Compatibilism is impossible

[Flannel Jesus]

And yet, that's the exact effect of what they believe. Determinism is certain, they think: and free will has to be explained-away.

If you can't see that that makes free will phony, I don't know what to tell you.

As long as you realise they don't say it, it's all good.

I've now said three times exactly why they won't say "illusion." It's because their goal is to allegedly "compatiblize" the two: but they are incoherent in that, because they still always end up casting free will as an illusion. None of the Compatibilist views will suggest for even a moment that Determinism might not be right: but they will trade-away the term "free will," in favour of some Deterministic equivalent. Doing so renders any actuality of free will a simple illusion.

So illusion is exactly the right word, even if they're too irrational to admit it.

Cool. You started out saying that compatibilists say free will is an illusion. Now you realise that's actually what incompatiblist determinists say. Your personal evaluation of compatibilist ideas aside, you now know the difference between what compatibilists say and what they don't say. LEARNING!

[Iwannaplato]

No, no...no dodging out now.

You made a very specific claim, one intended to be insulting and denigrating, obviously. And you claimed there was a "long string" of evidence.

You need to substantiate your claim. Let's see the evidence.

Quote me. Prove it.

I'll do it when...

No, I know you won't. It was bunk from the start.

Ah, so you decided not to respond to the example I gave in the post you quoted here. Dodging.
And now FJ has pointed out another, which so far you haven't been able to admit, this being at least the third time he's mentioned it: and before my post mentioning your errors.
See the post above this one. Which is merely pointing out an error, one of the ones I mentioned, long ago in the thread.

[Atla]

So will someone actually try to show how determinism and free will are compatible, without resorting to fallacies? Because so far compatiblism has about as much going for it as the belief in the Tooth Fairy.

Well as the next best thing, we could try to ask God:

Is there a best argument for compatibilism (in the free will versus determinism debate)? If yes, could you present it?

Compatibilism is the philosophical position that argues that free will and determinism are compatible concepts. In other words, it contends that even if determinism is true, it is still possible for individuals to have free will. One prominent argument for compatibilism is often referred to as the "compatibility of freedom and determinism." Here's a basic outline of this argument:

Defining Free Will:

Compatibilists often start by defining free will in a way that is compatible with determinism. They propose that free will should be understood as the ability to act in accordance with one's desires, motivations, and values, without external coercion or undue influence.

Freedom from Coercion:

Compatibilists argue that true freedom is not necessarily the absence of causation or determinism but rather the absence of external coercion or constraints. They contend that as long as one's actions are not forced by external factors, individuals can be considered free.

Internal Causes and Desires:

Compatibilists emphasize that what matters for free will is whether an individual's actions are in line with their internal causes, such as desires, intentions, and values. Even if these internal causes are determined by prior events, the individual still exercises autonomy by acting in accordance with their own internal states.

Moral Responsibility:

Compatibilists often tie their argument to the concept of moral responsibility. They contend that even if determinism is true, individuals can be held morally responsible for their actions if those actions are the result of their own internal states and motivations. The key is that the individual could have acted otherwise if their internal states had been different.

Practical Implications:

Compatibilists argue that the recognition of free will as compatible with determinism is important for our everyday understanding of personal responsibility, accountability, and the legal system. They claim that our legal and moral systems can still function coherently even if determinism is true, as long as individuals are considered responsible for actions that align with their own internal states.

It's important to note that the free will versus determinism debate is complex, and there are various nuanced positions within compatibilism and in opposition to it. While the argument presented here is a common one, it's just one perspective in a rich and ongoing philosophical conversation.

Well as expected, all the views here fall under a stance called determinism. You are free to do anything that doesn't actually require free will, like you can't walk through walls.

I see a parallel here with the Hard problem of consciousness. Western philosophers have worked on it for hundreds of years without making any progress. But of course they could solve it anytime, it's a known fact that the solution is nondualism, but they don't want to solve it. They have to act like they are working on stuff, they need to get paid.

So we have two positions, determinism and free will, and the position called compatibilism obviously doesn't exist. It can't exist. But they pretend it exists and the majority may even subscribe to it. They have to act like they are working on stuff, they need to get paid.

[Immanuel Can]

Cool. You started out saying that compatibilists say free will is an illusion.

No, that's not what I said. I don't say they "say" that. I say it's true anyway.

You're mixing up statements that are not the same.

