Free will is wholly deterministic

[phyllo]

Easily. Free will is not a denial of some "antecedent conditions." It's a denial that those "antecedent conditions" are the exclusive source of answers as to why things happen -- i.e. a denial of Determinism, not of "antecedents."

Which brings up the questions ...

What other sources are there beside "antecedent conditions"?

How do these sources interact with "antecedent conditions"?

Obviously all those ideas are present in the world so they require a free-will explanation.

Determinism cannot explain anything with reference to "free will," or to any "will" at all. It can only appeal to "antecedent conditions."

I'm not asking for it to be explained in terms of determinism. I'm asking for it to be explained in terms of free-will.

No, but Determinists could. Because they believe that the only reason people form beliefs is because of "antecedent conditions," they have no reason to trust any of the pronouncements of science or of their own minds.

Why do we believe the earth is round, or gravity works, or that the Sun moves? They have to say, "antecedent conditions" make us believe it. Just that. They can't say "reason" makes us believe it, or "the facts" do. Why do we do science? "Antecedent conditions" made us do science. It wasn't because science leads to good answers, or because science is true. Why do I believe anything? "Antecedent conditions," not truth or rationality account for my believing things...all this nonsense is what follows from supposing Determinism.

Evidence is "antecedent conditions". Those things are believed because of the evidence presented to support the belief.

You're writing as if determinists believe random things completely disconnected from any reality and as if "antecedent conditions" are somehow random.

[phyllo]

Exactly. In the Determinist's universe "thinking" or "pondering" is an illusion, it is merely the unimportant feeling associated with the inevitable conclusions anyone will arrive at based on their brain-state the nanosecond before their "decision" was "made".

Please explain how someone with free-will thinks.

One would assume that their brain functions are founded on deterministic chemistry and electricity.

[LuckyR]

Exactly. In the Determinist's universe "thinking" or "pondering" is an illusion, it is merely the unimportant feeling associated with the inevitable conclusions anyone will arrive at based on their brain-state the nanosecond before their "decision" was "made".

Please explain how someone with free-will thinks.

One would assume that their brain functions are founded on deterministic chemistry and electricity.

Oh, no one knows the intricacies associated with the sensation we have collectively labeled "thinking". The causes you "assume" are very popular, in fact I share them as my personal guess. My point is that Determinism not only doesn't require true thinking at all, it actually eliminates it as a possibility.

[phyllo]

My point is that Determinism not only doesn't require true thinking at all, it actually eliminates it as a possibility.

Of course it requires thinking. How would a determinist move/act/decide otherwise?

[Immanuel Can]

Exactly. In the Determinist's universe "thinking" or "pondering" is an illusion, it is merely the unimportant feeling associated with the inevitable conclusions anyone will arrive at based on their brain-state the nanosecond before their "decision" was "made".

Nicely put.

Essentially the text of Hamlet was assured by the exact way that the Big Bang unfolded 13.8 billion years ago (as was this post). Theoretically possible, of course but not only inconsistent with the entirety of human experience, but also just ridiculous sounding on it's face.

Yes; you would have to say, "Not utterly impossible, but so highly implausible as to be absurd."

Just so.

[phyllo]

Essentially the text of Hamlet was assured by the exact way that the Big Bang unfolded 13.8 billion years ago (as was this post). Theoretically possible, of course but not only inconsistent with the entirety of human experience, but also just ridiculous sounding on it's face.

Yes; you would have to say, "Not utterly impossible, but so highly implausible as to be absurd."

Just so.

What are you saying?

That the Big Bang intentionally created the text of Hamlet? You think that's what determinism is claiming?

Some sequence of events took place since the Big Bang. Hamlet is part of that sequence.

Here you are sitting assigning some sort of meaning to it that is not there.

If Hamlet had not been written, then you would reference some other work.

You don't bring up works which were never written because they don't exist. Rate the implausibility of those works.

Here you are. At the end of a chain of events. And that's your perspective.

[Immanuel Can]

My point is that Determinism not only doesn't require true thinking at all, it actually eliminates it as a possibility.

Of course it requires thinking. How would a determinist move/act/decide otherwise?

