FDP has a Cognitive Moral Deficit in Morality

[Veritas Aequitas]

2) Make the argument in your own words please. It's is not clear how you want us to integrated the title of the thread, article, your brief assertions, and FDP's position is some coherent whole.

I have already present my thesis in the OP.
FDP is a moral Skeptic.
Boyd claimed moral skeptics [moral facts deniers] has a cognitive moral deficit in Morality.

I have presented Boyd's argument in detail.
Is Boyd wrong or my reference to Boyd wrong?

Note AI's view
viewtopic.php?p=702037#p702037

[FlashDangerpants]

I have presented the full S4.7, show in detail [not cherry pick] where I am wrong.

Strawman. You are trying to be deceptive and bullshit.
Boyd did not claim nor referred to 'brain damage' but merely "cognitive deficit".

Simple common sense should tell you that what you have described is impossible. Here let me repeat the thing you need to understand...

Boyd would be out of work for the rest of his life if he wrote the essay you think you read. On a normal forum, you would get banned for this thread. You are an idiot who cannot read.

You keep blabbering but present no arguments.

I've already explained multiple times that moral skepticism is a meta-ethical position that describe the logical status of expressive sentences such as "it was wrong of you to call me brain damaged". Specifically it implies that the wrongness in the sentence doesn't come from any universal source of right and wrong but from a socially derived and somewhat contingent set.

This does not imply any lack of moral feeling, only a way of decribing how moral feelings arise and on what basis expressive sentences dedscribing them can be justified. Boyd understands this, you can tell that from the sentence I underlined for you. There is no need to delve further than that.

Your entire argument is predicated on you being too ignorant to understand that meta-ethics and ethics are not the same thing. This is a comprehension problem that is entirely of your own making. You should be thoroughly ashamed of yourself for posting this thread.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Simple common sense should tell you that what you have described is impossible. Here let me repeat the thing you need to understand...

Boyd would be out of work for the rest of his life if he wrote the essay you think you read. On a normal forum, you would get banned for this thread. You are an idiot who cannot read.

You keep blabbering but present no arguments.

I've already explained multiple times that moral skepticism is a meta-ethical position that describe the logical status of expressive sentences such as "it was wrong of you to call me brain damaged". Specifically it implies that the wrongness in the sentence doesn't come from any universal source of right and wrong but from a socially derived and somewhat contingent set.

This does not imply any lack of moral feeling, only a way of decribing how moral feelings arise and on what basis expressive sentences dedscribing them can be justified. Boyd understands this, you can tell that from the sentence I underlined for you. There is no need to delve further than that.

Your entire argument is predicated on you being too ignorant to understand that meta-ethics and ethics are not the same thing. This is a comprehension problem that is entirely of your own making. You should be thoroughly ashamed of yourself for posting this thread.

Meta-Ethics is a discussion of Ethical theories, principles and terms.

But you personally claimed to adopt the beliefs of a moral skeptic:

That in itself might be a problem, because we are in danger of agreeing on some stuff and I am a moral skeptic of some sort....
viewtopic.php?p=559314#p559314

Moral skepticism (or moral scepticism in British English) is a class of meta-ethical theories all members of which entail that no one has any moral knowledge. Many moral skeptics also make the stronger, modal claim that moral knowledge is impossible. Moral skepticism is particularly opposed to moral realism: the view that there are knowable and objective moral truths.

I think you made such a claim a few times??

In addition, you, Peter, Sculptor and the like claimed there are no moral facts.

[Atla]

"The anti-realist diagnoses this deficit as a failure to recognize a definitional or otherwise necessary connection between Moral goodness and reasons for action."

This is an insane claim btw. What's wrong with American "philosophers"? Why do they pretend that they are philosophers?

Sure I guess there are anti-realists who do this, and what kind of damage led to this, is an interesting question. But generally, realism vs anti-realism has nothing to do with the connection between Moral goodness and reasons for action. Those two simply come together. The real issue is whether or not we have things that are objectively morally good or not.

[FlashDangerpants]

You keep blabbering but present no arguments.

I've already explained multiple times that moral skepticism is a meta-ethical position that describe the logical status of expressive sentences such as "it was wrong of you to call me brain damaged". Specifically it implies that the wrongness in the sentence doesn't come from any universal source of right and wrong but from a socially derived and somewhat contingent set.

