Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Mon May 06, 2024 6:06 am
Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Mon May 06, 2024 4:04 am
Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Sun May 05, 2024 11:26 am
False. The claim 'all humans do not torture and kill babies for pleasure' is not a moral assertion. It's a factual assertion with a truth-value. It has no moral entailment whatsoever - as neither would it's negation: 'all humans torture and kill babies for pleasure'.
As ever, your insertion of a moral entailment is question-begging - you just assume it, with flummery about 'the moral fsk' - or whatever you call it now. And you just don't understand the mistake. Probably never will.
Again, your what is fact is grounded on an illusion.
You have been running away and not countering my argument.
PH's What is Fact is Illusory
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39577
I have stated your 'what is fact' is outdated, here is the generally accepted meaning of what is a fact.
What is a Fact? ref: WIKI
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=29486
I say that what we call a fact is a feature of reality that is or was the case, regardless of opinion. And I say that's why we value facts and objectivity.
You say that such facts are illusions, because humans 'construct' reality - the facts of reality. To put it simply: what we call a fact is a human construct.
But now, go very slowly here.
If a fact is a human construct,
then the fact that a fact is a human construct is
also a human construct.
I agree up to this point.
It based on Kant's Copernican Revolution, the association with the human conditions is inevitable.
Note we have gone through this before.
To put it another way. If humans construct reality, then there can be no perspective or vantage point from which to observe that humans construct reality.
Yes, there is no independent vantage point to observe that human construct reality, i.e. a human is not God and cannot have an absolutely independent perspective.
The vantage point of view is a
shared-platform intersubjectively on the basis of a Framework and System of Emergence, Realization of Reality and Cognition.
But wait. Anti-realism is the claim that it's a 'fact' that humans construct reality - that it's a feature of reality that just is the case, regardless of opinion.
When anti-realism depends on the collective share-consensus of a group of humans within a Framework and System, it is independent and regardless of the opinion of any individuals or a loose group of individuals.
For example, objective scientific facts [anti-realism] are independent and regardless of the opinions and belief of any individual scientists but it is not absolutely independent of the organized collective of subjects or human scientists.
But - such a thing - such a fact - is supposed to be an illusion.
It is only an illusion when realists claimed that facts are
absolutely independent of the human conditions.
Antirealists claim objective facts are independent of a subject or group of loose subjects and not absolutely independent of the human conditions because supposedly 'independent' objective facts in one perspective are not ultimately independent of the collective of subjects.
Thus in this case, objectivity is inter
subjectivity.
Whatever is objective reality, there is no escape from the elements of the subjects, i.e. the collective-of-subjects.
Conclusion? Anti-realism rests on flatly contradictory premises. And that's a fact.
It appear to be contradictory, but antirealism's is relative independence while that of the realist is based on absolute independence which is not tenable.
Now, instead of mindlessly repeating that my 'what is fact' is an illusion - and instead of mindlessly giving a link to your silly argument - have a long, slow think about what I've said. Please.
PS To put it another way. If reality is a human construct, then humans are also a human construct. And the human construction of reality is also a human construct. So there is no bottom or stopping point. If my 'what is fact' is an illusion, then all is illusion.
Now, instead of mindlessly repeating that my 'what is fact' is contradictory - and instead of mindlessly giving shallow argument - have a long, slow think about what I've said. Please.
There is no issue of a bottomless pit for me.
What I start with is based on empirical observations of what is spontaneously experienced and the cognition and knowing of it is based on the collective-shared knowledge.
Thus what-is-knowledge is based on as far as the evidence can support reinforced with critical thinking and wisdom.
I don't need to speculate and assume there is something illusory beyond the empirical to be discovered.
Btw, at present I am reading the book 'Against Facts' by Arianna Betti who argued your concept of what is fact is a sham.
[quote
'Against Facts' by Arianna Betti.
]
https://www.amazon.com/Against-Facts-Pr ... 0262029219
An argument that the major metaphysical theories of facts give us no good reason to accept facts in our catalog of the world.
In this book Arianna Betti argues that we have no good reason to accept facts in our catalog of the world, at least as they are described by the two major metaphysical theories of facts. She claims that neither of these theories is tenableneither the theory according to which facts are special structured building blocks of reality nor the theory according to which facts are whatever is named by certain expressions of the form the fact that such and such. There is reality, and there are entities in reality that we are able to name, but, Betti contends, among these entities there are no facts.
Drawing on metaphysics, the philosophy of language, and linguistics, Betti examines the main arguments in favor of and against facts of the two major sorts, which she distinguishes as compositional and propositional, giving special attention to methodological presuppositions. She criticizes compositional facts (facts as special structured building blocks of reality) and the central argument for them, Armstrong's truthmaker argument. She then criticizes propositional facts (facts as whatever is named in the fact that statements) and what she calls the argument from nominal reference, which draws on Quine's criterion of ontological commitment. Betti argues that metaphysicians should stop worrying about facts, and philosophers in general should stop arguing for or against entities on the basis of how we use language.[/quote]