It's not that Determinists cannot move, act or decide. It's that their Determinism logically entails that their movements are not their own, their acts are not their own, and their decisions are an illusory seeming, not a real decision at all. In truth (Determinism entails), these things are "epiphenomena," meaning basically that they are weird side-effects of an essentially deterministic process, but have nothing whatsoever to do with actual causality. They're illusions, not realities.

[Walker]

My point is that Determinism not only doesn't require true thinking at all, it actually eliminates it as a possibility.

Of course it requires thinking. How would a determinist move/act/decide otherwise?

It's not that Determinists cannot move, act or decide. It's that their Determinism logically entails that their movements are not their own, their acts are not their own, and their decisions are an illusory seeming, not a real decision at all. In truth (Determinism entails), these things are "epiphenomena," meaning basically that they are weird side-effects of an essentially deterministic process, but have nothing whatsoever to do with actual causality. They're illusions, not realities.

IC, this describes acting without choice. Does it also describe, “Determinism?”

“Choice, it seems to me, is an act of confusion. When I'm bewildered, uncertain, confused, then I choose; and I say to myself, "I choose out of my freedom; I am free to choose". But is not choice the outcome of uncertainty? Out of my confusion, bewilderment, uncertainty, the feeling of being incapable of clarity - out of this I act. I choose a leader; I choose a certain course of action; and I commit myself to a particular activity, but that activity, that pattern of action, the pursuit of a particular mode of thought is the result of my confusion. If I'm not confused, if there is no confusion whatsoever, then there is no choice; I see things as they are. I act not on choice.”
- Jiddu Krishnamurti, NEW YORK 3RD PUBLIC TALK, 30TH SEPTEMBER 1966

[Immanuel Can]

Of course it requires thinking. How would a determinist move/act/decide otherwise?

It's not that Determinists cannot move, act or decide. It's that their Determinism logically entails that their movements are not their own, their acts are not their own, and their decisions are an illusory seeming, not a real decision at all. In truth (Determinism entails), these things are "epiphenomena," meaning basically that they are weird side-effects of an essentially deterministic process, but have nothing whatsoever to do with actual causality. They're illusions, not realities.

IC, this describes acting without choice. Does it also describe, “Determinism?”


“Choice, it seems to me, is an act of confusion. When I'm bewildered, uncertain, confused, then I choose; and I say to myself, "I choose out of my freedom; I am free to choose". But is not choice the outcome of uncertainty? Out of my confusion, bewilderment, uncertainty, the feeling of being incapable of clarity - out of this I act. I choose a leader; I choose a certain course of action; and I commit myself to a particular activity, but that activity, that pattern of action, the pursuit of a particular mode of thought is the result of my confusion. If I'm not confused, if there is no confusion whatsoever, then there is no choice; I see things as they are. I act not on choice.”
- Jiddu Krishnamurti, NEW YORK 3RD PUBLIC TALK, 30TH SEPTEMBER 1966

I'm not seeing what it's actually intended to describe. It seems a little confused itself, to me. For one thing, choices don't necessarily come out of "uncertainty." They usually come out of probability calculations...and probability doesn't involve "confusion" "lack of clarity" or "bewilderment" at all, but rather a kind of estimation of likelihoods which can be quite rational and thoughtful -- and should be, in the ideal.

Determinism, it seems to me, is an ideology...a very impractical one, based on a single thought...that of things being preset by prior forces. It's a totalizing ideology, in that it allows for no dissent or exceptions, but aims to swallow all phenomena whole, naively universalizing physical cause-effect relations to describe phenomena that are not physically fixed, such as volition, rationality, argumentation and decision.

I think it was G.K. Chesterton who so pithily said that Determinists are "...in the clean and well-lit prison of a single idea." I think that's quite an excellent summary of how Determinism operates on them.

[Immanuel Can]

Essentially the text of Hamlet was assured by the exact way that the Big Bang unfolded 13.8 billion years ago (as was this post). Theoretically possible, of course but not only inconsistent with the entirety of human experience, but also just ridiculous sounding on it's face.

Yes; you would have to say, "Not utterly impossible, but so highly implausible as to be absurd."

Just so.

What are you saying?

That the Big Bang intentionally created the text of Hamlet? You think that's what determinism is claiming?

"Intentionally?" No. The BB never "intended" anything. But Determinism has to suppose that Hamlet is nothing more than a product of time and chance. We just got lucky, I guess.

