Is morality objective or subjective?

[Immanuel Can]

Therefore after 20k+ comments, your best argument seems to be that morality can't be subjective, because only objective morality can be morality.

You're not reading. My argument is that Subjectivism doesn't work at all, even on its own terms. And that's regardless of whether or not objective morality is even possible.

But your argument was, once again, that subjectivism doesn't give us any information on objectivist terms.

No, my argument was that Subjectivism gives us no information on ITS OWN terms. Objectivism is not assumed. You can become a Nihilist, if you like.

[Immanuel Can]

My argument is that Subjectivism doesn't work at all,

If a person subjectively thinks that stealing is morally wrong, and that disinclines him from stealing, why do you describe that as not working?

Yes. Because he has no idea why he has that twinge. And if it's just a twinge, he has no justification to trust it at all...anymore than a twinge of hunger, or lust, or rage, or greed, or any other twinge.

[Harbal]

My argument is that Subjectivism doesn't work at all,

If a person subjectively thinks that stealing is morally wrong, and that disinclines him from stealing, why do you describe that as not working?

Yes. Because he has no idea why he has that twinge. And if it's just a twinge, he has no justification to trust it at all...anymore than a twinge of hunger, or lust, or rage, or greed, or any other twinge.

That doesn't answer the question. If my moral feelings motivate my actions, then my moral function is working, how can you deny the logic of that?

[Immanuel Can]

If a person subjectively thinks that stealing is morally wrong, and that disinclines him from stealing, why do you describe that as not working?

Yes. Because he has no idea why he has that twinge. And if it's just a twinge, he has no justification to trust it at all...anymore than a twinge of hunger, or lust, or rage, or greed, or any other twinge.

That doesn't answer the question. If my moral feelings motivate my actions, then my moral function is working, how can you deny the logic of that?

Because you have no way of knowing if it's even "moral." Subjectivism can't reveal that to you. Subjectivism has no opinion about whether it's right or wrong to steal...because the answer depends as much on the thief as it does on you, or on society...or a different society.

So there's no logic in you asserting that your antipathy to stealing is correct and moral, but so is the thief's preference for stealing. That's such bad logic that it's an outright contradiction of your own view. And it doesn't tell us anything about what the moral status of theft is, so we don't know what laws to make, or when an injustice has happened, or what gives us a right to lock up the thief (or you, if the winds blow that way).

We don't know anything. Subjectivism has left us as clueless as before we came to the situation. You think the thief is being immoral, and he thinks he's moral. Who wins?

[Immanuel Can]

My argument is that Subjectivism doesn't work at all,

If a person subjectively thinks that stealing is morally wrong, and that disinclines him from stealing, why do you describe that as not working? I think your idea of working morality is the sort that would enable you, for example, to tell others how they should behave.

Because if one person subjectively thinks that stealing is morally wrong and another person subjectively thinks stealing is morally right, there is no way to determine who is correct.

Nicely and concisely put.

[Harbal]

Yes. Because he has no idea why he has that twinge. And if it's just a twinge, he has no justification to trust it at all...anymore than a twinge of hunger, or lust, or rage, or greed, or any other twinge.

That doesn't answer the question. If my moral feelings motivate my actions, then my moral function is working, how can you deny the logic of that?

Because you have no way of knowing if it's even "moral." Subjectivism can't reveal that to you.

Of course I have a way of knowing. We all know that stealing is a moral issue, so if I have feelings about stealing, I know I have feelings about a moral issue.

Subjectivism has no opinion about whether it's right or wrong to steal..

My subjectivism thinks that stealing is wrong, so it seems it does have an opinion. How do you know if stealing is wrong or not?

So there's no logic in you asserting that your antipathy to stealing is correct and moral,

If it conforms to my sense of morality, it seems quite logical to assert it.

And it doesn't tell us anything about what the moral status of theft is

It tells me what the moral status of theft is, and dissuades me from stealing. What more do you expect of it?

We don't know anything. Subjectivism has left us as clueless as before we came to the situation.

It doesn't leave me clueless, because I have a sense of right and wrong that I can refer to. If I had to start looking round for objective moral truth to know the difference between right and wrong, that is when I would be clueless.

You think the thief is being immoral, and he thinks he's moral. Who wins?

Who wins what?

When you think thieves are being immoral, and they disagree with you, who wins then? Perhaps you will show them a stone tablet with "Thou shalt not steal" chiselled into it, and hope it brings them to their senses.

[Harbal]

If a person subjectively thinks that stealing is morally wrong, and that disinclines him from stealing, why do you describe that as not working? I think your idea of working morality is the sort that would enable you, for example, to tell others how they should behave.

Because if one person subjectively thinks that stealing is morally wrong and another person subjectively thinks stealing is morally right, there is no way to determine who is correct.

Nicely and concisely put.

So if one person objectively thinks that stealing is morally wrong, and another person subjectively thinks stealing is morally right, what way is there to determine who is correct?

[Immanuel Can]

That doesn't answer the question. If my moral feelings motivate my actions, then my moral function is working, how can you deny the logic of that?

Because you have no way of knowing if it's even "moral." Subjectivism can't reveal that to you.

Of course I have a way of knowing. We all know that stealing is a moral issue, so if I have feelings about stealing, I know I have feelings about a moral issue.

The thief has different feelings. How do we know, given Subjectivism, whose feelings are right?

For that matter, how do we know that the fact that you have a feeling about stealing means that it's a "moral" feeling. Maybe it's just a feeling of queasy. Maybe you ate a bad burrito. Maybe you'll feel differently after you have some sleep, or if you find better reasons to steal.

What is "moral" in that situation? What is "the right thing to do"?

Subjectivism has no opinion about whether it's right or wrong to steal..

My subjectivism thinks that stealing is wrong, so it seems it does have an opinion.

