Faith and reason

[Iwannaplato]

Well, God is omniscient so He should know if there is proof for his existence or not.

So, you take the Bible as the word of God?

As I said, if there is proof of the existence of God, then faith becomes meaningless

Can we then assume you think believing in anything we don't have proof of is meaningless and foolish?

On the other hand, God said that He accepts people just through faith. Therefore there should not be any reason for the existence of God.

Possibly this makes sense if you are a Christian who interprets the quote the way you do, might feel cornered into agreeing. But that has nothing to do with demonstrating there is no reason for the existence of a deity. It doesn't demonstrate anything about ontology.

And, of course, those theists who don't think the Bible or the Torah are the word of God has no reason to just accept an appeal to Biblical authority.

True.

Ah, great, thanks.

Strong belief in the doctrines of a religion, based on spiritual conviction rather than proof.

So, only religious faith, then.

Yes.

I am currently studying several proofs of the existence of God. Some of the proofs are not based on assumptions. Some of them are very hard to counter.

unless your memory of those experiences and your thinking are faulty.

But it seems to make sense to assume that memory is at least to some degree reliable, so many of us, including you it seems, assume things we cannot prove.

[bahman]

Well, God is omniscient so He should know if there is proof for his existence or not.

So, you take the Bible as the word of God?

No. I am challenging Christian only.

As I said, if there is proof of the existence of God, then faith becomes meaningless

Can we then assume you think believing in anything we don't have proof of is meaningless and foolish?

No. To me believing is a way to find the truth. We first believe on something and then try to see if it makes sense or not.

On the other hand, God said that He accepts people just through faith. Therefore there should not be any reason for the existence of God.

Possibly this makes sense if you are a Christian who interprets the quote the way you do, might feel cornered into agreeing. But that has nothing to do with demonstrating there is no reason for the existence of a deity. It doesn't demonstrate anything about ontology.

I agree. I am just challenging Christian God.

I am currently studying several proofs of the existence of God. Some of the proofs are not based on assumptions. Some of them are very hard to counter.

Unless your memory of those experiences and your thinking are faulty.

What do you mean with those experiences?

But it seems to make sense to assume that memory is at least to some degree reliable, so many of us, including you it seems, assume things we cannot prove.

I cannot follow you here. Could you please elaborate?

[Atla]

I am currently studying several proofs of the existence of God. Some of the proofs are not based on assumptions. Some of them are very hard to counter.

Could you point me to one that's hard to counter? (not the Kalam nonsense)

[bahman]

I am currently studying several proofs of the existence of God. Some of the proofs are not based on assumptions. Some of them are very hard to counter.

Could you point me to one that's hard to counter? (not the Kalam nonsense)

For example Anselm’s Second Version of the Ontological Argument.

[Atla]

I am currently studying several proofs of the existence of God. Some of the proofs are not based on assumptions. Some of them are very hard to counter.

Could you point me to one that's hard to counter? (not the Kalam nonsense)

For example Anselm’s Second Version of the Ontological Argument.

I don't think that one makes sense as an omni-god is beyond human imagination, so it's irrelevant what we can and can't imagine. Also, a God that necessarily exists is not greater than a God that doesn't necessarily exist.

One could even argue that a not necessary God had to reach omni-everything status through effort, which is better than simply automatically having omni-everything status.

[bahman]

Could you point me to one that's hard to counter? (not the Kalam nonsense)

For example Anselm’s Second Version of the Ontological Argument.

I don't think that one makes sense as an omni-god is beyond human imagination, so it's irrelevant what we can and can't imagine.

What do you mean by an omni-god is beyond human imagination?

Also, a God that necessarily exists is not greater than a God that doesn't necessarily exist.

So you are attacking the second premise! Could you please elaborate?

One could even argue that a not necessary God had to reach omni-everything status through effort, which is better than simply automatically having omni-everything status.

What if the omni-everything is boundless? This is discussed in Modal Versions of the Argument.

[Atla]

What do you mean by an omni-god is beyond human imagination?

Well how should we correctly imagine things that are infinitely beyond us, so they are unimaginable to us? I don't understand this argument at all. As if humans could ever correctly evaluate an omni-god.

So you are attacking the second premise! Could you please elaborate?

I see no real connection between necessary existence and greatness. Just because something can't be any other way, doesn't mean that it's the best that it can't be any other way.

Take the world for example. Let's say it can't be any other way, and therefore nor can our part of the world be any other way. But our part of the world is mediocre at best. So that's clearly not perfection.

What if the omni-everything is boundless? This is discussed in Modal Versions of the Argument.

2. The existence of an unlimited being is either logically necessary or logically impossible.

Either existence is limited or unlimited, but that says nothing about whether or not existence is a being. And even if existence is an unlimited being, so it's omni-present, it doesn't mean that it's also omni-everything-else.

