Boony's Room - a contemplation of Free Will & Determinism
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Boony's Room - a contemplation of Free Will & Determinism
Two identical copies of cricketer David Boon were made unbeknownst to him. The two copies of Boony, instantly appear facing each other from opposite corners of a white room that is 3 metres cubed, identical in all directions.
There are no causal effects differing in each of the Boony's slightly differing positions in spacetime. Nothing in this thought experiment regarding each version of David Boon once instantiated within the room is different in any way.
What happens next?
Do they both, at the same time, ask the exact same question of each other?
Do they end up arguing because they both keep attempting to interject at precisely the same time with precisely the same dialogue?
After five minutes, the pair hear a voice asking them to draw a picture of their favourite fruit on the wall and are told there is a pencil in their left pocket.
Do they both turn and draw on the same symmetrically opposite part of the wall?
Do they both draw identical images of the fruit?
There are no causal effects differing in each of the Boony's slightly differing positions in spacetime. Nothing in this thought experiment regarding each version of David Boon once instantiated within the room is different in any way.
What happens next?
Do they both, at the same time, ask the exact same question of each other?
Do they end up arguing because they both keep attempting to interject at precisely the same time with precisely the same dialogue?
After five minutes, the pair hear a voice asking them to draw a picture of their favourite fruit on the wall and are told there is a pencil in their left pocket.
Do they both turn and draw on the same symmetrically opposite part of the wall?
Do they both draw identical images of the fruit?
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Re: Boony's Room - a contemplation of Free Will & Determinism
> Do they both, at the same time, ask the exact same question of each other?
Suppose they don't say the same thing. Is that supposed to indicate anything of "free will"? If they're exactly the same, then their will was the same at the start of this too. So any difference in their behaviour past this point cannot be a difference created by a difference in will - since their will is the same! So the difference in behaviour must have it's ultimate source outside of their will.
If it wasn't their will that was the source of this difference in behaviour, we can't take it to be evidence of free will.
But we can take it as possible evidence against determinism I suppose.
Suppose they don't say the same thing. Is that supposed to indicate anything of "free will"? If they're exactly the same, then their will was the same at the start of this too. So any difference in their behaviour past this point cannot be a difference created by a difference in will - since their will is the same! So the difference in behaviour must have it's ultimate source outside of their will.
If it wasn't their will that was the source of this difference in behaviour, we can't take it to be evidence of free will.
But we can take it as possible evidence against determinism I suppose.
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Re: Boony's Room - a contemplation of Free Will & Determinism
That's the question.Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Sun Jan 22, 2023 5:58 pm > Do they both, at the same time, ask the exact same question of each other?
Suppose they don't say the same thing. Is that supposed to indicate anything of "free will"? If they're exactly the same, then their will was the same at the start of this too. So any difference in their behaviour past this point cannot be a difference created by a difference in will - since their will is the same! So the difference in behaviour must have it's ultimate source outside of their will.
If it wasn't their will that was the source of this difference in behaviour, we can't take it to be evidence of free will.
But we can take it as possible evidence against determinism I suppose.
This forum has many 'hard determinists'...
Certainly, a hard determinist would have both Boonys in a mirrored state until they drop dead.
No?
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Re: Boony's Room - a contemplation of Free Will & Determinism
That certainly is the hard determinist stance, for most forms of basic determinism, I agree.
But my interest isn't in that. My interest is in the scenario I talked about, where they do something different. Do you agree with my assessment of that scenario?
But my interest isn't in that. My interest is in the scenario I talked about, where they do something different. Do you agree with my assessment of that scenario?
Re: Boony's Room - a contemplation of Free Will & Determinism
If they didn't draw the same picture, the existence of randomness would be proved.
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Re: Boony's Room - a contemplation of Free Will & Determinism
the actions of the copies are simply that... if the copies were predetermined to behave as they did, it would have been because they were made (constructed) that way... I don't believe that there is anyway to know...
what happens when one Boony stabs the other with the pencil? would the original feel it?
-Imp
what happens when one Boony stabs the other with the pencil? would the original feel it?
-Imp
- attofishpi
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Re: Boony's Room - a contemplation of Free Will & Determinism
Absolutely.Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Sun Jan 22, 2023 5:58 pm > Do they both, at the same time, ask the exact same question of each other?
Suppose they don't say the same thing. Is that supposed to indicate anything of "free will"?
No, I think as time increases differences will manifest in relation to quantum indeterminacy.Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Sun Jan 22, 2023 5:58 pmIf they're exactly the same, then their will was the same at the start of this too. So any difference in their behaviour past this point cannot be a difference created by a difference in will - since their will is the same! So the difference in behaviour must have it's ultimate source outside of their will.
I agree. So my question is, what do you think would happen regarding the questions I posed in the OP?Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Sun Jan 22, 2023 5:58 pmIf it wasn't their will that was the source of this difference in behaviour, we can't take it to be evidence of free will.
