What could make morality objective?

[Peter Holmes]

Arguments against moral objectivism

4 Instrumentality or goal-consistency arguments

The claim ‘action B is consistent with goal A’ is not a moral assertion, because it says nothing about moral rightness or wrongness.

The claim ‘if we want goal A, then we ought to do action B’ is not a moral assertion. This is an instrumental or goal-consistent use of the word ought, as in ‘if we want to drive safely, we ought to obey traffic signs’.

Objectively demonstrable goal-consistency does not confer objectivity on moral assertions. Consider the following argument.

P1 Goal A is morally right or good.
P2 Action B is demonstrably consistent with goal A.
C Therefore, action B is morally right or good.

Even if this argument is deductively valid, the conclusion’s consistency with the moral opinion in P1 does not make it a fact that action B is morally right or good. That remains a moral opinion.

And anyway, an action that is thought to be morally wrong could nonetheless be considered consistent with a goal that is thought to be morally right – perhaps by arguing that the end justifies the means.

[LuckyR]

The function of morals and morality is to guide humans in their behavioral choices towards "rightness" and away from "wrongness". Unfortunately for moral objectivists, those terms are subjective. Not dissimilar to how a fashion sense or taste guide humans on choices on what to wear towards "attractive" and away from "repulsive".

Of course there are those who don't care how they look, just as there are psychopaths who don't care about how their behavioral choices impact others.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Arguments against moral objectivism

4 Instrumentality or goal-consistency arguments

The claim ‘action B is consistent with goal A’ is not a moral assertion, because it says nothing about moral rightness or wrongness.

The claim ‘if we want goal A, then we ought to do action B’ is not a moral assertion. This is an instrumental or goal-consistent use of the word ought, as in ‘if we want to drive safely, we ought to obey traffic signs’.

Objectively demonstrable goal-consistency does not confer objectivity on moral assertions. Consider the following argument.

P1 Goal A is morally right or good.
P2 Action B is demonstrably consistent with goal A.
C Therefore, action B is morally right or good.

Even if this argument is deductively valid, the conclusion’s consistency with the moral opinion in P1 does not make it a fact that action B is morally right or good. That remains a moral opinion.

And anyway, an action that is thought to be morally wrong could nonetheless be considered consistent with a goal that is thought to be morally right – perhaps by arguing that the end justifies the means.

Your whole argument is a sham.

First we need to define 'what is morality & ethics'.
Morality is the management of evil to enable its related good to manifest.
Then we need to define 'what is evil'.
We need a specific list of what is deemed evil.

For example, "humans killing of humans" is recognized as evil, so it is immoral within the moral FSERC.
The moral maxim is thus 'no human ought to kill humans' as derived from the inherent biological oughtnot-ness to kill humans.
This biological "oughtnot-ness to kill humans" is encoded in the human DNA and is expressed as a neural algorithm that is represented by its physical neural correlates, thus this is objective within the science-biology FSERC.

It is an inherent drive of nature to preserve a species and without the above "oughtnot-ness to kill humans" it would be contradictory, i.e. leading to the extinction of the human species.
When this natural scientific evolutionary fact is inputted into the moral FSERC it is an objective moral fact.

As qualified to the above moral maxim, moral is objective.
Morality is objective must be qualified to a specific list of moral elements, e.g. the above.
Morality cannot be generalized to be objective without the necessary qualifications.

[Alexiev]

Your whole argument is a sham.

First we need to define 'what is morality & ethics'.
Morality is the management of evil to enable its related good to manifest.
Then we need to define 'what is evil'.
We need a specific list of what is deemed evil.

For example, "humans killing of humans" is recognized as evil, so it is immoral within the moral FSERC.
The moral maxim is thus 'no human ought to kill humans' as derived from the inherent biological oughtnot-ness to kill humans.
This biological "oughtnot-ness to kill humans" is encoded in the human DNA and is expressed as a neural algorithm that is represented by its physical neural correlates, thus this is objective within the science-biology FSERC.

