moral relativism

[iambiguous]

MORAL NIHILISM
Finntronaut's Philosophy Fair

NON-COGNITIVISM is a view contrary to cognitivism, where moral statements themselves are viewed to be neither right or wrong. That is to say that a statement such as “Murder is wrong.” would be tantamount to saying something like “Boo on murder!” or it could be a commandment not to murder, for example.

Ah, of course: how "for all practical purpose" might philosophers and ethicists draw the line between thoughts and feelings about murder...or abortion or gun control or human sexuality.

Whereas from my own frame of mind, thoughts and feelings -- intuitions? -- derived existentially from dasein, still leave us just spinning our wheels. It's not like any prominent philosopher historically has resolved that for us.

If the world's most renowned philosophers have pursued objective morality in a truly disciplined manner for millennia, how come they [like all the rest of us] still pop up all along the moral and political spectrum?

Doesn't that alone speak volumes regarding just how far removed deontology is from being "the right answer" in regard to conflicting goods?

And of course, emotional utterances such as “Let’s go Rangers!” or commandments such as “Go brush your teeth!” are not propositions attempting to identify some kind of truth about this world. The purpose of the emotional utterances, such as “Boo murder!” or commandments such as “Stop pissing on the carpet!”, is something different rather than to identify a truth about the world.

All we can explore more in depth here with regard to both thoughts and feelings is the context itself. Does it warrant one set of reasons and emotions -- reactions -- rather than another? Can objective truths be confirmed and then passed on to all rational men and women? And, clearly, some will think and feel one way and others another simply because of where they factor into the actual situation itself. Abortion? Mary is pregnant, John is not. Homosexuality? Jane is gay, Joe is not.

For this reason, I’m personally not a cognitivist, but rather a non-cognitivist, with the caveat that somebody could of course mean with moral statements that there are some natural moral properties floating in the atmosphere – or something silly like that – but let’s just say that 99% of the time, moral statements are used as non-cognitive utterances such as emotions or commandments.

Of course, our jobs as philosophers is to take all of that into account and attempt to, what, get as close to an optimal deontological assessment as possible?

Want to try?

[iambiguous]

MORAL NIHILISM
Finntronaut's Philosophy Fair

Moral nihilism, although the difference is rather subtle, is not the same thing as moral relativism.

Technically? Again, all we can do here is to focus in on a moral conflagration of note and attempt to articulate our own distinctions.

While both moral nihilists and moral relativists believe morality to be subjective, relativists nevertheless insist that moral statements can be true or false relative to the preferences of individuals or the norms of society. For example, a moral relativist might say that it is true that disobeying the laws and customs of a country is immoral or that it is true that acting against your own self-interests is immoral. Nihilists, on the other hand, say that even individual preferences or societal norms are impotent at creating moral facts.

As long as morality pertains to human interactions in a No God world, what else is there but individual subjects -- you and I -- out in a particular world understanding it in a particular way. And how is this not profoundly embedded historically and culturally in a world awash in contingency, chance and change? And from my frame of mind, a moral relativist may or may not argue that "disobeying the laws and customs of a country is immoral or that it is true that acting against your own self-interests is immoral". Instead, he or she might argue not only that rules of behavior are relative to a particular community/culture/historical era, but that, in turn, no one set of rules reflects the optimal or most rational human behaviors. Or, rather, that philosophers and ethicists have failed to establish an objective morality applicable to all cultures over the centuries.

It’s not because you prefer to eat ice cream that it is moral to eat ice cream – it’s not because society views murder as bad that it is immoral to murder; this is the moral nihilist view, which is in opposition to moral relativism, somewhat.

Sure, if "technically" this works for you, fine. Embrace that distinction yourself. For me, they are "for all practical purposes" much the same thing. Both start with the assumption that morality is intersubjective and ever evolving over time and place. It's just that some [like me] recognize that both are in turn rooted existentially in dasein. At least until philosophers and ethicists -- scientists? -- are able to encompass an objective -- universal? -- political/legal agenda.

