Measuring Existence

[Obvious Leo]

JSS. It might be best if you stick to the equations and leave the philosophy for the grown-ups.

[JSS]

JSS. It might be best if you stick to the equations and leave the philosophy for the grown-ups.

I'll discuss that with them when they show up.

[uwot]

That doesn't mean that they physically exist anywhere. They are designated as "fictional characters". And you just proved their existence in concept by using them as you just did .. as "fictional characters".

So what is it about affectance that makes it different from a fictional character?

[JSS]

That doesn't mean that they physically exist anywhere. They are designated as "fictional characters". And you just proved their existence in concept by using them as you just did .. as "fictional characters".

So what is it about affectance that makes it different from a fictional character?

It is physically real. Physical existence is defined as "that which physically affects", aka "physical affectance".

[uwot]

It is physically real. Physical existence is defined as "that which physically affects", aka "physical affectance".

So what affect does affectance account for that the "physically real" forces of nature, as described by physics, don't?

[JSS]

It is physically real. Physical existence is defined as "that which physically affects", aka "physical affectance".

So what affect does affectance account for that the "physically real" forces of nature, as described by physics, don't?

Young's Double Slit for one. Mach-Zehner phenomenon for another. But more significantly, Affectance ontology explains WHY those "forces" exist in the first place. I know that you personally don't care, but generally science likes to know these things for future studies.

And on top of that, Affectance Ontology uses only one field to explain literally all "forces", fields, and particles. And when extended through analogy, Affectance Ontology also organizes and explains all psychology, sociology, and economics. It is a true "Grand Unified Field Theory".

If you want to know why they want such a thing .. go ask them.

[Hobbes' Choice]

It is physically real. Physical existence is defined as "that which physically affects", aka "physical affectance".

So what affect does affectance account for that the "physically real" forces of nature, as described by physics, don't?

Young's Double Slit for one. Mach-Zehner phenomenon for another. But more significantly, Affectance ontology explains WHY those "forces" exist in the first place. I know that you personally don't care, but generally science likes to know these things for future studies..

In answering this question in this way you have contradicted yourself. Because you have already said that affectance is the same as real.
Cite:"It is physically real. Physical existence is defined as "that which physically affects", aka "physical affectance"."
If affectance is the same as real than it cannot "account" for that which science does not.

But in effect all you are doing is appending a name to shit you don't understand. Like calling the ineffable, "god".

[JSS]

In answering this question in this way you have contradicted yourself.

Not in the slightest. Did you even read the question?

But in effect all you are doing is appending a name to shit you don't understand. Like calling the ineffable, "god".

The exact opposite. Physics has been appending names on things that they didn't understand (eg "gravity"). I am the one who is revealing the understanding that they have been leaving out.

[Hobbes' Choice]

In answering this question in this way you have contradicted yourself.

Not in the slightest. Did you even read the question?

But in effect all you are doing is appending a name to shit you don't understand. Like calling the ineffable, "god".

The exact opposite. Physics has been appending names on things that they didn't understand (eg "gravity"). I am the one who is revealing the understanding that they have been leaving out.

You are saying precisely nothing whatever.

[uwot]

Young's Double Slit for one.

That'll do for starters. So, let's hear it.

Affectance ontology explains WHY those "forces" exist in the first place.

It's not clear to me that it does. If you do not distinguish between a thing and its properties, all you are saying is that there are properties. That's hardly news.

I know that you personally don't care, but generally science likes to know these things for future studies.

You've got this arse about tit. I do care, that's why I did philosophy rather than physics, and there is no such thing as a caring science. Some physicists are instrumentalists, for practical purposes, they all are, because, for instance, it simply doesn't matter whether a physicist believes that 'spacetime' is real or not; if they want to describe the force of gravity, there are as yet no better equations than Einstein's, which are predicated on a substance with mechanical properties.

And on top of that, Affectance Ontology uses only one field to explain literally all "forces", fields, and particles.

And as I have said, my own view is that the most plausible explanation for all the phenomena that give the impression that there is a universe made of some stuff, is some stuff the universe is made of. But that, ironically, is metaphysics. Physics already deals with affects, with enormous success.

