Despite my repetitions, p-realists seem to interpret that I believe reality is an illusion.
I [as an antirealist(Kantian)] have never claimed 'reality is an illusion'.
To antirealists(Kantian), whatever "is" is real but contingent upon a specific human-based FSERC.
This thread is to present my correct [antirealist] position;
I as an antirealist [Kantian] do not believe reality is an illusion.
It only when philosophical realists claim there is something beyond the empirical, the experienced and possible-to-be-experienced, that antirealist charge the p-realists as chasing an illusion.
You missed my point and so you ended with a strawman.Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Fri May 24, 2024 9:59 am VA says his claims and argument are nuanced, subtle, profound and sublime. Here are some crude, obvious, mundane and tawdry points in response.
1 If all is illusion, then we humans are illusions, and reality is an illusion experienced by illusions.
2 If all is illusion, then there's no perspective from which to conclude that all is illusion.
3 Any claim about reality must come from a realist position.
So an anti-realist claim or argument undermines it self. Iow, anti-realists don't have a leg to stand on.
PH: 1 If all is illusion, then we humans are illusions, and reality is an illusion experienced by illusions.
Antirealists [Kant] do not believe all of reality [all there is] is an illusion.
It only when philosophical realists claim there is something beyond the empirical, the experienced and possible-to-be-experienced, that antirealist charge the p-realists as chasing an illusion.
Here is where I explain your sort of misunderstanding;
To the antirealist [Kantian] reality is all there is, even an illusion has a basis of reality to it, i.e. the neural correlates that generate the illusion.
It only when philosophical realists claim there is something beyond the empirical, the experienced and possible-to-be-experienced, that antirealist charge the p-realists as chasing an illusion.
- Analogy
This is like people of primitive tribeA [aka p-realists] seeing an "oasis" across a river on the desert they do not have access to, and they claim [by inherent instinct] that the "oasis" is absolutely real. They believe if they can get to it, they will have access to the water and dates therein; thus generating some kind of hope.
There is no way they have access to understand what is a 'mirage'.
One day a person-B from another tribeB [antirealists] 100 km away chance upon the primitive tribe who have had experienced and understood that such a 'oasis' is an illusion and it it not something real.
Person B told the people of tribeA that the "oasis' they are seeing is not the real thing.
Since there is no way for the people of tribeA to verify and justify their belief what they perceived is real or false, they naturally stuck to their inherent instinct that the "oasis" they perceived is absolutely real.
In this analogy, person-B [antirealist] did not believe in any illusion; but charged the people of tribe-A [p-realist] is believing in an illusion when they insist the 'oasis' [mirage] is absolutely real.
It only when philosophical realists claim there is something beyond the empirical, the experienced and possible-to-be-experienced, that antirealist charge the p-realists as chasing an illusion.