Is morality objective or subjective?

[Immanuel Can]

So could you just as easily enjoy the pointless suffering of others.

Not and be moral. I would be objectively a bad person, if I did that. I can freely recognize that, because that's what the objective moral fact is: those who cause "pointless suffering" are cruel.

Well I can easily arrive at the subjective opinion that cruelty is morally wrong; in fact, I can't avoid arriving at it.

You could, though. And you could change your mind in the next five minutes, and there'd be no basis for you even to feel sorry about it, if you did. And you couldn't find a reason to tell anybody else that it would be wrong for them, or wrong for your society to support, or wrong for the world to do, or right to arrest or punish people if they did it, and no basis for recompense or justice for the victims...

There's not a lot you could do with that "opinion," in fact: not even keep yourself on track, since you could change your mind.

Where's the "moral" content in that?

[Harbal]

Not and be moral. I would be objectively a bad person, if I did that. I can freely recognize that, because that's what the objective moral fact is: those who cause "pointless suffering" are cruel.

Well I can easily arrive at the subjective opinion that cruelty is morally wrong; in fact, I can't avoid arriving at it.

You could, though. And you could change your mind in the next five minutes, and there'd be no basis for you even to feel sorry about it, if you did. And you couldn't find a reason to tell anybody else that it would be wrong for them, or wrong for your society to support, or wrong for the world to do, or right to arrest or punish people if they did it, and no basis for recompense or justice for the victims...

There's not a lot you could do with that "opinion," in fact: not even keep yourself on track, since you could change your mind.

Where's the "moral" content in that?

You might not like it, but there is no alternative. Your idea about objective moral truth is a none starter.

[Immanuel Can]

Well I can easily arrive at the subjective opinion that cruelty is morally wrong; in fact, I can't avoid arriving at it.

You could, though. And you could change your mind in the next five minutes, and there'd be no basis for you even to feel sorry about it, if you did. And you couldn't find a reason to tell anybody else that it would be wrong for them, or wrong for your society to support, or wrong for the world to do, or right to arrest or punish people if they did it, and no basis for recompense or justice for the victims...

There's not a lot you could do with that "opinion," in fact: not even keep yourself on track, since you could change your mind.

Where's the "moral" content in that?

You might not like it, but there is no alternative.

Well, that's your assumption, I realize. I don't share it, but I believe that's what you think. However, if you think it, what you should really be is a nihilist. The truth is that, as a Subjectivist (or an Emotivist) you don't believe in any morals...because the alleged "morality" or "opinion" you have could change in the next ten seconds, and there's nothing more than your present twinge to hold you to it.

[Harbal]

You could, though. And you could change your mind in the next five minutes, and there'd be no basis for you even to feel sorry about it, if you did. And you couldn't find a reason to tell anybody else that it would be wrong for them, or wrong for your society to support, or wrong for the world to do, or right to arrest or punish people if they did it, and no basis for recompense or justice for the victims...

There's not a lot you could do with that "opinion," in fact: not even keep yourself on track, since you could change your mind.

Where's the "moral" content in that?

You might not like it, but there is no alternative.

Well, that's your assumption, I realize. I don't share it, but I believe that's what you think. However, if you think it, what you should really be is a nihilist.

I think it's for me to decide what I should be in that respect. As your moral outlook if founded on something that isn't there, I suppose you would have to be a fantasist.

[Immanuel Can]

You might not like it, but there is no alternative.

Well, that's your assumption, I realize. I don't share it, but I believe that's what you think. However, if you think it, what you should really be is a nihilist.

I think it's for me to decide what I should be in that respect.

Absolutely. But the term for what you're describing is something like "Solipsism." As Wiki puts it, "Ethical solipsism is a form of personal morality that holds that no other moral judgement exists or matters apart from one's own individual moral judgement." That's pretty much a summary of what you've identified as your own view, so far as I can see.

Or is there more to it?

[Harbal]

Well, that's your assumption, I realize. I don't share it, but I believe that's what you think. However, if you think it, what you should really be is a nihilist.

I think it's for me to decide what I should be in that respect.

Absolutely. But the term for what you're describing is something like "Solipsism."

Well I am a bit of a loner, to be honest.

I've noticed that, despite my best efforts, you won't be drawn into defending or justifying your claims about objective moral truth. I don't blame you.