This is silly. Since killing people is not considered evil in many cultures, it is, in all probability, not "encoded in our DNA". And even if it were, that would be irrelevant to the question of whether morality is objective. Morals would not be necessary if they were "encoded in our DNA", and the notion that rules of conduct are so encoded is clearly belied by the fact that many people behave immorally.

The notion that morals are encoded in DNA is so contrary to common sense, historical facts, and personal experience that it need not even be refutedl

[Veritas Aequitas]

Your whole argument is a sham.

First we need to define 'what is morality & ethics'.
Morality is the management of evil to enable its related good to manifest.
Then we need to define 'what is evil'.
We need a specific list of what is deemed evil.

For example, "humans killing of humans" is recognized as evil, so it is immoral within the moral FSERC.
The moral maxim is thus 'no human ought to kill humans' as derived from the inherent biological oughtnot-ness to kill humans.
This biological "oughtnot-ness to kill humans" is encoded in the human DNA and is expressed as a neural algorithm that is represented by its physical neural correlates, thus this is objective within the science-biology FSERC.

This is silly. Since killing people is not considered evil in many cultures, it is, in all probability, not "encoded in our DNA". And even if it were, that would be irrelevant to the question of whether morality is objective. Morals would not be necessary if they were "encoded in our DNA", and the notion that rules of conduct are so encoded is clearly belied by the fact that many people behave immorally.

The notion that morals are encoded in DNA is so contrary to common sense, historical facts, and personal experience that it need not even be refutedl

I have mentioned the fundamental of 'morality' [no killing of humans] is encoded in the DNA.
The moral potential is not sufficiently expressed in the majority at present so it is not sufficiently active due to the present circumstances and constraints. This is why at present [unfortunately] there are humans killing humans and it is even legally accepted under certain circumstances in wars, self-defense, death penalty etc.

There are many potentials encoded within the DNA and its manifestations with a time-delay in the unfoldment of its potential.
Note the puberty-potential which is dormant in all humans until the reach a certain age.

The inherent moral potential is unfolding very slowly along with evolution.
Have you read Steven Pinker's

The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined is a 2011 book by Steven Pinker, in which the author argues that violence in the world has declined both in the long run and in the short run and suggests explanations as to why this has occurred. WIKI

Note the positive trend of the abolishment of the death penalties within sovereign nature since 100 year to the present.

Also note the abolishment of chattel* slavery in all countries at present. 'a property owned and can be traded.

The above are evidences the moral potential has been slowly unfolding in time.
It is 'that' which is related to morality is objective, so morality is objective within a moral Framework and System [are you familiar with this FSK - FSERC thing?]

Also note,
There are Two Senses of 'Objectivity'
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39326

One point is without some sort of fixed standards [objective], there is no opportunity for something to act as a guide for moral progress within humanity.
The alternative, i.e. moral subjectivity is 'to each their own' and one has to tolerate whatever is claimed to be moral by each culture. You accept such a condition?

The notion that morals are encoded in DNA is so contrary to common sense, historical facts, and personal experience that it need not even be refutedl

That the majority do not rape or kill their nearest kin and babies [i.e. moral elements] is traceable to where if not from within the DNA?

[Peter Holmes]

Sorry, Alexiev. I responded to you by mistake.

[Peter Holmes]

Arguments against moral objectivism

4 Instrumentality or goal-consistency arguments

The claim ‘action B is consistent with goal A’ is not a moral assertion, because it says nothing about moral rightness or wrongness.

The claim ‘if we want goal A, then we ought to do action B’ is not a moral assertion. This is an instrumental or goal-consistent use of the word ought, as in ‘if we want to drive safely, we ought to obey traffic signs’.

Objectively demonstrable goal-consistency does not confer objectivity on moral assertions. Consider the following argument.