The story it tells goes like this: "In the beginning was the singularity. (Presumably whatever caused the Big Bang). Then there was a Big Bang. After that, the only things that existed in the universe were physical objects being acted upon by physical forces. Eventually, the fortuitous collision of these physical forces produced human beings, William Shakespeare, and Hamlet."

Some sequence of events took place since the Big Bang. Hamlet is part of that sequence.

That's maybe a shorter summary, but it's exactly what I was saying.

Doesn't it strike you as...if not utterly silly (which it should), at least as hopelessly reductional? To say that Hamlet is nothing more than the collision of fortuitous atoms seems not nearly to say enough, does it not?

[Immanuel Can]

Easily. Free will is not a denial of some "antecedent conditions." It's a denial that those "antecedent conditions" are the exclusive source of answers as to why things happen -- i.e. a denial of Determinism, not of "antecedents."

Which brings up the questions ...

What other sources are there beside "antecedent conditions"?

Volition. All people who believe in will believe that human beings can commence causal moments of their own. Determinists, on the other hand, have to regard the human contribution as a kind of "dumb terminal," meaning a node that actually merely reacts to the previous inputs, and thus adds nothing to the causal chain, merely passing along the consequences of the "antecedent" causes.

How do these sources interact with "antecedent conditions"?

Oh, that's fairly easy.

The person who believes in will accepts that antecedent conditions set up a range of possible choices for the volitional person; but the volitional person still has choice within the range offered by the various "antecedent conditions."

And that's, in fact, exactly how we all act as if it is. We say, "I found myself in circumstance A, and I decided to B." Or "I needed to go to university, so I chose Harvard...or Yale...or Patterson Technical College." Or "I could have loved Mary or Celine or Maya, but chose Priyanka instead."

Obviously all those ideas are present in the world so they require a free-will explanation.

Determinism cannot explain anything with reference to "free will," or to any "will" at all. It can only appeal to "antecedent conditions."

I'm not asking for it to be explained in terms of determinism. I'm asking for it to be explained in terms of free-will.

Oh, sorry. Maybe you could reword, because I've missed your point here.

No, but Determinists could. Because they believe that the only reason people form beliefs is because of "antecedent conditions," they have no reason to trust any of the pronouncements of science or of their own minds.

Why do we believe the earth is round, or gravity works, or that the Sun moves? They have to say, "antecedent conditions" make us believe it. Just that. They can't say "reason" makes us believe it, or "the facts" do. Why do we do science? "Antecedent conditions" made us do science. It wasn't because science leads to good answers, or because science is true. Why do I believe anything? "Antecedent conditions," not truth or rationality account for my believing things...all this nonsense is what follows from supposing Determinism.

Evidence is "antecedent conditions". Those things are believed because of the evidence presented to support the belief.

It's not that simple.

Evidence is equivocal. It can be interpreted as one thing, or as another. It takes a volitional agent to assess which explanation of the evidence is the most plausible, and to choose to select it over the other possible explanations for the evidence that can possibly exist.

Think of a detective trying to solve a murder. He has a body, some electrical cords, a puddle of water on the floor... how was the person killed? Well, maybe he was electrocuted when he stepped in the water where the electrical cords were dangling. Or maybe he hanged himself with the electrical cord, and then fell in the water. Or maybe somebody came in and strangled him with the electrical cord, and in the struggle, broke a glass of water...There are various possible explanations. What the detective has to do is to decide which of such explanations best fits all the stuff in the room, and what things are not actually relevant to the cause of the tragedy, and then when and who should be charged (if anyone)...and so on. The "antecedent conditions" set up the mystery: but he's still got a ton of work to do in order to arrive at the proper solution. And all of it calls for his cognition, choice-making and action.

You're writing as if determinists believe random things completely disconnected from any reality and as if "antecedent conditions" are somehow random.

Many think they are. Materialists, Physicalists, Naturalists, and so on, all have to think that all "antecedent conditions" regardless of any appearance of organization or purpose they might suggest, are actually nothing more than the fortuitous products of accident. Materials, plus chance, plus time, plus physical laws, are all that can be implicated, for Determinism. And the physical laws themselves are not the product of any deliberate design, but are just chance things we happen to have gotten lucky enough to have in this universe. That's all random stuff. No overarching design or intention governs it at all...we just got lucky and ended up where we are, it has to suppose.

