What could make morality objective?

[Peter Holmes]

Perhaps here's one form of the fallacy behind some forms of anti-realism:

Each of us constructs reality 'in the mind', based on sense data.
Therefore, reality is nothing more than each person's mental construct based on sense data.

If it is, then the empiricist skepticism - and ultimately solipsism - is evident. As is the performative contradiction involved in making such a claim - along with talk about intersubjective consensus.

Here's the crazy picture: zombie mental constructs agree with each other about reality, based on zombie sense data that are themselves mental constructs.

Philosophical anti-realism blocks itself in every direction.

But when meat bags agree that what they perceive is the same as what other meat bags perceive then they band together in the knoweldge that thee is simething "out there" and it is not just generated purely in their brains, but generated by the same things out there.

Agreed. And I like 'meat bags'. But this is a realist description, of course, which ignores the 'mentalism' and therefore 'mind-dependence' in the proposed fallacy.

The trouble comes when different groupings of meat bags having had slightly different experiences guided by the endemic assumptions of their personal meatbag collective start to disagree violently with other meat bag groups who having evolved a different set of endemic assumptions are also voilent back.
Science is can, not always, but can bridge the differences but sadly has very little positive input to say about morals, as it is beyond its perview..
And confusing behaviouralism with morality have never worked, nor should it

All agreed.

[Veritas Aequitas]

You insist my argument is realist[P] when to me it is not.
Therefrom you rely on your misunderstanding to condemn what you think is my argument [i.e. p-realist].
If that is not a strawman fallacy, then what it is.

No, I'm not distorting your argument. I'm showing why it is, in fact, philosophically realist. I know you think it isn't. But what you're supposed to do is address my reasons for saying it is. Which you don't.

You failed to get the point?
Those who are accused of building 'strawman' will not agree they are doing so.
You are merely interpreting and guessing my argument, but since I am more familiar with it, I am very certain it is not p-realist. [..it is possible I could be wrong but not in this case since I have been holding such view from the beginning.]

2 W's primitive language game examples, within 'forms of life', are always completely real - and 'realist'. He's saying: 'This is the kind of thing humans do. This is the function of language in human life.'

W's 'forms of life' do not imply philosophical realism and human-independent.
'Forms of life' literally means living things existing within a Framework and System, i.e. living-humans in particular and other living things having their specific 'forms of life'.
W's language games is contingent upon the human conditions.

No, his idea of 'forms of life' - still much debated - is, in my view at least, designed to narrow down on particular situations in which we act and interact with each other, using language. He wanted to break the hold of a generalising picture of the nature of language which is, arguably, representational or nomenclaturist. That's what the doctrine 'meaning is use' refers to. And what he called the 'background' is the reality of which we're a part, and in which we exist. This is in no way an anti-realist approach.

At least you accept 'still much debated'. Your view is wrong which is confined to PI.

If you study the whole of W's philosophy from beginning to later, W's refer 'forms of life' to include other forms of life, i.e. non-humans animals.

• “If a lion could talk, we wouldn’t be able to understand it” (PPF
  327)

W's rejected Moore's external world and stated that whatever is known is related to the different forms of life of which the human form of life is one.
In reference to the form of life, it is implied we have to take into consideration its 3.5b years of evolution extended to 13.5b since the BB.

It is anti-realist because when whatever is the external world is contingent to a specific form of life, i.e. human in this case, it cannot be independent of the human condition, thus cannot be realist[p]*.
*realist[p] claim the external world is independent of the human conditions.

In On Certainty, W countered Moore's insistence Moore's claim of 'knowing' an independent external world.
W insisted whatever is claimed is contingent within a language-game thus the human conditions.
To W, an absolutely independent external world is not possible to be known, as such his,
"whereof one cannot speak, one must remain in silent" thus cannot be reified nor hypostatized.

As you know, that's from the Tractatus, which promoted ideas that he rejected later in the Investigations and other writings, including On Certainty. His critique of Moore was that bafflement about the existence of 'the external world' comes from a peculiar philosophical delusion about our supposed separation from that world. In my opinion.

Nope! you got it wrong.
It is not from the Tractatus.
In the Tractatus, W claim the world consist of a totality of facts which are independent of the humans' opinion, beliefs and judgments. W then rejected this idea in PI and rejected that totally in 'On Certainty'.

