Definition of quality

[James Markham]

It seems to me that quality can be quite an ambiguous term, we use this noun in philosophy to denote an attribute which a thing possess, so for instance we say a brick is a hard, red, brittle, cuboid object. But are these qualities inherent in the brick, or simply imposed on it by our conscious evaluation? We have animals that don't see colour, so to them the brick isn't red, its hardness and brittleness are relative, and it's shape is only a subject of magnification, at reduced magnification it could appear as a dot, and an increase in magnification would show it to be irregular. So this post is concerned with whether an objects qualities are all mental impositions or projections, and if so, does the word quality better describe the classes of information that a particular form of mental activity is able to evaluate.


So here's my attempt at an ordered argument, I'll leave it to you to decide if it's in anyway logical.



The word quality is commonly used to denote attributes that are inherent.

An objects attributes are relative to, and dependent on a method of perception, and are therefore only an illustration of an interpretation.

If an objects qualities are subject to interpretation, then quality refers to interpreted information, and are of a mental classification.

Therefore a quality is a cognitive distinction not a physical attribute.

[Ginkgo]

It seems to me that quality can be quite an ambiguous term, we use this noun in philosophy to denote an attribute which a thing possess, so for instance we say a brick is a hard, red, brittle, cuboid object. But are these qualities inherent in the brick, or simply imposed on it by our conscious evaluation? We have animals that don't see colour, so to them the brick isn't red, its hardness and brittleness are relative, and it's shape is only a subject of magnification, at reduced magnification it could appear as a dot, and an increase in magnification would show it to be irregular. So this post is concerned with whether an objects qualities are all mental impositions or projections, and if so, does the word quality better describe the classes of information that a particular form of mental activity is able to evaluate.


So here's my attempt at an ordered argument, I'll leave it to you to decide if it's in anyway logical.



The word quality is commonly used to denote attributes that are inherent.

An objects attributes are relative to, and dependent on a method of perception, and are therefore only an illustration of an interpretation.

If an objects qualities are subject to interpretation, then quality refers to interpreted information, and are of a mental classification.

Therefore a quality is a cognitive distinction not a physical attribute.

Locke addresses this problem, but in a odd sort of way.

Lock divides qualities into primary and secondary. The primary qualities are those things that belong to the object of our experience, while the secondary qualities are not found within the object itself, but have the ability to cause sensations in us. Things like size and shape are primary attributes, while colour would be a secondary quality. In other words, Locke is saying that objects don't actually have a colour in them. The colour exists because the object causes us to see a colour.

[Skip]

All communication, including language, is subjective to some extent: each human language has its roots in a geography and carries a history and therefore imbues its native speakers with a cultural mode of thought. Even within a single nationality, the same language can have many regional, class and occupational dialects, where the same words are used differently. Beyond this, we are each individually taught a slightly modified familial variant of our mother tongue.

The greater the distance between people in generation, location and socio-economic condition, the harder it becomes to understand the meaning of even a single-purpose word (of which there are not many!), never mind esoteric concepts.
And yet we manage to communicate!

Obviously, in order to have been able to invent language at all, humans must have perceived some things in a similar enough way to agree on a word for those things. So, as there were not yet any bricks, stones found in nature must have had some innate qualities that were experienced in the same way by all the people who needed to talk in general about stones. Once it came to the more specialized uses of stones, the relative hardness of granite and flakiness of flint and guagability of sandstone gave rise to more description, more words - but ones that the average basket-weaver didn't need to know.

So, there are two classes of quality: the absolute traits* possessed by all examples of the thing named, which collectively constitute its definition, and the relative qualities perceived by those who need to discuss the thing in a particular context.
There are also two classes of language: the general, conversational, material and practical exchange of information, and the more fastidious use of words in a specialized context.

(*Colour is one such trait that can be subject to slight variation without causing much trouble. It doesn't matter whether the colour is in the object or in the eye of the beholder, or that some other species don't perceive light in the same way we do, since we only need to talk to our own kind about things like whether a plum is ripe or green; whether the child should hand us the orange-handled screwdriver or the blue one.)