On the other hand this...

So, moral nihilism can recognize subjective moral truths – as in opinions; you can say that it is true that Sally holds moral position X, even as a moral nihilist. But unlike relativism, nihilism does not consider these subjective moral truths or opinions to form moral facts. It can be true that Sally holds moral position X, but according to nihilism, this is not a moral fact, but rather it’s a descriptive fact about the way that this world is.

...is not an unreasonable assessment.

Note your own "moral facts" in regard to a particular set of circumstances and we can explore them here more...substantively?

[iambiguous]

MORAL NIHILISM
Finntronaut's Philosophy Fair

Moral nihilism is a position in meta-ethics. What this means, is that moral nihilism is a commentary on the nature of ethics itself. IT IS NOT AN ETHICAL POSITION. Moral nihilism does not say that moral nihilism is true, and therefore it’s a virtuous position to hold. No, it simply says that moral nihilism is true. That’s it.

On the other hand, perhaps some philosophers are simply hell-bent on examining it up in the theoretical/meta-ethical clouds. Exchanging purely intellectual assessments about it as though it has nothing much to do at all with flesh and blood human interactions. For, example, the interactions that precipitate moral and political conflagrations.

Nope, that's not what Will Durant's "epistemologists" consider relevant to the "human condition". Only when we are able technically to pin down objective definitions are objective deductions even possible at all. Or there about?

`There are many moral nihilists who are not outspoken about their moral nihilism because it has a bad stigma to it. This is not an act of hypocrisy for a moral nihilist, because as stated; this is a meta-ethical position. Because of this, there are no ethical rules on how anybody ought to act within the doctrine of moral nihilism.

Then it's just a matter of whether this "meta-ethical" "doctrine" begins to manifest itself "in your head" as a "fractured and fragmented" moral philosophy.

It is purely a position attempting to identify facts, rather than a position attempting to identify proper codes of conduct. This means that you could be a secret moral nihilist while simultaneously lying about not being a moral nihilist – and within the doctrine of moral nihilism, there would be nothing forbidding this kind of untruthful behavior.

Indeed, just ask the sociopaths among us and the crony capitalists who run the world how far that can be taken.

[Flannel Jesus]

How far can that be taken?

[iambiguous]

How far can that be taken?

Start here: https://www.google.com/search?q=famous+ ... s-wiz-serp

As for the "my way or the highway", "show me the money" moral nihilists who own and operate the global economy? Start with Henry Kissinger and the Bilderberg Group. Then explore the Trilateral Commision, the Council on Foreign Relation, The Bohemian Club, etc.

Then the Putins and the Xis of this world.

Also, my own rooted existentially in dasein take on the relationship between the ruling class/deep state and government policy: https://ilovephilosophy.com/viewtopic.p ... s#p2187045

[iambiguous]

MORAL NIHILISM
Finntronaut's Philosophy Fair

A moral nihilist can have personal morality. It is not an act of hypocrisy for a moral nihilist to make moral statements such as “You are evil!” or “He is such a good person.”. Just because these statements are not considered objectively true by the moral nihilist doesn’t mean that they are contradicting themselves when they speak such statements because not all statements have to be objective truth-claims.

"Moral nihilism (also called ethical nihilism) is the meta-ethical view that nothing is morally right or morally wrong and that morality doesn't exist." wiki

Let's just say that I am no less hopelessly "drawn and quartered" in regard to conclusions like this as well. And while there may well be moral nihilists who do make a distinction between good and evil, I'm not one of them. From my own rooted existentially in dasein frame of mind, objective morality revolves entirely around the existence of an omniscient and omnipotent God.

Though, sure, if some here are convinced that science or philosophy [deontology] or political ideology or biological imperatives allowed them to encompass objective morality in a No God world, by all means, given a particular context, let's explore that here.

Although, if one were an error theorist, you could say that they are making false-statements according to their own position.

I know that I would.

Unfortunately, however, none of this ever really comes down out of the intellectual clouds...