What Moore's [common sense] was claiming is similar to what W was claiming in his Tractatus.

W's critique of "a peculiar philosophical delusion about our supposed separation from that world" was a self-critique of his earlier delusion in the Tractatus.

We can't, because we're part of the reality that you agree is all there is. We're not separate from it, inside your invented FSRC bubble. And if the bubble is, in fact, reality itself - which is what you seem to accept - then of course there is no outside that bubble.

I'm showing why your argument is contradictory: reality is all there is; but humans are trapped inside an evolved fundamental framework and system of reality and cognition (EFFSRC). So is our EFFSFRC part of reality, or is it reality itself - which you say both is all there is and doesn't exist?

I did not state the FSRC does not exist - you must have misinterpreted my point.

The FSRC exists as a process that is part and parcel of reality [all there is].
It is a system and process just like digestive system, learning system, intelligence, and the like which are part and parcel of reality[all there is].

Like the digestive system and its framework, the FRSC processes are already in existence [pre-existed], the term FSRC is merely formalizing it as a subject for consideration, discussions and debate.

The question of Einstein's theism is still much debated. But if he was a theist, then he wasn't and isn't the only scientist to hold such an irrational belief. And your attempt to connect his philosophical realism with his theism is tendentious.

Einstein did believe in an independent God and independent external world. Einstein was not actually a 'theist' [believe in a person god] but actually a deist [a reasoned God like Spinoza].

When Einstein referred to "God did not play dice" with reference to the theories of QM, it is obvious he was bringing in his p-realist God into the debate and attempting to put QM into a realist[p] position.
But the current consensus of the QM principles are anti-p-realist.

How Einstein challenged quantum mechanics and lost
Einstein tried to disprove quantum mechanics. Instead, a weird concept called entanglement showed that Einstein was wrong.
https://bigthink.com/13-8/quantum-mechanics-einstein/

There are Einstein Apologists but they could not counter the current antirealist views re QM.

You keep falling back on QM as the foundation for your philosophical anti-realism. But it's completely rational to understand QM as an attempt to understand the nature of reality at its fundamental level - which is at least methodologically naturalist and arguably realist. Your use of the observer effect and indeterminacy to support your argument is illegitimate, in my opinion.

Your opinion is wrong due to ignorance of the subject.
Note my point above why Einstein p-realist view of QM was wrong.
In QM there is no absolutely independent reality-at-its-fundamental-level.
Whatever is reality with QM, it cannot be absolutely independent of the human conditions [as observers, etc.]

No, your argument is immature and badly-conceived. So there.

I have shown above with argument why your arguments are immature [e.g. relying on W's primitive ideas] and fall short understanding reality - all there is - humans being intricately part and parcel of reality.

As I had argued many times,
you are relying on W's primitive ideas from the Tractatus, i.e. "The world is the totality of facts" [states of affairs, that is the case] which are absolutely independent of the human conditions, i.e. opinions, beliefs and judgment.
While W had rejected the above, you are still clinging to it dogmatically.
Suggest you read PI and 'On Certainty' thoroughly.

So, it is you who should "Keep thinking about it. The penny may drop. Pigs may fly."

[Peter Holmes]

Just come across 'Filos O'Fickle Papers' at Amazon - and I find I agree with almost everything in it.

[Peter Holmes]

You insist my argument is realist[P] when to me it is not.
Therefrom you rely on your misunderstanding to condemn what you think is my argument [i.e. p-realist].
If that is not a strawman fallacy, then what it is.

No, I'm not distorting your argument. I'm showing why it is, in fact, philosophically realist. I know you think it isn't. But what you're supposed to do is address my reasons for saying it is. Which you don't.

You failed to get the point?
Those who are accused of building 'strawman' will not agree they are doing so.
You are merely interpreting and guessing my argument, but since I am more familiar with it, I am very certain it is not p-realist. [..it is possible I could be wrong but not in this case since I have been holding such view from the beginning.]

Again. You say your argument is not philosophically realist, and I say it is - and I show why. And again, you don't address my argument for why it is. And, absurdly, you offer the fact that you've always held an opinion as evidence for its truth. Do you realise how ridiculous that is?

The reason for straw-manning an argument is to refute the straw man and pretend that that refutes the actual argument. And that's not what I'm doing.