(atto edit) - correction, misread. Daft response!
What about compatabilism?Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Sun Jan 22, 2023 5:58 pmBut we can take it as possible evidence against determinism I suppose.
Last edited by attofishpi on Thu Jan 26, 2023 8:51 am, edited 2 times in total.
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Re: Boony's Room - a contemplation of Free Will & Determinism
You said "absolutely" that it indicates something of free will, but then you also said it's not evidence for free will. I don't really understand. Those seem directly contradictory to me.attofishpi wrote: ↑Thu Jan 26, 2023 2:08 amAbsolutely.Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Sun Jan 22, 2023 5:58 pm > Do they both, at the same time, ask the exact same question of each other?
Suppose they don't say the same thing. Is that supposed to indicate anything of "free will"?
No, I think as time increases differences will manifest in relation to quantum indeterminacy.Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Sun Jan 22, 2023 5:58 pmIf they're exactly the same, then their will was the same at the start of this too. So any difference in their behaviour past this point cannot be a difference created by a difference in will - since their will is the same! So the difference in behaviour must have it's ultimate source outside of their will.
I agree. So my question is, what do you think would happen regarding the questions I posed in the OP?Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Sun Jan 22, 2023 5:58 pmIf it wasn't their will that was the source of this difference in behaviour, we can't take it to be evidence of free will.
What about compatabilism?Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Sun Jan 22, 2023 5:58 pmBut we can take it as possible evidence against determinism I suppose.
I am a compatibilist, which is exactly why I started my post with the suggestion that if they do something different, that doesn't indicate anything about free will at all. Free will has nothing to do with randomness.
If the source of their different actions was quantum indeterminacy, then the source of their different choice wasn't free will, it was quantum indeterminacy. If we want free will, randomness (which is imo what quantum indeterminacy means) contributes absolutely 0 towards that goal.
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Re: Boony's Room - a contemplation of Free Will & Determinism
Yes, absolutely if Boony & Boony don't state the exact same thing once instantiated, it indicates something of free will. Where did I state that it is not evidence of free will?Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Thu Jan 26, 2023 6:52 amYou said "absolutely" that it indicates something of free will, but then you also said it's not evidence for free will. I don't really understand. Those seem directly contradictory to me.attofishpi wrote: ↑Thu Jan 26, 2023 2:08 amAbsolutely.Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Sun Jan 22, 2023 5:58 pm > Do they both, at the same time, ask the exact same question of each other?
Suppose they don't say the same thing. Is that supposed to indicate anything of "free will"?
No, I think as time increases differences will manifest in relation to quantum indeterminacy.Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Sun Jan 22, 2023 5:58 pmIf they're exactly the same, then their will was the same at the start of this too. So any difference in their behaviour past this point cannot be a difference created by a difference in will - since their will is the same! So the difference in behaviour must have it's ultimate source outside of their will.
I agree. So my question is, what do you think would happen regarding the questions I posed in the OP?Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Sun Jan 22, 2023 5:58 pmIf it wasn't their will that was the source of this difference in behaviour, we can't take it to be evidence of free will.
What about compatabilism?Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Sun Jan 22, 2023 5:58 pmBut we can take it as possible evidence against determinism I suppose.
You state you are a compatibilist, so why not address the questions posed in the OP as to how you, as a compatibilist think things will progress for Boony (and Boony)?
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Re: Boony's Room - a contemplation of Free Will & Determinism
Me: If it wasn't their will that was the source of this difference in behaviour, we can't take it to be evidence of free will.
You: I agree.
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Re: Boony's Room - a contemplation of Free Will & Determinism
Btw, that's what I am doing. The conversation has two directions: either they do the exact same thing as each other, every time, and pure determinism is true, or they do something different, and pure determinism isn't true.attofishpi wrote: ↑Thu Jan 26, 2023 8:05 am
You state you are a compatibilist, so why not address the questions posed in the OP as to how you, as a compatibilist think things will progress for Boony (and Boony)?
So then the next layer is discussing the implications of each scenario. And I'm doing that. I'm discussing the implications of them doing different things. My take on the implication of them doing different things is, they're not doing different things because of their free will, because the only reason they're doing different things is apparently because of physical randomness, not because of a difference in will. The physical randomness might RESULT in a difference in will, but that difference in will itself wasn't willed into existence, it was caused by randomness.
Maybe they have free will, maybe they don't, but randomness doesn't make their will more free. If anything it makes their will a slave to randomness.
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Re: Boony's Room - a contemplation of Free Will & Determinism
Woops. wasn't\can't screwed me. This is as perplexing as the few words I had to read in confession a week or two ago (and had read many many times)..I is getting screwed logically. Nevermind.Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Thu Jan 26, 2023 8:19 amMe: If it wasn't their will that was the source of this difference in behaviour, we can't take it to be evidence of free will.