But for a non-cognitivist moral nihilist, you can’t even say that they’re wrong by their own standards in making moral statements because they don’t believe moral statements to be propositions of truth.

Still, for those here who do subscribe to the belief that moral statements can reflect propositions of truth, note some examples of that given, say, the sort of moral conflagrations that we encounter day after day "on the news".

[Iwannaplato]

How far can that be taken?

Well, it's too bad no crony capitalist responded.

[Flannel Jesus]

How far can that be taken?

Well, it's too bad no crony capitalist responded.

[iambiguous]

MORAL NIHILISM
Finntronaut's Philosophy Fair

WHAT IS OBJECTIVITY? This is essential to define not only for somebody affirming objective morality, but also for somebody rejecting objective morality. So, objectivity, as I would define it, is a state of existence outside of the observer.

Trust me...

Each and every moral objectivist among us will define objectivity in a manner that sustains their own moral dogmas. And only their own.

This is what’s being rejected here: the existence of morality outside of the person perceiving moral truths. So one person says “Communism is evil.” – this is a moral truth to the speaker, just as the contradictory statement of “Communism is not evil.” is a moral truth to the person holding this position.

The tempting but often elusive, "I'm right from my side and you're right from your side" perspective. One that fit's in best with democracy and the rule of law.

But with most Isms -- God or No God -- that is entirely out of the question. It's "my way or the highway" instead. And we all know just how far some of them are willing to go. In fact, we're watching another rendition of it being played out right here in America. Trump, MAGA and the ever more frequently used F-word.

Namely, these are subjective moral truths; they are not objective moral truths – and this is why these statements can contradict each other while both still remaining true; subjective truths can contradict each other while objective truths cannot; subjective truths are opinions while objective truths are facts.

Again, however, the part about both statements being true revolves almost entirely around accepting the premises that each side embraces in reaching their conclusions. Start with the assumption that human beings are basically selfish and inclined toward the individual and, of course, capitalism is the most rational political economy. Or start with the assumption that human beings are basically selfless and inclined toward collective social interaction...?

So, the truth of communism being evil exists for the anti-communist, but it does not exist for the communist. The truth of communism not being evil exists for the communist, but it does not exist for the anti-communist. Objective truths, on the other hand exist for any observer possessing the necessary equipment with which to perceive a common object.

Okay, Mr. Philosopher -- Mr. Scientist? -- let's get cracking on this. Is capitalism inherently -- objectively -- more rational than Communism? Is there in fact an objective truth to be found here in a No God world?

You might conceptualize it like this: imagine you have vision and one day you go blind. Upon you going blind, you probably do not reject the existence of the objects which you could see back when you were not blind. This is because these objects still have the potentiality to impose upon you their existence even when you cannot see them.

Yes, but then we are back to those things which do in fact exist objectively whether we are blind or not. And other things such that, whether we are blind or not, it still comes down to particular sets of moral and political prejudices. All of which are rooted existentially in dasein.

Thus...

A great example of this would be the sun, which will continue to impose upon you its warmth even when you cannot see it. And THIS cannot be said about moral truths. If you lose the moral sight for communism being evil, then communism is no longer evil to you. If you lose the sight for pick-pocketing being wrong, then pick-pocketing is no longer wrong for you. No specific moral belief inherently imposes itself upon you; you can always imagine an alternative to any moral belief. This is why morality is not objective, but is subjective instead.

Then each of us one by one has to fit ourselves into this. Me, I'm fractured and fragmented in regard to human interactions in the is/ought world, while others here make little or no distinction at all between the either/or world and the is/ought world. Human morality may as well be a branch of physics or chemistry to them.

[iambiguous]

Are There Any Moral Facts?
Bob Harrison talks about Moral Realists and the Boo/Hurrah party, and explains what David Hume overlooked.

“What that fellow did was morally unacceptable. It was wrong. In fact, it was disgusting; downright revolting.”