W's 'forms of life' do not imply philosophical realism and human-independent.
'Forms of life' literally means living things existing within a Framework and System, i.e. living-humans in particular and other living things having their specific 'forms of life'.
W's language games is contingent upon the human conditions.

No, his idea of 'forms of life' - still much debated - is, in my view at least, designed to narrow down on particular situations in which we act and interact with each other, using language. He wanted to break the hold of a generalising picture of the nature of language which is, arguably, representational or nomenclaturist. That's what the doctrine 'meaning is use' refers to. And what he called the 'background' is the reality of which we're a part, and in which we exist. This is in no way an anti-realist approach.

At least you accept 'still much debated'. Your view is wrong which is confined to PI.

If you study the whole of W's philosophy from beginning to later, W's refer 'forms of life' to include other forms of life, i.e. non-humans animals.

• “If a lion could talk, we wouldn’t be able to understand it” (PPF
  327)

Obvious and irrelevant. When he talks about humans using language, he's talking about human forms of life.

W's rejected Moore's external world and stated that whatever is known is related to the different forms of life of which the human form of life is one.
In reference to the form of life, it is implied we have to take into consideration its 3.5b years of evolution extended to 13.5b since the BB.

No, this is your interpolation, which has nothing to do with W's purpose or method.

It is anti-realist because when whatever is the external world is contingent to a specific form of life, i.e. human in this case, it cannot be independent of the human condition, thus cannot be realist[p]*.
*realist[p] claim the external world is independent of the human conditions.

No. This is your straw man of (at least my) philosophical realism. And your reference to 'the external world' gives the game away. There is no internal/external world distinction. We are, as you say, part and parcel of reality. And to say that that reality depends in some way on us is ridiculous.

In On Certainty, W countered Moore's insistence Moore's claim of 'knowing' an independent external world.
W insisted whatever is claimed is contingent within a language-game thus the human conditions.
To W, an absolutely independent external world is not possible to be known, as such his,
"whereof one cannot speak, one must remain in silent" thus cannot be reified nor hypostatized.

As you know, that's from the Tractatus, which promoted ideas that he rejected later in the Investigations and other writings, including On Certainty. His critique of Moore was that bafflement about the existence of 'the external world' comes from a peculiar philosophical delusion about our supposed separation from that world. In my opinion.

Nope! you got it wrong.
It is not from the Tractatus.
In the Tractatus, W claim the world consist of a totality of facts which are independent of the humans' opinion, beliefs and judgments. W then rejected this idea in PI and rejected that totally in 'On Certainty'.

'Wittgenstein, the Austrian-British philosopher, famously expressed this idea in his work Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. The statement “whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must remain silent” ...'

I've been reading and wrestling with Wittgenstein for at least 40 years, and I've corresponded with Peter Hacker at Oxford - arguably the most important and influential W scholar (along with Gordon Baker) ever. So I suggest you tread carefully when proclaiming that you understand W better than others. And feel free to apologise for this mistake.

What Moore's [common sense] was claiming is similar to what W was claiming in his Tractatus.

W's critique of "a peculiar philosophical delusion about our supposed separation from that world" was a self-critique of his earlier delusion in the Tractatus.

I know. And I also know how to suck eggs.

We can't, because we're part of the reality that you agree is all there is. We're not separate from it, inside your invented FSRC bubble. And if the bubble is, in fact, reality itself - which is what you seem to accept - then of course there is no outside that bubble.

I'm showing why your argument is contradictory: reality is all there is; but humans are trapped inside an evolved fundamental framework and system of reality and cognition (EFFSRC). So is our EFFSFRC part of reality, or is it reality itself - which you say both is all there is and doesn't exist?

I did not state the FSRC does not exist - you must have misinterpreted my point.

Try reading carefully. I didn't say you think the EFFSRC doesn't exist. I said you think that reality - outside the EFFSRC - doesn't exist - that there's no such thing outside the EFFSRC bubble.

The FSRC exists as a process that is part and parcel of reality [all there is].
It is a system and process just like digestive system, learning system, intelligence, and the like which are part and parcel of reality[all there is].

And if it exists as a process like the digestive system, then it is part of reality - a real thing, like the digestive system - and that is a philosophically realist claim. That's why your argument is realist.

Like the digestive system and its framework, the FRSC processes are already in existence [pre-existed], the term FSRC is merely formalizing it as a subject for consideration, discussions and debate.

Patent nonsense. The digestive system didn't pre-exist the life forms that evolved with digestive systems.