This does not imply any lack of moral feeling, only a way of decribing how moral feelings arise and on what basis expressive sentences dedscribing them can be justified. Boyd understands this, you can tell that from the sentence I underlined for you. There is no need to delve further than that.

Your entire argument is predicated on you being too ignorant to understand that meta-ethics and ethics are not the same thing. This is a comprehension problem that is entirely of your own making. You should be thoroughly ashamed of yourself for posting this thread.

Meta-Ethics is a discussion of Ethical theories, principles and terms.

But you personally claimed to adopt the beliefs of a moral skeptic:

That in itself might be a problem, because we are in danger of agreeing on some stuff and I am a moral skeptic of some sort....
viewtopic.php?p=559314#p559314

I hold a meta-ethical position that falls within the scope of moral skepticism. So I am a moral skeptic of some sort.

Do you seriously intent to interpret that this implies I am unmotivated by morality? That would cross a line, that would be a really bad thing for you to be arguing and I would strongly suggest you reconsider right away.

Moral skepticism (or moral scepticism in British English) is a class of meta-ethical theories all members of which entail that no one has any moral knowledge. Many moral skeptics also make the stronger, modal claim that moral knowledge is impossible. Moral skepticism is particularly opposed to moral realism: the view that there are knowable and objective moral truths.

I think you made such a claim a few times??

In addition, you, Peter, Sculptor and the like claimed there are no moral facts.

This is an emergency for you. You do need to show that you can distinguish between ethics and meta-ethics. You are badly out of your depth and you need to end this thread with an appology and a commitment to do better in future.

[FlashDangerpants]

"The anti-realist diagnoses this deficit as a failure to recognize a definitional or otherwise necessary connection between Moral goodness and reasons for action."

This is an insane claim btw. What's wrong with American "philosophers"? Why do they pretend that they are philosophers?

Sure I guess there are anti-realists who do this, and what kind of damage led to this, is an interesting question. But generally, realism vs anti-realism has nothing to do with the connection between Moral goodness and reasons for action. Those two simply come together. The real issue is whether or not we have things that are objectively morally good or not.

There's a video that did the rounds a while ago where some college age American girl is in police custody and they are asking her if she understands that she just caused a fatal road accident. She says she does understand, but she imediately turns her attention to how she will get to class the next day (spoiler alert, she's not going to class the next day) That's somebody who is unable to link morality to their actions by means of moral motivation. That's what Boyd is describing in this little section of his essay...



Everybody agrees that the girl in that video is fundamentally broken, there's just differences of opinion about how to describe what is broken about her. For him, the basic moral naturalist (a form of realist) position would be that there is a universal truth to the matter that killing people is wrong, and if you have killed somebody then that is clearly and obviously important, and it should matter to you a lot. Boyd recommends his own naturalising realist theory (homeostatic consequentialism) as a very good way of explaining all this.

Against that, he generalises moral antirealism explaining her broken-ness very differently. He thinks that the anti-realist uses something akin to language to link morality to motivation .... as indeed we typically do. My description of Belief Desire Motivation works exactly that way, and Simon Blackburn refers to that BDM as his API which stands for A-priori Principle of Interpretation because beliefs/desires are how we invariably interpret motivation when we ask questions such as "why did he do that?"

If we cannot link somebody's actions to theior beliefs and desires, we automatically consider them mad even if only temporarily. In fact peopel who do something entirely out of character all of a sudden and act agaisnt their own usual set of beliefs and desires will themselves call it a moment of madness.

If we cannot understand a set of beliefs and desires that could motivate somebody in their actions on a general day to day basis, we sould consider that person mad, or sociopathic or something like that as a matter of course. This is what Boyd is referring to, and that is how the anti-realist who holds that beliefs and desires explain motivation would be taken to be describing it as a rule.

There's nothing insane about Boyd. This only because a trainwreck because VA can't handle his basic shit properly.

[Iwannaplato]

Moral skepticism is particularly opposed to moral realism: the view that there are knowable and objective moral truths.

Actually if we translate this in your own language it means that a moral skeptic thinks there is no mind independent morality. That every moral , statement is conditioned on a particular moral FSK. So, it is only supported/justified within that particular moral FSK of which there are many. Basically you are chiding and judging FDP for being an antirealist when it comes to moral realism. And if you look at his language, it parallels your global antirealism, even including an equivalent to a moral FSK term.