You could say all of these things about the same act, and they could all refer, quite properly, to the same thing. But would they all mean the same thing? The first two expressions say something, quite obviously, about what the fellow did. It was morally unacceptable. It was wrong. Both of these expressions claim to tell us moral facts about the action. But the second two expressions – that it was disgusting, and that it was revolting – tell us something about the person speaking. She was disgusted, and felt revulsion.

Okay, what did the fellow do? Suppose he was a doctor and performed abortions. Some will find it morally unacceptable. They will insist it is wrong. And some will go further, become more emotional, and blurt out how disgusted and revolted they are by what he does. Where, after all, does one draw the line between the reaction they have to the behaviors that some choose and their reaction to them in regard to their...character?

Quite apart from the fact that these expressions are examples of hyperbole; deliberately extreme language used to convey great strength of feeling, they are subjective; expressing the speaker’s feelings rather than reporting facts.

In other words, in regard to human morality which comes first, the head or the heart?

In fact, we come upon this all the time here. This thread for example: viewtopic.php?t=40971

We can attempt to think through the conflict there [philosophically or otherwise] and arrive at what we deem to be the most reasonable assessment. Only, for most of us, we also tend to have a visceral, gut reaction...we might seethe when considering the behaviors of one side over the other. Or of both sides in regard to the slaughter of the truly innocent children.

This distinction is important because of an ongoing debate amongst philosophers. On the one hand there are those who believe that there are such things as ‘moral facts’. Examples might be, “Adultery is wrong”, “We should not tell lies”, “We ought to keep promises”, “People should be kind”. All of these propositions claim to report facts, which might be expressed: “It is the case that X is wrong”, or “It is the case that we ought to do Y”.

And then I come along and muddle things up all the more by suggesting these "facts" themselves are actually only moral and political prejudices rooted existentially in dasein.

To those who believe in them, moral facts are very important because they can be seen as something certain, hard and fast, that we can appeal to when judging someone else’s behaviour, or when seriously considering how we ourselves should act in a particular situation. They are real, and we can consult them as we would a reference book. “Should I do this: yes or no? What is the moral fact?” For this reason, people who believe in them are sometimes called Moral Realists.

Or moral objectivists? The "my way or the highway" folks who embody what I call the "psychology of objectivism": https://www.ilovephilosophy.com/viewtop ... 5&t=185296

[iambiguous]

Are There Any Moral Facts?
Bob Harrison talks about Moral Realists and the Boo/Hurrah party, and explains what David Hume overlooked.

On the other hand, there are those who believe that there are no moral facts. What we are doing when we call something right or wrong, they say, is simply expressing our approval or disapproval, or urging our own preferences on others.

And it could be in regard to any human interactions that precipitate conflicting value judgments. Unless, of course, the moral realists here would be willing to note the moral facts that they have accumulated in regard to a conflagration of note.

Someone who is nervous about sex, and apprehensive of how one can be hurt when a relationship is betrayed, might well want to claim categorically that ‘Adultery is wrong’. If everyone agrees – and acts on their agreement – then it will be a much more emotionally safe world for this nervous person, in the absence of peer and media pressure to break with his own conservative moral practices.

And how is this part not rooted existentially in dasein? Or is there actually a methodology one can embrace as a philosopher enabling one to grasp the most rational and virtuous sexual mores? Deontological sex?

And, sure, if one can then connect the dots between human sexual interaction and Judgment Day, all the better. All of eternity itself becomes a factor.

After all, if these values are generally pursued, then insecure persons will live in a world where it is easier, or at least more socially acceptable, to cling to the emotional matrix of that micro-community which is the family. And, of course, if moral statements are subjective, the rich man will want to claim that stealing is morally reprehensible, whilst the poor man will think unequal distribution of wealth is a moral scandal.

That's invariably how it works. Given any particular confluence of historical, cultural and experiential variables, such aspects of our lives like the family and property are construed in different and at times conflicting ways. For any number of socialists, after all, property as championed by the capitalists is theft.

For some, it is a moral fact that abortion is the murder of unborn human babies, while for others it is a moral fact that women confronted with an unwanted pregnancy must be permitted access to abortion.

