Qualia Blindness

[Atla]

My current working hypothesis is that there is just a color problem, in that nobody knows the intrinsic color of anything. Or we don't know which of all our descriptions of stuff in the brain is a description of redness. “RQT” is predicting that we can resolve this so called 'hard problem' by simply not being qualia blind. You seem to be talking about a different solution which may resolve a different 'hard problem' And I don't see how what you are talking about can help anyone bridge the explanatory gap, or discover the intrinsic color of anything?

You seem to have misunderstood the depth of the Hard problem. It's impossible to experimentally bridge the explanatory gap, because it's impossible to directly measure qualia.

You can't measure X using X. You can't bite your own teeth, you can't measure a ruler with that ruler. Reality can't be somehow other than itself, somehow outside of itself. That's just the way it is.

All you can do is get better and better at correlating third-person structural descriptions (like molecules, EM fields etc.) with first-person accounts of qualia. Obviously there are many or infinitely many shades of red by the way, that's not the issue.

[AlexW]

Take the 3D space you can see, and divide it up into a set of cubic pixels or voxels. Each of these voxels has a unique set of X,Y, and Z values as it’s spatial location in this 3D volume. Now, take a 3D volume of neurons, each neuron in the volume also having an x, y, and z address, of where that particular neuron exists in that volume of neurons. Now the eyes maps what it detects in each of the spots in this 3D volume it is looking at, into this volume of neurons. If the eye detects red light being reflected off of an x,y,z location on the surface of the strawberry, it flags the corresponding x,y,z, neuron to fire with the neurotransmitter glutamate (has an intrinsic redness quality). If the eye detects green light being reflected off of a leaf, at a different x,y,z location, it flags the neuron in that x,y,z, location to fire with glycine (greenness quality). So, you end up with 3D diorama of phenomenal knowledge, with 3D voxel models of the strawberry and leaves, representing what your eyes are seeing. In other words, there is what steve calls a "diorama" of knowledge in your brain, which our brain represents as if it was reality, itself.

Sorry to chime in on that, but the whole setup seems to be nothing else but a converter - a bit like a 3D analog to digital converter where the output is a discrete version of analog reality...
But I am not sure what problem this setup actually solves? There is still the question: Who actually experiences this "diorama of knowledge in your brain"?
As I see it (and I might be overlooking something), all this process achieves is "shifting reality" from a continuous into a discrete form/representation... and then what? How do you continue from there?

See, the problem is, you will never actually find the observer of this "diorama" in your head - simply because the observer is not a thing that can be found.
And what happens if something is not a thing..? It is actually no-thing, which is ultimately the same as everything. Not sure you understand, but this is what consciousness actually is - it is reality and, at the sam time, the diorama/knowledge in the brain. Its just a different perspective/form it takes.

[AlexW]

To me, the only “so called” hard problem is the explanatory gap, or discovering the intrinsic qualities of stuff in our brain. So, it seems to me you are incorrect in claiming your model “solves pretty much all so called ‘hard problem’”? As your model sheds no light, whatsoever, on the qualitative nature of consciousness or bridging the explanatory gap.

Thats what I was trying to actually get across: consciousness/reality doesn't have any "intrinsic qualities" - thats why this "hard problem" doesn't even arise. But at the same time - so the dualistic mind can actually try to make sense of that - we could say: it is/has all qualities (which again leads us to the realisation that: it ultimately has none at all).

Its the same with "here" and "infinity", "now" and "eternity" - in essence they are one and the same - all opposites, by negating each other, are void, what remains is reality itself.

To "understand" something that is not a thing, thinking has to work on a different level - not in opposites and limitations, but as a direct reflection of reality (but here we have to let go of language as language is inherently dualistic - and as we communicate using conceptual thought/language there will never be full understanding - or a bridging of the explanatory gap - the problem is not the gap, but the tools we use trying to overcome it - its like trying to change a lightbulb with a hammer ... it wont work).

[Skepdick]

Basically, the simplest not yet falsified version of the model is as follows.

Before a model can be falsified, first it needs to be testable. The experiment which you are designing isn't testable. It has a number of epistemic, design as well as technical challenges.

The first principle is that you must not fool yourself and you are the easiest person to fool. --Richard Feynman.

Your explanation seems schizophenic in the sense that it keeps mixing up two perspectives: a priori and a posteriori knowledge.
You keep mixing up a priori unknowns (unknowables?) like "green" and "glutamate" and you treat them as a-posteriori knowns.

