There is no such thing as knowing

[popeye1945]

Philosophers have traditionally drawn a distinction between 'knowing how' and 'knowing that' and concentrated investigations epistemological on 'knowing that' Russel further classifying this as knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. But I contend that there is only 'knowing how'

all the best, rantal

Knowing is an experience, or experience and knowledge are one and the same thing. A forgotten experience, is forgotten knowledge.

[Agent Smith]

Interesting title!

I neither know nor think I know.

[popeye1945]

Interesting title!

I neither know nor think I know.

Experience is knowledge of the subjective physical world/the world of objects alters the body of a conscious subject and is known through the body subjectively. This could be understood better in that it is energy that alters a conscious subject's body and is processed through the understanding and is projected as object/s.

[Agent Smith]

Interesting title!

I neither know nor think I know.

Experience is knowledge of the subjective physical world/the world of objects alters the body of a conscious subject and is known through the body subjectively. This could be understood better in that it is energy that alters a conscious subject's body and is processed through the understanding and is projected as object/s.

True that!

[Magnus]

To know something is to be able to observe or to have experienced it, and thus be able to recognize that certain phenomena or experience at a later date.

[popeye1945]

To know is to be affected, for physicality or energy forms that make alterations to the subject's body is experience, and experience is knowledge, and knowledge is meaning, and this is knowing

[Agent Smith]

Perhaps we should dive deeper into the pool of <insert appropriate qualifier> knowledge. What's there? What's been said about what's there? Who said what, when, where?

[Consul]

Knowing is remembering an experience, indeed experience and knowledge are one and the same thing. A forgotten experience is a forgotten knowing.

Empirical knowledge is based on experience, but knowing itself is not a kind of (subjective) experience. There are no knowledge-experiences, because knowledge is a nonexperiential, (phenomenally) nonconscious mental state. There is nothing it is like for me to know something.

The same goes for all other so-called propositional attitudes such as belief and desire. There are neither belief-experiences nor desire-experiences.

[Consul]

To know something is to be able to observe or to have experienced it, and thus be able to recognize that certain phenomena or experience at a later date.

I know that 3 is a prime number, but I have never observed or perceived that it is; and I couldn't possibly have done so, since numbers are imperceptible abstract objects.

[Consul]

Philosophers have traditionally drawn a distinction between 'knowing how' and 'knowing that' and concentrated investigations epistemological on 'knowing that' Russel further classifying this as knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. But I contend that there is only 'knowing how'

Stephen Hetherington has developed an account of propositional knowledge or knowing-that according to which it is reducible to operational knowledge or knowing-how: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/know ... nowHowSkil

"Whenever you know that p, you have an ability—in that sense, you know how—to represent or respond or report or reason accurately, regarding p (where in general these potential outcomes need not be publicly verifiable)."

(Hetherington, Stephen. How to Know: A Practicalist Conception of Knowledge. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011. p. 34)

"We thereby reach what may be called the knowledge-as-ability hypothesis. Here is a preliminary statement of it (which, in a moment, I will generalise somewhat):

Your knowing that p is your having the ability to manifest various accurate representations of p. The knowledge as such is the ability as such.

This hypothesis articulates a practicalist reduction, according to which any instance of knowledge-that is some combination of instances of knowledge-how. Here is one quite schematic example of how that sort of reduction might look:

Your knowing that you are in a particular room = Your knowing how to believe accurately that you are in the room, and/or your knowing how to process relevant data accurately (such as visual data), and/or your knowing how to describe the situation accurately, and/or your knowing how to use relevant concepts accurately, and/or your knowing how to answer questions accurately about the situation, and/or your knowing how to reason accurately about the situation (such as how to link your belief, about being in the particular room, accurately with other beliefs), etc.

And all of those instances of knowledge-how can be understood as your having an associated ability."

(Hetherington, Stephen. How to Know: A Practicalist Conception of Knowledge. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011. p. 42)

Here's a review: https://ndpr.nd.edu/reviews/how-to-know ... knowledge/

[Consul]

What do you call the taste of sugar, when you actually experience it? Do you 'know' that taste?

Knowing something/somebody is objectual knowledge, as opposed to propositional knowledge (knowing that something is true/the case) and operational knowledge (knowing how to do something). Knowing the taste of sugar is a kind of objectual knowledge (by experiential acquaintance).

[Iwannaplato]

But I contend that there is only 'knowing how'

Is that a knowing how?

[popeye1945]

Knowing is remembering an experience, indeed experience and knowledge are one and the same thing. A forgotten experience is a forgotten knowing.

Empirical knowledge is based on experience, but knowing itself is not a kind of (subjective) experience. There are no knowledge-experiences, because knowledge is a nonexperiential, (phenomenally) nonconscious mental state. There is nothing it is like for me to know something.

The same goes for all other so-called propositional attitudes such as belief and desire. There are neither belief-experiences nor desire-experiences.

I do not deny that the sensory information gained through experiences is then processed through the understanding, but I believe it is one process, you cannot have one without the other, and I suspect instinct, a hardwired reaction is the strongest example of this process. I do not think it wise to drive a wedge of duality into process here, but treat it as what it is process.

[Advocate]

[quote=rantal post_id=131873 time=1362302809 user_id=8678]
[color=#008000][i]Philosophers have traditionally drawn a distinction between 'knowing how' and 'knowing that' and concentrated investigations epistemological on 'knowing that' Russel further classifying this as knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. But I contend that there is only 'knowing how'

all the best, rantal[/i][/color]
[/quote]

Knowledge is justified belief, regardless what of.

[Agent Smith]

A big, really, really, biiig van is what we call a bus!