It's not that unusual of a term. Basically, it's the ontological equivalent of an elementary particle.RCSaunders wrote: ↑Tue Jul 27, 2021 2:04 pmIn all my study of ontology, I have never run across that particular phrase, "ontic simples." The closest concept I've encountered in ontology to what that sounds like is some absurd notion called, "ontic vagueness." It sound quite esoteric to me.Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Tue Jul 27, 2021 11:05 am So you didn't answer if you're familiar with the field of ontology. If you are, are you familiar with the notion of ontic simples?
Unfortunately, most of what goes by the name ontology today is a hodge-podge of ideas based on quantum physics which have nothing to do with ontology. Ah well!
Can Physics Be Too Speculative? / by Sabine Hossenfelder /
- Terrapin Station
- Posts: 4548
- Joined: Wed Aug 03, 2016 7:18 pm
- Location: NYC Man
Re: Can Physics Be Too Speculative? / by Sabine Hossenfelder /
Re: Can Physics Be Too Speculative? / by Sabine Hossenfelder /
yes sometimes I wish those experiences could be changed
Re: Can Physics Be Too Speculative? / by Sabine Hossenfelder /
think about it this way, it was already predetermined at the Big Bang that you wouldn't get a working brain.. so let's blame the damn Big Bang!
Re: Can Physics Be Too Speculative? / by Sabine Hossenfelder /
Thik about it even better. You wouldn't get why my brain works better than yours. So lets just blame the damn Big Bang!
That's equifinality right there
Logical confluence.
That's the sound of... inevitability.
- RCSaunders
- Posts: 4704
- Joined: Tue Jul 17, 2018 9:42 pm
- Contact:
Re: Can Physics Be Too Speculative? / by Sabine Hossenfelder /
I don't doubt you. I've read a lot! of philosophy and philosophers and have just never run across that expression. Perhaps you can point to a source.Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Tue Jul 27, 2021 6:36 pm It's not that unusual of a term. Basically, it's the ontological equivalent of an elementary particle.
- Terrapin Station
- Posts: 4548
- Joined: Wed Aug 03, 2016 7:18 pm
- Location: NYC Man
Re: Can Physics Be Too Speculative? / by Sabine Hossenfelder /
Here's an example of a paper that mentions simples a lot (the first occurrence is on page 537 in the last paragraph, but it's worth reading the whole paper as the topic is related to simples):RCSaunders wrote: ↑Tue Jul 27, 2021 8:36 pmI don't doubt you. I've read a lot! of philosophy and philosophers and have just never run across that expression. Perhaps you can point to a source.Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Tue Jul 27, 2021 6:36 pm It's not that unusual of a term. Basically, it's the ontological equivalent of an elementary particle.
https://andrewmbailey.com/papers/bare_p ... /Davis.pdf
Re: Can Physics Be Too Speculative? / by Sabine Hossenfelder /
Quantum ontology without speculation
Published: 30 January 2021
/ by Matthias Egg /
-------
Existing proposals concerning the ontology of quantum mechanics (QM) either involve speculation
that goes beyond the scientific evidence or abandon realism about large parts of QM.
This paper proposes a way out of this dilemma, by showing that QM as it is formulated
in standard textbooks allows for a much more substantive ontological commitment
than is usually acknowledged.
For this purpose, I defend a non-fundamentalist approach to ontology,
which is then applied to various aspects of QM. In particular, I will defend realism about spin,
which has been viewed as a particularly hard case for the ontology of QM.
#
How to be a realist about spin
The problem with spin
#
Against underdetermination about the ontology of spin
#
Against underdetermination about wave function collapse
#
This concludes (for the time being) my account of a non-speculative ontology for QM.
There are still ontological lessons to be learnt from QM, even if we refuse to engage in speculation.
---------
https://link.springer.com/article/10.10 ... 20-00346-1
---------------------
Published: 30 January 2021
/ by Matthias Egg /
-------
Existing proposals concerning the ontology of quantum mechanics (QM) either involve speculation
that goes beyond the scientific evidence or abandon realism about large parts of QM.
This paper proposes a way out of this dilemma, by showing that QM as it is formulated
in standard textbooks allows for a much more substantive ontological commitment
than is usually acknowledged.
For this purpose, I defend a non-fundamentalist approach to ontology,
which is then applied to various aspects of QM. In particular, I will defend realism about spin,
which has been viewed as a particularly hard case for the ontology of QM.
#
How to be a realist about spin
The problem with spin
#
Against underdetermination about the ontology of spin
#
Against underdetermination about wave function collapse
#
This concludes (for the time being) my account of a non-speculative ontology for QM.
There are still ontological lessons to be learnt from QM, even if we refuse to engage in speculation.
---------
https://link.springer.com/article/10.10 ... 20-00346-1
---------------------
- RCSaunders
- Posts: 4704
- Joined: Tue Jul 17, 2018 9:42 pm
- Contact:
Re: Can Physics Be Too Speculative? / by Sabine Hossenfelder /
Thanks for the link. Perhaps I'm not familiar with the, "simples," idea because I dismissed all ontologies that assumed some kind of underlying, "substrate," to which attributes pertain, as in this example from the article:Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Tue Jul 27, 2021 9:02 pmHere's an example of a paper that mentions simples a lot (the first occurrence is on page 537 in the last paragraph, but it's worth reading the whole paper as the topic is related to simples):RCSaunders wrote: ↑Tue Jul 27, 2021 8:36 pmI don't doubt you. I've read a lot! of philosophy and philosophers and have just never run across that expression. Perhaps you can point to a source.Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Tue Jul 27, 2021 6:36 pm It's not that unusual of a term. Basically, it's the ontological equivalent of an elementary particle.
https://andrewmbailey.com/papers/bare_p ... /Davis.pdf
What's wrong with all of that is the notion that existents are something to which attributes are applied or which attributes, in someway, cause to be what they are. First of all, an ontological entity is whatever its intrinsic attributes (qualities, properties, characteristics) are and no two ontological entities can be identical, that is, every entitiy must have some attribute that is different from all other entities or it does not exist. An entity's attributes do not make an entity what it is, they are what it is.Aristotle and Plato in terms of some external (spatio-temporal) relation in which they stand. For example, suppose that Aristotle and Plato stand in theis six inches from relation; it then follows that they must occupy distinct spatio-temporal locations and thus count as distinct spots. However, as Moreland and Mertzrightly observe, this individuative solution will not work; for a pair of objects to occupy distinct spatio-temporal locations, those objects must already be distinct.
