Justified true belief: knowledge and the myth of propositions

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Eodnhoj7
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Re: Justified true belief: knowledge and the myth of propositions

Post by Eodnhoj7 »

Peter Holmes wrote: Sun Feb 16, 2020 12:42 pm
Eodnhoj7 wrote: Sat Feb 15, 2020 8:41 pm
Peter Holmes wrote: Sat Feb 15, 2020 11:48 am
Here's a defintion of metaphor: 'an expression, often found in literature, that describes a person or object by referring to something that is considered to have similar characteristics to that person or object: "The mind is an ocean" and "the city is a jungle" are both metaphors.'

Are you saying these metaphors - and the camel/rich man, eye-of-needle/way to salvation metaphors - have truth-value, in that they could be false? Would it be possible to falsify the claim that 'the mind is an ocean'? And you seem to be saying there's no such thing as a false metaphor - which means it's vacuous to say they have truth-value.

When we say 'it's true that the mind is an ocean', we're not saying the claim has factual truth-value, so that it could be false. We're saying we find the comparison poetically suggestive.
Truth value occurs by definition alone, falsifiability does not always necessitate whether truth value exists or not. Metaphors and analogies are definitive by nature thus always have some degree of truth.
I agree that a factual assertion can be true only given the way we use the signs involved - the way we define those signs. But only factual assertions have truth-value - can be true or false - because only they assert a feature of reaity that may or may not be the case. And 'the mind is an ocean' doesn't do that, so it doesn't have the truth-value of a factual assertion. Metaphorical assertions are not factual - it's their function not to be.
Metaphors are definitive through the comparison and connection of qualities. Fact are the relation of qualities. Both metaphors and facts define phenomenon.

Truth value is descriptive, no more and no less.



As to the rest:


The mind is an ocean as it is a field of phenomenon connecting and separating in strings much like waves.
Peter Holmes
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Re: Justified true belief: knowledge and the myth of propositions

Post by Peter Holmes »

Eodnhoj7 wrote: Sun Feb 16, 2020 5:35 pm
Peter Holmes wrote: Sun Feb 16, 2020 12:42 pm
Eodnhoj7 wrote: Sat Feb 15, 2020 8:41 pm
Truth value occurs by definition alone, falsifiability does not always necessitate whether truth value exists or not. Metaphors and analogies are definitive by nature thus always have some degree of truth.
I agree that a factual assertion can be true only given the way we use the signs involved - the way we define those signs. But only factual assertions have truth-value - can be true or false - because only they assert a feature of reaity that may or may not be the case. And 'the mind is an ocean' doesn't do that, so it doesn't have the truth-value of a factual assertion. Metaphorical assertions are not factual - it's their function not to be.
Metaphors are definitive through the comparison and connection of qualities. Fact are the relation of qualities. Both metaphors and facts define phenomenon.

Truth value is descriptive, no more and no less.

As to the rest:

The mind is an ocean as it is a field of phenomenon connecting and separating in strings much like waves.
This is woo - pseudo-profound, mystical nonsense. Not my cup of tea. But thanks.
Eodnhoj7
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Re: Justified true belief: knowledge and the myth of propositions

Post by Eodnhoj7 »

Peter Holmes wrote: Mon Feb 17, 2020 12:31 pm
Eodnhoj7 wrote: Sun Feb 16, 2020 5:35 pm
Peter Holmes wrote: Sun Feb 16, 2020 12:42 pm
I agree that a factual assertion can be true only given the way we use the signs involved - the way we define those signs. But only factual assertions have truth-value - can be true or false - because only they assert a feature of reaity that may or may not be the case. And 'the mind is an ocean' doesn't do that, so it doesn't have the truth-value of a factual assertion. Metaphorical assertions are not factual - it's their function not to be.
Metaphors are definitive through the comparison and connection of qualities. Fact are the relation of qualities. Both metaphors and facts define phenomenon.

Truth value is descriptive, no more and no less.