You: I agree.
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Re: Boony's Room - a contemplation of Free Will & Determinism
Ok. Since I am still learning philosophy what does compatibilism mean to you?Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Thu Jan 26, 2023 8:33 amBtw, that's what I am doing. The conversation has two directions: either they do the exact same thing as each other, every time, and pure determinism is true, or they do something different, and pure determinism isn't true.attofishpi wrote: ↑Thu Jan 26, 2023 8:05 am
You state you are a compatibilist, so why not address the questions posed in the OP as to how you, as a compatibilist think things will progress for Boony (and Boony)?
So then the next layer is discussing the implications of each scenario. And I'm doing that. I'm discussing the implications of them doing different things. My take on the implication of them doing different things is, they're not doing different things because of their free will, because the only reason they're doing different things is apparently because of physical randomness, not because of a difference in will. The physical randomness might RESULT in a difference in will, but that difference in will itself wasn't willed into existence, it was caused by randomness.
Maybe they have free will, maybe they don't, but randomness doesn't make their will more free. If anything it makes their will a slave to randomness.
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Re: Boony's Room - a contemplation of Free Will & Determinism
To me, it means that the usefulness of the concepts of free will and moral responsibility do not rely on determinism being false, at all.
All possible forms of physics exist on a spectrum from 100% determinism to 100% random, and our universe is somewhere on that spectrum (but clearly not at the 100% random side). So early on in my philosophical journeys, I of course was introduced to the debate between free will and determinism, and i noticed a lot of the amateur philosophers who argued for free will pitted it directly against determinism, and so I thought through what that meant physically and realized that that's a confusion.
If our choices are subject to randomness, that does not make our will more free, that makes our will less free. Our will is less directly in control of our actions in a world where our actions can be changed, against our will, by random forces. Randomness takes away control, it doesn't add control, so how could moral responsibility be stronger in a world with less control? How can a loss of control result in more moral culpability?
It can't. Our moral culpability is directly tied to the ability of our will and our mind to control our actions, and that ability does not increase with randomness. So, I reason, our will is more free to do as it sees fit with less randomness, not more, so pitting free will against determinism is a mistake.
Our world is somewhere on the spectrum of determinism. It's probably not 100% deterministic given quantum randomness. But wherever it is on that spectrum, going more random does not produce freer will or more moral responsibility. That's compatibilism to me.
All possible forms of physics exist on a spectrum from 100% determinism to 100% random, and our universe is somewhere on that spectrum (but clearly not at the 100% random side). So early on in my philosophical journeys, I of course was introduced to the debate between free will and determinism, and i noticed a lot of the amateur philosophers who argued for free will pitted it directly against determinism, and so I thought through what that meant physically and realized that that's a confusion.
If our choices are subject to randomness, that does not make our will more free, that makes our will less free. Our will is less directly in control of our actions in a world where our actions can be changed, against our will, by random forces. Randomness takes away control, it doesn't add control, so how could moral responsibility be stronger in a world with less control? How can a loss of control result in more moral culpability?
It can't. Our moral culpability is directly tied to the ability of our will and our mind to control our actions, and that ability does not increase with randomness. So, I reason, our will is more free to do as it sees fit with less randomness, not more, so pitting free will against determinism is a mistake.
Our world is somewhere on the spectrum of determinism. It's probably not 100% deterministic given quantum randomness. But wherever it is on that spectrum, going more random does not produce freer will or more moral responsibility. That's compatibilism to me.
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Re: Boony's Room - a contemplation of Free Will & Determinism
Very interesting. So how do you see physics working within the conscious mind where the two sides of the coin are compatible?Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Thu Jan 26, 2023 8:49 am To me, it means that the usefulness of the concepts of free will and moral responsibility do not rely on determinism being false, at all.
All possible forms of physics exist on a spectrum from 100% determinism to 100% random, and our universe is somewhere on that spectrum (but clearly not at the 100% random side). So early on in my philosophical journeys, I of course was introduced to the debate between free will and determinism, and i noticed a lot of the amateur philosophers who argued for free will pitted it directly against determinism, and so I thought through what that meant physically and realized that that's a confusion.
If our choices are subject to randomness, that does not make our will more free, that makes our will less free. Our will is less directly in control of our actions in a world where our actions can be changed, against our will, by random forces. Randomness takes away control, it doesn't add control, so how could moral responsibility be stronger in a world with less control? How can a loss of control result in more moral culpability?
It can't. Our moral culpability is directly tied to the ability of our will and our mind to control our actions, and that ability does not increase with randomness. So, I reason, our will is more free to do as it sees fit with less randomness, not more, so pitting free will against determinism is a mistake.
Our world is somewhere on the spectrum of determinism. It's probably not 100% deterministic given quantum randomness. But wherever it is on that spectrum, going more random does not produce freer will or more moral responsibility. That's compatibilism to me.