The question of Einstein's theism is still much debated. But if he was a theist, then he wasn't and isn't the only scientist to hold such an irrational belief. And your attempt to connect his philosophical realism with his theism is tendentious.

Einstein did believe in an independent God and independent external world. Einstein was not actually a 'theist' [believe in a person god] but actually a deist [a reasoned God like Spinoza].

When Einstein referred to "God did not play dice" with reference to the theories of QM, it is obvious he was bringing in his p-realist God into the debate and attempting to put QM into a realist[p] position.
But the current consensus of the QM principles are anti-p-realist.

As usual, you miss my point. Einstein's theism or deism has nothing to do with his scientific work, and so his attitude towards interpretations of quantum mechanics.

How Einstein challenged quantum mechanics and lost
Einstein tried to disprove quantum mechanics. Instead, a weird concept called entanglement showed that Einstein was wrong.
https://bigthink.com/13-8/quantum-mechanics-einstein/

There are Einstein Apologists but they could not counter the current antirealist views re QM.

This is barefaced nonsense. QM discoveries and interpretations don't entail philosophically anti-realist conclusions. You're down yet another blind alley.

You keep falling back on QM as the foundation for your philosophical anti-realism. But it's completely rational to understand QM as an attempt to understand the nature of reality at its fundamental level - which is at least methodologically naturalist and arguably realist. Your use of the observer effect and indeterminacy to support your argument is illegitimate, in my opinion.

Your opinion is wrong due to ignorance of the subject.
Note my point above why Einstein p-realist view of QM was wrong.
In QM there is no absolutely independent reality-at-its-fundamental-level.
Whatever is reality with QM, it cannot be absolutely independent of the human conditions [as observers, etc.]

Wrong. The observer need not be a human. It's just that which can't identify both position and velocity together. But perhaps other particle physicists here can settle this for us.

No, your argument is immature and badly-conceived. So there.

I have shown above with argument why your arguments are immature [e.g. relying on W's primitive ideas] and fall short understanding reality - all there is - humans being intricately part and parcel of reality.

As I had argued many times,
you are relying on W's primitive ideas from the Tractatus, i.e. "The world is the totality of facts" [states of affairs, that is the case] which are absolutely independent of the human conditions, i.e. opinions, beliefs and judgment.
While W had rejected the above, you are still clinging to it dogmatically.
Suggest you read PI and 'On Certainty' thoroughly.

So, it is you who should "Keep thinking about it. The penny may drop. Pigs may fly."

I prefer to follow the later Wittgenstein, in his critique of his earlier ideas - and their implications. And that critique in no way entailed philosophical anti-realism. But hey, what do I know?

[Veritas Aequitas]

The reason for straw-manning an argument is to refute the straw man and pretend that that refutes the actual argument. And that's not what I'm doing.

A straw man fallacy occurs when someone distorts or exaggerates another person’s argument, and then attacks the distorted version of the argument instead of genuinely engaging.
https://owl.excelsior.edu/argument-and- ... straw-man/

That you insist my arguments are that of philosophical realism is a distortion and insisting you are right is a strawman as defined above.

If you study the whole of W's philosophy from beginning to later, W's refer 'forms of life' to include other forms of life, i.e. non-humans animals.

• “If a lion could talk, we wouldn’t be able to understand it” (PPF
  327)

Obvious and irrelevant. When he talks about humans using language, he's talking about human forms of life.

Note the plurality in 'forms' and there are many times in 'On Certainty' where W reference to non-human forms of life implying 'conditioning reality'.
Don't have it on hand, I get will get the reference later.

W's rejected Moore's external world and stated that whatever is known is related to the different forms of life of which the human form of life is one.
In reference to the form of life, it is implied we have to take into consideration its 3.5b years of evolution extended to 13.5b since the BB.

No, this is your interpolation, which has nothing to do with W's purpose or method.

That is what philosophy is about; philosophy is not about deadwood and dogmatic historical thoughts.

It is anti-realist because when whatever is the external world is contingent to a specific form of life, i.e. human in this case, it cannot be independent of the human condition, thus cannot be realist[p]*.
*realist[p] claim the external world is independent of the human conditions.

No. This is your straw man of (at least my) philosophical realism. And your reference to 'the external world' gives the game away. There is no internal/external world distinction. We are, as you say, part and parcel of reality. And to say that that reality depends in some way on us is ridiculous.

