I didn't mean to dodge any questions. Could you ask them again, and I'll try not to miss them this time?
Have I, or anyone here, said anything that means anything other than red and green are different components of colour?
Have I, or anyone here, said anything that means anything other than red and green are different components of colour?
Yeah you should ignore nondualism then, which solves the problem of consciousness and also refutes the RQT. The West isn't ready for it anyway for like another 50 years. And it has nothing to do with religion.Brent.Allsop wrote: ↑Sun May 24, 2020 5:20 pm Hi everyone,
Wow, all this eastern religious stuff is remarkably interesting. I’ve been studying all this in more detail online and on YouTube, trying to catch up with you all on this. However, most of this is a bit off topic with what we’re trying to accomplish with the “Theories of Consciousness” topic on Canonizer and more specifically with the “Representational Qualia Theory” emerging consensus camp we are trying to build and track as much scientific consensus as possible with (including tracking how much consensus there is against the ideas).
The general idea is that we are very sloppy with our epistemology of color (i.e. everyone, including most of the discussions here are qualia blind, as defined in RQT: only use one word for all things ‘red’)
There are currently about 40 of the 50 or so participating experts in the “Approachable Via Science” camp supporting RQT. A very significant amount of consensus that nobody has been able to achieve, anywhere. These 40 people have basically joined this camp, in support of the idea of the importance of improving our epistemology of color. Today, pretty much all of the peer reviewed articles in the world on the neuroscience of perception are completely ‘qualia blind’. In our opinion, this is a terrible problem that needs to be fixed, if we are to ever understand anything about the qualitative nature of consciousness, perception of color, and so on.
According to the supporters of RQT there are a set of ‘correct’ answers to all of the questions in this “Are you Qualia Blind” questioner. How many of you agree that these are the ‘correct’ answers, and that it is important for experimentalists studying perception to understand this (not be qualia blind)
If you agree that these are the ‘correct’ answers, could you help us amplify the wisdom of everyone by supporting at east RQT , if not one of (or create a new one) the supporting sub camps. And if the terminology in RQT can be improved, to better accommodate eastern philosophy, please help us with this, so we can build a better and more accurate scientific consensus about a good epistemology of color. I will do anything in my power to help ‘canonize’ all of you great ideas and integrate it all into this consensus building and tracking topic. The more people that participate, the more it amplifies the wisdom of everyone.
Please help push this field forward, so everyone can know and track, concisely and quantitatively, what all the experts think on this problematic topic. Instead of just nit picking and swearing at each other about what we disagree on, forever, let's find and focus on what we agree on, and change the world.
Hopefully,
Brent Allsop
You seem to have missed the part where I pointed out you can know this, simply by having different words for red and redness, and providing definitions, as is done in effing statements like: "My redness is like your greenness, both of which we call red." And also me pointing out there are 1. week, 2. stronger, and 3. strongest forms of effing the ineffable, (see the accordingly named sections in this paper.) or methods of objectively discovering and verifying the connections between the abstract objective and qualitative subjective.
I guess I did miss this. Could you help me out by providing a simple "happy path" example of using an algorithm, instead of just a sentence, and the advantages of such?Brent.Allsop wrote: ↑Mon May 25, 2020 7:41 pm You missed the point is that when you say "redefine X", you expect a new English sentence and I expect an algorithm.
Algorithms work better in my model.
You are missing my point.Brent.Allsop wrote: ↑Mon May 25, 2020 8:01 pm You seem to have missed the part where I pointed out you can know this, simply by having different words for red and redness, and providing definitions, as is done in effing statements like: "My redness is like your greenness, both of which we call red."
Sure. Invent consciousness.Brent.Allsop wrote: ↑Mon May 25, 2020 8:01 pm I guess I did miss this. Could you help me out by providing a simple "happy path" example of using an algorithm, instead of just a sentence, and the advantages of such?
You are probably right, the supporters of “RQT” may not yet be ready for what you are talking about. So in that case, you start a better, competing camp to “RQT”, and start to build consensus arround that. First you find one person to understand and join the camp. Then the 2 of you 4, 8, 16... And I bet it won't take 50 years, if there is indeed utility for everyone with such models. That's what we're doing with “RQT”
It sounds to me like you are asking me to "invent" a new color, or something? Maybe call it grue, or something? Maybe something like that would be possible, if functionalism can be experimentally verified, and someone comes up with a new 'function' that results in a new grueness experience? But I'm in the camp that predicts intrinsic colors are simply properties of particular molecules, and that you don't 'Invent' grue, you discover it.Skepdick wrote: ↑Mon May 25, 2020 8:04 pmSure. Invent consciousness.Brent.Allsop wrote: ↑Mon May 25, 2020 8:01 pm I guess I did miss this. Could you help me out by providing a simple "happy path" example of using an algorithm, instead of just a sentence, and the advantages of such?