1. Compatiblisms effectively make free will an illusion.

2. Compatibilists understand that their view effective makes free will an illusion.

3. Compatibilists admit that their view makes free will an illusion.

# 1 is certainly true.

#2 is suspect: maybe they don't know, and we shouldn't accuse them of necessarily lying.

#3 is certainly untrue, for then they could not be called "Compatibilists" at all.

I'm affirming the truth of #1, and you're denying #3...as would I.

But the only important question is whether or not #1 is true. For it is not necessary for Compabilistis to understand or admit the implications of their own view: they could be mistaken, confused or lying.

In any case, they're one of those things, since #1 is manifestly correct. They invariably affirm Determinism and explain away free will. So nothing's been made genuinely "compatible" there at all.

And if we suppose it's otherwise, then it's on us to show how Compatibilism can work. Because so far as any of the extant projects are concerned, it does not.

[Flannel Jesus]

Cool. You started out saying that compatibilists say free will is an illusion.

No, that's not what I said. I don't say they "say" that. I say it's true anyway.

So, Compatiblism says...?

Compatibilism: "Both, in a sense: but only in that Determinism is ultimate truth, and free will is strictly an illusion within which we all live."

I feel like I can be forgiven for thinking you're saying compatibilists say this, given your literal own words right here.

[Sculptor]

I think we can agree on the fact that the brain is a set of neurons that interact with each other. Any mental state, the physical state of the brain, leads into another mental state by following the laws of physics. This is a deterministic chain of causality. Free will on another hand is the ability to initiate or terminate a chain of causality. This is true since we are dealing with two options in an undecided situation which requires an agent to choose one of the options and initiate a chain of causality. This, initiating or terminating a causal chain, is impossible in a physical/deterministic world. Therefore compatibilism is impossible.

Compatibilism is merely a recognition that although wholly deterministic, each of our wills can act as agents to intervene in various chains of causality.
The POV is "compatible" with the notion of "free will" since the meaing of "free" means not complelled by exogenous forces (such as a gun to the head) but where the determination of the individual is endogenously generated.
Such actions of mine are free in that they are not determined by others, but chosen through considerations of endogenous causes such as experience, learning and volition which are personal.

[Immanuel Can]

Compatibilism: "Both, in a sense: but only in that Determinism is ultimate truth, and free will is strictly an illusion within which we all live."

I feel like I can be forgiven for thinking you're saying compatibilists say this, given your literal own words right here.

Then I forgive you, if that's what you want.

But the point is the same: regardless of what Compatiblists are or are not prepared to admit, and regardless of what they claim to know or not know, the truth is that Compabilism negotiates out of existence any "free will." This, whether they know it or not, they render it an illusion.

Wow. That took way too much work to establish.

Now, can you save Compatiblism? Do you even think you can try? Or is it a lost cause?

[Flannel Jesus]

Now, can you save Compatiblism? Do you even think you can try? Or is it a lost cause?

Does it need saving? From what? More than 50% of professional philosophers are compatibilists, I don't think it needs my help. It's not dieing any time soon.

[Immanuel Can]

Now, can you save Compatiblism? Do you even think you can try? Or is it a lost cause?

Does it need saving?

Yep. It's incoherent. Effectively, it doesn't "compatibilize" the two: it just banishes free will. So it doesn't even earn its own name.

[Flannel Jesus]

Yep. It's incoherent. Effectively, it doesn't "compatibilize" the two: it just banishes free will. So it doesn't even earn its own name.

I fully accept that you think that and I wouldn't dream of trying to change your mind. I think the root thought processes that go into compatibilism are too far removed from the philosophical place you reside that it's just not a fruitful endeavour. The kinds of things that motivate compatibilist thought are not the kinds of things you are in a position to relate to.

And that's okay.

[attofishpi]

I think we can agree on the fact that the brain is a set of neurons that interact with each other. Any mental state, the physical state of the brain, leads into another mental state by following the laws of physics. This is a deterministic chain of causality. Free will on another hand is the ability to initiate or terminate a chain of causality. This is true since we are dealing with two options in an undecided situation which requires an agent to choose one of the options and initiate a chain of causality. This, initiating or terminating a causal chain, is impossible in a physical/deterministic world. Therefore compatibilism is impossible.

