Against Facts by Arianna Betti

[Veritas Aequitas]

PH et. al. claimed there are no moral facts based on their version of 'what is fact'.
For morality to be objective moral elements must be factual.
To them, all moral elements are subjective, thus not factual nor objective.
therefore they infer morality is not objective


Here is a view that counter the Analytic Philosophy's concept of 'what is fact' as a sham and illusory.
Thus PH et. al. cannot rely on their illusory facts to counter morality is not objective.

'Against Facts' by Arianna Betti.
]https://www.amazon.com/Against-Facts-Pr ... 0262029219
An argument that the major metaphysical theories of facts give us no good reason to accept facts in our catalog of the world.

In this book Arianna Betti argues that we have no good reason to accept facts in our catalog of the world, at least as they are described by the two major metaphysical theories of facts.
She claims that neither of these theories is tenable neither the theory according to which facts are special structured building blocks of reality nor the theory according to which facts are whatever is named by certain expressions of the form the fact that such and such.
There is reality, and there are entities in reality that we are able to name, but, Betti contends, among these entities there are no facts.

Drawing on metaphysics, the philosophy of language, and linguistics, Betti examines the main arguments in favor of and against facts of the two major sorts, which she distinguishes as compositional and propositional, giving special attention to methodological presuppositions.
She criticizes compositional facts (facts as special structured building blocks of reality) and the central argument for them, Armstrong's truthmaker argument.
She then criticizes propositional facts (facts as whatever is named in the fact that statements) and what she calls the argument from nominal reference, which draws on Quine's criterion of ontological commitment.

Betti argues that metaphysicians should stop worrying about facts, and philosophers in general should stop arguing for or against entities on the basis of how we use language.

The Analytic Philosophers sense of fact is illusory.
PH's What is Fact is Illusory
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39577

On the other hand, my basis of what is fact is based on the antirealist version, i.e. a FSERC based fact which is not an absolutely independent fact;
What is a Fact?
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=29486


Discuss??
Views??

[Veritas Aequitas]

Notes:
Here are two reviews of Betti's book which will give an idea of her arguments Against Facts [analytic tradition]:

Reviewed by Maria van der Schaar, Leiden University
ndpr.nd.edu/reviews/against-facts/

Reviewed by William F. Vallicella
philpapers.org/archive/VALABA-2.pdf

Truthmaking. Are Facts Still Really Indispensable?
https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/ ... ml?lang=en
I conclude that it is useful to distinguish two concepts of facts, which at the same time indicate two different approaches to facts as truth-makers: categorial facts (described in Sections 2 and 3) and deflationary facts (described in Sections 4 and 5). Categorial facts are understood as specific categories of entities: true propositions, propositional ideal truths corresponding to true propositions, or worldly instantiations of universals by particulars. Deflationary facts, on the other hand, denote facts as truthmakers regardless of the category of entities to which they belong. Both conceptions of fact can be found in the recent debate. As a result of significant criticism of categorial facts, the defender of facts can appeal to deflationary facts. But even here it is difficult to justify their use as truthmakers, so it is better to appeal to other entities as truthmakers.
There may be a role for facts somewhere, but it [facts] doesn’t seem to be in truth-making theory.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Notes: KIV

[Veritas Aequitas]

Here is a summary from AI re Against Facts by Arianna Betti;

Compositional facts are believed to be real objects in the world that make sentences true. Betti argues that they are not necessary because relations themselves can unify a sentence’s terms. For example, the fact that loves relates a and b is enough to show that a loves b, without needing a compositional fact.

Propositional facts are seen as true propositions, or the meaning of sentences. Betti argues against these by saying that that-clauses, which are used to refer to propositions, cannot be singular terms. This means that they cannot refer to objects in the world and therefore cannot be facts.

In summary, Betti argues against compositional facts by saying that relations themselves can unify a sentence’s terms, and against propositional facts by saying that that-clauses cannot refer to objects in the world.

If facts (analytic version) are to be abandoned, alternatives for what is fact according to the webpage could be relations between objects in the world.

[Age]

PH et. al. claimed there are no moral facts based on their version of 'what is fact'.

"veritas aequitas" claims that there is no actual 'reality/Universe', if human beings did not come to exist, but there are 'objective moral facts', if, or if not, human beings exist. Yet, "veritas aequitas" is yet to name just one, supposed, 'objective moral fact'.