Yes, I think we are in violent agreement. It is all about ostensive things that can be objectively verified. It isn't about semantics or abstract words, it is about the physical definition of those words. And the definition must be a falsifiable pointer to something, whether that be glutamate, or some program. If someone experiences grueness, while no glutamate is present, glutamate = grueness theory falsified. You seem to be predicting grueness can result from some new function or 'program'? Could you provide a falsifiable simple example of such a program that has a new intrinsic grueness quality, so experimentalists could test that? Then it's all up to the experimentalists. If experimentalists discover that glutamate has a gruenness quality, and nobody can falsify that. And nobody can find any function that results in grueness - we then verifiably know which theory is THE ONE, and which theory must be abandoned or considered falsified, right?
After you invent it you can call it what you want - the name is immaterial.Brent.Allsop wrote: ↑Mon May 25, 2020 9:08 pm It sounds to me like you are asking me to "invent" a new color, or something? Maybe call it grue, or something?
But we already performed this experiment with AlexW (look further back in the thread)?Brent.Allsop wrote: ↑Mon May 25, 2020 9:08 pm Maybe something like that would be possible, if functionalism can be experimentally verified, and someone comes up with a new 'function' that results in a new grueness experience?
It goes deeper than that.Brent.Allsop wrote: ↑Mon May 25, 2020 9:08 pm Yes, I think we are in violent agreement. It is all about ostensive things that can be objectively verified. It isn't about semantics or abstract words, it is about the physical definition of those words.
The "something" is continuous - the light spectrum. Colors are discrete.Brent.Allsop wrote: ↑Mon May 25, 2020 9:08 pm And the definition must be a falsifiable pointer to something, whether that be glutamate, or some program.
It's difficult for me to respond to this - your thinking is grounded in words, not in quantities.Brent.Allsop wrote: ↑Mon May 25, 2020 9:08 pm If someone experiences grueness, while no glutamate is present, glutamate = grueness theory falsified. You seem to be predicting grueness can result from some new function or 'program'? Could you provide a falsifiable simple example of such a program that has a new intrinsic grueness quality, so experimentalists could test that? Then it's all up to the experimentalists. If experimentalists discover that glutamate has a gruenness quality, and nobody can falsify that. And nobody can find any function that results in grueness - we then verifiably know which theory is THE ONE, and which theory must be abandoned or considered falsified, right?
My point is trivial.Brent.Allsop wrote: ↑Mon May 25, 2020 9:08 pm It sounds to me like you are asking me to "invent" a new color, or something? Maybe call it grue, or something?
You are proving you are qualia blind, by conflating abstract representations of color, most often physically represented by different voltages on sets of wires, with the intrinsic qualities of AlexW’s conscious knowledge that results from such.Skepdick wrote: ↑Mon May 25, 2020 9:43 pm I asked [AlexW] whether THIS COLOR produces the same experience as THIS COLOR.
He informed me that it does,
And I informed him that they are, in fact, different colors. By design (they have different digital representation).
So I have, in fact invented a new color. It LOOKS like "red" to AlexW, but it isn't.
And your point is qualia blind. Again, all you are doing is adding more abstract bits of resolution to the number of words or representations of colors you are using. Nowhere, do you give any intrinsic definitions any of those additional bit patterns can be labels for.
AlexW could be red/green color blind. This would be the case if he represented both the red wavelengths of light and the green wavelengths of light with your redness. You can’t communicate to such a person what your greenness is like, by just telling him there is a new color he has never experienced, and saying it is greenness. He has never experienced greenness.
I am not conflating anything I am just counting.Brent.Allsop wrote: ↑Mon May 25, 2020 10:35 pm You are proving you are qualia blind, by conflating abstract representations of color, most often physically represented by different voltages on sets of wires, with the intrinsic qualities of AlexW’s conscious knowledge that results from such.
You have this exactly backwards. The number of colors you can recognize determines the number of words you need to speak about qualia.Brent.Allsop wrote: ↑Mon May 25, 2020 10:35 pm And your point is qualia blind. Again, all you are doing is adding more abstract bits of resolution to the number of words or representations of colors you are using.