Compatibilism is merely a recognition that although wholly deterministic, each of our wills can act as agents to intervene in various chains of causality.
The POV is "compatible" with the notion of "free will" since the meaing of "free" means not complelled by exogenous forces (such as a gun to the head) but where the determination of the individual is endogenously generated.
Such actions of mine are free in that they are not determined by others, but chosen through considerations of endogenous causes such as experience, learning and volition which are personal.

Pretty certain we are on the same money since you mention that our wills act upon the chain of causality.

I mentioned many times earlier in the thread, that we have free-will and we affect causality of the deterministic universe. (compatibilism)

It's a no brainer that there is a deterministic universe, but once a 'brain' is involved, well as Sir Roger Penrose points out, he sees no computation within consciousness, whereas anything determined can be placed within a computational algorithm, consciousness does not appear to be such.

[Immanuel Can]

Yep. It's incoherent. Effectively, it doesn't "compatibilize" the two: it just banishes free will. So it doesn't even earn its own name.

I fully accept that you think that and I wouldn't dream of trying to change your mind. I think the root thought processes that go into compatibilism are too far removed from the philosophical place you reside that it's just not a fruitful endeavour. The kinds of things that motivate compatibilist thought are not the kinds of things you are in a position to relate to.

And that's okay.

So what you really mean is, "I haven't got a clue how Compatilism can be coherently articulated." And I agree...that's how it is.

[Flannel Jesus]

Yep. It's incoherent. Effectively, it doesn't "compatibilize" the two: it just banishes free will. So it doesn't even earn its own name.

I fully accept that you think that and I wouldn't dream of trying to change your mind. I think the root thought processes that go into compatibilism are too far removed from the philosophical place you reside that it's just not a fruitful endeavour. The kinds of things that motivate compatibilist thought are not the kinds of things you are in a position to relate to.

And that's okay.

So what you really mean is, "I haven't got a clue how Compatilism can be coherently articulated." And I agree...that's how it is.

Okay man

[Sculptor]

I think we can agree on the fact that the brain is a set of neurons that interact with each other. Any mental state, the physical state of the brain, leads into another mental state by following the laws of physics. This is a deterministic chain of causality. Free will on another hand is the ability to initiate or terminate a chain of causality. This is true since we are dealing with two options in an undecided situation which requires an agent to choose one of the options and initiate a chain of causality. This, initiating or terminating a causal chain, is impossible in a physical/deterministic world. Therefore compatibilism is impossible.

Compatibilism is merely a recognition that although wholly deterministic, each of our wills can act as agents to intervene in various chains of causality.
The POV is "compatible" with the notion of "free will" since the meaing of "free" means not complelled by exogenous forces (such as a gun to the head) but where the determination of the individual is endogenously generated.
Such actions of mine are free in that they are not determined by others, but chosen through considerations of endogenous causes such as experience, learning and volition which are personal.

Pretty certain we are on the same money since you mention that our wills act upon the chain of causality.

I mentioned many times earlier in the thread, that we have free-will and we affect causality of the deterministic universe. (compatibilism)

It's a no brainer that there is a deterministic universe, but once a 'brain' is involved, well as Sir Roger Penrose points out, he sees no computation within consciousness, whereas anything determined can be placed within a computational algorithm, consciousness does not appear to be such.

No. Not even consciousness can escape the laws of nature.
If decisions were not determined by your experience , what use would learning be?

[attofishpi]

Compatibilism is merely a recognition that although wholly deterministic, each of our wills can act as agents to intervene in various chains of causality.
The POV is "compatible" with the notion of "free will" since the meaing of "free" means not complelled by exogenous forces (such as a gun to the head) but where the determination of the individual is endogenously generated.
Such actions of mine are free in that they are not determined by others, but chosen through considerations of endogenous causes such as experience, learning and volition which are personal.

Pretty certain we are on the same money since you mention that our wills act upon the chain of causality.

I mentioned many times earlier in the thread, that we have free-will and we affect causality of the deterministic universe. (compatibilism)

It's a no brainer that there is a deterministic universe, but once a 'brain' is involved, well as Sir Roger Penrose points out, he sees no computation within consciousness, whereas anything determined can be placed within a computational algorithm, consciousness does not appear to be such.

No. Not even consciousness can escape the laws of nature.
If decisions were not determined by your experience , what use would learning be?

Sure, my decisions are based upon experience but more importantly my outlook, what i aspire to see within my FUTURE..it is that where upon my WILL "lies" --->