The above is similar to your 'what is fact' which is independent of the human conditions of human opinions, beliefs and judgment.
According to W, 'what is fact' [post Tractatus] is contingent to a specific form of life, i.e. the specific language-game of a form of life.

As you know, that's from the Tractatus, which promoted ideas that he rejected later in the Investigations and other writings, including On Certainty. His critique of Moore was that bafflement about the existence of 'the external world' comes from a peculiar philosophical delusion about our supposed separation from that world. In my opinion.

Nope! you got it wrong.
It is not from the Tractatus.
In the Tractatus, W claim the world consist of a totality of facts which are independent of the humans' opinion, beliefs and judgments. W then rejected this idea in PI and rejected that totally in 'On Certainty'.

'Wittgenstein, the Austrian-British philosopher, famously expressed this idea in his work Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. The statement “whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must remain silent” ...'

I've been reading and wrestling with Wittgenstein for at least 40 years, and I've corresponded with Peter Hacker at Oxford - arguably the most important and influential W scholar (along with Gordon Baker) ever. So I suggest you tread carefully when proclaiming that you understand W better than others. And feel free to apologise for this mistake.

I won't accuse you of the "fallacy of name-dropping". At least you gave me an idea of where you are coming from with your ideas.

There are tons of materials out there which claim the later-W is antirealist culminated in his 'On Certainty'. Here is one among the many;
An approach to Wittgenstein’s antirealism
https://www.redalyc.org/journal/1053/105352363010/html/
Having read W's On Certainty thoroughly I agree with such a view.
Btw, I am not a fan of W except to understand his views to counter those who misunderstood the later-W.

Peter Hacker is an analytic philosopher, so most likely a philosophical realist and will not accept the fact that the later W is antirealist. If Hacker still insist W is the typical realist [p] then he is wrong.
Btw, Bertrand Russell [a hardcore analytic philosopher] who was W's teacher in Oxford did not agree with the later-W ideas implying W had gone to the other side, i.e. antirealism.

What Moore's [common sense] was claiming is similar to what W was claiming in his Tractatus.
W's critique of "a peculiar philosophical delusion about our supposed separation from that world" was a self-critique of his earlier delusion in the Tractatus.

I know. And I also know how to suck eggs.

While W did move on, you are stuck with W primitive views from the Tractatus.

I did not state the FSRC does not exist - you must have misinterpreted my point.

Try reading carefully. I didn't say you think the EFFSRC doesn't exist. I said you think that reality - outside the EFFSRC - doesn't exist - that there's no such thing outside the EFFSRC bubble.

The FSRC exists as a process that is part and parcel of reality [all there is].
It is a system and process just like digestive system, learning system, intelligence, and the like which are part and parcel of reality[all there is].

And if it exists as a process like the digestive system, then it is part of reality - a real thing, like the digestive system - and that is a philosophically realist claim. That's why your argument is realist.

So, this is you point?
Suggest you elaborate your argument here,
viewtopic.php?t=42176
so I can counter your argument more specifically.
I addition, the new thread will enable easy reference if you ever make the same claim again.

Like the digestive system and its framework, the FRSC processes are already in existence [pre-existed], the term FSRC is merely formalizing it as a subject for consideration, discussions and debate.

Patent nonsense. The digestive system didn't pre-exist the life forms that evolved with digestive systems.

You missed my point.

In one perspective, the digestive system pre-existed before it was so named within the human-based science-biology FSRC, e.g. in primates and in the cruder form in less complex animals.

It is the same with the actual human-based Emergence, Realization of Reality and Cognitive System inherent in all humans and other forms of life.
Since it is human-based, logically it follows, whatever the resultant cannot be absolutely independent of the human conditions, thus cannot be that of realism[p].

The question of Einstein's theism is still much debated. But if he was a theist, then he wasn't and isn't the only scientist to hold such an irrational belief. And your attempt to connect his philosophical realism with his theism is tendentious.

Einstein did believe in an independent God and independent external world. Einstein was not actually a 'theist' [believe in a person god] but actually a deist [a reasoned God like Spinoza].

When Einstein referred to "God did not play dice" with reference to the theories of QM, it is obvious he was bringing in his p-realist God into the debate and attempting to put QM into a realist[p] position.
But the current consensus of the QM principles are anti-p-realist.

