What could make morality objective?

[Peter Holmes]

Holmes is killin it.

Holmes whatchu think about Wittgenstein's summation: a thought is a proposition with a sense.

Well, I'm a fan of his deflationary approach - the way that 'meaning is use' demystifies all sorts of philosophical nonsense - and I think 'proposition with a sense' is one of his many jokey, tongue-in-cheek teases. Not taking it seriously is the point.

[Skepdick]

Yes, like many of us, I can do what we call thinking. And even moron dick-for-brains tries to, sometimes.

But there's no reason to say that thinking is an abstract or non-physical process - that what we call thought is an abstract or non-physical thing. So where does this idiotic delusion come from? I think it's glaringly obvious.

We can't find what we call thoughts or thinking - or a mind - in a brain. All we find is synaptic firing in brain tissue - physical processes in physical things.

Ah, people have said for millennia - and morons still do - we know that thoughts and thinking and minds exist. So they must be abstract or non-physical things. QED.

And this gateway dualist delusion is grist for the supernaturalist mill - hence IC's tired old canard: you already believe that abstract or non-physical things exist - so why can't fairies and gods exist?

Trouble is, a causal explanation, with no evidence for either the cause or the causal mechanism, is no explanation at all. It's just mysticism. So 'the mind dun it' is as useless as 'a god dun it'.

That's almost as many words as ChatGPT.

Peter "Dumb Cunt" Holmes was asked a simple existence question with a yes/no answer. Do thoughts exist?

Observe the sophistry and mental gymnastics about physicalism, abstract things and brain synapses.

Well, I'm a fan of his deflationary approach

Are you now? On deflationism brain activity is evidence for brain activity. What or where are these thoughts of yours?

[Peter Holmes]

Open question.

What and where is [insert supposed abstract thing], and in what way does it exist?

Answers that beg the question or equivocate on 'thing' and 'exist' are useless. Tip: dogs, synapses and electrochemical processes are examples of things that exist.

[Skepdick]

Open question.

What and where is [insert supposed abstract thing], and in what way does it exist?

Answers that beg the question or equivocate on 'thing' and 'exist' are useless. Tip: dogs, synapses and electrochemical processes are examples of things that exist.

Here are some of the questions that are NOT being asked of Peter "Dumb Cunt" Holmes:
* Is thought abstract?
* Is thought a thing?
* Is thought an abstract thing?
* In what way do thoughts exist?
* Do abstract things exist?

Here are the the question that ARE being asked of Peter "Dumb Cunt" Holmes:
* Do thoughts exist?
* Are thoughts examples of things that exist?

Logic 101. Law of excluded middle. Either thoughts exist; or they don't. It's a yes/no question!

Why the mental gymnastics to avoid answering it?
Is the word "obscurantist" applicable to Peter "Dumb Cunt" Holmes? Most definitely!

obscurantist
/ˌɒbskjʊˈrantɪst/
noun
a person who deliberately prevents the facts or full details of something from becoming known.

[promethean75]

What we have here, gentlemen, is a dispute involving what your homeboy gilbert ryle called a category mistake.

"Ryle argued that it was a mistake to treat the mind as an object made of an immaterial substance because predications of substance are not meaningful for a collection of dispositions and capacities."

Peter 'dumb c*nt' Holmes is saying that what is implied by skep 'dick for brains' dick's use of the word 'thing' (in reference to 'thoughts') is that the subject in question can be described with predications of substance. PH says 'no', u can't do this becuz 'thinking' is a behavior, disposition or capacity, not a substantive material of sorts like a table or bowl of noodles.

[Skepdick]

What we have here, gentlemen, is a dispute involving what your homeboy gilbert ryle called a category mistake.

"Ryle argued that it was a mistake to treat the mind as an object made of an immaterial substance because predications of substance are not meaningful for a collection of dispositions and capacities."

Peter 'dumb c*nt' Holmes is saying that what is implied by skep 'dick for brains' dick's use of the word 'thing' (in reference to 'thoughts') is that the subject in question can be described with predications of substance. PH says 'no', u can't do this becuz 'thinking' is a behavior, disposition or capacity, not a substantive material of sorts like a table or bowl of noodles.

What we have here is another overly-philosophical navel-gazing obscurantist who mistakes elaborate sophistry for intellect.

Spare us the pointless commentary and provide a yes/no answer.

Do your thoughts exist?

Either your thoughts are in the universal category called "existence"; or I'm talking to a chatbot.