As to the rest:

The mind is an ocean as it is a field of phenomenon connecting and separating in strings much like waves.
This is woo - pseudo-profound, mystical nonsense. Not my cup of tea. But thanks.
Actually is isn't mystical. All metaphors are the connection and seperation of qualities to form a new quality. One quality points to another thus forming a new one. Each set of qualtities is descriptive by nature, thus to use a metaphor is to use a set of phenomenon to describe another set of phenomenon.

The mind can be compared to an ocean as both have qualities of "spaciousness", "depth", "waves"(rhythm), etc.
Peter Holmes
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Re: Justified true belief: knowledge and the myth of propositions

Post by Peter Holmes »

In what way does a metaphor such as 'the mind is an ocean' have a truth-value similar to the factual assertion 'the earth is an oblate spheroid'?
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Re: Justified true belief: knowledge and the myth of propositions

Post by Peter Holmes »

For anyone interested, here's a link to my paper, DFPKT, which is an attempt to summarise and synthesise ideas from my previous papers. and from contributions to this and other discussion groups. The long title is Definition, facts, propositions, knowledge and truth.

http://www.peasum.co.uk/447931834
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Re: Justified true belief: knowledge and the myth of propositions

Post by Peter Holmes »

Signs such as words – words such as knowledge and truth – can mean only what we use them to mean. And that is why correspondence, truth-maker/bearer, nomenclaturist and representationalist theories are misleading. The relationship can only be one-way. And this has a bearing on what we say about knowledge, as follows.

I assume there are three separate and different things: features of reality that are or were the case; what we believe and know about them; and what we say about them, which, in classical logic, may be true or false. And to muddle these things up is a mistake.

My standing question is this: what and where are so-called abstract things, and in what way do they exist? (Objects and entities are more up-market than things. But then – what and where are abstract objects? In what way do abstract entities exist?)

Pending an answer that avoids equivocation or question-begging, here are some thoughts.

1 To define a thing is to describe it, which we may do in different ways. So, if there are abstract things, to define them is to describe them.

2 We cannot name or describe a thing into or out of existence. Outside language, the existence and nature of things have nothing to do with language.

3 Pending evidence for the existence of abstract things, belief that they exist is irrational. (Abstract things are remarkably like supernatural things.)

4 Belief that abstract things exist may come from the ancient and pervasive delusion that what we call abstract nouns are names of things which, therefore, do or may exist.

5 The claim that abstract things are concepts in minds explains nothing. Concepts and minds are just more abstract things. A dog chasing its tail needs to re-think the premise.

6 Descriptions of abstract things – such as being, truth, knowledge, justice, beauty and identity – in short, the stuff of philosophy – are fictions about fictions.

7 Like metaphors, fictions can both have their uses and lead us astray. Talk about minds, and mental things and events, is an example.

8 Philosophy is talk about abstract things. But all we can do is explain the ways we do or could use signs in general, and certain abstract nouns and their cognates in particular.
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Re: Justified true belief: knowledge and the myth of propositions

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Peter Holmes wrote: Fri Jun 11, 2021 2:23 pm Signs such as words – words such as knowledge and truth – can mean only what we use them to mean. And that is why correspondence, truth-maker/bearer, nomenclaturist and representationalist theories are misleading. The relationship can only be one-way. And this has a bearing on what we say about knowledge, as follows.

I assume there are three separate and different things: features of reality that are or were the case; what we believe and know about them; and what we say about them, which, in classical logic, may be true or false. And to muddle these things up is a mistake.

My standing question is this: what and where are so-called abstract things, and in what way do they exist? (Objects and entities are more up-market than things. But then – what and where are abstract objects? In what way do abstract entities exist?)

Pending an answer that avoids equivocation or question-begging, here are some thoughts.

1 To define a thing is to describe it, which we may do in different ways. So, if there are abstract things, to define them is to describe them.

2 We cannot name or describe a thing into or out of existence. Outside language, the existence and nature of things have nothing to do with language.