But... those unknowns is precisely what your experiment is meant to elucidate for you. For example, how/when did you discover that wavelength of 560–520 nm triggers glutamite? You haven't told us about THAT experiment, and until you design/perform it then all you can technically say is that 560–520 nm wavelengths trigger some neurotransmitter.

I'll now put on my "a priori' hat and point out all the things which are out of place (e.g you don't know this) in your experiment design...

Take the 3D space you can see, and divide it up into a set of cubic pixels or voxels. Each of these voxels has a unique set of X,Y, and Z values as it’s spatial location in this 3D volume. Now, take a 3D volume of neurons, each neuron in the volume also having an x, y, and z address, of where that particular neuron exists in that volume of neurons.

Here... you have digitised the 3D space of a room, and you have digitised a 3D brain. So, I must immediately ask the question.

What is your matrix size for the brain? (lets call this brain-matrix)
What is your matrix size for the space? (lets call this space-matrix)

What happens if I put you in a bigger OR smaller space? If the space-matrix size changes, does the brain-matrix size change too?

Now the eyes maps what it detects in each of the spots in this 3D volume it is looking at, into this volume of neurons.

You are being very vague about this mapping that the eye does. What do you expect to happen in the brain-matrix, when the eye looks at a strawberry in the space-matrix?

Who is observing the brain-matrix and how?
Is it the same person who is observing the table, or a different person?

It's your job (the scientist's job) how to figure out how the brain's neurons actually represent a "table". You don't know how, but you are taking it for granted.

If the eye detects red light being reflected off of an x,y,z location on the surface of the strawberry, it flags the corresponding x,y,z, neuron to fire with the neurotransmitter glutamate (has an intrinsic redness quality). If the eye detects green light being reflected off of a leaf, at a different x,y,z location, it flags the neuron in that x,y,z, location to fire with glycine (greenness quality).

Why do you assume that there will be a 1:1 relationship between pixels in the room and pixels in the brain?
Given that the space-matrix size changes, butt he brain-matrix size does not, this assumption is simply wrong.

How do you know that glutamate is the thing you are looking for?

So, you end up with 3D diorama of phenomenal knowledge, with 3D voxel models of the strawberry and leaves, representing what your eyes are seeing. In other words, there is what steve calls a "diorama" of knowledge in your brain, which our brain represents as if it was reality, itself.

So this is the huge flaw in the design. You are assuming that the neurons in the brain "mirror" reality 1:1.

You also need some kind of computational binding system, so all these pixels aren’t just stand alone (like in a TV or Camera) where they have no awareness of any of the other pixels.

Yeah. It's called a neural network. And you will also need to grasp some computational complexity theory, because networks get pretty complex pretty quickly!

We don't have the Mathematical instruments or the computational power to analyse them in real time.

In other words, there is a set of computationally bound neurons, in the shape of the strawberry,

There may well be a set of neurons which represent "strawberry" but they are most certainly not in the SHAPE of a strawberry, so how do you propose you identify which neurons you are looking for?

all firing with glutamate, all computationally bound together, with the name ‘red’ and the name ‘strawberry’. There is a different set of pixels, in the shape of the leaf, all computationally bound with the word ‘green’ and ‘leaf’.

Where is the "name red" and the "name strawberry" in the brain exactly?

Does that help understand what we mean by the intrinsic qualities of conscious knowledge we are directly aware of?

I do understand what you are saying. What I am giving you is a list of design errors (flawed assumptions) in your experiment...

[Sculptor]

Hi Sculptor,
I didn't mean to dodge any questions. Could you ask them again, and I'll try not to miss them this time?

Is red one quale and green another quale?
Or are they both different qualia of colour?

Have I, or anyone here, said anything that means anything other than red and green are different components of colour?

You've dodged the question.
Let me ask again.
Given what you understand to be the meaning of the concept of "Qualia" (without you having to accept it as true or valid)
Is red one quale and green another quale?
Or are they both different qualia of colour?

[Brent.Allsop]

You've dodged the question.
Let me ask again.
Given what you understand to be the meaning of the concept of "Qualia" (without you having to accept it as true or valid)
Is red one quale and green another quale?
Or are they both different qualia of colour?

