What could make morality objective?

[Peter Holmes]

do the existence and nature of rocks depend on the existence of a brain or brains?

No, but you do.

And: do moral rightness and wrongness exist as things at all, let alone things that may be independent from a brain or brains?

Moral fact extends out of a fact about man: it is not independent of him (in the same way fire is not independent of oxygen, heat, and fuel).

But: I'll follow Advocate's lead and leave it there.

A non-moral premise 'X is the case' [eg some 'fact about man'] can never entail a moral conclusion 'therefore Y is morally right/wrong'.

It's a non sequitur. And yep - I'll leave it there too.

[phyllo]

A non-moral premise 'X is the case' [eg some 'fact about man'] can never entail a moral conclusion 'therefore Y is morally right/wrong'.

People get upset when someone takes their stuff, therefore taking stuff without the owner's permission is morally wrong.

What's wrong with that?

[Peter Holmes]

A non-moral premise 'X is the case' [eg some 'fact about man'] can never entail a moral conclusion 'therefore Y is morally right/wrong'.

People get upset when someone takes their stuff, therefore taking stuff without the owner's permission is morally wrong.

What's wrong with that?

It doesn't follow. 'X upsets people; therefore X is morally wrong.' A conclusion can't contain information not present in the premise or premises. And in this case, it's easy to think of something that upsets people that's not morally wrong. Holding them accountable for their crimes, for example.

[phyllo]

It doesn't follow. 'X upsets people; therefore X is morally wrong.' A conclusion can't contain information not present in the premise or premises. And in this case, it's easy to think of something that upsets people that's not morally wrong. Holding them accountable for their crimes, for example.

There are millions of actions which could be classified as immoral but they are not, because nobody really cares.

Why isn't spitting on the sidewalk immoral? Because it doesn't bother people.

If nobody was upset about killing, then killing wouldn't even come up as a moral issue.

[Peter Holmes]

It doesn't follow. 'X upsets people; therefore X is morally wrong.' A conclusion can't contain information not present in the premise or premises. And in this case, it's easy to think of something that upsets people that's not morally wrong. Holding them accountable for their crimes, for example.

There are millions of actions which could be classified as immoral but they are not, because nobody really cares.

Why isn't spitting on the sidewalk immoral? Because it doesn't bother people.

If nobody was upset about killing, then killing wouldn't even come up as a moral issue.

You're missing the logical point about entailment: a non-moral premise can't entail a moral conclusion.

But yes, what we call morally right and wrong is a matter of individual or collective opinion. That's why morality isn't objective.

[phyllo]

You're missing the logical point about entailment: a non-moral premise can't entail a moral conclusion.

But yes, what we call morally right and wrong is a matter of individual or collective opinion. That's why morality isn't objective.

If morality is objective then it's based on some fact about the world.

That people get upset by certain actions is a fact about the characteristics of humans. It's not just a matter of opinion. It's human psychology.

[Peter Holmes]

You're missing the logical point about entailment: a non-moral premise can't entail a moral conclusion.

But yes, what we call morally right and wrong is a matter of individual or collective opinion. That's why morality isn't objective.

If morality is objective then it's based on some fact about the world.

That people get upset by certain actions is a fact about the characteristics of humans. It's not just a matter of opinion. It's human psychology.

It may be a fact that X upsets people. And it may be a fact that people think X is morally wrong. But that doesn't make it a fact that X is morally wrong. Here's your argument.

People think X is morally wrong; therefore, (it's a fact that) X is morally wrong.

If you can't see why that's a non sequitur, I don't think you understand the issue.

[Age]

It doesn't follow. 'X upsets people; therefore X is morally wrong.' A conclusion can't contain information not present in the premise or premises. And in this case, it's easy to think of something that upsets people that's not morally wrong. Holding them accountable for their crimes, for example.

There are millions of actions which could be classified as immoral but they are not, because nobody really cares.

Why isn't spitting on the sidewalk immoral? Because it doesn't bother people.

If nobody was upset about killing, then killing wouldn't even come up as a moral issue.

You're missing the logical point about entailment: a non-moral premise can't entail a moral conclusion.

But yes, what we call morally right and wrong is a matter of individual or collective opinion.

Is there ANY thing right or wrong that is NOT a matter of individual or collective opinion, to you?

If yes, then what is it or they?

That's why morality isn't objective.

So, the reason WHY 'morality' is NOT objective is because that is "peter holmes' '' personal or individual opinion.

Hopefully, the CONTRADICTION can be CLEARLY SEEN here and is speaking for ITSELF now.

[phyllo]

Here's your argument.