P1 Goal A is morally right or good.
P2 Action B is demonstrably consistent with goal A.
C Therefore, action B is morally right or good.

Even if this argument is deductively valid, the conclusion’s consistency with the moral opinion in P1 does not make it a fact that action B is morally right or good. That remains a moral opinion.

And anyway, an action that is thought to be morally wrong could nonetheless be considered consistent with a goal that is thought to be morally right – perhaps by arguing that the end justifies the means.

Your whole argument is a sham.

First we need to define 'what is morality & ethics'.
Morality is the management of evil to enable its related good to manifest.
Then we need to define 'what is evil'.
We need a specific list of what is deemed evil.

For example, "humans killing of humans" is recognized as evil, so it is immoral within the moral FSERC.
The moral maxim is thus 'no human ought to kill humans' as derived from the inherent biological oughtnot-ness to kill humans.
This biological "oughtnot-ness to kill humans" is encoded in the human DNA and is expressed as a neural algorithm that is represented by its physical neural correlates, thus this is objective within the science-biology FSERC.

It is an inherent drive of nature to preserve a species and without the above "oughtnot-ness to kill humans" it would be contradictory, i.e. leading to the extinction of the human species.
When this natural scientific evolutionary fact is inputted into the moral FSERC it is an objective moral fact.

As qualified to the above moral maxim, moral is objective.
Morality is objective must be qualified to a specific list of moral elements, e.g. the above.
Morality cannot be generalized to be objective without the necessary qualifications.

Go back to the distinction between facts - things that are the case, expressed by factual assertions with truth-value - and judgements, beliefs and opinions. And don't bother with your 'FSK' bleating, because you're happy to appeal to facts to support your moral objectivity.

You say there are facts about human nature - for example, behaviour encoded in human DNA, and a historical decline in homicide and slavery as evidence for the gradual affect of that DNA encoding. And you say it's a fact that, if members of a species all kill each other, the species would go extinct. (Within an FSK, of course.)

So you're down with facts and evidence for them. And again, your condition that these facts are matters of intersubjective consensus is irrelevant, because you're still happy to cite them to support your moral argument.

What you still don't and can't recognise is that no fact - how ever produced - can ever entail a moral conclusion. And that's why you have to begin with your definition of morality as the reduction of evil and the promotion of its opposite good. You can't deduce moral conclusions from facts, so you have to assume the moral premise, and then impose it on your argument.

For example: 'human DNA encodes an inhibition towards killing other humans'. (Leave aside the truth of this factual assertion. Suppose it's true.) But then what? Does that mean it's morally wrong for humans to kill humans? And if so, why? Your silly answer is: well, morality is about reducing evil and promoting good. And it's obviously evil for humans to kill humans, and obviously good if they don't.

And why so? Well, it's obviously evil for a species to destroy itself, and obviously good if it doesn't.

As I've been saying, a moral assumption has to be in place as a premise in an argument with a moral conclusion. And your argument demonstrates this. You're not arguing from factual premises to a moral conclusion. You're going backwards from those facts to your moral premise.

And you obscure what you're doing with blather about 'inputting' actual facts into a moral FSK, which 'outputs' what you call moral facts.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Arguments against moral objectivism

4 Instrumentality or goal-consistency arguments

The claim ‘action B is consistent with goal A’ is not a moral assertion, because it says nothing about moral rightness or wrongness.

The claim ‘if we want goal A, then we ought to do action B’ is not a moral assertion. This is an instrumental or goal-consistent use of the word ought, as in ‘if we want to drive safely, we ought to obey traffic signs’.

Objectively demonstrable goal-consistency does not confer objectivity on moral assertions. Consider the following argument.

P1 Goal A is morally right or good.
P2 Action B is demonstrably consistent with goal A.
C Therefore, action B is morally right or good.

Even if this argument is deductively valid, the conclusion’s consistency with the moral opinion in P1 does not make it a fact that action B is morally right or good. That remains a moral opinion.