Hmm, well if you want to be more specific, you need to do more than give ‘abstract’ words that have no know specific qualitative definition. For example, the word ‘red’ is an abstract word, which has no intrinsic definition the way you are using it. I define ‘red’ to be anything that has in intrinsic quality causing it to either emit or reflect red light. And that has nothing to do with qualia, other than people use different intrinsic qualities of knowledge to represent red things with. The different word ‘redness’ is a label for an elemental quale. The ambiguous way you use the term 'red' I can't know which of these you might be talking about, or how you might define them.

And, since everyone is ‘qualia blind’ nobody has any idea what ‘redness’ is an intrinsic quality of. As you can see in the many supporting sub camp of “Representational Qualia Theory”, non of those camps have been falsified, so it could be any of those predictions, or something else entirely. So basically, it seems to me, until people stop being qualia blind, and discover which of all our descriptions of stuff in the brain are descriptions of, nobody can hope to answer your question, in anything other than abstract and arbitrary way of defining things?

[Brent.Allsop]

I do understand what you are saying. What I am giving you is a list of design errors (flawed assumptions) in your experiment...

Yes, you are definitely proving you understand much of what I’m saying. But, remember, what I provided was an extremely simplified summary. The issues you raise, like the mapping of the 3D space eyes see, and the space of the knowledge have very detailed, and convincing to most answers in the full descriptions of such. You just need to spend a bit of time studying Lehar’s work, especially his “the brain in your head”.

I’m not an expert on the difference between a priori and a posteriori knowledge, but my current understand is that knowledge we perceive (through our senses) is obviously all a posteriori knowledge. This knowledge can be mistaken. Our direct knowledge of the qualities of our knowledge is different. It cannot be mistaken. For example, we know, absolutely, what our redness is qualitatively like, and how this differs from greenness. So isn’t that knowledge clearly a-priori? Is this thinking still “schizophrenic”?

As far as asking things like “where is the name ‘red’ in the brain”, I don’t yet know this, especially since all experimental reporting is still qualia blind. But what I do know, a-priori, and absolutely, as that there is something, that is my knowledge of the word red, and that this is bound to my redness in a dictionary like mechanical way of some kind, enabling me to say things like: “That is red.”

Finally, none of these arguments you are presenting have come anywhere close to falsifying “Representational Qualia Theory”, for me. And I would predict they would not convince any of the current supporters of of “Representational Qualia Theory”. So, if you really think there are some legitimate reasons nobody should accept any part of “Representational Qualia Theory”, please help us canonize that, so we can see if anyone but you thinks your concerns are legitimate, especially compared to the growing number of people that don’t. Let's not waste this valuable conversation. And if you agree with any of this, we could really use some support in helping to communicate to experimentalists and physicists, the importance of not being 'qualia blind'.

[Skepdick]

Finally, none of these arguments you are presenting have come anywhere close to falsifying “Representational Qualia Theory”, for me.

Perhaps this is the most significant concern.

A good scientist knows how to falsify their own theory.
A good scientists knows where their gaps in reasoning are.

You've put the burden of falsification onto others, because you haven't figured that part out.

You don't even know what evidence/empirical result you need to convince yourself that you are wrong.

[Skepdick]

For example, we know, absolutely, what our redness is qualitatively like, and how this differs from greenness. So isn’t that knowledge clearly a-priori? Is this thinking still “schizophrenic”?

Sure, but I see at least three different knowledge-claims in your paragraph above.

1. I know what redness is like.
2. I know what greenness is like.
3. I know that redness and greenness are different.

You can't qualitatively explain the difference between "redness" and "greenness". You "just know it".

If you accept the above, then I don't understand why this scenario isn't sufficient to cure you from qualia blindness:

You look at some object on some table (color unspecified). You know that you are experiencing "redness". You announce it.
I look at exactly the same object on the table. I know that I am experiencing "greenness". I announce it.

And now you know that your redness is like my greenness, and I know that my greenness is like your redness - this is the standard consensus model.
This is how mutual information works.

What I don't understand is why you think this approach is not sufficient for curing "qualia blindness".

[Sculptor]

You've dodged the question.
Let me ask again.
Given what you understand to be the meaning of the concept of "Qualia" (without you having to accept it as true or valid)
Is red one quale and green another quale?
Or are they both different qualia of colour?

Hmm, well if you want to be more specific, you need to do more than give ‘abstract’ words that have no know specific qualitative definition. For example, the word ‘red’ is an abstract word, which has no intrinsic definition the way you are using it. I define ‘red’ to be anything that has in intrinsic quality causing it to either emit or reflect red light. And that has nothing to do with qualia, other than people use different intrinsic qualities of knowledge to represent red things with. The different word ‘redness’ is a label for an elemental quale. The ambiguous way you use the term 'red' I can't know which of these you might be talking about, or how you might define them.