[Walker]

I'm not seeing what it's actually intended to describe. It seems a little confused itself, to me. For one thing, choices don't necessarily come out of "uncertainty." They usually come out of probability calculations...and probability doesn't involve "confusion" "lack of clarity" or "bewilderment" at all, but rather a kind of estimation of likelihoods which can be quite rational and thoughtful -- and should be, in the ideal.

Interesting. Knowing the probabilities, most folks buy lottery tickets with the realistic expectation of losing, which means that the real purpose is the cheap thrill of the improbable. That sounds like a choiceless need, although the actor is still responsible for the debt.

The new flick "Oppenheimer," which relies heavily on an annoying, relentless soundtrack, made a point about choice. The choice was made to risk a chain reaction incinerating the atmosphere, because although that was possible it was not probable.

[Immanuel Can]

I'm not seeing what it's actually intended to describe. It seems a little confused itself, to me. For one thing, choices don't necessarily come out of "uncertainty." They usually come out of probability calculations...and probability doesn't involve "confusion" "lack of clarity" or "bewilderment" at all, but rather a kind of estimation of likelihoods which can be quite rational and thoughtful -- and should be, in the ideal.

Interesting. Knowing the probabilities, most folks buy lottery tickets with the realistic expectation of losing, which means that the real purpose is the cheap thrill of the improbable. That sounds like a choiceless need, although the actor is still responsible for the debt.

"Choiceless"? I hardly think we can say it's that. One has the choice whether or not to buy the ticket. And if one has a felt need to gamble, that doesn't imply one cannot resist it. If it did, all gamblers would simply be incurable.

I think what you're pointing to is more that not all felt needs are appropriate to the evidence. One buys a ticket out of a desire for hope, perhaps, even though one knows one most probably cannot win.

The new flick "Oppenheimer," which relies heavily on an annoying, relentless soundtrack, made a point about choice. The choice was made to risk a chain reaction incinerating the atmosphere, because although that was possible it was not probable.

That's a sort of description of how "antecedent conditions" relate to choice. Oppenheimer is not compelled to blow up the bomb. He could have chosen not to: that's the point of the drama. But he did, because he calculated that the most probable effect he would get would not include that ultimate disaster.

It would be an odd sort of drama (and horribly boring), if it began with a disclaimer like,

"Before we begin, we want to notify all viewers that there are no genuine choices depicted in this movie. All characters will simply act in response to whatever antecedent conditions are there for them, and will do so in the only way they possibly could. Do not be fooled by any appearance of deliberation, thought, choice or volition on the part of any characters: they do not reflect real persons in the throes of decision making. And the ending will be inevitable."

[Walker]

Oppenheimer is not compelled to blow up the bomb. He could have chosen not to: that's the point of the drama. But he did, because he calculated that the most probable effect he would get would not include that ultimate disaster.

That is another point made in the movie. He was compelled. He felt he had no choice and his rationale was that if the Nazi's developed the bomb first, there would be hell to pay.

Why else risk the world unless there was no choice?

Also, the proof that he had no choice was that he did it.

[Immanuel Can]

Oppenheimer is not compelled to blow up the bomb. He could have chosen not to: that's the point of the drama. But he did, because he calculated that the most probable effect he would get would not include that ultimate disaster.

That is another point made in the movie. He was compelled. He felt he had no choice and his rationale was that if the Nazi's developed the bomb first, there would be hell to pay.

But that's not compulsion. He had options. He just made a probability calculation...which could have been quite wrong, actually. As it turned out, we didn't need the bomb to beat the Nazis. All we had to do is sabotage their heavy-water experiments in Norway and elsewhere until normal armies could win...which is exactly what we did, and exactly what happened. When we entered Berlin and when Hitler killed himself, it was not because of the bomb at all; it was because of the ground advance and the collapse of German defenses beneath them.

Why else risk the world unless there was no choice?

There was a choice. The bomb only came into play against Japan, and was never used against the Nazis at all. So if Oppenheimer had not created the bomb, we would still have beaten the Nazis.

Also, the proof that he had no choice was that he did it.

That's how the Determinists have to argue, of course..."It happened, so that proved it had to happen." But no, we don't know what could have happened if things we had chosen had been different...justs as Oppenheimer did not know what the Nazis would do, or that the bomb would not, after all, be necessary for them.