[James Markham]

Ginkgo,I can see the merits of distinguishing between projected, and inherent qualities, but I also think it could be argued that all quality, in a philosophical use of the word, are distinctions that only exist by virtue of our mental faculties, and not actually independent characteristics.

The interaction between mind and matter, is responsible for all distinction, if it were not for the mind, and it's evaluation of the universe, then all that can be said to exist is the the potential for an event to occur, that potential may change in the absence of a mind, but the actual configuration of energy is only ever distinguishable by a conscious event.

I'm not sure that the universe is fundamentally a physical thing, the only information I've been able to find describes it as energy, but most descriptions of energy are that it is the potential for an event to occur. What does that even mean? Is it a thing, or the potential for things to exist? But one thing I think is pretty certain is that without the process of evaluation, whatever exists objectively, does so without distinction. Or am I wrong?

[James Markham]

Skip, I totally agree that in general, the everyday usage of the word quality is sufficient and apt to describe events within our lives, what I'm disputing is it's application in philosophical terms. More specifically, what does it mean when used in an ontological statement?

What I'm disputing, is that in certain contexts the word is better used to describe an aspect of mental activity. So instead of saying the objective universe possess qualities, I think it may be better to say the objective universe produces quality, only when under observation. This would distinguish between something that has an independent existence, and something that is reliant on the process of a particular type of event, called evaluation. So in the absence of evaluation, there would be no quality, and it's only by the interaction between mind and matter that qualities are produced.

As a little mental exercise, try and think about the objective universe when it isn't being evaluated by the senses. How do you think we could describe it in the absence of terms such as size and colour? Or do you think this is illogical, in that there isn't a way to understand what exists without applying the tools we have for the purpose. I kind of think there should be something we can say about it, but I may be wrong.

[Skip]

More specifically, what does it mean when used in an ontological statement?

That's when the second class of language kicks in: specific meaning for specialist context. The speakers of that language must form a consensus on the appropriate usage of their vocabulary in order to communicate effectively. Chemists know how to do this, as do architects and basket-makers and tow-truck drivers. Philosophers are still wrestling with the problem, apparently.

What I'm disputing, is that in certain contexts the word is better used to describe an aspect of mental activity.

Okay,

So instead of saying the objective universe possess qualities, I think it may be better to say the objective universe produces quality, only when under observation.

but I won't. I find it less than useful to imagine that the universe had no qualities before I came along to describe them.... coz, without any qualities, how did the universe produce this all-perceiving me?

As a little mental exercise, try and think about the objective universe when it isn't being evaluated by the senses.

By what senses? How do I know some other entity isn't watching it when i'm asleep or dead? What happens to all the billions and billions that I can never perceive or evaluate?

How do you think we could describe it in the absence of terms such as size and colour?

I don't see why we'd even try. The terms exist in all our languages. Size and colour are in our consciousness because we have come to understand those concepts at an age (both species and individual) before ontology could bother us.

Or do you think this is illogical, in that there isn't a way to understand what exists without applying the tools we have for the purpose.

That kind of sums me up. But then, i'm no philosopher - just a poor layman who likes language to have meaning.

[SpheresOfBalance]

It seems to me that quality can be quite an ambiguous term, we use this noun in philosophy to denote an attribute which a thing possess, so for instance we say a brick is a hard, red, brittle, cuboid object. But are these qualities inherent in the brick, or simply imposed on it by our conscious evaluation? We have animals that don't see colour, so to them the brick isn't red, its hardness and brittleness are relative, and it's shape is only a subject of magnification, at reduced magnification it could appear as a dot, and an increase in magnification would show it to be irregular. So this post is concerned with whether an objects qualities are all mental impositions or projections, and if so, does the word quality better describe the classes of information that a particular form of mental activity is able to evaluate.


So here's my attempt at an ordered argument, I'll leave it to you to decide if it's in anyway logical.