For now. And the thief has a different feeling. Who's right?

And it doesn't tell us anything about what the moral status of theft is

It tells me what the moral status of theft is,...

No, it doesn't. It tells you you feel queasy. Nothing more.

We don't know anything. Subjectivism has left us as clueless as before we came to the situation.

It doesn't leave me clueless, because I have a sense of right and wrong that I can refer to.

You have a feeling. You don't know if it's a morally right feeling, a morally wrong feeling, or just a feeling.

You think the thief is being immoral, and he thinks he's moral. Who wins?

Who wins what?

You know. Who is right?

[Immanuel Can]

Because if one person subjectively thinks that stealing is morally wrong and another person subjectively thinks stealing is morally right, there is no way to determine who is correct.

Nicely and concisely put.

So if one person objectively thinks that stealing is morally wrong, and another person subjectively thinks stealing is morally right, what way is there to determine who is correct?

None, by way of Subjectivism. There IS no morally wrong or right. There are just contrary feelings had by different people. The term "moral" doesn't even apply. Maybe the word "feelies" does, but that can't tell us anything about the moral status of an action or person.

So Subjectivism is a gelding. It's is utterly impotent to tell us anything about what right and wrong are. All it can leave is with is slight queasiness, the meaning of which we are left powerless to decode.

[Will Bouwman]

How do we know, given Subjectivism, whose feelings are right?

How do you know how you currently interpret your Bible is right?

[Immanuel Can]

How do we know, given Subjectivism, whose feelings are right?

How do you know how you currently interpret your Bible is right?

I'm not sure how that question relates to Subjective Morality. Maybe you'll explain.

[Age]

False. The claim 'all humans do not torture and kill babies for pleasure' is not a moral assertion. It's a factual assertion with a truth-value. It has no moral entailment whatsoever - as neither would it's negation: 'all humans torture and kill babies for pleasure'.

Although you are right about 'that claim' having no 'moral assertion' and is just a 'factual assertion' it still does have some sort of 'moral entailment' to it, in the sense that what you human beings do, and/or how you mis/behave, it could be said and argued is all about 'morality' or a 'moral issue'.

Not so. I'm referring to logical entailment: how non-moral premises can never entail moral conclusions.

P: All humans think X is morally wrong. / All humans don't 'do X'.
C: Therefore, X is morally wrong.

The conclusion simply doesn't follow from either premise. X can be 'caring for babies' or 'torturing, etc, babies', and the argument remains invalid. We have to inject or assume the moral opinion from outside the argument, as you do below when you say 'there is a 'moral issue' in there'.

So, although 'the claim', 'all human beings do not torture and kill babies for pleasure', in and of itself has no implied meaning nor claim about what is Right nor Wrong in Life, there is a 'moral issue' in there, somewhere, obviously.

That is if one wants to go looking for it.

As ever, your insertion of a moral entailment is question-begging - you just assume it, with flummery about 'the moral fsk' - or whatever you call it now. And you just don't understand the mistake. Probably never will.

How many posters here 'understand' 'the mistake/s', which 'we' all keep making here?

Not for me to say. I just point out when they appear not to.

Well obviously non-moral premises do not entail moral conclusions. Why would you have even thought otherwise? I certainly never thought, let alone said, so above anywhere here.

[Age]

How do we know, given Subjectivism, whose feelings are right?

How do you know how you currently interpret your Bible is right?

I'm not sure how that question relates to Subjective Morality. Maybe you'll explain.

Because what is in the bible is subjective morality, obviously.

Are you really this blind and stupid here "Immanuel can"?

Has your belief in one theological religion blinded you that much?

Also, absolutely all 'feelings' are 'right' and can never be otherwise. It is your 'mental interpretations' of things that can be wrong, right.

[Harbal]

Because you have no way of knowing if it's even "moral." Subjectivism can't reveal that to you.

Of course I have a way of knowing. We all know that stealing is a moral issue, so if I have feelings about stealing, I know I have feelings about a moral issue.

The thief has different feelings. How do we know, given Subjectivism, whose feelings are right?

Well each thinks they are right, just like it is with objectivism.

For that matter, how do we know that the fact that you have a feeling about stealing means that it's a "moral" feeling.

I am the one who needs to know, not you. Besides, how do we know that the fact you say something is an objective moral truth means that it is one?

Maybe it's just a feeling of queasy. Maybe you ate a bad burrito. Maybe you'll feel differently after you have some sleep, or if you find better reasons to steal.

What is "moral" in that situation? What is "the right thing to do"?

Stop eating burritos?

My subjectivism thinks that stealing is wrong, so it seems it does have an opinion.

For now. And the thief has a different feeling. Who's right?

By normal social standards, I would be right, but objectively speaking, the question doesn't even make sense.

And it doesn't tell us anything about what the moral status of theft is

It tells me what the moral status of theft is,...

No, it doesn't. It tells you you feel queasy. Nothing more.

As long as it's the kind of queasy that stops me from stealing, what's it matter?

How is it any different to the queasy you feel when you've been reading your Bible?

It doesn't leave me clueless, because I have a sense of right and wrong that I can refer to.

You have a feeling. You don't know if it's a morally right feeling, a morally wrong feeling, or just a feeling.

I suppose it's a matter of trusting my feelings, just like you have to trust that your moral truths are actually true.

You think the thief is being immoral, and he thinks he's moral. Who wins?

Who wins what?

You know. Who is right?

Nobody is right objectively speaking, but like I asked you, when you think thieves are being immoral, and they disagree with you, who wins then?

[Harbal]

Nicely and concisely put.

So if one person objectively thinks that stealing is morally wrong, and another person subjectively thinks stealing is morally right, what way is there to determine who is correct?

None, by way of Subjectivism.

So by what other means can it be determined?