And when extended through analogy, Affectance Ontology also organizes and explains all psychology, sociology, and economics. It is a true "Grand Unified Field Theory".

I think you may be overreaching yourself, but by all means explain the link between affectance and any of the above.

If you want to know why they want such a thing .. go ask them.

As I pointed out, not all of 'them' particularly care. Have you asked 'them' why they haven't embraced affectance?

[uwot]

Don't knock the monster, mate. The church of the Flying Spaghetti Monster has been officially recognised under New Zealand law as a legitimate religious institution, being neither more nor less plausible than any of its competitors in the battle for the credulous dollar.

If I have offended any believers in the Flying Spaghetti Monster, I am truly sorry. It is not my wish to undermine unobtrusive metaphysical beliefs.

I understand that a decision on the status of the unicorns is pending.

Well, if you take Popper's world 3 argument seriously, they too are real.

JSS is fond of stressing the importance of using precise definitions of terms in the philosophical discourse, an emphasis with which I heartily concur.

I'm all context, me.

He should be heeding his own advice and not speaking of the term "ontological" in a context other than in its commonly accepted usage.

Well, it's a skill in itself to understand what people mean rather than what they say.

[Obvious Leo]

Well, it's a skill in itself to understand what people mean rather than what they say.

Very true, and ordinarily I'm willing to cut people a fair bit of slack, but the distinction between epistemology and ontology is central to any philosophical debate and is especially relevant to physics. The physical properties of objects are always emergent and emergent properties are by definition a construct of the consciousness of the observer of them. Therefore to describe such objects as "ontological" features of reality is not just a misuse of language but demonstrates fundamentally flawed thinking. For instance, the considerable stable of subatomic particles nowadays used in physics must never be regarded as physically real entities in an ontological sense. They are nothing more than a mathematical convention agreed on by an exclusive priesthood of geeks as a useful way of codifying a particular class of observations in a highly contrived experimental scenario. These geeks are to be congratulated for their mathematical virtuosity but if they imagine they have made a discovery about the ontological nature of physical reality then they're living in a fantasy land. There is no valid reason whatsoever why the subatomic world should be modelled in this chosen way and not in some other way and at any tick of the clock they could chuck every one of their particles in the bin labelled "Phlogiston" and start all over again.

[uwot]

The physical properties of objects are always emergent and emergent properties are by definition a construct of the consciousness of the observer of them.

I know your mate Leibniz was a critic, but I still think the distinction between primary and secondary qualities is valid. I don't think primary qualities are emergent. (Other than that all the things we experience are composites.)

Therefore to describe such objects as "ontological" features of reality is not just a misuse of language but demonstrates fundamentally flawed thinking.

That's me fucked then.

For instance, the considerable stable of subatomic particles nowadays used in physics must never be regarded as physically real entities in an ontological sense. They are nothing more than a mathematical convention agreed on by an exclusive priesthood of geeks as a useful way of codifying a particular class of observations in a highly contrived experimental scenario.

It's not always that contrived. As a kid I remember being shown the trails of alpha and beta particles in a cloud chamber (a Petri dish with a bit of dry ice in it, to be honest).

These geeks are to be congratulated for their mathematical virtuosity but if they imagine they have made a discovery about the ontological nature of physical reality then they're living in a fantasy land.

Well, something was making those trails

There is no valid reason whatsoever why the subatomic world should be modelled in this chosen way and not in some other way and at any tick of the clock they could chuck every one of their particles in the bin labelled "Phlogiston" and start all over again.

It's back to the distinction between epistemology and ontology. From the trails in cloud, bubble and wire chambers, you can see the effects of 'something' passing through them. From the shape, length and intensity of those trails, you can work out some of the properties of the cause of those trails and give the properties arbitrary names like mass, charge and spin. So the cause of the trail becomes a collection of properties, which are measurable and therefore can be described mathematically. For the purposes of physics, that's all they are. I don't have a problem with that, and I'm quite happy to use the same terms, but to me the interesting question is the one that goes beyond the physics; the literally metaphysical question of whether these epistemologically undeniable physical properties are properties of something that ontologically obtains. ('Is real' is about as accurate a translation as you are likely to get for those that don't speak philosophese.) My own pet fruitloopery is that 'particles' are knots and twists and waves in big bang stuff. Call me crazy, but I think that properties are properties of something.