As usual, you miss my point. Einstein's theism or deism has nothing to do with his scientific work, and so his attitude towards interpretations of quantum mechanics.

I understand your point if with reference to theists like Newton, Mendel and many other scientists who were dealing with CLASSICAL science, they do not bring in theism into their theories.

There is no definitive scientific work from Einstein re QM proper.
In Einstein case, his claims [thesis] on QM [hidden variable] were not accepted because he insisted in incorporating philosophical realism and the related theism in his claim which was implied in his 'God did not play dice'.

Note your ignorance on the above.
Any counter?

How Einstein challenged quantum mechanics and lost
Einstein tried to disprove quantum mechanics. Instead, a weird concept called entanglement showed that Einstein was wrong.
https://bigthink.com/13-8/quantum-mechanics-einstein/

There are Einstein Apologists but they could not counter the current antirealist views re QM.

This is barefaced nonsense. QM discoveries and interpretations don't entail philosophically anti-realist conclusions. You're down yet another blind alley.

I suggest you research more on this?
I will hold back in exposing your ignorance.

Did you know, upon acceptance of QM, philosophy was a compulsory paper for any Physics in all [if not most] Universities.

You keep falling back on QM as the foundation for your philosophical anti-realism. But it's completely rational to understand QM as an attempt to understand the nature of reality at its fundamental level - which is at least methodologically naturalist and arguably realist. Your use of the observer effect and indeterminacy to support your argument is illegitimate, in my opinion.

Your opinion is wrong due to ignorance of the subject.
Note my point above why Einstein p-realist view of QM was wrong.
In QM there is no absolutely independent reality-at-its-fundamental-level.
Whatever is reality with QM, it cannot be absolutely independent of the human conditions [as observers, etc.]

Wrong. The observer need not be a human. It's just that which can't identify both position and velocity together. But perhaps other particle physicists here can settle this for us.

You missed my point.
Note I stated [as observers, etc.]
Whatever, the activity of science and modern physics cannot be done without human involvements and implied in 'etc'.

No, your argument is immature and badly-conceived. So there.

I have shown above with argument why your arguments are immature [e.g. relying on W's primitive ideas] and fall short understanding reality - all there is - humans being intricately part and parcel of reality.

As I had argued many times,
you are relying on W's primitive ideas from the Tractatus, i.e. "The world is the totality of facts" [states of affairs, that is the case] which are absolutely independent of the human conditions, i.e. opinions, beliefs and judgment.
While W had rejected the above, you are still clinging to it dogmatically.
Suggest you read PI and 'On Certainty' thoroughly.

So, it is you who should "Keep thinking about it. The penny may drop. Pigs may fly."

I prefer to follow the later Wittgenstein, in his critique of his earlier ideas - and their implications. And that critique in no way entailed philosophical anti-realism. But hey, what do I know?

I don't think you have read the later-W 'On Certainty' thoroughly with suspended judgment and no dogmatic bias as a hardcore realist[p].

As stated above, there are tons of material supporting why the later-W is antirealist especially in relation to this early realism.

Do you know W was a fan of Schopenhauer and was 'religious' but he put aside whatever from these sources to 'Whereof one cannot speak, one must remain in silence'.
Will you insist this is nonsense? It is likely you will, but that is due to your ignorance and the missing pieces of W from your 40 years of a superficial understanding of W.

[Atla]

Has this Wittgenstein guy ever said anything substantial, anything groundbreaking? It's a pretty bad sign when you start arguing against your former philosophy, if you don't get philosophy right the first time, chances are you won't get it right the second time either.

[Peter Holmes]

Has this Wittgenstein guy ever said anything substantial, anything groundbreaking? It's a pretty bad sign when you start arguing against your former philosophy, if you don't get philosophy right the first time, chances are you won't get it right the second time either.

Okay. There's no need to give a monkey's about what any philosopher has written, cos it's the premises and arguments that count, regardless of who makes them. So if you think this wrangling about Wittgenstein's ideas is beside the point, I tend to agree. Same with Kant.

I think I've been trying to address VA's actual argument, concentrating on his main premise: reality is nothing more than a product of an 'evolved, fundamental framework and system of reality and cognition' (EFFSRC) - and so dependent in some way on us humans. Viz: humans are part of reality, which is all there is; but there is no reality outside or unconditioned by a human EFFSRC. Which I think is patent and demonstrable nonsense.