FFS

And, since everyone is ‘qualia blind’ nobody has any idea what ‘redness’ is an intrinsic quality of.

Like I've said before - since you do not seem to understand the idea of qualia, when YOU use the phrase "qualia blind" you do not know what you are taking about.

So far from everyone being qualia blind, the phrase in your text is meaningless. You are blind; blind to know what qualia means. There seems to be no evidence that you understand it. What this makes clear, is the confused set of questions that you linked at the top of the thread. The questions are incoherent, because of your ignorance of the term.

As you can see in the many supporting sub camp of “Representational Qualia Theory”, non of those camps have been falsified, so it could be any of those predictions, or something else entirely. So basically, it seems to me, until people stop being qualia blind, and discover which of all our descriptions of stuff in the brain are descriptions of, nobody can hope to answer your question, in anything other than abstract and arbitrary way of defining things?

Those that understand the concept of qualia are perfectly capable of understanding and answering my question.

It is not possible to access another's experience. What do you not understand about that too?

[Skepdick]

Those that understand the concept of qualia are perfectly capable of understanding and answering my question.

It is not possible to access another's experience. What do you not understand about that too?

Sir,

If I am not mistaken we still have an outstanding item from you...

You were going to prove to us that you "understand".

Until you do that, I am completely qualia-blind as to whether your "understanding" is like my "ignorance".

On the other hand, I completely understand that I don't understand what it means to understand, but I don't know if you understand that you don't understand what it means to understand.

As far as I am concerned it's one of two things.

A. You do understand that you don't understand what it means to understand.
B. You don't understand that you don't understand what it means to understand.

Which one is it?

When (if?) you answer my question, then I will know what your "understanding" is like!
If you answer my question, then I would have "accessed your experience of understanding".

^^^^^^^ THIS IS HOW ENTANGLEMENT/QUANTUM INFORMATION WORKS

When you choose to play the stupid Philosophical language games, you are forcing decoherence. You are fucking up communication.

Probably because you are too chickenshit to let anybody inside your head.

[Brent.Allsop]

You've dodged the question.
Let me ask again.
Given what you understand to be the meaning of the concept of "Qualia" (without you having to accept it as true or valid)
Is red one quale and green another quale?
Or are they both different qualia of colour?

And

Those that understand the concept of qualia are perfectly capable of understanding and answering my question.

OK, I’ll make an attempt to switch from my to your different definition of Qualia. Based on what I understand of how you guys have defined this, Red and green are not ‘dual’ things, they are “non-dual’ different kinds of color. (I do not like mixing “color” (red reflects or emits red light out there) and “qualia” (redness is the intrinsic property of our knowledge of ‘red’ in the brain) the way you have since they are very different things, so is it alright if I say it in this less ambiguous way, talking either about colour(out there) or colourness(qualia, in the brain), and not ambiguously mixing the two the way you do?


P.S.

It is not possible to access another's experience. What do you not understand about that too?

This has already been pointed out and discussed multiple times, how this is, absolutely possible, with a “computational binding” neural ponytail which operates the same as the corpus callosum does. Only instead of just computationally binding 2 hemispheres, it computationally binds 2 brains. With such, you would directly experience all of the sensations (or at least as much as you wanted to share), not just half. Just like conjoined twins, in some cases, can see out the other’s eyes or are directly aware of the knowledge being produced from their twins eyes, being represented in one of the other 3 hemespheres.
See:
viewtopic.php?f=17&t=29286&start=30#p454510
viewtopic.php?f=17&t=29286&start=75#p456422
and the discussions that followed those posts to this thread.

[Brent.Allsop]

Hi Skepdick,

Sorry, I’ve read and reread these posts of yours many times, researched less familiar things like mutual information, slept on it and red them again, but I can’t seem to figure out how you are thinking or what you are getting at, other than maybe you are still misunderstanding much of what I’m trying to say.

A good scientist knows how to falsify their own theory.
A good scientists knows where their gaps in reasoning are.

You've put the burden of falsification onto others, because you haven't figured that part out.

You don't even know what evidence/empirical result you need to convince yourself that you are wrong.

