What could make morality objective?

[Veritas Aequitas]

I think it's time to give it a rest. VA simply doesn't seem to be capable of distinguishing between reality and our description of reality.

It's a monumental claim that those two are one and the same thing, a claim overwhelmingly contradicted by scientific knowledge. Yes there is such a philosophical position, but there is a philosophical position for anything.

But VA can't even entertain the possibility that he's wrong. He doesn't seem to be capable of the above distinction between the description and the described.

Looks like he's not simply rejecting this kind of "realism", but can't even comprehend it. He seems to have a major cognitive deficit that makes him incapable of critical thinking, and incapable of ever participating in any more serious philosophical discussion.

Agreed. Maybe another way to show the fallacy is this - and it's staggeringly obvious:

P: A human description of reality cannot be 'independent from the human conditions'. [sic]
C: Therefore, reality is not 'independent from the human conditions'. [sic]

But to confess - I have a perverse desire to reach a million hits, even if it's from bots. And also - maybe - our determination to counter VA's argument is a minor contribution to the wider discussion. I've certainly learnt stuff along the way.

The realism[philosophical] vs antirealism [many types] is one of the most fundamental philosophical contention within philosophy per se.

Realism [philosophical] is driven by an evolutionary default, thus as an ideology it is very primal and proto.

Kant, one of the greatest philosopher of all times, had exposed the falseness of the philosophical realists claim as illusory while accepting it is nevertheless a useful illusion.
Since Kant, there has been a lot of antirealist who had demonstrated that philosophical realism is just not tenable to be realistic.

For realists to brush off the counter arguments is due to psychological desperations and ignorance.

Agreed. Maybe another way to show the fallacy is this - and it's staggeringly obvious:

P: A human description of reality cannot be 'independent from the human conditions'. [sic]
C: Therefore, reality is not 'independent from the human conditions'. [sic]

But to confess - I have a perverse desire to reach a million hits, even if it's from bots. And also - maybe - our determination to counter VA's argument is a minor contribution to the wider discussion. I've certainly learnt stuff along the way.

You keep yelping the above strawman a million times despite my explanations of my position.

VA: Knowledge & Descriptions CANNOT Produce Facts
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39925 Apr 10, 2023

You seem to shameless [philosophically] in ignoring it
and keep repeating your strawman.

But to confess - I have a perverse desire to reach a million hits, even if it's from bots. And also - maybe - our determination to counter VA's argument is a minor contribution to the wider discussion. I've certainly learnt stuff along the way.

I had already gained a lot from what I have posted herein.
I will not be contributing any posts in this thread from herefrom.

[Peter Holmes]

P: A human description of reality cannot be 'independent from the human conditions'. [sic]
C: Therefore, reality is not 'independent from the human conditions'. [sic]

You keep yelping the above strawman a million times despite my explanations of my position.
VA: Knowledge & Descriptions CANNOT Produce Facts
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39925 Apr 10, 2023

Agreed. Knowledge and descriptions cannot produce facts - because features of reality just are or were the case, regardless of what anyone believes, knows or says.

But wait - you say that facts are 'conditioned upon a framework and system of KNOWLEDGE'. So your explanation asserts a massive contradiction. And blather about emergence and realisation is irrelevant.

Your position is untenable.

[Peter Holmes]

Elsewhere, VA makes the following argument from an analogy between human digestion and morality:

'But within all the above, there is a one-size-fit-all, i.e. all the above variations and complexity are reducible to:
-one generic digestive system with
-one purpose to extract essential nutrients for
-one purpose to support human life.

It is the same for morality as a human function:
the complex set of subjective moral variations with different "convention among people" in terms of culture, traditions, customs, etc., are reducible to a "one-size-fit-all"
-one generic moral system
-one purpose to general moral principles for moral actions for
-one purpose to support human life.

That it is one, generic and universal means it is objective [intersubjective].
The question is what is this undeniable generic moral system?
This is where one will have to research and contemplate.'

There is so much that's wrong about this that it's hard to know where to start. But the terms one, generic, universal and purpose seem prominent, so perhaps they're the way in. Two thoughts.

1 The choice of a goal - such as 'to support human life' - is subjective, as is the claim that it's morally right to support human life. So calling these choices 'one, generic and universal' does nothing to establish their objectivity. A belief that's generic and universal remains a belief, which is subjective.

2 What we call objectivity is very precisely and explicitly NOT intersubjective. And that's the whole point of objectivity - of what we call facts. The DESCRIPTION of facts is intersubjective, in the sense that it depends on agreement on the use of signs in context. But a fact acknowledged and described by no one is still a fact. That's what makes it a fact. So subjectivity - inter or not - is irrelevant.