And anyway, an action that is thought to be morally wrong could nonetheless be considered consistent with a goal that is thought to be morally right – perhaps by arguing that the end justifies the means.

Your whole argument is a sham.

First we need to define 'what is morality & ethics'.
Morality is the management of evil to enable its related good to manifest.
Then we need to define 'what is evil'.
We need a specific list of what is deemed evil.

For example, "humans killing of humans" is recognized as evil, so it is immoral within the moral FSERC.
The moral maxim is thus 'no human ought to kill humans' as derived from the inherent biological oughtnot-ness to kill humans.
This biological "oughtnot-ness to kill humans" is encoded in the human DNA and is expressed as a neural algorithm that is represented by its physical neural correlates, thus this is objective within the science-biology FSERC.

It is an inherent drive of nature to preserve a species and without the above "oughtnot-ness to kill humans" it would be contradictory, i.e. leading to the extinction of the human species.
When this natural scientific evolutionary fact is inputted into the moral FSERC it is an objective moral fact.

As qualified to the above moral maxim, moral is objective.
Morality is objective must be qualified to a specific list of moral elements, e.g. the above.
Morality cannot be generalized to be objective without the necessary qualifications.

Go back to the distinction between facts - things that are the case, expressed by factual assertions with truth-value - and judgements, beliefs and opinions. And don't bother with your 'FSK' bleating, because you're happy to appeal to facts to support your moral objectivity.

I have argued
There are Two Senses of 'What is Fact'
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39587

PH's What is Fact is Illusory
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39577

I am now reading a few books and articles on 'what is fact' and the conclusion is 'your sort of what is fact' must be abandoned with 'what is proposition'.
What is relevant is merely stick to statement.
The truth of statements are contingent upon a human-based FSERC, of which the scientific FSERC is the most credible and objective.

As such, what is realistic and objective is my FSERC approach to 'what is fact' [if the term fact is to be used], i.e. objective moral fact.

You say there are facts about human nature - for example, behaviour encoded in human DNA, and a historical decline in homicide and slavery as evidence for the gradual affect of that DNA encoding. And you say it's a fact that, if members of a species all kill each other, the species would go extinct. (Within an FSK, of course.)

So you're down with facts and evidence for them. And again, your condition that these facts are matters of intersubjective consensus is irrelevant, because you're still happy to cite them to support your moral argument.

What you still don't and can't recognise is that no fact - how ever produced - can ever entail a moral conclusion. And that's why you have to begin with your definition of morality as the reduction of evil and the promotion of its opposite good. You can't deduce moral conclusions from facts, so you have to assume the moral premise, and then impose it on your argument.

For example: 'human DNA encodes an inhibition towards killing other humans'. (Leave aside the truth of this factual assertion. Suppose it's true.) But then what? Does that mean it's morally wrong for humans to kill humans? And if so, why? Your silly answer is: well, morality is about reducing evil and promoting good. And it's obviously evil for humans to kill humans, and obviously good if they don't.

And why so? Well, it's obviously evil for a species to destroy itself, and obviously good if it doesn't.

As I've been saying, a moral assumption has to be in place as a premise in an argument with a moral conclusion. And your argument demonstrates this. You're not arguing from factual premises to a moral conclusion. You're going backwards from those facts to your moral premise.

And you obscure what you're doing with blather about 'inputting' actual facts into a moral FSK, which 'outputs' what you call moral facts.

I had argued,
Whatever is fact, truth, reality, objective must be contingent upon a human-based FSERC.
A moral fact, truth, reality and objectivity is contingent upon a human-based moral FSERC.
What is needed here is to establish a necessary moral FSERC with its constitution and processes.

[Peter Holmes]

Your whole argument is a sham.

First we need to define 'what is morality & ethics'.
Morality is the management of evil to enable its related good to manifest.
Then we need to define 'what is evil'.
We need a specific list of what is deemed evil.