In general you are antirealist in relation to all ontology. FDP is antirealist when it comes to moral realism. And very similar arguments that you make can be used against your own moral realism.

The difference is that you claim there is a morality proper FSK, which is what every moral realist does. My morals are the correct ones.

If you didn't pull that move, you'd be forced to notice that there are a variety of moral FSKs and that you are also a moral antirealist.

You and FDP can joust over the term 'objective', but your version of objective is actually what most people would call intersubjective. So, just as FDP says there are local moralities that one can adhere to and have moral feellings around.

So, what you've done is 1) lazy posting - since you don't even integrate the cut and paste of others' work. 2) calling someone out on poor grounds 3) uncharitably avoiding noticing the parallels between his moral antirealism and your ontological antirealism. And by the way, the issue of whether morals objectively exist is an ontological issue.

Instead you could focus on moral skepticism and explain why your think it is incorrect, while integrating the ideas of Boyd.

Because generally when you quote and use people, you misunderstand them or use them despite the fact that what they are saying causes problems for you regarding your own beliefs. Or, as here, it's a kind of floppy mess. You get the sense that it somehow undermines FDPs position so you flight it out there, rather than digesting it first.

[Atla]

"The anti-realist diagnoses this deficit as a failure to recognize a definitional or otherwise necessary connection between Moral goodness and reasons for action."

This is an insane claim btw. What's wrong with American "philosophers"? Why do they pretend that they are philosophers?

Sure I guess there are anti-realists who do this, and what kind of damage led to this, is an interesting question. But generally, realism vs anti-realism has nothing to do with the connection between Moral goodness and reasons for action. Those two simply come together. The real issue is whether or not we have things that are objectively morally good or not.

There's a video that did the rounds a while ago where some college age American girl is in police custody and they are asking her if she understands that she just caused a fatal road accident. She says she does understand, but she imediately turns her attention to how she will get to class the next day (spoiler alert, she's not going to class the next day) That's somebody who is unable to link morality to their actions by means of moral motivation. That's what Boyd is describing in this little section of his essay...



Everybody agrees that the girl in that video is fundamentally broken, there's just differences of opinion about how to describe what is broken about her. For him, the basic moral naturalist (a form of realist) position would be that there is a universal truth to the matter that killing people is wrong, and if you have killed somebody then that is clearly and obviously important, and it should matter to you a lot. Boyd recommends his own naturalising realist theory (homeostatic consequentialism) as a very good way of explaining all this.

Against that, he generalises moral antirealism explaining her broken-ness very differently. He thinks that the anti-realist uses something akin to language to link morality to motivation .... as indeed we typically do. My description of Belief Desire Motivation works exactly that way, and Simon Blackburn refers to that BDM as his API which stands for A-priori Principle of Interpretation because beliefs/desires are how we invariably interpret motivation when we ask questions such as "why did he do that?"

If we cannot link somebody's actions to theior beliefs and desires, we automatically consider them mad even if only temporarily. In fact peopel who do something entirely out of character all of a sudden and act agaisnt their own usual set of beliefs and desires will themselves call it a moment of madness.

If we cannot understand a set of beliefs and desires that could motivate somebody in their actions on a general day to day basis, we sould consider that person mad, or sociopathic or something like that as a matter of course. This is what Boyd is referring to, and that is how the anti-realist who holds that beliefs and desires explain motivation would be taken to be describing it as a rule.

There's nothing insane about Boyd. This only because a trainwreck because VA can't handle his basic shit properly.

I saw that video. What am I supposed to say to the above?

Considering that every view you listed is obviously wrong, even insane, where does that leave us? VA is wrong, so are you, and so is the entirety of American moral "philosophy".

Language has nothing to do with morality, morality is an emotional phenomenon. Realism vs anti-realism in morality has nothing to do with language either.

"That's somebody who is unable to link morality to their actions by means of moral motivation."

People who know what morality is, would never says something bonkers like this. It assumes that morality / moral motivation exists in the girl's consciousness.

[FlashDangerpants]

I saw that video. What am I supposed to say to the above?

Considering that every view you listed is obviously wrong, even insane, where does that leave us? VA is wrong, so are you, and so is the entirety of American moral "philosophy".

As long as we are on the same page talking about the same stuff, then it leaves us better off than before.

Language has nothing to do with morality, morality is an emotional phenomenon. Realism vs anti-realism in morality has nothing to do with language either.

