Draft I Part XV

So what's really going on?

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Eodnhoj7
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Joined: Mon Mar 13, 2017 3:18 am

Draft I Part XV

Post by Eodnhoj7 »

Time is a contradiction as it is the measurement of change and change is contradictory. This change necessitates one thing existing within one space in time and the same thing existing in another space thus the ‘same thing’ is no longer the ‘same thing’ because of their differences in identity relative to their positions. In these respects a length of time is a length of space considering the positions of time are positions in space. This spatial nature necessitates time, at its root, fundamentally being the simultaneous expansion and contraction of space.

It is expansive space considering the position of a phenomenon in time A progresses to time B thus causing the phenomenon to replicate as time A is different from time B. This replication of the phenomenon is the expansion of the phenomenon. On the opposite, however, time is contracting space. This is also considering the position of a phenomenon in time A and the position of the phenomenon in time B shows two separate positions where the object is divided into separate entities. In other terms time is division that causes the phenomenon to become more and more distinct thus ‘shrinking’ its ability to manifest more and more possible states due to its manifestation of further distinctions. This expansion and contraction are dualistic and oppositional and in turn this leads time itself as having a contradictory state as the expansion and contraction occur simultaneously when the phenomenon is viewed as a whole.

Another aspect of time, which may be viewed as contradictory due to their dualistic nature, is Aristotle’s distinctions of the ‘actual’ and the ‘potential’. The ‘actual’ is the manifestation of a distinct state which exists through the absence of the ‘actual’, i.e. the ‘potential’. In other terms the ‘potential’ is a non-distinct state synonymous to void. The contradiction occurs in the respect that while the ‘actual’ and ‘potential’, synonymously viewed as ‘form’ and ‘void’, are opposites they fundamentally equivocate as one is dependent upon the other. This dependency results in a fallacy of equivocation as opposites, which contradict because of said ‘oppositional qualities’, result in the other.

The ‘actual’ is dependent upon the ‘potential’ as the ‘actual’ moves through the ‘potential’ much in the same manner ‘form’ moves through ‘void’. The ‘actual’s’ ability to change is the result of the ‘potential’ dividing and multiplying its states. An example of this is movement of an atom through void. The atom as moving through void divides the one atom into multiple positions in time, thus different identities, with these multiple positions effectively multiplying the atom’s identity in time at the same time. In these respects the ‘actual’ is multiplied and divided through the ‘potential’ and any change which occurs within the ‘actual’ is because of the ‘potential’. In other respects ‘form’, i.e. the ‘actual’, changes because of ‘void’, i.e. the ‘potential’.

In another respect the ‘potential’ is dependent upon the ‘actual’ in the respect that the changing of one ‘actual’ into another necessitates a division through manifestation of multiple distinctions. This multiplicity of distinctions is a multiplicity of ‘void’, i.e. ‘unactual’, states considering the act of one ‘actual’ being distinct from another ‘actual’ results in the respective ‘void’ of qualities found in one ‘actual’ but not in another. Using other terms the nature of ‘potentiality’ being ‘unactuality’ results in the differences of one actual, in one position of time, relative to another actual, in another position in time. In these respect ‘potentiality’ occurs because of ‘actuality’.

Time, in these regards, is a state of changing actualities which contain within themselves potentiality considering only the ‘actual’ really exists and existing on its own terms is effectively nothing. As effectively ‘no-thing on its own terms’ the ‘actual’ is the ‘potential’. In other words, the actual on its own terms is the ‘potentiality’ of other phenomenon. Actuality and potentiality thus equivocate as the ‘actual’ is the relative ‘potential’ when one actual is relative to another. Using another example, the ‘actual’ in time A exists through the ‘potential’ of time B with time B being the ‘actual’ when relative to time C. This is assuming time is viewed linearly. Time, viewed as a whole, contains ‘actuality’ and ‘potentiality’ simultaneously and this is a contradiction of equivocation because of their oppositional nature as dualistic opposites. The dualism of ‘actuality’ and ‘potentiality’ makes little sense upon further analysis.

To address the above from another angle, this no-thingness of the ‘potential’ results in the ‘actual’ effectively changing itself considering only it exists as potentiality is an absence of actuality, i.e. ‘form’, thus akin to ‘void’ or ‘no-thingness’. In these respects Aristotle is wrong in making a distinction between ‘actuality’ and ‘potentiality’ considering only the ‘actual’ can be observed as the ‘potential’ is ‘unactuality’, i.e. ‘void’ or ‘no-thingness’. Potentiality is its own contradiction as the ‘potentiality of potentiality’, or rather the ‘void of void’, is ‘actuality’ or ‘form’. Under these terms only the ‘actual’ really exists and the observation of ‘potentiality’ is the relationship of one distinct actual to that of another distinct actual. In these respects ‘potentiality’ is relative, much like ‘actuality’ and as relative is nothing in itself. But this makes little sense as ‘potentiality’ is already ‘no-thingness’ thus speaking of potentiality is to speak of no-thingness thus only ‘actuality’ can be effectively observed. Only distinct actuals exist and this distinction of the actuals in one respect shows a separation, because of the aforementioned distinction, while in another respect shows the connection as the act of one contrasting actual to that of the other actual necessitates a connection because of the relationship necessitated by said contrast. One distinction is connected to another distinction because of the quality of ‘distinction’ both share.

Laying ‘actuality’ and ‘potentiality’ aside one may revert back to the previously mentioned definition of time as “measurement of change”. Considering time is a measurement it may be argued as strictly subjective, in the case of Kant’s argument, but this does not necessitate it as only subjective. Time is the observation of movements, internally or externally of the observer, and as such the movements may be objective in the respect multiple observers can see the same thing. An example of this internality is the act of counting ‘one Mississippi, two Mississippi, etc.. The act of counting this way subjectively may be repeated across different observers, or repeated within the same observer, thus resulting in objectivity. An example of this externality is a clock. One person may view a clock one way and another person may see it in another way yet the fact that two people can see the same thing necessitates an objective state that impresses itself upon both viewers no matter the difference in the angle of observation. Time in these respects is both internal and external measurement thus resulting in subjectivity and objectivity as effectively one and the same even though they are fundamentally different things. This makes little sense.

The contradictions of ‘time as observation’ go further though. The observation of one time zone is observed within another time zone with this being observed within another time zone thus time infinitely regresses and becomes indefinite. An example of this is the movement of repeating water drops which is relative to the repeated movement of me tapping my hand which is relative to the repeated movement of the rotation of the stars so on and so forth. Considering time is the observation of change, one set of movements acts as the relative time zone through which another time zone is measured and this continues as change continues. In these respects the infinite continuity of time necessitates time as existing outside of time thus time is timeless. This is senseless. However if time is not infinitely continuous then time eventually ends thus resulting in a timeless state and time once again contradicts itself by resulting in its opposite.

In conclusion time is fundamentally contradictory. It is contradictory in the respect of it being simultaneous expansion and contraction of space. It is contradictory in the respect of it being simultaneous actuality and potentiality. It is contradictory in its nature of being infinite or even being not infinite. These contradictions necessitate time as being fundamentally senseless and a phenomenon which cannot be accurately discussed, it is only assumed as how it presents itself to the observer.
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