Secondly, what is called, "position," is only the identification of a relationship between entities. The basic relationship between all entities is position. If two things are perceived their relationship in the field of perception is their position in that field. From that comes the concept of space and the idea that two things cannot occupy the same space or position.
The concepts of position and change can actually describe all physical phenomena. A change in position is motion. A change in motion is acceleration. Mass, force, and energy can all be explained in terms of motion and acceleration.
Re: Can Physics Be Too Speculative? / by Sabine Hossenfelder /
well somehow everyone fails to see your genius, you must be above all other humans by now
Re: Can Physics Be Too Speculative? / by Sabine Hossenfelder /
Quantum Mechanics, Plato’s Cave and the Blind Piranha
Can we ever really know the world?
/ By John Horgan on July 24, 2021/
-------.
https://www.scientificamerican.com/arti ... TA4eOPNU6E
----------------------.
Can we ever really know the world?
/ By John Horgan on July 24, 2021/
-------.
https://www.scientificamerican.com/arti ... TA4eOPNU6E
----------------------.
- Terrapin Station
- Posts: 4548
- Joined: Wed Aug 03, 2016 7:18 pm
- Location: NYC Man
Re: Can Physics Be Too Speculative? / by Sabine Hossenfelder /
Yeah, I also don't at all agree with the notion of "bare particulars," but the issue of ontic simples doesn't hinge on that. Ontic simples again are rather like the idea of elementary particles (and on some accounts, the two would be an identical issue). If there aren't elementary particles (ontic simples), then we kind of have a "turtles all the way down" problem, but if there are elementary particles (ontic simples), it's not necessarily the easiest thing to identify them.RCSaunders wrote: ↑Wed Jul 28, 2021 1:10 amThanks for the link. Perhaps I'm not familiar with the, "simples," idea because I dismissed all ontologies that assumed some kind of underlying, "substrate," to which attributes pertain, as in this example from the article:Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Tue Jul 27, 2021 9:02 pmHere's an example of a paper that mentions simples a lot (the first occurrence is on page 537 in the last paragraph, but it's worth reading the whole paper as the topic is related to simples):RCSaunders wrote: ↑Tue Jul 27, 2021 8:36 pm
I don't doubt you. I've read a lot! of philosophy and philosophers and have just never run across that expression. Perhaps you can point to a source.
https://andrewmbailey.com/papers/bare_p ... /Davis.pdf
What's wrong with all of that is the notion that existents are something to which attributes are applied or which attributes, in someway, cause to be what they are. First of all, an ontological entity is whatever its intrinsic attributes (qualities, properties, characteristics) are and no two ontological entities can be identical, that is, every entitiy must have some attribute that is different from all other entities or it does not exist. An entity's attributes do not make an entity what it is, they are what it is.Aristotle and Plato in terms of some external (spatio-temporal) relation in which they stand. For example, suppose that Aristotle and Plato stand in theis six inches from relation; it then follows that they must occupy distinct spatio-temporal locations and thus count as distinct spots. However, as Moreland and Mertzrightly observe, this individuative solution will not work; for a pair of objects to occupy distinct spatio-temporal locations, those objects must already be distinct.
Secondly, what is called, "position," is only the identification of a relationship between entities. The basic relationship between all entities is position. If two things are perceived their relationship in the field of perception is their position in that field. From that comes the concept of space and the idea that two things cannot occupy the same space or position.
The concepts of position and change can actually describe all physical phenomena. A change in position is motion. A change in motion is acceleration. Mass, force, and energy can all be explained in terms of motion and acceleration.
Re: Can Physics Be Too Speculative? / by Sabine Hossenfelder /
That's a pretty good article, socrat44, and it is apparent that at least one of the participants in this thread (he knows who I'm talking about) is completely fooled by the shadows in our little cave.socrat44 wrote: ↑Wed Jul 28, 2021 5:21 am Quantum Mechanics, Plato’s Cave and the Blind Piranha
Can we ever really know the world?
/ By John Horgan on July 24, 2021/
-------.
https://www.scientificamerican.com/arti ... TA4eOPNU6E
----------------------.
_______
Re: Can Physics Be Too Speculative? / by Sabine Hossenfelder /
I've been thinking about QM for 10 years. As we are leaving that particular cave, one of the first things we realize is that people who are likeseeds wrote: ↑Wed Jul 28, 2021 5:28 pmThat's a pretty good article, socrat44, and it is apparent that at least one of the participants in this thread (he knows who I'm talking about) is completely fooled by the shadows in our little cave.socrat44 wrote: ↑Wed Jul 28, 2021 5:21 am Quantum Mechanics, Plato’s Cave and the Blind Piranha
Can we ever really know the world?
/ By John Horgan on July 24, 2021/
-------.
https://www.scientificamerican.com/arti ... TA4eOPNU6E
----------------------.
_______
"Boohoo we don't know the correct interpretation of QM, therefore my version of a Berkeleyen God and my seeds theory and all that holographic shit surely must be true, but people are too dumb to get it!"
can be gently pushed aside.