The word quality is commonly used to denote attributes that are inherent.

An objects attributes are relative to, and dependent on a method of perception, and are therefore only an illustration of an interpretation.

If an objects qualities are subject to interpretation, then quality refers to interpreted information, and are of a mental classification.

Therefore a quality is a cognitive distinction not a physical attribute.

Yes, quality is subjective, I agree!

[SpheresOfBalance]

Ginkgo,I can see the merits of distinguishing between projected, and inherent qualities, but I also think it could be argued that all quality, in a philosophical use of the word, are distinctions that only exist by virtue of our mental faculties, and not actually independent characteristics.

The interaction between mind and matter, is responsible for all distinction, if it were not for the mind, and it's evaluation of the universe, then all that can be said to exist is the the potential for an event to occur, that potential may change in the absence of a mind, but the actual configuration of energy is only ever distinguishable by a conscious event.

I'm not sure that the universe is fundamentally a physical thing, the only information I've been able to find describes it as energy, but most descriptions of energy are that it is the potential for an event to occur. What does that even mean? Is it a thing, or the potential for things to exist? But one thing I think is pretty certain is that without the process of evaluation, whatever exists objectively, does so without distinction. Or am I wrong?

Things are as they are. Each human sees them with their own particular set of filters. Quality, as you've used it, only speaks of distinctive characteristics. Any particular words used to speak of it, are not necessarily complete, as all things have many differences, that can be used to distinguish. Of course it's from our individual perspectives, which varies between each of us, and can only ever be understood as the current culmination, of continuously variable individual experience, as it reports in that instance. But things to have their qualities or physics, however described, which has no effect on them, being as they are, despite our limited distinctions. Or so that's the way I see it!

[James Markham]

Spheres, thanks for the reply, although my post may appear to suggest I have chosen in favour of quality being a distinction projected onto objective reality, I must say it is only tentively that I make this claim, I'm not sure I know either way at this stage.

I think critically, if quality was an inherent attribute, then there would be some sense in which the charictaristical aspects of objects would prevail beyond their acknowledgement as such. So with this in mind, can you think of any objective charictaristical that is defined by objective criteria, as opposed to subjective evaluation.

[Ginkgo]

I'm not sure that the universe is fundamentally a physical thing, the only information I've been able to find describes it as energy, but most descriptions of energy are that it is the potential for an event to occur. What does that even mean? Is it a thing, or the potential for things to exist? But one thing I think is pretty certain is that without the process of evaluation, whatever exists objectively, does so without distinction. Or am I wrong?

I don't think you are wrong, but it depends who you talk to. Scientific realism is the view that objects exist independently of any particular mind dependent qualities. This has created a problem when the quantum world comes into contact with the classical scientific world.

The scientific basis for quantum mechanics is just as secure as classical science, so on this basis the clash has resulted in different philosophical interpretations to explain events. For example the idea that an observer is needed to collapse the wave function. This invariably leads to the idea that reality is mind dependent.

In order to restore objectivity to the world people such as Penrose propose what he calls, "objective reduction". Basically he is saying that when the wave function reaches a critical threshold the wave function will collapse of its own accord.No observer is required. If you google, 'Penrose objective reduction' you will get something far better than I can come up with.

Throw in Chalmers with his argument for qualia, then we have a good argument for the idea that experiencing objects necessarily involves a subjective element. The immediate question then arises as to the relationship between qualia (assuming it exists) and quantum mechanics. I'll let you figure that one out. Suffice to say that it all depends on who you talk to.

[Skip]

Experience is subjective. Objects are objective. Without an encounter, there can be no experience. Entities must have a separate existence in order for encounter to be possible. .

Define:
apple
steam engine
baby

How do you tell these things apart, the first time you encounter one? How did they materialize as distinct entities out of the amorphous potentiality of energy? How does your experience of them differ from mine? How can we ever talk about them?

[HexHammer]

Experience is subjective. Objects are objective. Without an encounter, there can be no experience. Entities must have a separate existence in order for encounter to be possible. .