I said akin to becasue there is often supposed to be a similar internal structure at work. Something about morality allows us to link and compare multiple emotive responses, to review and change our minds, to act in accordance with or against our desires for various reasons. Language and logic have similar features. So I respectfully reject your reductivism because prima facie it seems to lack such features.

There are moral theories that place the whole thing within the realm of emotion (see AJ Ayer), they then have to find a way to explain that reasoning aspect that leads to argument and persuasion and so on, it tends to be a bit of a struggle.

There's other theories that place the whole thing within the realm of reason (see Kant), they then have to find a way to explain how reason motivates us to want things and that is a struggle as well.

I welcome you to give us a thread based on your own view, I'm sure it would make for an interesting distraction from VA who has probably worn himself out with all these manic postings over the last couple of weeks.

[Atla]

I saw that video. What am I supposed to say to the above?

Considering that every view you listed is obviously wrong, even insane, where does that leave us? VA is wrong, so are you, and so is the entirety of American moral "philosophy".

As long as we are on the same page talking about the same stuff, then it leaves us better off than before.

Language has nothing to do with morality, morality is an emotional phenomenon. Realism vs anti-realism in morality has nothing to do with language either.

I said akin to becasue there is often supposed to be a similar internal structure at work. Something about morality allows us to link and compare multiple emotive responses, to review and change our minds, to act in accordance with or against our desires for various reasons. Language and logic have similar features. So I respectfully reject your reductivism because prima facie it seems to lack such features.

There are moral theories that place the whole thing within the realm of emotion (see AJ Ayer), they then have to find a way to explain that reasoning aspect that leads to argument and persuasion and so on, it tends to be a bit of a struggle.

There's other theories that place the whole thing within the realm of reason (see Kant), they then have to find a way to explain how reason motivates us to want things and that is a struggle as well.

I welcome you to give us a thread based on your own view, I'm sure it would make for an interesting distraction from VA who has probably worn himself out with all these manic postings over the last couple of weeks.

I already explained that morality, at its core, comes from the conscience, which is a fundamentally emotional, psychological thing. Makes us experience the feelings of right and wrong. And it is best understood by meeting people who have no conscience.

Then via thinking, language we can construct and compare the wider moral systems, implement them in the world.

I continue to be baffled why there are 6387 competing theories about morality, and most of them seem to have it backwards, when it's so simple and obvious what morality is.

[Iwannaplato]

4) it's really irritating that VA starts a new damn thread for points that fit perfectly in previous threads

For example, this cold have been part of
viewtopic.php?t=29659'
Moral Fact Deniers Has Cognitive Deficit in Morality

So, if I check to see if there are new posts or new threads I don't have to wade though the noise of VAs redundant threads to find topics I want to participate in.

Talk about a cognitive deficit in empathy in morality.

[Veritas Aequitas]

I hold a meta-ethical position that falls within the scope of moral skepticism. So I am a moral skeptic of some sort.

Do you seriously intent to interpret that this implies I am unmotivated by morality? That would cross a line, that would be a really bad thing for you to be arguing and I would strongly suggest you reconsider right away.

Moral skepticism (or moral scepticism in British English) is a class of meta-ethical theories all members of which entail that no one has any moral knowledge. Many moral skeptics also make the stronger, modal claim that moral knowledge is impossible. Moral skepticism is particularly opposed to moral realism: the view that there are knowable and objective moral truths.

I think you made such a claim a few times??

In addition, you, Peter, Sculptor and the like claimed there are no moral facts.

This is an emergency for you. You do need to show that you can distinguish between ethics and meta-ethics. You are badly out of your depth and you need to end this thread with an apology and a commitment to do better in future.

You are so arrogant in thinking you know all about morality but from the above your knowledge re morality is very limited.
You should apologize for your ignorance.

Here AI's [wR] view on the point between Metaethics vs Personal Moral Beliefs:

[Me] I understand Metaethics is a discussion [balanced, unbiased, objective] of ethical theories, principles, terms and the like of various moral positions, e.g. moral realism, moral skepticism, moral nihilist and others.
However, when a person decided that he is a moral skeptics, that would be a personal moral belief that will drive his actions specific to that belief.
In this case, should this personal belief be regarded a metaethics?
If yes, why?
If no, how should we categorize this sort of ethical believing?