[CIN]

I think it's for me to decide what I should be in that respect.

Absolutely. But the term for what you're describing is something like "Solipsism."

Well I am a bit of a loner, to be honest.

I've noticed that, despite my best efforts, you won't be drawn into defending or justifying your claims about objective moral truth. I don't blame you.

Since each of you has successfully refuted the other's position (though evidently neither of you has yet grasped this), wouldn't the sensible thing be to stop discussing this topic and go and do something more useful?

[Immanuel Can]

I've noticed that, despite my best efforts, you won't be drawn into defending or justifying your claims about objective moral truth.

What you've noticed is that I didn't bother with the "red herrings."

The subject was your own morality and Subjectivism. What you were attempting was a strategy called the "et tu quoque" fallacy...and I just saw it coming, and of course did not allow our line of inquiry to be deflected from the point.

And you can see that's true. For if I were to grant to you entirely (which I don't, of course) that moral objectivism were impossible, then it would not mean that moral subjectivism was rational. Moral Subjectivism, like Solipsism, is really merely a weigh-station on the way to moral nihilism...the only question between those three positions being wether or not the subjectivist actually takes his own views seriously. If he does, then he's going to end up being "beyond good and evil" entirely, along with Nietzsche. Whether he's objectively right or wise to be there...well, that's a different question. But rationally, that's where he's bound to end up.

So I just showed you the future of your view. That is, assuming you stay committed to rationality. Many see the end coming, and "taxicab" their beliefs to avoid the unpleasant conclusion. They want to pretend to be "good people" themselves, even while denying that "good" has any meaning, or that any "people" are obligated to be it. And they rightly fear where that road ends up, and won't go there, even at the cost of believing irrational and contradictory things like that.

So if you want to say there's no such thing as morality...then at least you're rationally consistent with what you believe about how the universe came to be what it is. But if you want to say that morality is subjective, or that Solipsism is how things are, then I can't give you the credit for even being rationally-consistent with your own wrong view.

That's how it really is. Objectively, I mean.

[Harbal]

I've noticed that, despite my best efforts, you won't be drawn into defending or justifying your claims about objective moral truth.

What you've noticed is that I didn't bother with the "red herrings."

That's still rather unfair of you, as I have been dealing with all your red herrings. But I throw down the challenge: I do not think you can present a convincing argument for the existence of objective moral truth. Regardless of what you have said about my views, I had the courage and confidence to try to explain and justify them. I predict a lame excuse from you, or just silence.

[Harbal]

Absolutely. But the term for what you're describing is something like "Solipsism."

Well I am a bit of a loner, to be honest.

I've noticed that, despite my best efforts, you won't be drawn into defending or justifying your claims about objective moral truth. I don't blame you.

Since each of you has successfully refuted the other's position (though evidently neither of you has yet grasped this), wouldn't the sensible thing be to stop discussing this topic and go and do something more useful?

No, I don't do anything useful any more.

[Immanuel Can]

I've noticed that, despite my best efforts, you won't be drawn into defending or justifying your claims about objective moral truth.

What you've noticed is that I didn't bother with the "red herrings."

That's still rather unfair of you, as I have been dealing with all your red herrings.

I haven't given you any. I've stayed on topic.

But I throw down the challenge: I do not think you can present a convincing argument for the existence of objective moral truth.

Well, let's do it. But let me ask you this, so I know what my task is. What do you regard as the necessary criteria for proving that something is genuinely "moral"?

I have to ask, because it seems obvious to me that Subjectivism has no such criteria. It accepts everything -- and hence, distinguishes nothing-- as "moral." Anything a person can desire or do is equally "moral" to everything else, under Subjectivism, which is the same as to say that the word "moral" itself fails to pick out anything in particular. It voids the word itself of any particular referents, and makes it refer to nothing.

But an Objectivist would say, and I would say, that for an axiom to be genuinely "moral," it would have to have a certain set of features. Among these are that it would have to be conformable to the objective truth (obviously). Secondly, it would have to be logical in view of, and rationalize with, the Moral Objectivist's fundamental assumptions about the universe. Thirdly, it would be obligatory for all persons who are in the relevantly similar situations, so universal, and capable of informing others. Fourthly, it would have to be authoritative...and I could go on.

None of that will the Subjectivist accept, of course.