[bahman]

What do you mean by an omni-god is beyond human imagination?

Well how should we correctly imagine things that are infinitely beyond us, so they are unimaginable to us? I don't understand this argument at all. As if humans could ever correctly evaluate an omni-god.

I think we can imagine infinite things. We are not able to accommodate infinite things such as knowledge though.

So you are attacking the second premise! Could you please elaborate?

I see no real connection between necessary existence and greatness.

I have the same problem with his argument as well. That is however a problem with the third premise of his first argument as well. Philosophers however accept that there is a relation between existence and greatness in both argument (that is something that I don't understand). They however complain about other things, such as the existence is not a property as this apply to his first argument.

Just because something can't be any other way, doesn't mean that it's the best that it can't be any other way.

I agree.

What if the omni-everything is boundless? This is discussed in Modal Versions of the Argument.

2. The existence of an unlimited being is either logically necessary or logically impossible.

Either existence is limited or unlimited, but that says nothing about whether or not existence is a being.

To understand this premise you need to study the whole section before the argument. Moreover, this premise does not talk about existence to be limited or not but it is talking about the existence of an unlimited being.

And even if existence is an unlimited being, so it's omni-present, it doesn't mean that it's also omni-everything-else.

Again, this premise is not talking about whether existence is an unlimited being. I however agree with you that an omni-present being is not necessary omni-everything-else.

[Atla]

I think we can imagine infinite things. We are not able to accommodate infinite things such as knowledge though.

We can sort of imagine the concept of infinity, but correctly imagining an omni-god would mean imagining an infinite thing. Can't fit into our little brains.

To understand this premise you need to study the whole section before the argument. Moreover, this premise does not talk about existence to be limited or not but it is talking about the existence of an unlimited being.

Again, this premise is not talking about whether existence is an unlimited being. I however agree with you that an omni-present being is not necessary omni-everything-else.

That's the problem, there's no good reason to think that existence is a being. So

2. The existence of an unlimited being is either logically necessary or logically impossible.

the existence of an unlimited being is neither logically necessary nor logically impossible.

[bahman]

I think we can imagine infinite things. We are not able to accommodate infinite things such as knowledge though.

We can sort of imagine the concept of infinity, but correctly imagining an omni-god would mean imagining an infinite thing. Can't fit into our little brains.

To understand this premise you need to study the whole section before the argument. Moreover, this premise does not talk about existence to be limited or not but it is talking about the existence of an unlimited being.

Again, this premise is not talking about whether existence is an unlimited being. I however agree with you that an omni-present being is not necessary omni-everything-else.

That's the problem, there's no good reason to think that existence is a being. So

2. The existence of an unlimited being is either logically necessary or logically impossible.

the existence of an unlimited being is neither logically necessary nor logically impossible.

So you are changing the second premise!? What is your point? There is the whole section discussing this premise.

[Atla]

I think we can imagine infinite things. We are not able to accommodate infinite things such as knowledge though.

We can sort of imagine the concept of infinity, but correctly imagining an omni-god would mean imagining an infinite thing. Can't fit into our little brains.

To understand this premise you need to study the whole section before the argument. Moreover, this premise does not talk about existence to be limited or not but it is talking about the existence of an unlimited being.

Again, this premise is not talking about whether existence is an unlimited being. I however agree with you that an omni-present being is not necessary omni-everything-else.

That's the problem, there's no good reason to think that existence is a being. So

2. The existence of an unlimited being is either logically necessary or logically impossible.

the existence of an unlimited being is neither logically necessary nor logically impossible.

So you are changing the second premise!? What is your point? There is the whole section discussing this premise.

I'm saying the 2. premise is obviously false.

[bahman]

We can sort of imagine the concept of infinity, but correctly imagining an omni-god would mean imagining an infinite thing. Can't fit into our little brains.



That's the problem, there's no good reason to think that existence is a being. So

2. The existence of an unlimited being is either logically necessary or logically impossible.

the existence of an unlimited being is neither logically necessary nor logically impossible.

So you are changing the second premise!? What is your point? There is the whole section discussing this premise.

I'm saying the 2. premise is obviously false.

It is not obvious to me.

[Atla]

It is not obvious to me.