People think X is morally wrong; therefore, (it's a fact that) X is morally wrong.

That's not my argument.

This is my argument:

People are upset by some actions.

Those actions are declared to be morally wrong.

People who do those actions are punished for it.

That reduces the frequency of those actions.

For example,

People get stressed by the possibility of being killed, or their loved ones being killed or their neighbors, etc.

Killing is declared immoral.

Killers are discouraged by the possibility of punishment. Killers are removed from society when they kill.

As a result, fewer people are killed.

People feel safer and less stressed.

[FlashDangerpants]

This is my argument:

People are upset by some actions.

Those actions are declared to be morally wrong.

People who do those actions are punished for it.

That reduces the frequency of those actions.

For example,

People get stressed by the possibility of being killed, or their loved ones being killed or their neighbors, etc.

Killing is declared immoral.

Killers are discouraged by the possibility of punishment. Killers are removed from society when they kill.

As a result, fewer people are killed.

People feel safer and less stressed.

Nothing in that amounts to an argument.

[phyllo]

Then ignore my posts.

Easy cheesy

[Veritas Aequitas]

What a conceptual mess!

It is not my conceptual mess.
What had presented are the ideas of realists, i.e. metaphysical/philosophical realists, which no matter how much you deny, you are a metaphysical/philosophical realists. I will demonstrate you are in fact a philosophical realist.

What distinction does the expression 'external reality' make? Is there an 'internal reality''? And what exactly is it?

Your question show how ignorant you are within the scope of philosophy especially on such a common term 'external world'.

• external world: (philosophy) The world consisting of all the objects and events which are experienceable or whose existence is accepted by the human mind, but which exist independently of the mind.

For more details see;
https://www.britannica.com/topic/external-world

The term 'external-world' of realism is in contrast to the 'internal-world' of idealism [typical].
Some idealist believe the world is "in" the mind [of God -Berkeley] and in my case is entangled with the mind [~ Kantian].
If you do not accept 'external-world' then you are a typical idealist?

And the various misguided theories of truth - such as correspondence, truth maker/truth-bearer, pragmatism and consensus - are about language. They have nothing to do with reality - with ontology - what actually exists. Outside language, reality is not linguistic, so it has no truth-value.

Ignorant again! Nope pragmatism [utility & use by humans] and consensus [intersubjective within human minds] are NOT about independent language!

When you state "reality is not linguistic" you are implying reality exists which is independent of linguistic which is what the philosophical realists believe.
So how can you deny you are not a philosophical realist.
As such in-general you need to believe in an external world as opposed to an internal world.

You need to go back to the beginning and challenge all the assumptions - and delusions - that underpin what has passed for philosophy. And the daddy of them all is mistaking what we say about things for the way things are - as do Putnam and Button, to judge by what you quote.

You are condemning all the above which are are actually believing without understanding their basis.
If you don't agree with what I presented above, then show me your basis that you are better than G E Moore et. al. and other analytic philosophers [most] who believe in an independent external world as realists.

Meanwhile, I think what you say here is central to our disagreement:

'I agree moral opinion and beliefs which are descriptive and prescriptive cannot be moral facts BUT
the moral potential [oughtness] existing as physical neural correlates which can be verified and justified within the scientific FSK can emerge as moral facts within a credible moral FSK. [note emerge and emergentism].'

I and others have been trying to show you the mistake you make here. Fruitlessly.

What mistake??
You are the very ignorant one in terms of this related philosophy.
I have already shown why you are so stuck in a dogmatic paradigm.

First you are basically a philosophical realists as demonstrated, but ignorantly deny you are one.

The other is you are stuck with the linguistic perspective of a philosophical realist fact with low grade understanding of what is morality proper.
To you, morality is purely and solely moral statement of moral opinions and beliefs this is where you are entrapped within a silo. Thus at the mentioned of 'moral facts' you will jumped on and bashed them with your ignorant hammer.

I agree, purely and solely moral statement of moral opinions and beliefs are what they are, thus cannot be moral facts, BUT ...

I am going along with Hume's matter-of-fact where he denied there is such moral fact [matter-of-fact] but that is [he admitted his ignorance] merely due to the limited knowledge [anatomy, neuroscience, biology, evolutionary psychology, etc.] of his time. I have quoted Hume's Treatise on this.

Thus my claim;
the moral potentiality [oughtness] existing as physical neural correlates which can be verified and justified within the scientific FSK can emerge as moral facts within a credible moral FSK. [note emerge and emergentism].

I noted in all your post you have not made a single [if any - very rare] reference to any credible sources at all but merely blah blah blah noises from your own mushy brain.
OTOH I have been supplying references left, right and center from credible sources.