In short, our talk about morality is just a matter of attaching high-sounding terms such as ‘right’, ‘wrong’, ‘duty’, and ‘obligation’, to the practices we like or dislike, in order to give our preferences more persuasive force.

Yes, and here these "high-sounding terms" are often confined solely to exchanges that almost never leave the theoretical clouds. Facts here are defined and deduced into existence in order, in my view, to sustain the psychological balm of moral objectivism itself.

[iambiguous]

Are There Any Moral Facts?
Bob Harrison talks about Moral Realists and the Boo/Hurrah party, and explains what David Hume overlooked.

I’ve remarked that believers in moral facts tend to be called Moral Realists: those who take the opposite view attract a more light-hearted title. Since the language of morality, for them, largely reflects our feeling of disapproval or our applause, for certain acts, they are sometimes nicknamed the ‘Boo/Hurrah’ party. ‘Boo to cruelty: Hurrah for kindness’ and so on.

Or, for some, "hurrah to cruelty, boo to kindness." Then the part where they make these distinctions existentially. In other words, in regard to things like race and gender and sexual orientation and religion and politics. The part I root subjectively in dasein, the part others root objectively in one or another dogma.

And, to the latter -- the objectivists -- I propose that we focus in on a set of circumstances whereby they can provide us with what they construe these "moral facts" to be. This and an exploration into how moral realism and moral objectivism either do or do not overlap. Given a particular context.

More soberly, we are inclined to call them Noncognitivists, or perhaps Subjectivists, since they think that moral theory is not a matter of cognition, i.e. knowing about moral facts, but of something more subjective, such as our feelings.

Or, perhaps, more grimly, we call them moral nihilists...those who are fractured and fragmented and, either intellectually or emotionally, are hopelessly ambivalent regarding "good" and "evil".

David Hume expresses this subjectivity very clearly. If you see something happen that you judge to be wicked, such as murder, you look in vain at the act itself to find the ‘wrongness’ of it:

“The vice entirely escapes you as long as you consider the object. You never can find it till you turn your reflection into your own breast, and find a sentiment of disapprobation which arises in you towards this action…It lies in yourself, not the object. So that when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it.”

Now, imagine Hume reacting to the arguments that I make in my signature threads:

https://www.ilovephilosophy.com/viewtop ... 1&t=176529
https://www.ilovephilosophy.com/viewtop ... 1&t=194382
https://www.ilovephilosophy.com/viewtop ... 5&t=185296

Your "self" here as the embodiment of dasein, the constituted nature of "I" in the is/ought world as an existential contraption rooted as much [if not more] in memes as in genes.

[iambiguous]

Are There Any Moral Facts?
Bob Harrison talks about Moral Realists and the Boo/Hurrah party, and explains what David Hume overlooked.

In his ‘belief-desire’ theory, Hume ingeniously analyses human action, including moral action; acts that we would describe as right or wrong. He claims that we can account for everything we do in terms of the interplay of two factors: reason and belief.

Yes, and note how, in regard to the either/or world, over and over and over again it can be shown that in fact a particular belief is either reasonable or it is not. If Susan becomes pregnant and doesn't want to be, it's reasonable for her to think, "I'll have an abortion".

Problem solved.

And when Bob points out to her that aborting her unborn baby is not a reasonable behavior at all, she asks him, "when's the last time you experienced an unwanted pregnancy"?

Moral facts? From whose frame of mind?

An action begins with desire. We desire to do something. Hume doesn’t think we need to go further back than this. Our nature is such that we have desires. Reason is then consulted. How shall I do what I desire? If I do it, will it satisfy me? Will it be prudent?

Desire initiates the course of action; reason enables me to undertake it, by giving me instruction as to the means, and as to how I will justify myself in doing it.

Again, all of this is noted in a "general description intellectual/philosophical" assessment. In other words, one of your actions might be precipitated by a desire. But why do you desire one thing while others in the same or a similar set of circumstances desire something altogether different? And how are our desires [much like out reasons] not rooted existentially in dasein? Finally, is there a way for philosophers, using the technical tools of their trade, to nail down that which, given a particular context, all rational and virtuous men and women ought to desire?

