after Kant, e.g. Hegel [the Absolute], Schopenhauer [Will] and others succumbed to be deceived by the illusions.
This included Einstein [a follower of Schopenhauer] who insisted "God do not play dice" based on his philosophical realism stance.
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