3 Pending evidence for the existence of abstract things, belief that they exist is irrational. (Abstract things are remarkably like supernatural things.)

4 Belief that abstract things exist may come from the ancient and pervasive delusion that what we call abstract nouns are names of things which, therefore, do or may exist.

5 The claim that abstract things are concepts in minds explains nothing. Concepts and minds are just more abstract things. A dog chasing its tail needs to re-think the premise.

6 Descriptions of abstract things – such as being, truth, knowledge, justice, beauty and identity – in short, the stuff of philosophy – are fictions about fictions.

7 Like metaphors, fictions can both have their uses and lead us astray. Talk about minds, and mental things and events, is an example.

8 Philosophy is talk about abstract things. But all we can do is explain the ways we do or could use signs in general, and certain abstract nouns and their cognates in particular.
What, exactly, are you referring to as, "abstract things?" I know you provide some examples: being, truth, knowledge, justice, beauty, identity, but that's kind of a mixed bag. It sounds like you are referring to concepts which identify things other than physical entities. Is that what you mean? If that's the case, every concept that does not identify a specific entity or class of entities (universals) would be an abstract, all attributes and qualities, all relationships, and all actions, wouldn't it?
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Re: Justified true belief: knowledge and the myth of propositions

Post by Peter Holmes »

RCSaunders wrote: Fri Jun 11, 2021 9:47 pm
Peter Holmes wrote: Fri Jun 11, 2021 2:23 pm Signs such as words – words such as knowledge and truth – can mean only what we use them to mean. And that is why correspondence, truth-maker/bearer, nomenclaturist and representationalist theories are misleading. The relationship can only be one-way. And this has a bearing on what we say about knowledge, as follows.

I assume there are three separate and different things: features of reality that are or were the case; what we believe and know about them; and what we say about them, which, in classical logic, may be true or false. And to muddle these things up is a mistake.

My standing question is this: what and where are so-called abstract things, and in what way do they exist? (Objects and entities are more up-market than things. But then – what and where are abstract objects? In what way do abstract entities exist?)

Pending an answer that avoids equivocation or question-begging, here are some thoughts.

1 To define a thing is to describe it, which we may do in different ways. So, if there are abstract things, to define them is to describe them.

2 We cannot name or describe a thing into or out of existence. Outside language, the existence and nature of things have nothing to do with language.

3 Pending evidence for the existence of abstract things, belief that they exist is irrational. (Abstract things are remarkably like supernatural things.)

4 Belief that abstract things exist may come from the ancient and pervasive delusion that what we call abstract nouns are names of things which, therefore, do or may exist.

5 The claim that abstract things are concepts in minds explains nothing. Concepts and minds are just more abstract things. A dog chasing its tail needs to re-think the premise.

6 Descriptions of abstract things – such as being, truth, knowledge, justice, beauty and identity – in short, the stuff of philosophy – are fictions about fictions.

7 Like metaphors, fictions can both have their uses and lead us astray. Talk about minds, and mental things and events, is an example.

8 Philosophy is talk about abstract things. But all we can do is explain the ways we do or could use signs in general, and certain abstract nouns and their cognates in particular.
What, exactly, are you referring to as, "abstract things?" I know you provide some examples: being, truth, knowledge, justice, beauty, identity, but that's kind of a mixed bag. It sounds like you are referring to concepts which identify things other than physical entities. Is that what you mean? If that's the case, every concept that does not identify a specific entity or class of entities (universals) would be an abstract, all attributes and qualities, all relationships, and all actions, wouldn't it?
Thanks. You refer to 'concepts which identify things other than physical entities'. But what and where is a concept? And in what way does a concept 'identify' a thing - by naming it? And what are supposed 'things other than physical entities'? In what way do such things exist?

We use signs such as words to describe what we call properties or attributes, qualities, relationships and actions. But the very 'universal/particular' distinction you allude to - at the heart of the debate between Platonists and nominalists - assumes there are such things as universals which, therefore do or may exist. And that's the nomenclaturist delusion I'm talking about. What exactly are nominalists denying?