[Obvious Leo]

Obvious Leo wrote:
The physical properties of objects are always emergent and emergent properties are by definition a construct of the consciousness of the observer of them.


I know your mate Leibniz was a critic, but I still think the distinction between primary and secondary qualities is valid. I don't think primary qualities are emergent. (Other than that all the things we experience are composites.)

I'm not sure what you mean by this statement. What are primary and secondary qualities? Subatomic particles have properties of mass, charge and spin. Surely you don't disagree that these are emergent properties of an underlying process and thus observer-dependent.

Obvious Leo wrote:
Therefore to describe such objects as "ontological" features of reality is not just a misuse of language but demonstrates fundamentally flawed thinking.


That's me fucked then.

Don't take it too hard, mate, all is not yet lost.

Obvious Leo wrote:
These geeks are to be congratulated for their mathematical virtuosity but if they imagine they have made a discovery about the ontological nature of physical reality then they're living in a fantasy land.


Well, something was making those trails

Obviously. But the story being used to explain them is not the only possible story which could explain them. It's just the story which conforms to the theory.

"It is the THEORY which determines what the observer will observe"...Albert Einstein

It's back to the distinction between epistemology and ontology. From the trails in cloud, bubble and wire chambers, you can see the effects of 'something' passing through them. From the shape, length and intensity of those trails, you can work out some of the properties of the cause of those trails and give the properties arbitrary names like mass, charge and spin. So the cause of the trail becomes a collection of properties, which are measurable and therefore can be described mathematically. For the purposes of physics, that's all they are. I don't have a problem with that, and I'm quite happy to use the same terms, but to me the interesting question is the one that goes beyond the physics; the literally metaphysical question of whether these epistemologically undeniable physical properties are properties of something that ontologically obtains. ('Is real' is about as accurate a translation as you are likely to get for those that don't speak philosophese.) My own pet fruitloopery is that 'particles' are knots and twists and waves in big bang stuff. Call me crazy, but I think that properties are properties of something.

Our positions are closer than you might think ,uwot, because I agree with most of this. Big bang stuff being quanta of energy of course. The main difference is that you want reality to have a stage to perform on and I dispense with this superfluous Newtonian embellishment.

[uwot]

...I still think the distinction between primary and secondary qualities is valid. I don't think primary qualities areq emergent.

I'm not sure what you mean by this statement. What are primary and secondary qualities?

The distinction was most clearly made by John Locke. Primary qualities are things like size, shape and mass, whereas secondary are the more obviously observer dependent colour, smell, taste, sound and feel.

Subatomic particles have properties of mass, charge and spin. Surely you don't disagree that these are emergent properties of an underlying process and thus observer-dependent.

Mass and charge determine how a particle will interact with others, so at a stretch I suppose you could say they are meaningless without interacting with other matter/energy, which, stretching till it hurts, you could call observers. Spin on the other hand is an apparently intrinsic quality that happens to make particles follow a particular (no pun intended) path, with no help from the rest of the world.

...the story being used to explain them is not the only possible story which could explain them. It's just the story which conforms to the theory.

Yeah, but it's a good story. The plot meanders at some points, and some of the peripheral characters are a bit hollow, but it works for me. Of course it's underdetermined (basically, it can't be proved, thanks to Hume), but not only does it conform to the story, it writes itself by making predictions which then are confirmed.

"It is the THEORY which determines what the observer will observe"...Albert Einstein

Well yes and no. If, for instance, you are looking for evidence of gravity waves, you have to do a fair bit of data mining to extract your diamonds from the dirt, so yes: a given hypothesis will determine how a certain data crop will be interpreted, but, naughty scientists aside, you can't make up the data.

Big bang stuff being quanta of energy of course.

Actually no, Leo. Big bang stuff, in my opinion, is the medium that carries the different excitations, like waves and whirlpools on the ocean. There is a family of waves and eddies that make up the standard model, the members of which have discrete values-they are quantised.

The main difference is that you want reality to have a stage to perform on and I dispense with this superfluous Newtonian embellishment.

It's not a stage in the Newtonian space and time stage, those I can do without, it's the bricks and mortar of the theatre.