So what are the criteria for "morality" that you will accept, so I can see if we can meet them? What would show a particular axiom to be "moral" (as opposed, say, to merely pragmatic, or merely functional, or merely desired, or merely cultural, or useful for some purpose that may or may not be a moral purpose, or something else like that)?

[Harbal]

But I throw down the challenge: I do not think you can present a convincing argument for the existence of objective moral truth.

Well, let's do it. But let me ask you this, so I know what my task is. What do you regard as the necessary criteria for proving that something is genuinely "moral"?

What do you mean by "genuinely moral"? Do you mean genuinely morally good? I'll assume that is what you mean, unless you say otherwise. Well, to my mind, it is not possible to prove something morally good; it would be like trying to prove that blue is a nice colour. It seems to me that your understanding of what the word, "morality", means, and my understanding of what it means, are completely different.

This is a concise definition of morality that I got from an online dictionary. I think there is much more to morality than can be gleaned from this short sentence, but it does convey the gist of what I understand "morality" to mean:

"A set of personal or social standards for good or bad behaviour and character"

If you do not agree with this definition, then I respectfully ask you not to criticise it, but rather, just provide an acceptable definition of your own.

I don't think there is much to be achieved by continuing until this little matter has been cleared up.

I have to ask, because it seems obvious to me that Subjectivism has no such criteria. It accepts everything -- and hence, distinguishes nothing-- as "moral." Anything a person can desire or do is equally "moral" to everything else, under Subjectivism, which is the same as to say that the word "moral" itself fails to pick out anything in particular. It voids the word itself of any particular referents, and makes it refer to nothing.

But an Objectivist would say, and I would say, that for an axiom to be genuinely "moral," it would have to have a certain set of features. Among these are that it would have to be conformable to the objective truth (obviously). Secondly, it would have to be logical in view of, and rationalize with, the Moral Objectivist's fundamental assumptions about the universe. Thirdly, it would be obligatory for all persons who are in the relevantly similar situations, so universal, and capable of informing others. Fourthly, it would have to be authoritative...and I could go on.

None of that will the Subjectivist accept, of course.

So what are the criteria for "morality" that you will accept, so I can see if we can meet them? What would show a particular axiom to be "moral" (as opposed, say, to merely pragmatic, or merely functional, or merely desired, or merely cultural, or useful for some purpose that may or may not be a moral purpose, or something else like that)?

I think all that will have to go on hold until the other issue has been resolved.

[Immanuel Can]

But I throw down the challenge: I do not think you can present a convincing argument for the existence of objective moral truth.

Well, let's do it. But let me ask you this, so I know what my task is. What do you regard as the necessary criteria for proving that something is genuinely "moral"?

What do you mean by "genuinely moral"?

Well, when we ask somebody if what they want to do is "moral," we don't mean "practical," or "popular," or "convenient," or "desirable," or "lucrative," or whatever. We mean something quite different, the kind of quality that makes an action or person, in some sense, "good," or "principled," or "noble."

All I'm asking is what this special quality associated with the word "moral" ought to be, in your view.

And to help, I gave you examples of how an Objectivist would go about responding to that question -- because they have means to respond -- but I can't see that Subjectivist or Solipsists have the same sorts of things in view when they say "moral." And I can't put words in your mouth. So I want to know what you DO think being "moral" entails.

This is a concise definition of morality that I got from an online dictionary. I think there is much more to morality than can be gleaned from this short sentence, but it does convey the gist of what I understand "morality" to mean:

"A set of personal or social standards for good or bad behaviour and character"

If you do not agree with this definition, then I respectfully ask you not to criticise it, but rather, just provide an acceptable definition of your own.

I did do that, in my previous message. I listed four things that Objectivists can say are qualities of things that are "moral." I'll repeat:

But an Objectivist would say, and I would say, that for an axiom to be genuinely "moral," it would have to have a certain set of features. Among these are that it would have to be conformable to the objective truth (obviously). Secondly, it would have to be logical in view of, and rationalize with, the Moral Objectivist's fundamental assumptions about the universe. Thirdly, it would be obligatory for all persons who are in the relevantly similar situations, so universal, and capable of informing others. Fourthly, it would have to be authoritative...and I could go on.