I don't need to give definitions/labels - I SHOWED IT to you. Ostensively.Brent.Allsop wrote: ↑Mon May 25, 2020 10:35 pm Nowhere, do you give any intrinsic definitions any of those additional bit patterns can be labels for.
You keep confusing your color-blindness for mine. I can see 10 million colors. I only TALK about 100.Brent.Allsop wrote: ↑Mon May 25, 2020 10:35 pm You even brag about a definition for a word like ‘redness’ or ‘xRR1111’ as being ‘irrelevant’, proudly self-proclaiming your colorblindness.
You are suffering from a terrible case of logocentrism!Brent.Allsop wrote: ↑Mon May 25, 2020 10:35 pm AlexW could be red/green color blind. This would be the case if he represented both the red wavelengths of light and the green wavelengths of light with your redness. You can’t communicate to such a person what your greenness is like, by just telling him there is a new color he has never experienced, and saying it is greenness. He has never experienced greenness.
What is "intrinsically green" is a wavelength of 495–570 nmBrent.Allsop wrote: ↑Mon May 25, 2020 10:35 pm You need to use the #2, stronger form of effing the ineffable, and take glycine (working hypothesis of what is intrinsically green)
How? "Computation" and "consciousness" are abstract concepts, not physical ones.
You simply watch the knowledge that is produced by the brain of someone, while you are showing that person different wavelengths of light.
I completely agree and nobody has said anything different than this. But this is ALL you are talking about, which is fine if that is all you are interested in. In your simplistic world, all you need is one word for all things green. Classic qualia blindness. You should own up to being qualia blind (using one word for all things green) and be proud that your model is more efficient for many tasks.
Simply? How?Brent.Allsop wrote: ↑Tue May 26, 2020 12:37 am You simply watch the knowledge that is produced by the brain of someone, while you are showing that person different wavelengths of light.
How do you even know that you are looking for glutamate? Why aren't you looking for plutamate, or nutamate, or any one of a 10 million possible molecules?
How do you know that most people use glutamate to represent red with?Brent.Allsop wrote: ↑Tue May 26, 2020 12:37 am If you see glutamate (what most people use to represent red with),
But I am NOT talking about all things "green" - YOU are doing it and projecting it onto me.Brent.Allsop wrote: ↑Tue May 26, 2020 12:37 am I completely agree and nobody has said anything different than this. But this is ALL you are talking about, which is fine if that is all you are interested in. In your simplistic world, all you need is one word for all things green.
But I am NOT talking about the term "green". YOU ARE!!!Brent.Allsop wrote: ↑Tue May 26, 2020 12:37 am Then tell me which is the correct qualitative definition of the term 'green'.
I don't have a "greenness". I have an experience caused by 495–570 nm light, which I happen to call "green".
But you said that redness is a property of conscious knowledge. Now it's a property of the inverter?Brent.Allsop wrote: ↑Tue May 26, 2020 12:37 am , or your invert's, who has been engineered to have a red/green inverter in his optic nerve, and the inverted person has also has been given a red green inverted dictionary for which physical qualities he defines to be redness and greenness.
But I already know what mu experiences are qualitative like - I am experiencing them. I don't need a linguistic description?Brent.Allsop wrote: ↑Tue May 26, 2020 12:37 am If you don't want to model those kinds of intrinsic qualities, the qualia blind model you are using is better. But to most people, what something is qualitatively like is important to understanding phenomenal consciousness.
Well, lets play that game. Can your model map your own "redness" to a wavelength?Brent.Allsop wrote: ↑Tue May 26, 2020 12:37 am Your qualia blind model is not up to the task of answering question such as: "What is redness like for you?"
Yes, I do.Brent.Allsop wrote: ↑Mon May 25, 2020 5:08 pm It sounds like you think of the word ‘consciousness’ as a label for something different than this?
Oh, OK. Good Question. You’re asking about a section of the video we are still working on, which will soon fully answers this question. You can already see most of it, if you know what to look for. And, this informaiton is contained in Steven Lehar’s work. (notice he is currently the top peer ranked expert in this field). In particular his “The world in your head.”
OK, great, that is what I thought, we are talking about different things.AlexW wrote: ↑Tue May 26, 2020 2:12 amYes, I do.Brent.Allsop wrote: ↑Mon May 25, 2020 5:08 pm It sounds like you think of the word ‘consciousness’ as a label for something different than this?
To sum it up in one sentence:
People (and really anything else) don't have consciousness, they are consciousness.