How are objects objective?
People has vast knowledge about things they havn't met, but only gained knowledged through newspaper, TV and other media.

So what you say there doesn't make sense.

[Ginkgo]

Experience is subjective. Objects are objective. Without an encounter, there can be no experience. Entities must have a separate existence in order for encounter to be possible. .

Define:
apple
steam engine
baby

How do you tell these things apart, the first time you encounter one? How did they materialize as distinct entities out of the amorphous potentiality of energy? How does your experience of them differ from mine? How can we ever talk about them?

Again, it depends on who who you talk to. If you ask a physicalist such as Dennett then he would tell you that no subjectivity is required when we,"encounter" an object. Subjectivity can be explained in terms of matter in motion. The physical working of the brain accounts for our subjective perspective.

People such as Chalmers say that such "encounters" contain a unique subjective element as well. Your experience of the 'redness' of an apple is much the same as mine. But it isn't exactly the same. Our 'redness' is a unique intuitive experience. This is often expressed as the hard problem of consciousness. Naturally, a physicalist would deny that any such problem exists.

[Skip]

How are objects objective?

By being there even when nobody's watching.

People has vast knowledge about things they havn't met, but only gained knowledged through newspaper, TV and other media.

People have vast information about what they haven't encountered, though all information isn't knowledge. To have gained information from the sources you mention, you must first have learned language and others of your kind must have used a consistent term for each objects, in order to record the information. And that's how you recognize an apple the first time you see one: somebody [another member of your species] tells you what it is. And each time you see another one, you will know what it is, because you have in your data-base a verbal label "apple" attached to a group of qualities: round firm fruit, 4-10cm d, green-through-yellows-to-red, with seeds in the center and thin skin encompassing thick, whiteish crisp flesh.
It doesn't materialize out of nowhere: it pre-exists your first encounter, with all it's definitive qualities in situ.

So what you say there doesn't make sense.

Probably not. Of course, it was a question, not a statement. This one is a statement, so would be held to higher standard of sense.

Ginkgo:

Again, it depends on who who you talk to.

In this instance, I was talking to the participants here present. None - to date - have answered the simple questions.

If you ask a physicalist such as Dennett then he would tell you that no subjectivity is required when we,"encounter" an object. Subjectivity can be explained in terms of matter in motion.

But matter in motion doesn't invariably culminate in a "we" that's capable of encounter and experience. Subjectivity may not be required for an encounter, but there it is anyway. And I didn't introduce the problem of subjectivity, because I don't believe it's relevant.

The physical working of the brain accounts for our subjective perspective.

Well, obviously! What else could?

. Your experience of the 'redness' of an apple is much the same as mine. But it isn't exactly the same. Our 'redness' is a unique intuitive experience.

That doesn't change the apple.
Hence its objective reality and the unyielding fact that it can't be substituted for a baby or a steam engine, no matter how subjective each person's perception of them might be.

[HexHammer]

How are objects objective?

By being there even when nobody's watching.

People has vast knowledge about things they havn't met, but only gained knowledged through newspaper, TV and other media.

People have vast information about what they haven't encountered, though all information isn't knowledge. To have gained information from the sources you mention, you must first have learned language and others of your kind must have used a consistent term for each objects, in order to record the information. And that's how you recognize an apple the first time you see one: somebody [another member of your species] tells you what it is. And each time you see another one, you will know what it is, because you have in your data-base a verbal label "apple" attached to a group of qualities: round firm fruit, 4-10cm d, green-through-yellows-to-red, with seeds in the center and thin skin encompassing thick, whiteish crisp flesh.
It doesn't materialize out of nowhere: it pre-exists your first encounter, with all it's definitive qualities in situ.

So what you say there doesn't make sense.

Probably not. Of course, it was a question, not a statement. This one is a statement, so would be held to higher standard of sense.

Neither of what you say make sense, it's free interpetating and reinterpetation of language and philosophy, you are creating you own reality, which isn't philosophy of this world but your own.