I insist your do not make merely noises but justify your claims or condemnation of my view with credible references!

[Veritas Aequitas]

You're missing the logical point about entailment: a non-moral premise can't entail a moral conclusion.

But yes, what we call morally right and wrong is a matter of individual or collective opinion. That's why morality isn't objective.

If morality is objective then it's based on some fact about the world.

That people get upset by certain actions is a fact about the characteristics of humans. It's not just a matter of opinion. It's human psychology.

You are on the right track with human psychology driven by physical biological and moral facts.

It is not about individual or group moral opinions and belief but the inherent universal psychological drives supported by the physical neural correlates in the brain and body that is verifiable by science that is a fact, i.e. a moral fact emerging from a credible moral framework and system.

Analogically it is not what food people decide to eat based on their preferences, opinions, beliefs, customs, religions, etc.
E.g. the prescriptive commands, you ought to eat this, you ought not eat this, you ought not to eat too much of this or that, because so and so said this or that. They are merely opinion and beliefs at the superficial perspective. These are not fact of food, nutritional & hunger [biological] per se.

What is fact is the hunger drive as a potential embedded and supported by the physical neural correlates in the brain and chemicals in the body that is verifiable by science which is a fact, i.e. a biological fact of hunger emerging from a credible biological framework and system.

The point is most people do not see the above facts in the that perspective, even with biological facts, thus it is more difficult for most to apprehend physical moral facts in that sense.

Intuitively you are on the right track and the detailed explanation is what I described above.

[Peter Holmes]

There are millions of actions which could be classified as immoral but they are not, because nobody really cares.

Why isn't spitting on the sidewalk immoral? Because it doesn't bother people.

If nobody was upset about killing, then killing wouldn't even come up as a moral issue.

You're missing the logical point about entailment: a non-moral premise can't entail a moral conclusion.

But yes, what we call morally right and wrong is a matter of individual or collective opinion.

Is there ANY thing right or wrong that is NOT a matter of individual or collective opinion, to you?

If yes, then what is it or they?

That's why morality isn't objective.

So, the reason WHY 'morality' is NOT objective is because that is "peter holmes' '' personal or individual opinion.

Hopefully, the CONTRADICTION can be CLEARLY SEEN here and is speaking for ITSELF now.

There's no contradiction in my argument. Morality (moral discourse) deals with what we call moral rightness and wrongness. And it's a fact - not merely my opinion - that what we call moral rightness and wrongness is a matter of individual or collective opinion.

If you think there are no such things as facts - so that what we call objectivity is impossible - then by all means state that claim and support it with a sound argument. (Spoiler: then I'll explain why you're wrong.)

[Veritas Aequitas]

There's no contradiction in my argument. Morality (moral discourse) deals with what we call moral rightness and wrongness. And it's a fact - not merely my opinion - that what we call moral rightness and wrongness is a matter of individual or collective opinion.

If you think there are no such things as facts - so that what we call objectivity is impossible - then by all means state that claim and support it with a sound argument. (Spoiler; then I'll explain why you're wrong.)

You are following the footsteps of the logical positivists [note Ayer] where due to their arrogance based on ignorance insisted that whatever of morality is nonsense and useless.

The influential wrongness of AJ Ayer
Ayer’s work tells us important things about the shortcomings of Anglophone philosophy
Ayer was catapulted to fame by Language, Truth and Logic, a book published at the philosophically precocious age of 26. Inspired by a year in Austria in the company of the Vienna Circle, he had returned to proselytise his version of the group’s creed.

The members of the Vienna Circle—which included Otto Neurath, Rudolf Carnap and Kurt Gödel—did not all agree in detail but they shared a conviction that all philosophical metaphysics and most ethics to date was not so much wrong as meaningless nonsense.
Scientific claims made sense because there was some way of testing their truth. But how can we test, say, whether everything that exists is essentially immaterial or whether an action is morally right or wrong?
These claims appear to be meaningful because they come in the form of grammatically correct sentences with proper words. But since nothing could ever show them to be true or false they were, the Circle believed, meaningless.

https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/phil ... of-aj-ayer

His real change of heart seemed to be a more gradual realisation that his youthful enthusiasm for logical analysis failed to touch on what matters most in life.
“It seems that I have spent my entire time trying to make life more rational and that it was all wasted effort,” he said in 1986.

Subsequent to the defunct logical positivists, the philosophers [you probably are following] made changes, but insufficient to make it more rational, thus your wasted effort in ignorance.

As far as moral facts are concerned I have justified them as matter-of-fact throughout this thread and others.