Immanuel Can wrote:Justintruth wrote:Lacking the possibility to not be is a double negative which is a positive.
Not quite what I meant. I meant that a thing is only a "lack" if it would be a positive gain to
have it. When I say people in the desert "lack" water, I can only mean that it would be better if they
had water, but they don't have it.
To say God "lacks" the ability to self-destroy, one would have to think self-destruction potential was something one could "lack," and it would be better if God
had it.
But I think it's pretty clear that to cease to exist is to become less than to be exactly the same entity but
with real existence included. Thus, definitionally, a non-existent God would be
less than an existent one, and non-existence itself would be a
deficiency, not an advantage.
Thus a Supreme Being could not be said ever to "lack" power to make Himself not exist. The principle clause of the question above is logically contradicted by the hypothetical clause, because the latter contains the word "God" (Supreme Being), and the former contains the predication "destroy himself." Essentially, it's the same problem, therefore, as the one inherent in the old question about God and the big rock.
It's self-contradiction. As C.S. Lewis put it, "Nonsense is still nonsense; even when we use it to speak about God."
I think I see what you mean but the value comparison between there being a god and there not being one presupposes that a situation in which God exists and one in which he does not exist are both conceivable.
My understanding is that a situation in which there is no God is not conceivable and that God is necessary to be conceived of whenever any potential situation is projected as possibibly being. This is because of the relation of God to being.
A situation with no contingent existence would be interesting to look at as a counterexample but it looks like the existence proofs of mathematics might defeat it.
The relation between god and good that founds the arguments you ably describe is very deep and surprising. I think there is a deep relation between our sexuality and ontology - probably due to the effect of hormones on neurology - that causes the exctasy that is reported in mystical understanding of god.
Don't get me wrong. I am not reducing the experience to the doped neurology just hypothesizing its presence and causal efficacy in the sense of natural causality.
The idea is that to be is rooted deep in our survival and reproductive instincts. It can be frustrated - and we should study how suicidal motivations form, (especially before we corner someone in North Korea) but the dominant reality is an association of good with being and even an identification of the terms "good" and "god". You frequently hear not that "God is good" but also that "God is the good" or phrases like that.
It comes too from those who have actual religious experience of god.
I think that the experience of alienation in the existential sense - perhaps even the madness of Nietzsche - occurs in individuals that actualize purely objective ontologies because by definition the exclude the being of the subject and therefore frustrate the desire of the subject to experience it's being. That is a damn crude way to say it but perhaps you will get my point. Nietzsche tried to replace the theist with the ubermench but I think it fails technically because once god is dead so is the access to the genuine experience of being that, because of this relation to "the good" relieves the anxiety and provides the ectasy.
I do understand I think where that point Andelm an the others is coming from experientally. But there is a kind of flaw in those proofs. The meanings of the terms - the correct meanings - are so inaccessible themselves requiring mystical union to experience that the proofs really fail on accessibility of the premises. Worse, the common understandings of these terms -God, good, etc- provide a purely logical misinterpretation of the proofs.
In other words the problem is not to see how the ordinary meaning of the terms - God as a contingent being whose existence would be a fact requiring evidence, good as an adjective that can be ascribed or not to that being etc - can be logically manipulated to prove that in fact God exists, but rather to experience God mystically so the necessity of his existence and the identity of god with the good can be experienced and then - subsequently communicated through these "proofs" which are unlike other proofs designed to frustrate a certain kind of logic
it might seem crazy and it is speculation but seeing how good trips and bad trips play out neurologically may shed some light on the relation between "the good" and what Huxley called "Is-ness" in The Doors of Perception
I really appreciate the quality of your response. In the end I think there is an equivocation between god being the good and it merely being good - better to be exact - for god to exist.
Early Wittgenstein would conceive all of this as nonsense. Nonsense can be spoken about god, sure. The real question is whether the term god itself is nonsense and if not what are the implication for herenutics and the philosophy of language. Only at that level can these issues hope to be parsed.
My own opinion is that the term is not just nonsense in the ordinary sense. If in some sophisticated sense philosophically beyond my ken, it is appropriate to call all speech of god nonsensical, then that account will have to avoid explaining away all of the intellectual and experiential content that is its legitimate reference.