For morality to be objective moral elements must be factual.
To them, all moral elements are subjective, thus not factual nor objective.
therefore they infer morality is not objective


Here is a view that counter the Analytic Philosophy's concept of 'what is fact' as a sham and illusory.
Thus PH et. al. cannot rely on their illusory facts to counter morality is not objective.

'Against Facts' by Arianna Betti.
]https://www.amazon.com/Against-Facts-Pr ... 0262029219
An argument that the major metaphysical theories of facts give us no good reason to accept facts in our catalog of the world.

In this book Arianna Betti argues that we have no good reason to accept facts in our catalog of the world, at least as they are described by the two major metaphysical theories of facts.
She claims that neither of these theories is tenable neither the theory according to which facts are special structured building blocks of reality nor the theory according to which facts are whatever is named by certain expressions of the form the fact that such and such.
There is reality, and there are entities in reality that we are able to name, but, Betti contends, among these entities there are no facts.

Drawing on metaphysics, the philosophy of language, and linguistics, Betti examines the main arguments in favor of and against facts of the two major sorts, which she distinguishes as compositional and propositional, giving special attention to methodological presuppositions.
She criticizes compositional facts (facts as special structured building blocks of reality) and the central argument for them, Armstrong's truthmaker argument.
She then criticizes propositional facts (facts as whatever is named in the fact that statements) and what she calls the argument from nominal reference, which draws on Quine's criterion of ontological commitment.

Betti argues that metaphysicians should stop worrying about facts, and philosophers in general should stop arguing for or against entities on the basis of how we use language.

The Analytic Philosophers sense of fact is illusory.
PH's What is Fact is Illusory
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39577

On the other hand, my basis of what is fact is based on the antirealist version, i.e. a FSERC based fact which is not an absolutely independent fact;
What is a Fact?
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=29486


Discuss??
Views??

[Veritas Aequitas]

Btw, at present I am reading the book 'Against Facts' by Arianna Betti who argued your concept of what is fact is a sham.

Nuff said. Deep incomprehension. Of what do reality and its 'entities' (revealing obfuscation) consist?

I have read the preface and part of the intro.
At present just take note, there are alternative views to your 'what is fact' which I have argued is an illusion and sham from Analytic Philosophy. Preferably if you can read this as an alternative view to your linguistic ideology.
I have also argued Analyticism is already half-dead at present, you are clinging to very archaic ideology, i.e. related to the linguistic FSK.
I will present more details after I have read and understand the book.

Countering without fully understanding the book is meaningless.
As I had stated, my mentioned of Betti is just to show [for the present only] there are alternative views of the majority Analyticism 'what is fact'.

Generally, what Betti argued is Analyticism 'what is fact' is only valid within its closed language-game re the linguistic-turn with its specific rules and definitions.
The Analyticism's 'what is fact' is illusory and cannot be really real within a reality-FSK like the scientific FSREC.
I will present more detail in the other thread later.

To repeat, in my opinion, much of the analytic movement constituted a wrong-turn to language. Because what do analytic philosophers analyse? Thought, ideas, concepts? And, if so, are those things amenable to analysis in the way that physical reality is amenable to scientific analysis? And if so, what kind of analysis, and with what results? It is and always was dressed up nonsense.

When I see the word concept, I reach for the fly-swatter. The myth of the mind, containing mental things and events, continues to befog our understanding. 'What is fact?' 'Well, it's a concept.' Sounds like an answer, sounds impressively technical - but it explains absolutely nothing.

If Betti 'generally' says that a fact exists only within a language game, then that mistakes what we say for the way things are. And here's the point: it's as mistaken to deny facts, such as identity - sameness and difference - in reality, as it is to insist on linguistic identity in reality outside language. Both mistakes testify to the dazzling power of language - evident in the silliness of truth-maker/truth-bearer theory, and other correspondence theories of truth.

For example, the things we call cats and dogs and rocks and stones and trees are what they are, how ever we identify, name and describe them, and whether we say they're the same as or different from each other.

While you may reject certain views of the Analytic Tradition, you nevertheless adopted their definition of what is fact, i.e. a feature of reality, that is the case, states of affairs or just-is that is independent of the individual's opinions, judgement, beliefs.
You have defined 'what is fact' countless times.
That is what Betti reject as 'fact'.

And I've shown why Betti is wrong to do so.

Where?
You cannot provide a substantial counter against Betti until you have read and understand [not necessary agree with] her book.