For example, "humans killing of humans" is recognized as evil, so it is immoral within the moral FSERC.
The moral maxim is thus 'no human ought to kill humans' as derived from the inherent biological oughtnot-ness to kill humans.
This biological "oughtnot-ness to kill humans" is encoded in the human DNA and is expressed as a neural algorithm that is represented by its physical neural correlates, thus this is objective within the science-biology FSERC.

It is an inherent drive of nature to preserve a species and without the above "oughtnot-ness to kill humans" it would be contradictory, i.e. leading to the extinction of the human species.
When this natural scientific evolutionary fact is inputted into the moral FSERC it is an objective moral fact.

As qualified to the above moral maxim, moral is objective.
Morality is objective must be qualified to a specific list of moral elements, e.g. the above.
Morality cannot be generalized to be objective without the necessary qualifications.

Go back to the distinction between facts - things that are the case, expressed by factual assertions with truth-value - and judgements, beliefs and opinions. And don't bother with your 'FSK' bleating, because you're happy to appeal to facts to support your moral objectivity.

I have argued
There are Two Senses of 'What is Fact'
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39587

PH's What is Fact is Illusory
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39577

I am now reading a few books and articles on 'what is fact' and the conclusion is 'your sort of what is fact' must be abandoned with 'what is proposition'.
What is relevant is merely stick to statement.
The truth of statements are contingent upon a human-based FSERC, of which the scientific FSERC is the most credible and objective.

As such, what is realistic and objective is my FSERC approach to 'what is fact' [if the term fact is to be used], i.e. objective moral fact.

You say there are facts about human nature - for example, behaviour encoded in human DNA, and a historical decline in homicide and slavery as evidence for the gradual affect of that DNA encoding. And you say it's a fact that, if members of a species all kill each other, the species would go extinct. (Within an FSK, of course.)

So you're down with facts and evidence for them. And again, your condition that these facts are matters of intersubjective consensus is irrelevant, because you're still happy to cite them to support your moral argument.

What you still don't and can't recognise is that no fact - how ever produced - can ever entail a moral conclusion. And that's why you have to begin with your definition of morality as the reduction of evil and the promotion of its opposite good. You can't deduce moral conclusions from facts, so you have to assume the moral premise, and then impose it on your argument.

For example: 'human DNA encodes an inhibition towards killing other humans'. (Leave aside the truth of this factual assertion. Suppose it's true.) But then what? Does that mean it's morally wrong for humans to kill humans? And if so, why? Your silly answer is: well, morality is about reducing evil and promoting good. And it's obviously evil for humans to kill humans, and obviously good if they don't.

And why so? Well, it's obviously evil for a species to destroy itself, and obviously good if it doesn't.

As I've been saying, a moral assumption has to be in place as a premise in an argument with a moral conclusion. And your argument demonstrates this. You're not arguing from factual premises to a moral conclusion. You're going backwards from those facts to your moral premise.

And you obscure what you're doing with blather about 'inputting' actual facts into a moral FSK, which 'outputs' what you call moral facts.

I had argued,
Whatever is fact, truth, reality, objective must be contingent upon a human-based FSERC.
A moral fact, truth, reality and objectivity is contingent upon a human-based moral FSERC.
What is needed here is to establish a necessary moral FSERC with its constitution and processes.

We all know you've argued that, ad nauseam. And I've shown that your argument is fallacious - equally ad nauseam, no doubt. Perhaps we should both stop. They cry.

[Peter Holmes]

Arguments against moral objectivism

5 Anti-realist arguments for moral objectivity

Anti-realist arguments sometimes have the following form.

We humans necessarily perceive, know and describe reality in human ways. Therefore, either we can never know what reality really is, or there is no such thing as reality-as-it-really-is. (See Kant’s invocation and denial of the existence of noumena: things-in-themselves.)

So we have to construct a model of reality based on the ways it appears to us. (See Kant’s phenomena: appearances.) And recently this view has been called model-dependent realism or constructivism.

