The so-called realists has hijacked and bastardized the term 'real' with their ideology of realism.
In serious philosophical consideration Indirect Realism is not realistic as defined below;
What is realistic [of varying degrees] is conditioned upon an embodied human-based FSRC.
Here are the notes that support Indirect Realism is not realistic taken from
https://philosophyalevel.com/aqa-philos ... erception/
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Indirect Realism is the view that:
The external world exists independently of the mind (hence, realism)
But we perceive the external world indirectly, via sense data (hence, indirect)
Indirect realism says the immediate object of perception is sense data. This sense data is caused by, and represents, the mind-independent external world.
![Image](https://philosophyalevel.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/indirect-realism-768x183.jpg)
Sense data can be described as the content of perceptual experience.
It’s not a physical thing, it exists in the mind. However, sense data is said to be caused by and represent mind-independent physical objects (see diagram above).
Sense data is private. No one else can experience your sense data.
This avoids the problems with direct realism described above. For example, differences in perceptual variation can be explained by differences in sense data. The object itself stays the same throughout even if the sense data changes.
PROBLEMS FOR INDIRECT REALISM
1. BERKELEY: MIND-INDEPENDENT OBJECTS ARE TOTALLY DIFFERENT TO SENSE DATA
Again, indirect realism says what we perceive is sense data that resembles the mind-independent external world. But George Berkeley (the idealism philosopher) questions how it’s possible for mind-dependent sense data to resemble so-called mind-independent objects in any way.
For example, sense data constantly changes, but mind-independent objects do not. The perceptual variation argument demonstrates this: One moment my sense data may be of a square table, the next it’s diamond-shaped. The sense data changes, but the mind-independent object doesn’t – so how can the two things resemble each other?
Further, how can the properties of sense data be like the properties of mind-independent objects? We say that a table is square, but how can my sense data be square? How can the squareness of a (mind-independent) table be like the squareness of sense data? They are two completely different kinds of things!
These major differences between sense data and mind-independent objects undermine the indirect realist claim that sense data is caused by and resembles mind-independent objects.
2. SCEPTICISM AND THE VEIL OF PERCEPTION
A problem for indirect realism is that it leads to scepticism about the nature and existence of the external world.
![Image](https://philosophyalevel.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/veil-of-perception-1-2048x966.jpg)
Look at the two diagrams above. What would be the difference from the perceiver’s perspective between the two?
What difference would it make to the perceiver if there was no physical world at all?
The answer, surely, is nothing.
If we only perceive sense data, and not the object itself, how can we know anything about the external world?
There is no way of telling if the sense data is an accurate representation of the external world – or even that there is an external world at all!
We can’t get beyond the veil of perception (sense data) to access the external world behind it. So, how can indirect realism justify its claim that there is a mind-independent external world that causes sense data if we never actually perceive the mind-independent external world itself?
The Veil Problem:
How can we be sure our sense data accurately represent the external world? Is it like a veil that might distort reality?
Indirect realist replies to scepticism
Russell’s reply: External world is the best hypothesis
Bertrand Russell, an indirect realist, concedes that there is no way we can conclusively defeat this sceptical argument and prove the existence of the external world. So, instead, we must treat the external world as a hypothesis.
Note Russell admitted
"there is no way we can conclusively defeat this sceptical argument and prove the existence of the external world" of offer merely the best hypothesis.
3. The Homunculus Problem:
Who or what interprets the sense data? This can lead to an infinite regress if there's a little "person" in our heads interpreting the data.
From the above, Indirect Realism cannot be realistic.