[Skepdick]

cos it's the premises and arguments that count, regardless of who makes them.

How many times do you need me to demonstrate that you are lying about believing that?

If premises and arguments counted you'd have conceded the objectivity of morality by now.

You know, given the sound/valid argument presented to you for the wrongness of murder.

[Peter Holmes]

P1 If X is morally wrong, then X is morally wrong.
P2 X is morally wrong.
C Therefore, X is morally wrong.

That's a slam-dunk.

[Skepdick]

P1 If X is morally wrong, then X is morally wrong.
P2 X is morally wrong.
C Therefore, X is morally wrong.

That's a slam-dunk.

I agree! This is so banal it doesn't even need saying. It's just the first law of thought - identity.

So why do you keep rejecting it?

Why do you keep saying that the argument is NOT sound when X is Murder ?
If the argument is NOT sound it necessarily entails that Murder is NOT morally wrong.

Are you being ironic/intellectually dishonest when you say "That's a slam-dunk"; or are you just an immoral and murderous piece of shit?

[Peter Holmes]

How to sharpen up VA's argument?

Premise: We humans have to perceive, know and describe reality in human ways.
(Note: This sentence is a description of a feature of reality, or a state-of-affairs. And it has a truth-value.)
Conclusion: Therefore, reality is nothing more than the ways we humans perceive, know and describe it.
(Note: This sentence is a description of reality. And it has a truth-value.)

Now, I think the premise is true. And I think it's what VA's palaver about a human EFFSRC amounts to. (His blather about emergence and realisation is so much mystical nonsense.)

But I think the conclusion doesn't follow from the premise, so the argument is a non sequitur fallacy. We can't conclude from our necessary 'limitation' that reality is nothing more than our 'limitation' allows.

VA will shout 'straw man' and fail to address this refutation. But can anyone else here have a go at it?

In the interests of intellectual enquiry.

[Veritas Aequitas]

I think I've been trying to address VA's actual argument, concentrating on his main premise:
reality is nothing more than a product of an 'evolved, fundamental framework and system of reality and cognition' (EFFSRC)
- and so dependent in some way on us humans.

Rather than a product which can be misleading, reality [all there is] it is an 'emergence' that is subsequently realized as real and then cognized, perceived, known and described.

Viz: humans are part of reality, which is all there is; but there is no reality outside or unconditioned by a human EFFSRC. Which I think is patent and demonstrable nonsense.

First I do not deny there is an external reality from the common and conventional sense. This is my empirical realist's view.

But then when do serious and more rigorous philosophy we are faced with:

When we have realized the obstacles in the way of a straightforward and confident answer, we shall be well launched on the study of philosophy -
- for philosophy is merely the attempt to answer such ultimate questions, not carelessly and dogmatically, as we do in ordinary life and even in the sciences,
but critically after exploring all that makes such questions puzzling, and after realizing all the vagueness and confusion that underlie our ordinary ideas.
Problem of Philosophy - Russell
https://www.ditext.com/russell/rus1.html

The "the way of a straightforward and confident answer" is the mind-independence of philosophical realism, i.e. it is common and and conventional sense that things exists regardless of humans.

When one realized there are obstacles to the above, one is launched into philosophy-proper. In Russell's case, he realized there is a possibility;

Among these surprising possibilities, doubt suggests that perhaps there is no table at all. Philosophy, if it cannot answer so many questions as we could wish, has at least the power of asking questions which increase the interest of the world, and show the strangeness and wonder lying just below the surface even in the commonest things of daily life.
ibid

In the case of Kant and other antirealists, they realize "the way of a straightforward and confident answer" of philosophical realism is contentious and not tenable at a higher deliberation of FSRC-ed reality.

Consider, apart from empirical realism, within a higher perspective of the FSRC-ed reality;
if humans are intricately part and parcel of the FSRC-ed reality [all there is],
how can humans [affixed to reality as all-there-is] extricate themselves out of the all-there-is to have an objective independent view of the FSRC-ed all-there-is [which they are in]?

Therefore the more realistic view is FSRC-ed reality cannot be absolutely independent of the human conditions.

Besides, the absolutely independent of the human conditions view of an reality serves no pragmatic purpose for humanity as whole other than to soothe the individuals' terrible psychological dissonances arising from an existential crisis and the default ex nihilo fit impulse.