[AI]

You're right! There's a key distinction to make here between metaethics and personal moral beliefs.

Metaethics vs. Personal Moral Belief
• Metaethics: This is a branch of philosophy that analyzes the nature of morality itself. It doesn't tell you what's right or wrong, but instead asks questions like:
o Are moral truths objective (realism) or relative to cultures (relativism)?
o How do we know what's moral (moral epistemology)?
o What does it mean to say something is "good" or "bad"?

• Personal Moral Belief: This is your individual compass for navigating right and wrong. It's shaped by your upbringing, experiences, and chosen ethical framework (e.g., utilitarianism, deontology). It guides your actions based on what you believe is moral.

So, is a moral skeptic's belief metaethics?
No. While skepticism is a position discussed in metaethics (does objective morality exist?), your personal decision to adopt skepticism is a moral belief, not an analysis of morality itself. You're using a metaethical theory (skepticism) to inform your personal moral compass.

Here's an analogy:
• Metaethics is like studying the science of light and color. It asks how light works, what colors are, etc.
• Personal moral beliefs are like choosing your favorite color for painting. You use your understanding of color (metaethics) to make a personal choice.
Your personal moral belief (skepticism) is informed by metaethics, but it's not the same thing.


How to categorize this ethical belief?
These beliefs can be informed by various ethical theories (like moral skepticism) you encounter in metaethics. But they also involve your own experiences and judgments.

There's no single category, but some possibilities include:
•Moral Philosophy: This is the broader field that encompasses both metaethics and normative ethics (which tells you what's good or bad). Your personal belief would fall under the application of a specific philosophical viewpoint.
•Moral Code: This is a more personal set of principles that guide your actions based on your beliefs.
• Moral Framework: Similar to a moral code, but it might emphasize the thought process behind your decisions, not just the principles themselves.

There are [another] two ways to look at it:
1. Moral Position: You can simply say you hold a skeptical moral position. This indicates you doubt the existence of objective moral truths.
2. Metaethical Influence: You can acknowledge the influence of a metaethical theory (moral skepticism) on your personal moral belief system.

In essence, metaethics provides the philosophical framework for analyzing morality, while personal moral beliefs are the practical application of that framework in your own life.

[FlashDangerpants]

I hold a meta-ethical position that falls within the scope of moral skepticism. So I am a moral skeptic of some sort.

Do you seriously intent to interpret that this implies I am unmotivated by morality? That would cross a line, that would be a really bad thing for you to be arguing and I would strongly suggest you reconsider right away.

Moral skepticism (or moral scepticism in British English) is a class of meta-ethical theories all members of which entail that no one has any moral knowledge. Many moral skeptics also make the stronger, modal claim that moral knowledge is impossible. Moral skepticism is particularly opposed to moral realism: the view that there are knowable and objective moral truths.

I think you made such a claim a few times??

In addition, you, Peter, Sculptor and the like claimed there are no moral facts.

This is an emergency for you. You do need to show that you can distinguish between ethics and meta-ethics. You are badly out of your depth and you need to end this thread with an apology and a commitment to do better in future.

You are so arrogant in thinking you know all about morality but from the above your knowledge re morality is very limited.
You should apologize for your ignorance.

Here AI's [wR] view on the point between Metaethics vs Personal Moral Beliefs:

[Me] I understand Metaethics is a discussion [balanced, unbiased, objective] of ethical theories, principles, terms and the like of various moral positions, e.g. moral realism, moral skepticism, moral nihilist and others.
However, when a person decided that he is a moral skeptics, that would be a personal moral belief that will drive his actions specific to that belief.
In this case, should this personal belief be regarded a metaethics?
If yes, why?
If no, how should we categorize this sort of ethical believing?

[AI]

You're right! There's a key distinction to make here between metaethics and personal moral beliefs.

Metaethics vs. Personal Moral Belief
• Metaethics: This is a branch of philosophy that analyzes the nature of morality itself. It doesn't tell you what's right or wrong, but instead asks questions like:
o Are moral truths objective (realism) or relative to cultures (relativism)?
o How do we know what's moral (moral epistemology)?
o What does it mean to say something is "good" or "bad"?

• Personal Moral Belief: This is your individual compass for navigating right and wrong. It's shaped by your upbringing, experiences, and chosen ethical framework (e.g., utilitarianism, deontology). It guides your actions based on what you believe is moral.