I'm fully aware of how uncomfortable my standing question really is. But I think we've been fooling ourselves for at least two and a half millennia - and probably a great deal longer than that. Or, at least, (most) philosphers have. Regular people don't care.
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Re: Justified true belief: knowledge and the myth of propositions

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Peter Holmes wrote: Sat Jun 12, 2021 5:10 am
RCSaunders wrote: Fri Jun 11, 2021 9:47 pm
Peter Holmes wrote: Fri Jun 11, 2021 2:23 pm Signs such as words – words such as knowledge and truth – can mean only what we use them to mean. And that is why correspondence, truth-maker/bearer, nomenclaturist and representationalist theories are misleading. The relationship can only be one-way. And this has a bearing on what we say about knowledge, as follows.

I assume there are three separate and different things: features of reality that are or were the case; what we believe and know about them; and what we say about them, which, in classical logic, may be true or false. And to muddle these things up is a mistake.

My standing question is this: what and where are so-called abstract things, and in what way do they exist? (Objects and entities are more up-market than things. But then – what and where are abstract objects? In what way do abstract entities exist?)

Pending an answer that avoids equivocation or question-begging, here are some thoughts.

1 To define a thing is to describe it, which we may do in different ways. So, if there are abstract things, to define them is to describe them.

2 We cannot name or describe a thing into or out of existence. Outside language, the existence and nature of things have nothing to do with language.

3 Pending evidence for the existence of abstract things, belief that they exist is irrational. (Abstract things are remarkably like supernatural things.)

4 Belief that abstract things exist may come from the ancient and pervasive delusion that what we call abstract nouns are names of things which, therefore, do or may exist.

5 The claim that abstract things are concepts in minds explains nothing. Concepts and minds are just more abstract things. A dog chasing its tail needs to re-think the premise.

6 Descriptions of abstract things – such as being, truth, knowledge, justice, beauty and identity – in short, the stuff of philosophy – are fictions about fictions.

7 Like metaphors, fictions can both have their uses and lead us astray. Talk about minds, and mental things and events, is an example.

8 Philosophy is talk about abstract things. But all we can do is explain the ways we do or could use signs in general, and certain abstract nouns and their cognates in particular.
What, exactly, are you referring to as, "abstract things?" I know you provide some examples: being, truth, knowledge, justice, beauty, identity, but that's kind of a mixed bag. It sounds like you are referring to concepts which identify things other than physical entities. Is that what you mean? If that's the case, every concept that does not identify a specific entity or class of entities (universals) would be an abstract, all attributes and qualities, all relationships, and all actions, wouldn't it?
Thanks. You refer to 'concepts which identify things other than physical entities'. But what and where is a concept?
What a concept is would require a little more than a, "twenty words or less," explanation, since they are the foundation of all epistemology. Concepts are not, "things," not, "entities with a location." A concept is simply the identification of an existent. Anything's identity is whatever its attributes (qualities, characteristics, and properties are). A concept is the means of holding in consciousness the awareness of a thing by means of its stored identity in memory when that thing cannot be directly perceived. It's by means of concepts one can think about apples seen yesterday and apple pie tomorrow.
Peter Holmes wrote: Sat Jun 12, 2021 5:10 am And in what way does a concept 'identify' a thing - by naming it?
Certainly not. A thing is whatever it's qualities are, a concept is the identity of a thing by means of those qualities which are the thing. A, "name," (or word) is not a concept, it is symbol which stands for or represents the concept, which is the actual identification of the existent.
Peter Holmes wrote: Sat Jun 12, 2021 5:10 am And what are supposed 'things other than physical entities'? In what way do such things exist?
They aren't, "things." They exist in the same way your aches and pains exist, as conscious experiences.
Peter Holmes wrote: Sat Jun 12, 2021 5:10 am ... at the heart of the debate between Platonists and nominalists - assumes there are such things as universals which, therefore do or may exist. And that's the nomenclaturist delusion I'm talking about. What exactly are nominalists denying?
Who cares. There certainly are concepts for all those things that have the same attributes, which can be considered classes or categories of existents (universals), but there is nothing ontological about that. It's simply an epistemological method. One may correctly describe two different categories of birds (white swans and black swans) as two different concepts or one category of swans (both black and white, with the different colors as sub-catgories) but it is entirely arbitrary. There are no universals in either the platonic realist or nominalist senses.

