Peter Holmes wrote:
Consider these pairs of claims:
1 Humans are social animals. Humans should be social animals.
2 Human societies have moral codes. Human societies should have moral codes.
3 People instinctively can't commit murder. People shouldn't commit murder.
4 People think murder is wrong. People should think murder is wrong.
But
1 All humans necessarily are social animals therefore it's necessary humans should be social animals.
2 All human societies necessarily have moral codes therefore it's necessary human societies should have moral codes.
3 People instinctively can't commit murder. People shouldn't commit murder.
4 People think murder is wrong. People should think murder is wrong.
I'd rather substitute 'are moral ' for 'moral codes, because codifying morality is a later development from simple moral coherence. Anyway that's a detail.
3 : if it's a universal and defining attribute of humans to be averse to killing other humans then yes, that implies the moral imperative to not kill other humans.But empirically we see that many humans kill other humans often without remorse. So revulsion from killing other people is not a necessarily defining attribute of human nature.
4: Many people who are not certifiably insane think it's all right for a human to kill another human and many more think that under certain circumstances it's all right to do so.Therefore killing another human however repulsive it may feel is not a necessarily defining attribute of human nature. This is an important discussion with many practical applications either way. (E.g. just war, medically- assisted dying, abortion, self defence) . The Biblical Commandment "Thou shalt not kill" is more accurately translated as "thou shalt not murder" and this makes sense because 'murder' was and is to this day limited to certain socially damaging and illegal acts whereas killing other men was and is not always forbidden, except for one or two eccentric cultures such as Jainism or pacifism.
3 and 4 are not the same as 1 and 2. The difference is necessity. It's impossible to contravene necessity. Necessity is a given as in 1 and 2 .
In the cases of 3 and 4 killing is not always forbidden therefore we have the responsibility to decide whether or not the circumstances justify killing. Usually killing other men is forbidden when it's preconceived and the motivation is personal gain. In modern developed societies personal or family revenge is not an extenuating circumstance.
We can test the consequences of people holding a moral opinion, such as that murder is wrong. For example, that may lead to a fall in the murder rate. Then 'when people believe murder is wrong, this leads to a fall in the murder rate' is a falsifiable factual assertion, testable in reality. And if it's true, that shows that there's a causal connection.
It depends on the method of social control. When there is centralised social control with a robust police and criminal justice system you are right.In some region typically a geographical region where smallish societies are scattered and centralised justice is not practicable especially if there is no binding religion, we see vendetta law which can be extremely wasteful of human lives.
But that doesn't and can't turn the moral assertion 'murder is wrong' into a fact. That's just faulty reasoning, extrapolating from (and assuming) that a fall in the murder rate is a good thing - another moral assertion. And if people believed murder is right (as people often have through our history), and that lead to a rise in the murder rate (as it often has through our history), that would similarly merely show a causal connection. It wouldn't and couldn't turn the moral assertion 'murder is right' into a fact. That's similarly just faulty reasoning.
I don't think it's faulty reasoning because if murder was to be permitted mutual trust would break down with everyone suspecting his neighbour.
I agree completely about human social survival and coherence, and how having a moral value such as 'murder is wrong' contributes to them. But that human societies should survive and cohere is a value-judgement, not a fact. (And our future porcine masters will think differently.) Given all the facts we deploy to justify our judgements, they remain judgements (opinions), not facts.
I do agree that the larger presumption that human societies should cohere is a value judgement. Ultimately I reach a subjective judgement life is better than death.
Belinda, I'm addressing this to you, because I'd like to know where you think my reasoning is faulty - if you do. (Univalence and I disagree, but I don't really understand her/his argument, so I'd be grateful to see yours. No worries if you're bored with it all.)
By the way - greetings from a fellow socialist!
Thanks for that. I appreciate your honest challenges as I'm here to learn so I am not bored in the least.
I am glad you are a socialist.