[Peter Holmes]

Words from a theistic moral objectivist:

'Pleasing oneself isn't moral; its what we expect any selfish, narcissistic or solipsistic person to do, and no more.'

Notice the blinkered puritanism. Is pleasing oneself always morally wrong? And is pleasing others always morally right?

And if pleasing oneself isn't moral, then neither is wanting to be pleased, rewarding those who please us and punishing those who don't. What kind of selfish, narcissistic or solipsistic person would do that?

Oh, wait. It's the invented Judaeo-Christian god. But, to generalise, theistic moral objectivism amounts to the following.

P1 If agent A says X is morally wrong, then (its a fact that) X is morally wrong.
P2 Agent A says X is morally wrong.
C Therefore, (it's a fact that) X is morally wrong.

This argument is deductively valid. But no rational person with a moral conscience would think it sound. And the claim that agent A's being 'my-team's-god' makes it sound is special pleading, which no one who cares about logic should accept.

[Peter Holmes]

VA: 'What is objective [fact, real, actual, true] must always be qualified to a human-based Framework and System of Knowledge [FSK] [of varying degrees of objectivity within a continuum] of which the scientific FSK is the most credible and objective. [sic]

Why is 'the scientific FSK...the most credible and objective'? And to which FSK [sic] is that fact 'qualified'? It can't be the scientific FSK, because that would be circular.

[Skepdick]

P1 If agent A says X is morally wrong, then (its a fact that) X is morally wrong.
P2 Agent A says X is morally wrong.
C Therefore, (it's a fact that) X is morally wrong.

This argument is deductively valid. But no rational person with a moral conscience would think it sound. And the claim that agent A's being 'my-team's-god' makes it sound is special pleading, which no one who cares about logic should accept.

P1. If lying is morally wrong, then lying is morally wrong.
P2. Lying is morally wrong.
C Lying is morally wrong.

This is the law of identity. X implies itself.
It is sound and valid.

Buuut, we've been down this path. You don't actually care about sound/valid arguments. You only say you do.

Which leaves everybody wondering why you are so intellectually dishonest - why do you keep lying about it?

[Peter Holmes]

I asked VA: 'Why is 'the scientific FSK...the most credible and objective'? And to which FSK [sic] is that fact 'qualified'? It can't be the scientific FSK, because that would be circular.'

VA replied: 'The scientific FSK's objectivity qualifies the factuality, reality and actuality of things as with other FSKs of the same consideration.'

Which doesn't answer the question. It's a word salad. Blather-flak.

And VA helpfully clarified as follows: 'To assess the credibility of a human-based FSK [re reality and actuality] we have a human-based FSK of assessment based on rationality and critical thinking, i.e.
Criteria in Rating Credibility & Objectivity of a FSK'

As Flash has pointed out, this is an infinite-regress: What makes an 'FSK of assessment based on rationality and critical thinking' credible and reliable? The claim that natural science is the most credible and reliable source of knowledge because it's rational and cognitively critical is empty.

The sad thing is that VA knows damn well - and has often said - that empirical evidence of features of reality is what makes natural science credible and (provisionally) reliable. So why deflect? Answer: VA has to defend the silly idea that features of reality - aka facts - are, as it were, products of FSKs, so they can't be independent from FSKs. Hence: 'PH's What is Fact is Illusory'.

[Peter Holmes]

VA asks: 'It there a better FSRK [besides mathematics] than the scientific FSRK in terms of its contribution to the progress of humanity?
You deny this?'

1 An FSRK is a framework and system of reality and knowledge - a hybrid or amalgam of an FSR and an FSK. VA's mistake all along has been to mistake what we believe, know and say about reality for reality itself - which VA says doesn't exist anyway.

2 The criterion 'contribution to the progress of humanity' as a measure is new in this discussion. And the claim that it's somehow tied to morality begs the question. Is it a fact that it's morally right to contribute to the progress of humanity?

3 But - granted that natural science has contributed most to the progress of humanity, my question is: why is this the case? Why is the knowledge about reality provided by natural science the most credible and reliable? If it's because it's testable, against what is it testable? If facts - features of reality - exist only within an FSK, how can we test the claims made within the FSK?

[Peter Holmes]

VA asks: 'What is the Chair-in-Itself Really Like?'

Why does a chair - or anything - have to be really like something? Does a thing strive to be something, such as a Platonic form? Is there an essential chair of which real chairs are inadequate copies or shadows in the cave?

Or does the question mean: what is a chair-in-itself? And if we can't answer that question - or if the question is meaningless - does that mean there's no such thing as a chair-in-itself?

