I'm very well aware of the conventional notions of a priori and a posteriori that you're talking about. I reject them for much the same reasons that so many others over the past century have. It's a horribly muddled concept. It requires special pleading wrt what kinds of experience are 'allowed', as well as equivocation and conflating knowledge with justification...Ginkgo wrote:
Yes I know, I already said that.Why propositions can be said to be apriori is contained in the following quote:
A Priori and A Posteriori
The terms "a priori" and "a posteriori" are used primarily to denote the foundations upon which a proposition is known. A given proposition is knowable a priori if it can be known independent of any experience other than the experience of learning the language in which the proposition is expressed, whereas a proposition that is knowable a posteriori is known on the basis of experience. For example, the proposition that all bachelors are unmarried is a priori, and the proposition that it is raining outside now is a posteriori.
The distinction between the two terms is epistemological and immediately relates to the justification for why a given item of knowledge is held. For instance, a person who knows (a priori) that "All bachelors are unmarried" need not have experienced the unmarried status of all—or indeed any—bachelors to justify this proposition. By contrast, if I know that "It is raining outside," knowledge of this proposition must be justified by appealing to someone's experience of the weather.
Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
If you wish to continue to use such a conceptual framework, then that is your choice. If you wish to defend the concept, as you're presenting it, then I'd be glad to walk you through the steps required for seeing that it is an unfounded, unjustifiable, and utterly arbitrary distinction between justification methodology and/or means of learning, not types of knowledge.
On the other hand, if you wish to argue for a Kantian notion of a priori, then I've no argument against it. It's a remarkably different conception than what you've been talking about.