If I write down a comprehensive description of an apple, that description is a concept--not the writing but what you understand when you read it. There is no meaning in the writing. The meaning only existed in my consciousness when I wrote and only exists in your consciousness when you read and understood it. The understanding of that description is the concept.

That description, however, is not what the concept means. What the concept means is the actual entity or entities the description describes as those described entities actually exist.
Peter Holmes wrote: Sat Jun 12, 2021 5:10 am I'm fully aware of how uncomfortable my standing question really is. But I think we've been fooling ourselves for at least two and a half millennia - and probably a great deal longer than that. Or, at least, (most) philosphers have. Regular people don't care.
What discomfort? I agree that almost everything philosophers have said about epistemology, with the exception of Abelard who has wrongly been classified a nominalist (he definitely wasn't) is mostly superstitious nonsense, and since Hume has become hopeless.
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Re: Justified true belief: knowledge and the myth of propositions

Post by Peter Holmes »

RCSaunders wrote: Sat Jun 12, 2021 6:34 pm
Peter Holmes wrote: Sat Jun 12, 2021 5:10 am
RCSaunders wrote: Fri Jun 11, 2021 9:47 pm
What, exactly, are you referring to as, "abstract things?" I know you provide some examples: being, truth, knowledge, justice, beauty, identity, but that's kind of a mixed bag. It sounds like you are referring to concepts which identify things other than physical entities. Is that what you mean? If that's the case, every concept that does not identify a specific entity or class of entities (universals) would be an abstract, all attributes and qualities, all relationships, and all actions, wouldn't it?
Thanks. You refer to 'concepts which identify things other than physical entities'. But what and where is a concept?
What a concept is would require a little more than a, "twenty words or less," explanation, since they are the foundation of all epistemology. Concepts are not, "things," not, "entities with a location." A concept is simply the identification of an existent. Anything's identity is whatever its attributes (qualities, characteristics, and properties are). A concept is the means of holding in consciousness the awareness of a thing by means of its stored identity in memory when that thing cannot be directly perceived. It's by means of concepts one can think about apples seen yesterday and apple pie tomorrow.
Peter Holmes wrote: Sat Jun 12, 2021 5:10 am And in what way does a concept 'identify' a thing - by naming it?
Certainly not. A thing is whatever it's qualities are, a concept is the identity of a thing by means of those qualities which are the thing. A, "name," (or word) is not a concept, it is symbol which stands for or represents the concept, which is the actual identification of the existent.
Peter Holmes wrote: Sat Jun 12, 2021 5:10 am And what are supposed 'things other than physical entities'? In what way do such things exist?
They aren't, "things." They exist in the same way your aches and pains exist, as conscious experiences.
Peter Holmes wrote: Sat Jun 12, 2021 5:10 am ... at the heart of the debate between Platonists and nominalists - assumes there are such things as universals which, therefore do or may exist. And that's the nomenclaturist delusion I'm talking about. What exactly are nominalists denying?
Who cares. There certainly are concepts for all those things that have the same attributes, which can be considered classes or categories of existents (universals), but there is nothing ontological about that. It's simply an epistemological method. One may correctly describe two different categories of birds (white swans and black swans) as two different concepts or one category of swans (both black and white, with the different colors as sub-catgories) but it is entirely arbitrary. There are no universals in either the platonic realist or nominalist senses.