Who ever says there's a chair-in-itself? Nowadays, most philosophical realists don't. There are just real things we call chairs. They're facts of reality that, fortunately, aren't illusions.

The fact that, outside language, there are no linguistic identities - no linguistic samenesses and differences - in reality - doesn't mean there are no samenesses and differences - no identities - in reality.

For example, the things we call cats and dogs are what they are, how ever we categorise and name them, and whether we say they're the same as or different from each other.

[Peter Holmes]

Elsewhere, a theist asserts the following:

'There are plenty of non-material things that are real that you believe in. Reason is one. Your own identity is another. Maybe morality is a third, and maybe meaning is fourth. You certainly claim to believe in the human mind, which is a non-material entity. A strict Materialist would have to call all these things "supernatural" and thus "irrational." '

The importance for a supernaturalist of a gateway belief in the non-material is obvious. And notice the standard list of things that are supposed to be non-material: reason, identity, morality, meaning and mind.

The story goes like this: we use nouns to name things; so what we misleadingly call abstract nouns must be names of things; but those things have no physical or material properties; so those things - such as reason, identity, morality, meaning and mind - are non-physical.

And this reificatory fallacy has passed for common sense for millennia. It's probably the most powerful of the bewitchments by the devices of our language that Wittgenstein identified. We've invented a magical realm of non-physical things and properties.

To repeat. Pending evidence for the existence of so-called abstract or non-physical things, belief that they exist is irrational. That there can be no such evidence is not a virtue.

[Skepdick]

To repeat. Pending evidence for the existence of so-called abstract or non-physical things, belief that they exist is irrational. That there can be no such evidence is not a virtue.

Peter "Dumb Cunt" Holmes is up to his old tricks again. Denying the very things he asserts.

What evidence do you have for the existence of rationality or beliefs?

[Peter Holmes]

An explanation for the hard of understanding.

We say some factual assertions are 'true', and we can explain how we use that word, its cognates, such as 'truth', and related words such as 'false' and 'falsehood'.

But then philosophers ask: 'Ah, but what is truth?' (Insert any other so-called abstract noun - this is the stuff of philosophy.) And we seem to be asking for a description of a thing of some kind. That thing has no physical existence or properties, so we stupidly think it must be an abstract or non-physical thing.

Then the morons among us get cross when asked for evidence for the existence of the abstract or non-physical thing. 'Duh. Okay, provide evidence for the existence of rationality and belief. After all, you agree that those things exist'.

Try thinking, just a little.

[Skepdick]

An explanation for the hard of understanding.

We say some factual assertions are 'true', and we can explain how we use that word, its cognates, such as 'truth', and related words such as 'false' and 'falsehood'.

But then philosophers ask: 'Ah, but what is truth?' (Insert any other so-called abstract noun - this is the stuff of philosophy.) And we seem to be asking for a description of a thing of some kind. That thing has no physical existence or properties, so we stupidly think it must be an abstract or non-physical thing.

Then the morons among us get cross when asked for evidence for the existence of the abstract or non-physical thing. 'Duh. Okay, provide evidence for the existence of rationality and belief. After all, you agree that those things exist'.

Try thinking, just a little.

Peter "Dumb Cunt" Holmes's faculties of comprehension and understanding seem utterly dysfunctional. Perhaps even non-existent?

He's merely being asked to apply his own standard to his own use of words. What or where is the evidence for his "thinking" and if he can't provide any then why should anyone infer there's anything beyond a useless lump of meat in his cranium?

[Peter Holmes]

Yes, like many of us, I can do what we call thinking. And even moron dick-for-brains tries to, sometimes.

But there's no reason to say that thinking is an abstract or non-physical process - that what we call thought is an abstract or non-physical thing. So where does this idiotic delusion come from? I think it's glaringly obvious.

We can't find what we call thoughts or thinking - or a mind - in a brain. All we find is synaptic firing in brain tissue - physical processes in physical things.

Ah, people have said for millennia - and morons still do - we know that thoughts and thinking and minds exist. So they must be abstract or non-physical things. QED.

And this gateway dualist delusion is grist for the supernaturalist mill - hence IC's tired old canard: you already believe that abstract or non-physical things exist - so why can't fairies and gods exist?

Trouble is, a causal explanation, with no evidence for either the cause or the causal mechanism, is no explanation at all. It's just mysticism. So 'the mind dun it' is as useless as 'a god dun it'.

[promethean75]

Holmes is killin it.

Holmes whatchu think about Wittgenstein's summation: a thought is a proposition with a sense.