Solution to Fitch's Paradox

[learis]

As I understand it, Fitch's paradox seems to be the strange conclusion that if all truths are knowable, then all truths MUST be known. In other words, it's impossible for there to be an unknown truth if all truths are knowable.

Here's the original argument for this. I've taken the argument from wikipedia:

Suppose p is a sentence that is an unknown truth; that is, the sentence p is true, but it is not known that p is true. In such a case, the sentence "the sentence p is an unknown truth" is true; and, if all truths are knowable, it should be possible to know that "p is an unknown truth". But this isn't possible, because as soon as we know "p is an unknown truth", we know that p is true, rendering p no longer an unknown truth, so the statement "p is an unknown truth" becomes a falsity. Hence, the statement "p is an unknown truth" cannot be both known and true at the same time. Therefore, if all truths are knowable, the set of "all truths" must not include any of the form "something is an unknown truth"; thus there must be no unknown truths, and thus all truths must be known.

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I wanted to take an attempt at providing a solution to this paradox.

My solution is this: In the sentence "p is an unknown truth", we need to examine the specific word "is".

Let's say there was a ball that fell out of a bag into a forest, and no one knew for 3 years.
In the first year where no one knew, it can be said "it's unknown the ball is in the forest"... or more simply it's an unknown truth. But to be very specific what we are really saying is: "at this point in time, it's unkown the ball is in the forest".

In the second year we can say the same.

In the third year, Jimmy stumbles upon the ball. According to this paradox, it's not possible for this unknown truth to be true anymore because Jimmy now knows it. And more nonsensically this unknown truth could have never existed in the first place and all truths must be known.

This illustrates the flaw of this paradox as well as the solution. Timing must be taken into consideration for the word "is". It's logically allowed for both unknown truths to exist and for all truths to be knowable. Once an unknown truth becomes known, it doesn't become false. Because the "unknown" aspect of the statement logically could only ever apply to it for the time that no one knew about it. So statements like "p is an unknown truth" can be true because they are temporally bound and "is" can only ever refer to the time when they are unknown. To be more specific, what the sentence is truly saying is: "At a certain specific time or range of time p is an unknown truth". That solves this paradox.

[Age]

As I understand it, Fitch's paradox seems to be the strange conclusion that if all truths are knowable, then all truths MUST be known.

When you say, 'MUST be', do you mean 'already be'?

In other words, it's impossible for there to be an unknown truth if all truths are knowable.

To me, this does not make sense.

To me, there can be, and are, countless 'unknown truths' at any 'period of time'.

As long as there exists some thing that 'can know', then all truths are knowable. But, just because all truths are knowable in no way means that at any 'period of time' all truths are already known.

Here's the original argument for this. I've taken the argument from wikipedia:

Suppose p is a sentence that is an unknown truth; that is, the sentence p is true, but it is not known that p is true. In such a case, the sentence "the sentence p is an unknown truth" is true; and, if all truths are knowable, it should be possible to know that "p is an unknown truth". But this isn't possible, because as soon as we know "p is an unknown truth", we know that p is true, rendering p no longer an unknown truth, so the statement "p is an unknown truth" becomes a falsity. Hence, the statement "p is an unknown truth" cannot be both known and true at the same time. Therefore, if all truths are knowable, the set of "all truths" must not include any of the form "something is an unknown truth"; thus there must be no unknown truths, and thus all truths must be known.

Here is another example of just absurdity, nonsense, and/or illogicality, which is then attempted to be passed off as 'a paradox'.

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I wanted to take an attempt at providing a solution to this paradox.

What is the, supposed, 'actual paradox'?

Are you aware that there exists definitions of the word 'paradox', which completely oppose each other? So, what is your definition of the 'paradox' word, which you are using here?

My solution is this: In the sentence "p is an unknown truth", we need to examine the specific word "is".

Let's say there was a ball that fell out of a bag into a forest, and no one knew for 3 years.
In the first year where no one knew, it can be said "it's unknown the ball is in the forest"... or more simply it's an unknown truth. But to be very specific what we are really saying is: "at this point in time, it's unkown the ball is in the forest".

In the second year we can say the same.

In the third year, Jimmy stumbles upon the ball. According to this paradox, it's not possible for this unknown truth to be true anymore because Jimmy now knows it. And more nonsensically this unknown truth could have never existed in the first place and all truths must be known.

1. That there are 'unknown truths', which, 'one day', will become known, as long as 'knowing beings' exist, is known.

2. What is the 'actual' 'unknown truth', itself, is exactly, is never, 'yet', known. Though it is 'currently' known that there are always 'unknown', or 'yet to be known', truths.

3. It is not a Truth that all truths 'MUST already be known'.

This illustrates the flaw of this paradox as well as the solution. Timing must be taken into consideration for the word "is". It's logically allowed for both unknown truths to exist and for all truths to be knowable. Once an unknown truth becomes known, it doesn't become false. Because the "unknown" aspect of the statement logically could only ever apply to it for the time that no one knew about it. So statements like "p is an unknown truth" can be true because they are temporally bound and "is" can only ever refer to the time when they are unknown. To be more specific, what the sentence is truly saying is: "At a certain specific time or range of time p is an unknown truth". That solves this paradox.

Did you, already, answer what a 'paradox' here even is or is referring to, exactly?

[Impenitent]

not all possible knowers of knowledge know everything...

what's his favorite color?

I don't know, you don't know, but he does...

-Imp

[Walker]

As I understand it, Fitch's paradox seems to be the strange conclusion that if all truths are knowable, then all truths MUST be known. In other words, it's impossible for there to be an unknown truth if all truths are knowable.

Why waste thought on a faulty premise?

The correct premise: If all truths are knowable, then all truths CAN be known. Knowability requires a sufficient capacity to know. A lack of knowablity capacity gave rise to the expression: if it was a snake it would have bitten you.

[Walker]

As I understand it, Fitch's paradox seems to be the strange conclusion that if all truths are knowable, then all truths MUST be known. In other words, it's impossible for there to be an unknown truth if all truths are knowable.

Why waste thought on a faulty premise?

The correct premise: If all truths are knowable, then all truths CAN be known. Knowability requires a sufficient capacity to know. A lack of knowablity capacity gave rise to the expression: if it was a snake it would have bitten* you.

* or is it, bit?