If I write down a comprehensive description of an apple, that description is a concept--not the writing but what you understand when you read it. There is no meaning in the writing. The meaning only existed in my consciousness when I wrote and only exists in your consciousness when you read and understood it. The understanding of that description is the concept.

That description, however, is not what the concept means. What the concept means is the actual entity or entities the description describes as those described entities actually exist.
Peter Holmes wrote: Sat Jun 12, 2021 5:10 am I'm fully aware of how uncomfortable my standing question really is. But I think we've been fooling ourselves for at least two and a half millennia - and probably a great deal longer than that. Or, at least, (most) philosphers have. Regular people don't care.
What discomfort? I agree that almost everything philosophers have said about epistemology, with the exception of Abelard who has wrongly been classified a nominalist (he definitely wasn't) is mostly superstitious nonsense, and since Hume has become hopeless.
Thanks again. So here's a list of your ways of describing a concept, or concepts.

1 Concepts are not, "things," not, "entities with a location."
2 A concept is simply the identification of an existent.
3 A concept is the means of holding in consciousness the awareness of a thing by means of its stored identity in memory when that thing cannot be directly perceived.
4 ...a concept is the identity of a thing by means of those qualities which are the thing
5 ...the concept, which is the actual identification of the existent.
6 If I write down a comprehensive description of an apple, that description is a concept--not the writing but what you understand when you read it.
7 That description, however, is not what the concept means. What the concept means is the actual entity or entities the description describes as those described entities actually exist.
8 ...they are the foundation of all epistemology.

Perhaps you'll agree there's some confusion here. A concept is not a thing with a location, but it's located in 'consciousness'. A concept both is something - the identity and (?) the identification of an existent by means of its properties - and means something - the actual thing described by a description.

And this conceptual mess is normal. We use the word 'concept' in various vague but seemingly technical ways. But anyway, you seem to agree with me that 'the identification of an existent' is an entirely physical process in a brain. I get no sense of lingering substance-dualism in anything you say. What we call a concept is, at least, not an abstract thing.

So my question about things such as knowledge and truth remains. Are they 'existents' with properties?
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Re: Justified true belief: knowledge and the myth of propositions

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Puff the magic dragon agrees

-Imp
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Re: Justified true belief: knowledge and the myth of propositions

Post by RCSaunders »

Peter Holmes wrote: Sun Jun 13, 2021 7:02 pm
RCSaunders wrote: Sat Jun 12, 2021 6:34 pm
Peter Holmes wrote: Sat Jun 12, 2021 5:10 am
Thanks. You refer to 'concepts which identify things other than physical entities'. But what and where is a concept?
What a concept is would require a little more than a, "twenty words or less," explanation, since they are the foundation of all epistemology. Concepts are not, "things," not, "entities with a location." A concept is simply the identification of an existent. Anything's identity is whatever its attributes (qualities, characteristics, and properties are). A concept is the means of holding in consciousness the awareness of a thing by means of its stored identity in memory when that thing cannot be directly perceived. It's by means of concepts one can think about apples seen yesterday and apple pie tomorrow.
Peter Holmes wrote: Sat Jun 12, 2021 5:10 am And in what way does a concept 'identify' a thing - by naming it?
Certainly not. A thing is whatever it's qualities are, a concept is the identity of a thing by means of those qualities which are the thing. A, "name," (or word) is not a concept, it is symbol which stands for or represents the concept, which is the actual identification of the existent.
Peter Holmes wrote: Sat Jun 12, 2021 5:10 am And what are supposed 'things other than physical entities'? In what way do such things exist?
They aren't, "things." They exist in the same way your aches and pains exist, as conscious experiences.
Peter Holmes wrote: Sat Jun 12, 2021 5:10 am ... at the heart of the debate between Platonists and nominalists - assumes there are such things as universals which, therefore do or may exist. And that's the nomenclaturist delusion I'm talking about. What exactly are nominalists denying?
Who cares. There certainly are concepts for all those things that have the same attributes, which can be considered classes or categories of existents (universals), but there is nothing ontological about that. It's simply an epistemological method. One may correctly describe two different categories of birds (white swans and black swans) as two different concepts or one category of swans (both black and white, with the different colors as sub-catgories) but it is entirely arbitrary. There are no universals in either the platonic realist or nominalist senses.