It follows that, since we have to construct or create what we call facts and, therefore, objectivity – we can construct what we can call moral facts – so that morality is or can be objective.

And, in line with the philosophical ‘turn to language’, this argument can take a linguistic form, as follows.

Agreement on the use of signs is all that constitutes what we call facts and, therefore, objectivity. So if we say x is morally right or wrong, then it’s a fact that x is morally right or wrong. This could be called the ‘that’s-how-we-use-these-words’ argument for moral objectivity.

Some counters to anti-realist moral objectivism are as follows.

To construct a model of reality is not to construct reality. If it were, then of what is the model a model? So we do not construct so-called moral facts, any more than we construct facts of any kind.

If there are no noumena (things-in-themselves), then there are also no phenomena (appearances). Of what are phenomena phenomena?

We can describe things in countless different ways. But a description is not the described. The described does not depend on the description. And we cannot describe things and their properties into or out of existence.

Pending evidence for the existence of abstract or non-physical things, the word existence means physical existence. So if there are moral facts, then they are physical things or properties – the burden of proof for the existence of which is with moral objectivists and realists, and unmet, so far, to my knowledge.

Though it is necessary for communication, agreement on the use of signs in descriptions does not constitute what we call facts and, therefore, objectivity. For example, we may agree on the use of words in the factual assertion 'there are pink unicorns on the moon'.

Therefore, the ‘that’s-how-we-use-these-words’ argument for moral objectivity is invalid, as it would be for any other kind of objectivity.

[Skepdick]

To construct a model of reality is not to construct reality.

Which reality are you constructing a model of?

We can describe things in countless different ways.

Which things are you describing?

But a description is not the described.

Which described are you describing?

Peter "Dumb Cunt" Holmes is just going to keep riding the fence between the definite and the indefinite.

The fence between determinate and indeterminate.
The fence between the identifiable and the unidentifiable.

Why? Because he's a time-thieving cunt.

[Skepdick]

Therefore, the ‘that’s-how-we-use-these-words’ argument for moral objectivity is invalid, as it would be for any other kind of objectivity.

Enforcement of social norms (such as the (in)validity of arguments) is an empirical example of the objectivity of morality.

There exists an object in the world (in this case that object is Peter "Dumb Cunt" Holmes) which performs the enforcement of said objective norms.

This Dumb Cunt object operates on the implicit assumption that arguments OUGHT to be valid.

Valid argument - Good! Allowed! Correct!
Invalid argument - Baaad! Disalowed! Incorrect!

This is how the thought police operates while lying to you about the "subjectivity" of morality.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Go back to the distinction between facts - things that are the case, expressed by factual assertions with truth-value - and judgements, beliefs and opinions. And don't bother with your 'FSK' bleating, because you're happy to appeal to facts to support your moral objectivity.

I have argued
There are Two Senses of 'What is Fact'
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39587

PH's What is Fact is Illusory
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39577

I am now reading a few books and articles on 'what is fact' and the conclusion is 'your sort of what is fact' must be abandoned with 'what is proposition'.
What is relevant is merely stick to statement.
The truth of statements are contingent upon a human-based FSERC, of which the scientific FSERC is the most credible and objective.

As such, what is realistic and objective is my FSERC approach to 'what is fact' [if the term fact is to be used], i.e. objective moral fact.

You say there are facts about human nature - for example, behaviour encoded in human DNA, and a historical decline in homicide and slavery as evidence for the gradual affect of that DNA encoding. And you say it's a fact that, if members of a species all kill each other, the species would go extinct. (Within an FSK, of course.)

So you're down with facts and evidence for them. And again, your condition that these facts are matters of intersubjective consensus is irrelevant, because you're still happy to cite them to support your moral argument.

What you still don't and can't recognise is that no fact - how ever produced - can ever entail a moral conclusion. And that's why you have to begin with your definition of morality as the reduction of evil and the promotion of its opposite good. You can't deduce moral conclusions from facts, so you have to assume the moral premise, and then impose it on your argument.