It's a false dichotomy. The opposite of "necessary" is "unnecessary", not "impossible". The opposite of "impossible" is "possible", not "necessary". Dunno, let's see this one:

Further, on Malcolm’s view, the existence of an unlimited being is either logically necessary or logically impossible. Here is his argument for this important claim. Either an unlimited being exists at world W or it doesn’t exist at world W; there are no other possibilities. If an unlimited being does not exist in W, then its nonexistence cannot be explained by reference to any causally contingent feature of W; accordingly, there is no contingent feature of W that explains why that being doesn’t exist. Now suppose, per reductio, an unlimited being exists in some other world W’. If so, then it must be some contingent feature f of W’ that explains why that being exists in that world. But this entails that the nonexistence of an unlimited being in W can be explained by the absence of f in W; and this contradicts the claim that its nonexistence in W can’t be explained by reference to any causally contingent feature. Thus, if God doesn’t exist at W, then God doesn’t exist in any logically possible world.

Well this said nothing about "the existence of an unlimited being is either logically necessary or logically impossible". It just said that either an omni-present being exists and is omni-present, or it doesn't exist.
That whole "causally contingent" talk and "at" worlds talk is just obfuscation. An omni-present being IS all the worlds.

3. The existence of an unlimited being is not logically impossible.

Okay

4. Therefore, the existence of God is logically necessary.

No it's not, as the 2nd premise didn't entail what it claimed to entail.

[bahman]

It is not obvious to me.

It's a false dichotomy. The opposite of "necessary" is "unnecessary", not "impossible". The opposite of "impossible" is "possible", not "necessary". Dunno, let's see this one:

I think by necessary he means that God exists in all possible worlds. I however don't understand how he confirms that the second premise is true. I am still reading the article to see if things make sense to me.

Further, on Malcolm’s view, the existence of an unlimited being is either logically necessary or logically impossible. Here is his argument for this important claim. Either an unlimited being exists at world W or it doesn’t exist at world W; there are no other possibilities. If an unlimited being does not exist in W, then its nonexistence cannot be explained by reference to any causally contingent feature of W; accordingly, there is no contingent feature of W that explains why that being doesn’t exist. Now suppose, per reductio, an unlimited being exists in some other world W’. If so, then it must be some contingent feature f of W’ that explains why that being exists in that world. But this entails that the nonexistence of an unlimited being in W can be explained by the absence of f in W; and this contradicts the claim that its nonexistence in W can’t be explained by reference to any causally contingent feature. Thus, if God doesn’t exist at W, then God doesn’t exist in any logically possible world.

Well this said nothing about "the existence of an unlimited being is either logically necessary or logically impossible". It just said that either an omni-present being exists and is omni-present, or it doesn't exist.
That whole "causally contingent" talk and "at" worlds talk is just obfuscation. An omni-present being IS all the worlds.

I agree with what you said about this paragraph but it seems that the article left the details of the argument for interested readers.

3. The existence of an unlimited being is not logically impossible.

Okay

Yes.

4. Therefore, the existence of God is logically necessary.

No it's not, as the 2nd premise didn't entail what it claimed to entail.

Yes, we have to figure out why the second premise is right.

[Atla]

Yes, we have to figure out why the second premise is right.

Certainly! Malcolm's modal version of the ontological argument for God's existence involves several premises, and the second premise you've mentioned is a crucial one. Let's break it down:

Malcolm's second premise states: "The existence of an unlimited being is either logically necessary or logically impossible."

Here's an explanation:

Unlimited Being: In the context of the ontological argument, an "unlimited being" refers to God, conceived as a being with maximal perfection, including attributes like omnipotence, omniscience, and moral perfection.

Logical Necessity or Impossibility: The premise proposes that the existence of such an unlimited being falls into one of two categories: either it is logically necessary or logically impossible.

Logical Necessity: If the existence of an unlimited being is logically necessary, it means that the very concept of such a being implies its existence. In other words, the idea of an unlimited being is self-contained and cannot coherently be thought of as not existing. It exists in all possible worlds by the nature of its definition.

Logical Impossibility: On the other hand, if the existence of an unlimited being is logically impossible, it means that the concept of such a being is inherently contradictory or inconsistent. The idea of an unlimited being cannot coherently be conceived, and therefore, its existence is ruled out in any possible world.

Implications for God's Existence: The second premise sets up a dichotomy – there are no other possibilities besides logical necessity and logical impossibility. If it can be established that the existence of an unlimited being (God) is not logically impossible, then, according to this premise, it must be logically necessary. In this case, God's existence would be necessary in all possible worlds.

It's worth noting that the ontological argument has been a topic of much philosophical debate, and not all philosophers accept its premises or find its logic convincing. Critics often challenge the idea that existence can be deduced from conceptual analysis alone, and they raise objections to the concept of necessity employed in the argument. Different versions of the ontological argument have been presented by various philosophers throughout history, and Malcolm's version is just one of them.

"If the existence of an unlimited being is logically necessary, it means that the very concept of such a being implies its existence."

That looks dumber than I thought. It's also logically necessary that I win the lottery next week, after all I already came up with the concept for it.