If I write down a comprehensive description of an apple, that description is a concept--not the writing but what you understand when you read it. There is no meaning in the writing. The meaning only existed in my consciousness when I wrote and only exists in your consciousness when you read and understood it. The understanding of that description is the concept.

That description, however, is not what the concept means. What the concept means is the actual entity or entities the description describes as those described entities actually exist.
Peter Holmes wrote: Sat Jun 12, 2021 5:10 am I'm fully aware of how uncomfortable my standing question really is. But I think we've been fooling ourselves for at least two and a half millennia - and probably a great deal longer than that. Or, at least, (most) philosphers have. Regular people don't care.
What discomfort? I agree that almost everything philosophers have said about epistemology, with the exception of Abelard who has wrongly been classified a nominalist (he definitely wasn't) is mostly superstitious nonsense, and since Hume has become hopeless.
Thanks again. So here's a list of your ways of describing a concept, or concepts.

1 Concepts are not, "things," not, "entities with a location."
2 A concept is simply the identification of an existent.
3 A concept is the means of holding in consciousness the awareness of a thing by means of its stored identity in memory when that thing cannot be directly perceived.
4 ...a concept is the identity of a thing by means of those qualities which are the thing
5 ...the concept, which is the actual identification of the existent.
6 If I write down a comprehensive description of an apple, that description is a concept--not the writing but what you understand when you read it.
7 That description, however, is not what the concept means. What the concept means is the actual entity or entities the description describes as those described entities actually exist.
8 ...they are the foundation of all epistemology.

Perhaps you'll agree there's some confusion here. A concept is not a thing with a location, but it's located in 'consciousness'.
The word, "in," obviously, is meant in the same way it is meant in expressions like, "in geometry, a line is ..., " or, "in this case," which do not indicate a physical location, but a prepositional relationship. I never actually used the phrase, "located in consciousness." What I said was, "A concept is the means of holding in consciousness the awareness of a thing ...," which possible ambiguity is cleared up by rephrasing it, "A concept is the means of consciously being aware of a thing ..." which has the exact same intended meaning.
Peter Holmes wrote: Sat Jun 12, 2021 5:10 am A concept both is something - the identity and (?) the identification of an existent by means of its properties - and means something - the actual thing described by a description.
Yes, that's right.

If you were working for me and I asked you to get a pair of shears from the tool box, but you didn't know what shears were, I would described them (their properties) to you. That description would be the shears', "identity," which you would use to, "identify," which tool from the tool box to get. When I told you to get the, "shears," of course, I did not me get the description of the shears (the definition), I meant the actual shears. The word, "shears," I used represented the concept that identified (by means of the description) the actual tool I wanted you to get. Please don't make too much of it. It is very simple.
Peter Holmes wrote: Sat Jun 12, 2021 5:10 am We use the word 'concept' in various vague but seemingly technical ways.
I only ever use the word concept exactly as just described.
Peter Holmes wrote: Sat Jun 12, 2021 5:10 am But anyway, you seem to agree with me that 'the identification of an existent' is an entirely physical process in a brain. I get no sense of lingering substance-dualism in anything you say. What we call a concept is, at least, not an abstract thing.
Well I'm sorry to disappoint you. A concept is not an, "abstraction," but it certainly isn't physical. It is not a physical entity, substance, attribute, or event. The word that represents a concept can exist physically (as a written, spoken or signed symbol), and whatever aspect of a concept that requires memory requires the physical aspects of the brain, and when the concept is of a physical entity the meaning of the concept is a physical entity, but the concept itself, as the identification of an existent, is a non-physical conscious phenomenon, which is why, no concept or knowledge exists independently of human consciousness.
Peter Holmes wrote: Sat Jun 12, 2021 5:10 am So my question about things such as knowledge and truth remains. Are they 'existents' with properties?
Well of course they exist and have properties, because every existent, both physical, and epistemological has properties, because everything that exists is whatever its properties (qualities, attributes, and characteristics) are.