For example: 'human DNA encodes an inhibition towards killing other humans'. (Leave aside the truth of this factual assertion. Suppose it's true.) But then what? Does that mean it's morally wrong for humans to kill humans? And if so, why? Your silly answer is: well, morality is about reducing evil and promoting good. And it's obviously evil for humans to kill humans, and obviously good if they don't.

And why so? Well, it's obviously evil for a species to destroy itself, and obviously good if it doesn't.

As I've been saying, a moral assumption has to be in place as a premise in an argument with a moral conclusion. And your argument demonstrates this. You're not arguing from factual premises to a moral conclusion. You're going backwards from those facts to your moral premise.

And you obscure what you're doing with blather about 'inputting' actual facts into a moral FSK, which 'outputs' what you call moral facts.

I had argued,
Whatever is fact, truth, reality, objective must be contingent upon a human-based FSERC.
A moral fact, truth, reality and objectivity is contingent upon a human-based moral FSERC.
What is needed here is to establish a necessary moral FSERC with its constitution and processes.

We all know you've argued that, ad nauseam. And I've shown that your argument is fallacious - equally ad nauseam, no doubt. Perhaps we should both stop. They cry.

Who are the "we," you are hallucinating phantoms in this case.
I have provided valid counters to all your arguments.

What you did is invoking science to support your what is fact [which is actually illusory] and I have countered that, but you dare not respond to it:
PH: 'What is Fact' is Confirmed by Science
viewtopic.php?t=42258

[Veritas Aequitas]

Arguments against moral objectivism

5 Anti-realist arguments for moral objectivity

Anti-realist arguments sometimes have the following form.

We humans necessarily perceive, know and describe reality in human ways. Therefore, either we can never know what reality really is, or there is no such thing as reality-as-it-really-is. (See Kant’s invocation and denial of the existence of noumena: things-in-themselves.)

So we have to construct a model of reality based on the ways it appears to us. (See Kant’s phenomena: appearances.) And recently this view has been called model-dependent realism or constructivism.

It follows that, since we have to construct or create what we call facts and, therefore, objectivity – we can construct what we can call moral facts – so that morality is or can be objective.

And, in line with the philosophical ‘turn to language’, this argument can take a linguistic form, as follows.

Agreement on the use of signs is all that constitutes what we call facts and, therefore, objectivity. So if we say x is morally right or wrong, then it’s a fact that x is morally right or wrong. This could be called the ‘that’s-how-we-use-these-words’ argument for moral objectivity.

Some counters to anti-realist moral objectivism are as follows.

To construct a model of reality is not to construct reality. If it were, then of what is the model a model? So we do not construct so-called moral facts, any more than we construct facts of any kind.

If there are no noumena (things-in-themselves), then there are also no phenomena (appearances). Of what are phenomena phenomena?

We can describe things in countless different ways. But a description is not the described. The described does not depend on the description. And we cannot describe things and their properties into or out of existence.

Pending evidence for the existence of abstract or non-physical things, the word existence means physical existence. So if there are moral facts, then they are physical things or properties – the burden of proof for the existence of which is with moral objectivists and realists, and unmet, so far, to my knowledge.

Though it is necessary for communication, agreement on the use of signs in descriptions does not constitute what we call facts and, therefore, objectivity. For example, we may agree on the use of words in the factual assertion 'there are pink unicorns on the moon'.

Therefore, the ‘that’s-how-we-use-these-words’ argument for moral objectivity is invalid, as it would be for any other kind of objectivity.

With reference to my arguments, your above is a strawman ad nauseum.
'We' have pointed your fallacies many times.

The speculated assertion 'there are pink unicorns on the moon' is an empirical possibility within the science-biology FSERC because all the variables therein are empirical-based.
It is just a matter of bringing the possible empirical evidence to be confirmed by science-biology.
Because there is no consensus agreement to the above speculation within a FSERC [a criterial for objectivity] there is no consideration of objectivity for this statement.