The definition you gave from the dictionary above has none of them, because it fudges the question. It says, for example, that morality involves "standards" (which would seem to imply they hold for more than one person, or at least hold regardless of one's personal disposition, but that's not definite) and then they say these "standards" can be "social," which makes some sense, but then "personal" could get us back to mere Solipsism again. Whatever else one can say about that definition, therefore, it's too equivocal to tell anybody much. It works only as long as one doesn't think about it very hard.

Then I added the problem I think you're going to face in honouring that request:

I have to ask, because it seems obvious to me that Subjectivism has no such criteria. It accepts everything -- and hence, distinguishes nothing-- as "moral." Anything a person can desire or do is equally "moral" to everything else, under Subjectivism, which is the same as to say that the word "moral" itself fails to pick out anything in particular. It voids the word itself of any particular referents, and makes it refer to nothing.

[Gary Childress]

can morality be objective if there is no god?

ChatGPT
Yes, morality can be considered objective even in the absence of a belief in God. Many philosophical frameworks propose objective morality without relying on divine authority. Here are some ways in which morality can be considered objective without reference to a deity:

Ethical Naturalism: Ethical naturalism asserts that moral truths can be derived from natural facts about the world. This perspective suggests that moral principles are grounded in observable aspects of reality, such as human well-being, social cooperation, or the consequences of actions. For example, the ethical theory of utilitarianism holds that actions are morally right if they lead to the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people, without invoking supernatural entities.

Moral Realism: Moral realism posits that moral facts exist independently of human beliefs and cultural norms. Proponents of moral realism argue that moral principles are objective features of the world, akin to facts about the natural sciences. While moral realism doesn't inherently rely on the existence of God, it often proposes that moral truths are grounded in some non-divine aspect of reality, such as human nature or universal principles.

Social Contract Theory: Social contract theories suggest that moral principles are derived from agreements or contracts made among rational individuals in a hypothetical state of nature. These agreements are based on mutual self-interest and the need for social cooperation. While social contract theories may vary in their specifics, they often propose objective moral principles that arise from rational deliberation and consensus among individuals, without necessitating belief in a deity.

Kantian Deontology: Immanuel Kant's deontological ethics proposes that moral principles are derived from reason and the concept of duty. According to Kant, certain actions are inherently right or wrong based on universal moral laws, such as the categorical imperative. Kantian ethics doesn't depend on the existence of God but rather on the rational autonomy of moral agents and the intrinsic value of human dignity.

These are just a few examples of how morality can be conceived as objective without reference to a divine source. Different philosophical perspectives offer various ways to ground objective morality in natural, rational, or social aspects of reality.

Question, IC: Is the above answer from ChatGPT incorrect?

[Gary Childress]

Is morality objective or subjective

ChatGPT
The question of whether morality is objective or subjective is a longstanding philosophical debate with various perspectives. Here's a brief overview:

Objective Morality: This perspective holds that moral principles exist independently of human beliefs, feelings, or cultural norms. In other words, certain actions are inherently right or wrong, regardless of individual or societal opinions. Proponents of objective morality often argue that moral truths can be discovered through reason or by appealing to a higher authority, such as a divine being or natural law.

Subjective Morality: This viewpoint posits that morality is dependent on individual or societal preferences, beliefs, and values. According to subjective morality, what is considered right or wrong varies from person to person or culture to culture. Moral judgments are seen as relative and not grounded in any objective reality beyond human experience.

Relativism: Relativism is a position within subjective morality that asserts that moral truths are relative to the context, culture, or individual perspectives. Cultural relativism, for example, suggests that moral standards are determined by the cultural context in which they arise, and there are no universal moral principles.

Moral Realism: Moral realism combines aspects of both perspectives. It holds that moral facts exist independently of human beliefs but may not necessarily be accessible through empirical observation. Moral realism allows for the possibility of objective moral truths while recognizing the role of subjective experiences and cultural influences in shaping moral judgments.

Constructivism: Constructivism suggests that moral truths are constructed by human beings through social interactions and rational deliberation. While moral principles are not seen as objective truths existing independently of human activity, they are not entirely subjective either, as they are grounded in shared human experiences and reasoning.

Ultimately, whether morality is deemed objective or subjective often depends on one's philosophical outlook, cultural background, and personal beliefs. It's a complex and nuanced topic that continues to be explored and debated within philosophy and other disciplines.