If you mean by, "properties," only physical properties, of course knowledge would not exist, and either would the quality, "truth," which only pertains to propositions. So you would either have to say, they do not exist (which is absurd), or understand that everything that depends for its existence on the human conscious mind does not have physical existence, which I suspect you would not like to do. That's OK, but I think it leaves you with an irresolvable dilemma.

I suspect that you might think regarding consciousness as not physical introduces some kind of, "dualism," or, "supernaturalism." But that worry is based on the superstitious notion that some God or something dictated that natural existence can only have physical properties, when it is quite obvious to anyone that there are organism with attributes that are not physical, like life, consciousness, and the human volitional, rational, intellectual mind. I reject anything that cannot be known from evidence anyone can be directly be conscious of or be discovered by reasoning from such evidence but equally reject the evasion of evidence that is available to anyone, especially their own life, consciousness, and mind.

I'm not trying to convince you or change your mind, Peter, only explaining that there is a perfectly rational valid way of understanding reality that does not result in endless mysteries and complication.
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Re: Justified true belief: knowledge and the myth of propositions

Post by mickthinks »

Impenitent wrote: Sun Jun 13, 2021 8:00 pm Puff the magic dragon agrees
It's like you can't cope with philosophical discussion, imp. What is it about the activity of philosophy that frightens you?
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Terrapin Station
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Re: Justified true belief: knowledge and the myth of propositions

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Peter Holmes wrote: Wed Jul 26, 2017 2:13 pm The point is, what happens in the story has nothing to do with propositions. The woman’s mistake does not come from a false premise. She just believes the stranger is her friend, which is not the case. And her belief that her friend is there is not propositional.
This is an old post, so who knows if you even have the same view still, but I don't really understand your comment here.

I'm wondering if you weren't thinking of propositions as being the same thing as particular expressions (of propositions). Propositions are rather the meanings that occur "behind" (and previous to) the expressions. That's why "Snow is white" and "Schnee ist weiss" can be the same proposition, but they're not the same sentence, the same expression, the same utterance.
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Re: Justified true belief: knowledge and the myth of propositions

Post by Peter Holmes »

Terrapin Station wrote: Mon Jun 14, 2021 12:31 pm
Peter Holmes wrote: Wed Jul 26, 2017 2:13 pm The point is, what happens in the story has nothing to do with propositions. The woman’s mistake does not come from a false premise. She just believes the stranger is her friend, which is not the case. And her belief that her friend is there is not propositional.
This is an old post, so who knows if you even have the same view still, but I don't really understand your comment here.

I'm wondering if you weren't thinking of propositions as being the same thing as particular expressions (of propositions). Propositions are rather the meanings that occur "behind" (and previous to) the expressions. That's why "Snow is white" and "Schnee ist weiss" can be the same proposition, but they're not the same sentence, the same expression, the same utterance.
I'm denying the truth condition of the JTB definition of knowledge: S knows that p iff p is true. Just as, outside language, a feature of reality has nothing to do with language (and therefore truth or falsehood), neither does knowing that a feature of reality is or was the case. (Russell's point about knowledge by description is trivial, because knowledge by description is knowledge by acquaintance with a description.)

So propositions don't come into Gettier cases. The JTB truth condition gets the situation exactly back-to-front: we can know a proposition is true only if it correctly describes a feature of reality, which therefore we must know first. And that has nothing to do with language.

The separate point about propositions is that they're misleading fictions. There's no third, abstract thing expressed by your two examples. It's simply that the two assertions have the same function in the two languages. And a logical expression of a proposition is just another linguistic assertion with a subject and predicate. The myth of propositions has haunted philosophy for far too long.
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