The real problem with the explanatory gap and theories of qualia in general, is that no current theories provide any predictions that are falsifiable. That is why it is called “philosophy of mind” rather than “theoretical science of mind” That is why the most revolutionary attribute of RQT , is it describes exactly this: how all the supporting sub camps (and RQT Itself) can be falsified. I have provided multiple examples of how this could be experimentally done in this thread. For example, a simple form of Molecular Materialism predicts that our description of glutamate, reacting in a synapse, is a description of what we directly experience as redness. So, if someone experiences redness, with no glutamate present, theory falsified. Then you substitute out glutamate, for some other theory’s prediction of what redness is, until you find something that cannot be falsified. Then you will verifiably know, in a way that cannot be experimentally falsified, which of all our abstract descriptions of stuff in the brain is a description of subjective redness. RQT predicts that it will be one of the supporting sub camps (or a variant) that will be proven to be THE ONE that can’t be falsified. This, also, is falsifiable. If all of the subcamps (and all variants) are falsified, RQT, itself will be falsified, leaving some of it’s competitors to check out, experimentally, to see if they can be falsified. That is other than the camps that predict consciousness is not approachable via science.

So how is this clear theoretical description of how to falsify these theories of qualia, not knowing how to “falsify their own theories”?

And now you know that your redness is like my greenness, and I know that my greenness is like your redness - this is the standard consensus model.
This is how mutual information works.

What you say is true, if all you have is the a-posteriori sources of information you describe. But, if you also have neural ponytails, in addition to the speaking of language you describe (someone could be lying) you can be directly aware of their qualia, a-priori directly knowing if they are mistaken or not about their redness being like your greenness. So, it seems to me this is an unjustified claim.


P.S.

If you accept the above, then I don't understand why this scenario isn't sufficient to cure you from qualia blindness:

and

What I don't understand is why you think this approach is not sufficient for curing "qualia blindness".

“Qualia Blindness”, like the term “Naive Realism” is a well-defined description of various theories of consciousness. If your theory predicts that redness is an intrinsic quality of the strawberry, or light, your theory is a form of “Naïve Realism”. Similarly, if your theory, or model, or the way you describe qualia, or your experimental results, only uses one word for all things red (i.e. All current peer reviewed science), then it is a “qualia blind” theory/work. The way you ‘cure someone’ from qualia blindness, by definition, is you teach them to use two words, like red and redness, and why this is important.

If you want to say I am blind in some other way (please provide and define a different term than qualia blindness), or say that your argument should falsify RQT for me, or something, that is fine, but please do not completely miss use the term qualia blindness like this, as RQT, by definition, is not qualia blind, so someone supporting RQT, by definition is already cured from ‘qualia blindness’.

[Skepdick]

Sorry, I’ve read and reread these posts of yours many times, slept on it and red them again, but I can’t seem to figure out how you are thinking or what you are getting at, other than maybe you are still misunderstanding much of what I’m trying to say.

How I think is like a scientist, stripes earned in the trenches of empiricism and all that.
How I think is like a monist and my monism is like Atla's non-dualism (but he will vehemently reject this for Philosophical reasons).

So the crux of the issue is thus: I may be qualia blind as you define it, but I am not qualia blind in practice, because I AM saying things like "my monism is like Atla's non-dualism". And I CAN say those things without having to build the contraption that you are trying to build.

So if your goal is to simply acquire the language to say "My X is like your Y" - humans are already doing this! I am already doing this. You haven't figured out how to do it.

The real problem with the explanatory gap and theories of qualia in general, is that no current theories provide any predictions that are falsifiable.

But that's not true at all! I have a prediction for you - light with wavelength from 622 to 780 nanometers is what causes my "redness".
I have no idea what causes yours. If you look at light with that particular frequency, do you experience "redness"

That is why it is called “philosophy of mind” rather than “theoretical science of mind”

Then stop listening to philosophers and start listening to scientists.
People who don't need a theory to explain empiricism to them.
People who understand empiricism.... empirically.

To put it in your language: people who are not qualia-blind with respect to empiricism itself.

Philosophers don't even have a model for a "mind" - how could they possibly predict anything about minds?

For example, a simple form of Molecular Materialism predicts that our description of glutamate, reacting in a synapse, is a description of what we directly experience as redness.

OK, but why is glutamate a better description than light with wavelength of 622 to 780 nanometers?

What does glutamate give you in the way of bridging the explanatory gap that light doesn't?

So, if someone experiences redness, with no glutamate present, theory falsified.