[iambiguous]

Are There Any Moral Facts?
Bob Harrison talks about Moral Realists and the Boo/Hurrah party, and explains what David Hume overlooked.

Reason, here, serves desire, as its counsellor. As Hume says, “Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions.”

Of course, my argument is that both the reasons we give for what we do and the emotions we feel when expressing them are rooted existentially in dasein. At least in regard to conflicting goods. And if we are slaves in regard to anything, it is most likely to be the Benjamin Button Syndrome.

Whereas a moral realist believes that we can consult moral facts as to our course of action, Hume would have our desiring self consult our reasoning self. On this view, all human action, including that which we would call moral action, can be completely accounted for by desire and reason. There is no need to consult any alleged moral facts.

All I can do here is to wait for the moral realists among us to actually note the moral facts that they are convinced exist in regard to a particular moral conflagrations. After all, those on both sides of these issues have their own sets of facts, right?

The effect of this ‘belief-desire’ theory is to make it difficult to see how moral facts can exist, or at least where in our psychological makeup we can perceive them.

Actually, given the way we seem to be hard-wired psychologically, the whole point of accumulating "facts" about conflicting goods is to allow ourselves to be anchored to one or another objectivist font. Liberal facts, conservative facts. Facts derived from one or another religious or ideological dogma.

Facts belong in the realm of reasoning, not passion. One doesn’t feel a fact: one believes it to be the case. But on Hume’s view our behaviour has its roots in passion, and reason has only a subsidiary role. So at what point do we encounter moral facts?

You tell me.

Given a particular context.

[iambiguous]

Are There Any Moral Facts?
Bob Harrison talks about Moral Realists and the Boo/Hurrah party, and explains what David Hume overlooked.

Hume’s account of human action has been so influential that subjective accounts of ethics now play a major part in moral philosophy. Working at Edinburgh University, where Hume was not appreciated in his own lifetime but is now posthumously much admired, I am aware of the importance of Hume’s ethics, but I think his belief-desire theory takes an oversimplified view of human psychology.

As, no doubt, my own "rooted existentially in dasein" assessment is. But how can any mere mortal not but have their own subjective rendition of an ethical philosophy reduced down experientially to a particular set of moral and political and religious prejudices.

Which is why over and again I suggest that in regard to what we believe is right or wrong behavior, we at least attempt to demonstrate why we believe others are obligated to believe the same. Beyond all that we think is true "in our head".

Suppose I hear that my mother is ill, in Birmingham, and I am here in Edinburgh. I feel that I ought to go and see her. I therefore desire to go to Birmingham. Consulting my reasoning faculty I find that the train is at such a time, when I can be free, and that I can afford the fare. However, reason also reminds me that my mother has always been a bit demanding, and I suspect that she may have little more than a cold, so there is a bit of a tussle going on in my mind. What tilts the scale? A feeling! An uncomfortable feeling that I ought to go, just in case she really needs me.

How about you and your mother? Me, I don't even know if my own mother [or any of my family other than my father] is dead or alive. That was/is simply the existential reality given my own set of circumstances. And that's always my point...closing the gap between families as they actually are and families as some insist they ought to be. As though with the most rational moral philosophy one can actually calculate what one ought to do in situations.

And, again, feelings -- intuitions -- are no less rooted existentially in dasein from my vantage point.

How do I account for this uncomfortable feeling? It seems that there is a belief, right at the beginning of my inner debate, that I ought to fulfil some filial obligation; a belief based on an assumption of some moral fact about parent/child relationships and that this belief plays a role that is not accounted for in Hume’s theory.

Of course: the part where each of us as children, more or less beyond Hume's theory, experience what can be very, very different upbringings. Historical and cultural narratives pertaining to parent/child relationships. With some cultures, the relationship is sustained all the way to the grave. With others, however you toss Mom and Pop into a nursing home.

So, what are the "moral facts" here?