[Peter Holmes]

'I can't say what a thought is, or where it is. But thoughts obviously exist, and it's obscurantist to say they don't.'

Projection, or what?

The myth of abstract or non-physical things is ancient - going back to and beyond Plato - potent and pervasive.

[Skepdick]

'I can't say what a thought is, or where it is. But thoughts obviously exist, and it's obscurantist to say they don't.'

But if you can't say what it is or where it is - what evidence can you possibly obtain; or even provide for a phenomenon you can neither identify nor locate ?!?

Awkward....

To repeat. Pending evidence for the existence s̶o̶-̶c̶a̶l̶l̶e̶d̶ ̶a̶b̶s̶t̶r̶a̶c̶t̶ ̶o̶r̶ ̶n̶o̶n̶-̶p̶h̶y̶s̶i̶c̶a̶l̶ ̶t̶h̶i̶n̶g̶s̶ of physical thoughts, belief that they exist is irrational.

The myth of abstract or non-physical things is ancient - going back to and beyond Plato - potent and pervasive.

So where's the evidence for physical thoughts?

[Peter Holmes]

Elsewhere, I wrote the following:

'Pending evidence for the existence of so-called abstract or non-physical things, belief that they exist is irrational.'

Dick-for-brains asks what evidence I have for the existence of physical thoughts. And this gotcha is supposed to show that thoughts must be non-physical. But there's no evidence for the existence of non-physical thoughts - or non-physical anything else. So there's a question-begging vacuum at the heart of the argument for the existence of abstract or non-physical things.

Solution: we call certain electrochemical processes in brains 'thinking', and we say this produces 'thoughts'. There's no need to fantasise about abstract or non-physical things and processes - invented mysteries which fail to explain mysteries of our own invention. Occam's razor can rarely be more fruitfully applied.

If we say a thing is beautiful, is it rational to demand evidence for the existence of beauty? And if there is no such evidence, is it rational to say beauty must be an abstract or non-physical property? And is moral wrongness a similar non-physical property?

[Iwannaplato]

Elsewhere, I wrote the following:

'Pending evidence for the existence of so-called abstract or non-physical things, belief that they exist is irrational.'

Dick-for-brains asks what evidence I have for the existence of physical thoughts. And this gotcha is supposed to show that thoughts must be non-physical. But there's no evidence for the existence of non-physical thoughts - or non-physical anything else. So there's a question-begging vacuum at the heart of the argument for the existence of abstract or non-physical things.

If the question is asked in order to demonstrate the existence of non-physical thoughts, I think it fails. But if the question is using the same criteria to question the existence of thoughts (that are considered physical), then it seems valid to me. If we can't talk about non-physical thoughts because we can't X and yet we can't X when talking about physical thoughts, then perhaps we shouldn't talk about either. Or pressing on the issue my lead to justifications for talking about one or the other or both.

Solution: we call certain electrochemical processes in brains 'thinking', and we say this produces 'thoughts'. There's no need to fantasise about abstract or non-physical things and processes - invented mysteries which fail to explain mysteries of our own invention. Occam's razor can rarely be more fruitfully applied.

Well, 'thinking' seems pretty abstract to me.

When I talk about thinking, I am talking about something that other then electrochemical processes. No matter how carefully, even with an electron microscope, look at those processes I don't find what I am talking about. Note: this is not an argument that it must be something else, but rather that the description isn't working for me.

If we say a thing is beautiful, is it rational to demand evidence for the existence of beauty? And if there is no such evidence, is it rational to say beauty must be an abstract or non-physical property? And is moral wrongness a similar non-physical property?

But that holds for thoughts and thinking. We can see the painting or landscape, but we can't produce evidence, at least in what seems to be a physicalist model, of beauty. Fine. But where is the physical evidence for thoughts. We have plenty of physical evidence for electrochemical processes, yet. To me thoughts and beauty are nearly direct parallels. We have objective things, but not the subjective elements in both situations.

And this is setting aside that I don't think 'physical' is a meaningful category, since it changes and expands over time, not just in terms of the specific 'things' in the set of physical things, but further in the required qualities something physical must have. I mean even neutrinos - passing in their trillions through the earth and us without touching anything - have mass, but there are other supposedly physical things that don't. Is there a clear category 'physical' or does it really just, now, mean real. Is it a spectrum? With things that are more physical and less physical? But that's a different line on the issue.

[Skepdick]

Elsewhere, I wrote the following:

'Pending evidence for the existence of so-called abstract or non-physical things, belief that they exist is irrational.'