If somebody is experiencing "redness" with no glumamate present, you have falsified glutamate but you haven't falsified light with wavelength of 622 to 780 nanometers.

Then you substitute out glutamate, for some other theory’s prediction of what redness is, until you find something that cannot be falsified.

I have it already. Light with wavelength of 622 to 780 nanometers

Then you will verifiably know, in a way that cannot be experimentally falsified, which of all our abstract descriptions of stuff in the brain is a description of subjective redness.

I know that already. It's light with wavelength of 622 to 780 nanometers.

So how is this clear theoretical description of how to falsify these theories of qualia, not knowing how to “falsify their own theories”?

I know how to falsify my own theory. Find something that correlates with my "redness" better than light with wavelength of 622 to 780 nanometers.

If you can make me experience "redness" without there being a light source of wavelength of 622 to 780 nanometers - theory of light falsified!
Theory of <however you made me experience redness> confirmed!

What you say is true, if all you have is the a-posteriori sources of information you describe. But, if you also have
neural ponytails, in addition to the speaking of language you describe (someone could be lying) you can be directly aware of their qualia, a-priori directly knowing if they are mistaken or not about their redness being like your greenness. So, it seems to me this is an unjustified claim.

But if you could invent telepathy we wouldn't even NEED language! You wouldn't even need the word "redness", or the word "knowledge", or the word "qualia".

The very linguistic expression "I know what my redness is like" becomes completely unnecessary if we can tap into each other's minds via network cables (neural ponytails).

That IS the very function of language. It's the network cable.

Similarly, if your theory, or model, or the way you describe qualia, or your experimental results, only uses one word for all things red (i.e. All current peer reviewed science), then it is a “qualia blind” theory/work

OK, so how many words do you think we should use to describe "redness"? How many synonyms do you think is enough?
Is there any point at which having 8 billion words for one experience becomes ridiculous?

. The way you ‘cure someone’ from qualia blindness, by definition, is you teach them to use two words, like red and redness, and why this is important.

I am already using them the way you are trying to teach me to use them.

That is why I am saying things like "my X is like your Y".

If you dig deeper into this forum, you'll see that one of my claims is that I can make words mean anything, which is intended to be understood as "I can make redness mean greenness". I think I have even been accused of arguing that black is white, and white is black.

I stand guilty as charged. It's intentional. I will use the word I want to use to communicate my message. If your "whiteness" is like my "blackness" then I will argue that white is black.

The trouble with Philosophers is that they don't understand what language is or how it works. They spent all their lives avoiding contradictions rather than embracing them as tools for inter-personal communication.

There is nothing wrong with being wrong. It's just language.

If you want to say I am blind in some other way (please provide and define a different term than qualia blindness)

No. I am going to use EXACTLY your term. It's intentional and necessary. Because science, and because the error in your approach is precisely in the false belief of definitions. You don't understand how language works.

The sentence "Brent.Allsop is qualia blind" makes a claim about reality. It makes a claim about you.
If that sentence is meaningful to you, then you should be able to apply empiricism to self - you should have a way to test AND falsify your own hypothesis about yourself.

How would you falsify it?

, or say that your argument should falsify RQT for me, or something, that is fine, but please do not completely miss use the term qualia blindness like this, as RQT, by definition, is not qualia blind, so someone supporting RQT, by definition is already cured from ‘qualia blindness’.

You don't need other people's theories/language to do science on yourself.

Qualitatively you understand what "qualia blindness" means to you. Obviously - because it's your phrase.
If you are qualia blind then you should be able to make testable/falsifiable predictions about your future self.

[Brent.Allsop]

I have a prediction for you - light with wavelength from 622 to 780 nanometers is what causes my "redness".

This is not true (ie falsified), if you splice a red/green inverted into your optic nerve. In that case the strawberry (on the inverted screen of the phone) and the light is green, when you experience redness.

Then you substitute out glutamate, for some other theory’s prediction of what redness is, until you find something that cannot be falsified.

I have it already. Light with wavelength of 622 to 780 nanometers

Um, what about when people are dreaming of girls in red dresses with there eyes shut, or a brain in a vat, with a “matrix” (Or TanK providing it) causing them to have knowledge of girls in red dresses, while in both cases, there is no light, in the "system" or anywhere? Redness is not in the 'matrix', redness can't be a property of light. Redness is in the brain, in the vat. And if you have an inverter, between the two, redness changes to grenness - your theory falsified.