So, is a moral skeptic's belief metaethics?
No. While skepticism is a position discussed in metaethics (does objective morality exist?), your personal decision to adopt skepticism is a moral belief, not an analysis of morality itself. You're using a metaethical theory (skepticism) to inform your personal moral compass.

Here's an analogy:
• Metaethics is like studying the science of light and color. It asks how light works, what colors are, etc.
• Personal moral beliefs are like choosing your favorite color for painting. You use your understanding of color (metaethics) to make a personal choice.
Your personal moral belief (skepticism) is informed by metaethics, but it's not the same thing.


How to categorize this ethical belief?
These beliefs can be informed by various ethical theories (like moral skepticism) you encounter in metaethics. But they also involve your own experiences and judgments.

There's no single category, but some possibilities include:
•Moral Philosophy: This is the broader field that encompasses both metaethics and normative ethics (which tells you what's good or bad). Your personal belief would fall under the application of a specific philosophical viewpoint.
•Moral Code: This is a more personal set of principles that guide your actions based on your beliefs.
• Moral Framework: Similar to a moral code, but it might emphasize the thought process behind your decisions, not just the principles themselves.

There are [another] two ways to look at it:
1. Moral Position: You can simply say you hold a skeptical moral position. This indicates you doubt the existence of objective moral truths.
2. Metaethical Influence: You can acknowledge the influence of a metaethical theory (moral skepticism) on your personal moral belief system.

In essence, metaethics provides the philosophical framework for analyzing morality, while personal moral beliefs are the practical application of that framework in your own life.

Your AI is agreeing with me, so what is your fucking point?

[FlashDangerpants]

4) it's really irritating that VA starts a new damn thread for points that fit perfectly in previous threads

This thread is not getting dropped. VA needs to learn he owes me an appology for his behaviour here.

[FlashDangerpants]

I have presented the full S4.7, show in detail [not cherry pick] where I am wrong.

Strawman. You are trying to be deceptive and bullshit.
Boyd did not claim nor referred to 'brain damage' but merely "cognitive deficit".

Simple common sense should tell you that what you have described is impossible. Here let me repeat the thing you need to understand...

Boyd would be out of work for the rest of his life if he wrote the essay you think you read. On a normal forum, you would get banned for this thread. You are an idiot who cannot read.

You keep blabbering but present no arguments.

Note AI's view on the OP;
viewtopic.php?p=702037#p702037

I am giving you another chance to do the right thing. Here below is the explanation of the text in that photo. It is enough, if you are an honest and capable student of philosophy to show that you desperately need to reverse your present argument right away. And it should warn you about your need to read better in the future.




There's a video that did the rounds a while ago where some college age American girl is in police custody and they are asking her if she understands that she just caused a fatal road accident. She says she does understand, but she imediately turns her attention to how she will get to class the next day (spoiler alert, she's not going to class the next day) That's somebody who is unable to link morality to their actions by means of moral motivation. That's what Boyd is describing in this little section of his essay...



Everybody agrees that the girl in that video is fundamentally broken, there's just differences of opinion about how to describe what is broken about her. For him, the basic moral naturalist (a form of realist) position would be that there is a universal truth to the matter that killing people is wrong, and if you have killed somebody then that is clearly and obviously important, and it should matter to you a lot. Boyd recommends his own naturalising realist theory (homeostatic consequentialism) as a very good way of explaining all this.

Against that, he generalises moral antirealism explaining her broken-ness very differently. He thinks that the anti-realist uses something akin to language to link morality to motivation .... as indeed we typically do. My description of Belief Desire Motivation works exactly that way, and Simon Blackburn refers to that BDM as his API which stands for A-priori Principle of Interpretation because beliefs/desires are how we invariably interpret motivation when we ask questions such as "why did he do that?"

If we cannot link somebody's actions to their beliefs and desires, we automatically consider them mad, even if only temporarily. In fact people who do something entirely out of character all of a sudden and act against their own usual set of beliefs and desires will themselves call it a 'moment of madness'.

If we cannot understand a set of beliefs and desires that could motivate somebody in their actions on a general day to day basis, we should consider that person mad, or sociopathic or something like that as a matter of course. This is what Boyd is referring to, and that is how the anti-realist who holds that beliefs and desires explain motivation would be taken to be describing it as a rule.

There's nothing insane about Boyd. This only because a trainwreck because VA can't handle his basic shit properly.