On the other hand, where reality as all-there-is is viewed as somehow related to the human conditions it enable the possibility and opportunity for humanity to control certain aspects of reality and the individual themselves from being at the mercy of an independent reality.

[Veritas Aequitas]

How to sharpen up VA's argument?

Premise: We humans have to perceive, know and describe reality in human ways.
(Note: This sentence is a description of a feature of reality, or a state-of-affairs. And it has a truth-value.)
Conclusion: Therefore, reality is nothing more than the ways we humans perceive, know and describe it.
(Note: This sentence is a description of reality. And it has a truth-value.)

Now, I think the premise is true. And I think it's what VA's palaver about a human EFFSRC amounts to. (His blather about emergence and realisation is so much mystical nonsense.)

But I think the conclusion doesn't follow from the premise, so the argument is a non sequitur fallacy. We can't conclude from our necessary 'limitation' that reality is nothing more than our 'limitation' allows.

VA will shout 'straw man' and fail to address this refutation. But can anyone else here have a go at it?

In the interests of intellectual enquiry.

What is there to refute when you are building strawman by deliberately ignoring the emergence and realization of reality elements despite me raising numerous threads to explain what they are about.

You are stuck with as Russell stated "the way of a straightforward and confident answer" and thus NOT doing mature philosophy proper.

[Peter Holmes]

How to sharpen up VA's argument?

Premise: We humans have to perceive, know and describe reality in human ways.
(Note: This sentence is a description of a feature of reality, or a state-of-affairs. And it has a truth-value.)
Conclusion: Therefore, reality is nothing more than the ways we humans perceive, know and describe it.
(Note: This sentence is a description of reality. And it has a truth-value.)

Now, I think the premise is true. And I think it's what VA's palaver about a human EFFSRC amounts to. (His blather about emergence and realisation is so much mystical nonsense.)

But I think the conclusion doesn't follow from the premise, so the argument is a non sequitur fallacy. We can't conclude from our necessary 'limitation' that reality is nothing more than our 'limitation' allows.

VA will shout 'straw man' and fail to address this refutation. But can anyone else here have a go at it?

In the interests of intellectual enquiry.

What is there to refute when you are building strawman by deliberately ignoring the emergence and realization of reality elements despite me raising numerous threads to explain what they are about.

You are stuck with as Russell stated "the way of a straightforward and confident answer" and thus NOT doing mature philosophy proper.

Tell you what - explain simply and quickly why emergence and realisation changes your main premise, so that the conclusion is valid. In other words, why does the term 'human EFFSRC' not cover what you call emergence and realisation?

To put it another way. What is that 'emerges' and 'realises'? Is it reality? Or is it an evolved, fundamental human FSRC? Or is it both? Or is it something else - in which case, what?

And - because I'm impatient, and this is tedious - here are some responses.

If it's reality (the universe) that 'emerges' and 'realises' over billions of years - then that's a standard, banal, and realist claim about reality. But if it's a human EFFSRC that 'emerges' and 'realises' - then that's also a standard, banal and realist claim - this time, about humans.

But if it's something else that 'emerges' and 'realises', then wtf is it?

[Atla]

Has this Wittgenstein guy ever said anything substantial, anything groundbreaking? It's a pretty bad sign when you start arguing against your former philosophy, if you don't get philosophy right the first time, chances are you won't get it right the second time either.

Okay. There's no need to give a monkey's about what any philosopher has written, cos it's the premises and arguments that count, regardless of who makes them. So if you think this wrangling about Wittgenstein's ideas is beside the point, I tend to agree. Same with Kant.

I think I've been trying to address VA's actual argument, concentrating on his main premise: reality is nothing more than a product of an 'evolved, fundamental framework and system of reality and cognition' (EFFSRC) - and so dependent in some way on us humans. Viz: humans are part of reality, which is all there is; but there is no reality outside or unconditioned by a human EFFSRC. Which I think is patent and demonstrable nonsense.

I stopped reading VA's comments, was just wondering about Wittgenstein. We all wondered about crude mind-dependent reality when we were 16, and later because of QM but that one is a much more sophisticated version. VA is just permanently 16.

We did a topic where I showed in more detail that indirect realism is superior to transcendental idealism, that should be the final nail in the coffin.

As for W, admittedly I'm biased because I find the entire approach of doing philosophy linguistically, to be a mistake.