Dick-for-brains asks what evidence I have for the existence of physical thoughts. And this gotcha is supposed to show that thoughts must be non-physical. But there's no evidence for the existence of non-physical thoughts - or non-physical anything else. So there's a question-begging vacuum at the heart of the argument for the existence of abstract or non-physical things.

Here is (the ever-growing) list of questions that are NOT being asked of Peter "Dumb Cunt" Holmes:
* Is thought abstract?
* Is thought a thing?
* Is thought physical?
* Is thought non-physical?
* Is thought an abstract thing?
* In what way do thoughts exist?
* Do abstract things exist?

Here is the question that Peter "Dumb Cunt" Holmes is working overtime to avoid:
* Irrespective of the adjective being used to qualify thought (physical or non-physical) - where is the physical evidence that thoughts exist?

Why the mental gymnastics to avoid answering it?
Is the word "obscurantist" applicable to Peter "Dumb Cunt" Holmes? Most definitely!

obscurantist
/ˌɒbskjʊˈrantɪst/
noun
a person who deliberately prevents the facts or full details of something from becoming known.

[Skepdick]

Solution: we call certain electrochemical processes in brains 'thinking', and we say this produces 'thoughts'.

So which electrochemical processes produce thoughts about themselves?
Which electrochemical processes are you talking about when you talk about your wife's favourite food?

[Peter Holmes]

What we have here, gentlemen, is a dispute involving what your homeboy gilbert ryle called a category mistake.

"Ryle argued that it was a mistake to treat the mind as an object made of an immaterial substance because predications of substance are not meaningful for a collection of dispositions and capacities."

Peter 'dumb c*nt' Holmes is saying that what is implied by skep 'dick for brains' dick's use of the word 'thing' (in reference to 'thoughts') is that the subject in question can be described with predications of substance. PH says 'no', u can't do this becuz 'thinking' is a behavior, disposition or capacity, not a substantive material of sorts like a table or bowl of noodles.

Thanks for this. Ryle had a point, but I think there's a deeper problem that he may not have addressed: mistaking predication - a linguistic exercise - for features of reality, which - outside language - are not linguistic, and so have no truth-value. The very trick of calling a property a predicate demonstrates the confusion. However, I don't claim expertise on Ryle, so I may be wrong - happy to be corrected.

I think the issue is purely ontological: do abstract or non-physical things exist? And is the expression 'abstract or non-physical existence' even coherent?

[Peter Holmes]

Elsewhere - in the ontological/metaphysical bog this discussion has been mired in for ages - the mystery of abstraction has recently flared up. And here's VA on the existence of abstract things:

'...I have demonstrated that the existence of abstract-object-proper, e.g. currencies etc. is not irrational.' [sic]

But a currency - and the valuations and exchanges it facilitates - are not things that exist as thoughts or ideas rather than as real, physical things.

Mentalist talk - about minds containing mental things, such as ideas or (more respectable!) concepts, and events - is, and has always been, metaphorical or fictional or mythical. And talk about abstract things and abstraction is completely mired in the myth.

The mind is the soul secularised and faux-respectabilised. It's a mystical, supernaturalist legacy hangover - as are the mental things and events it's supposed to 'contain'. It's metaphor right to the bottom.

[Iwannaplato]

Elsewhere - in the ontological/metaphysical bog this discussion has been mired in for ages - the mystery of abstraction has recently flared up. And here's VA on the existence of abstract things:

'...I have demonstrated that the existence of abstract-object-proper, e.g. currencies etc. is not irrational.' [sic]

But a currency - and the valuations and exchanges it facilitates - are not things that exist as thoughts or ideas rather than as real, physical things.

Mentalist talk - about minds containing mental things, such as ideas or (more respectable!) concepts, and events - is, and has always been, metaphorical or fictional or mythical. And talk about abstract things and abstraction is completely mired in the myth.

The mind is the soul secularised and faux-respectabilised. It's a mystical, supernaturalist legacy hangover - as are the mental things and events it's supposed to 'contain'. It's metaphor right to the bottom.

Presumably also thoughts and thinking are metaphors. We would say patterns in neuronal firing plus endocrine releases and effects.
What isn't a metaphor? We developed language through the motor cortex and our brains are primate. We're time bound and perceive, as individuals, from one place. That makes pretty much everything in language a trope. We just get used to some tropes and we share them. Even the idea of the physical, has do with batches of experiences through our senses. That hardly makes for something literal about objects.