If a speculation is raised, i.e. there are square-circles in Mars, this is outright nonsensical because there is no empirical possibility to such a contradiction.
Even if there is a group of millions insisting on such a claim, there is no question of any possibility of objectivity [zero] to it.

There are two senses of 'what is fact'.
Your sense of 'what is fact' is grounded on an illusion.
So it is a non-starter to prove to you 'objective moral facts' exist since you are relying on an illusory 'what is fact'.

[Peter Holmes]

Arguments against moral objectivism

5 Anti-realist arguments for moral objectivity

Anti-realist arguments sometimes have the following form.

We humans necessarily perceive, know and describe reality in human ways. Therefore, either we can never know what reality really is, or there is no such thing as reality-as-it-really-is. (See Kant’s invocation and denial of the existence of noumena: things-in-themselves.)

So we have to construct a model of reality based on the ways it appears to us. (See Kant’s phenomena: appearances.) And recently this view has been called model-dependent realism or constructivism.

It follows that, since we have to construct or create what we call facts and, therefore, objectivity – we can construct what we can call moral facts – so that morality is or can be objective.

And, in line with the philosophical ‘turn to language’, this argument can take a linguistic form, as follows.

Agreement on the use of signs is all that constitutes what we call facts and, therefore, objectivity. So if we say x is morally right or wrong, then it’s a fact that x is morally right or wrong. This could be called the ‘that’s-how-we-use-these-words’ argument for moral objectivity.

Some counters to anti-realist moral objectivism are as follows.

To construct a model of reality is not to construct reality. If it were, then of what is the model a model? So we do not construct so-called moral facts, any more than we construct facts of any kind.

If there are no noumena (things-in-themselves), then there are also no phenomena (appearances). Of what are phenomena phenomena?

We can describe things in countless different ways. But a description is not the described. The described does not depend on the description. And we cannot describe things and their properties into or out of existence.

Pending evidence for the existence of abstract or non-physical things, the word existence means physical existence. So if there are moral facts, then they are physical things or properties – the burden of proof for the existence of which is with moral objectivists and realists, and unmet, so far, to my knowledge.

Though it is necessary for communication, agreement on the use of signs in descriptions does not constitute what we call facts and, therefore, objectivity. For example, we may agree on the use of words in the factual assertion 'there are pink unicorns on the moon'.

Therefore, the ‘that’s-how-we-use-these-words’ argument for moral objectivity is invalid, as it would be for any other kind of objectivity.

With reference to my arguments, your above is a strawman ad nauseum.
'We' have pointed your fallacies many times.

The speculated assertion 'there are pink unicorns on the moon' is an empirical possibility within the science-biology FSERC because all the variables therein are empirical-based.
It is just a matter of bringing the possible empirical evidence to be confirmed by science-biology.
Because there is no consensus agreement to the above speculation within a FSERC [a criterial for objectivity] there is no consideration of objectivity for this statement.

If a speculation is raised, i.e. there are square-circles in Mars, this is outright nonsensical because there is no empirical possibility to such a contradiction.
Even if there is a group of millions insisting on such a claim, there is no question of any possibility of objectivity [zero] to it.

There are two senses of 'what is fact'.
Your sense of 'what is fact' is grounded on an illusion.
So it is a non-starter to prove to you 'objective moral facts' exist since you are relying on an illusory 'what is fact'.

No, your sense of 'what is fact' is grounded on an illusion.

You say a fact is not a thing that exists, or has occurred, or is true. Instead, you say a fact is a thing that exists only within a human 'framework and system of knowledge' - so that facts - and therefore reality/the universe - depend on humans. And that's both false, and anyway irrationally anthropocentric.

Let's stop saying these things to each other. I'm sure you're as bored as I am, and everyone else is.