compatibilism

[iambiguous]

Why Sam Harris is confused about free will
Dan Jones

Hard determinists often claim to have common sense on their side, but common sense doesn’t have much place in philosophy.

Besides, how are these claims not in and of themselves articulated such that they could never have been articulated otherwise? Common sense in a world where nothing can ever be other than what it must be?

That said, compatibilists do face the very hard task of showing in what sense we can be free, make choices, and remain responsible for our actions in a morally meaningful sense if determinism is true.

Ah, the part I keep waiting for someone to broach. Though, sure, some here claim to have already "explained" how Mary, compelled to abort her unborn baby, is still morally responsible because no one put a gun to her head and commanded her abort the baby or else.

In what follows I don’t claim to offer a detailed positive defence of compatibilism, but rather to show that if you’re a hard determinist like Harris, and you reject compatibilism and the libertarian conception of free will, then you’ve also got to leave moral responsibility, blame, praise, punishment, reward and most of the other language of moral discourse at the door.

I certainly do. Only I'm also the first to admit that compatibilists may well be grasping all of this in a more reasonable manner. Though from my frame of mind, in turn, Harris still comes off as a "free will determinist". It's like he argues that he was never able to argue anything other than what his brain compels him to argue...but that his own conclusions are still the best? He'll debate others while, what, concluding that the debates themselves unfold only as they were ever able to?

[iambiguous]

Why Sam Harris is confused about free will
Dan Jones

Harris is clear that he rejects compatibilism, which he takes to be an evasive, topic-changing approach to free will.

Again and again: what does it mean to be clear about something you were never able to encompass any other way? We're all being entirely clear here in that we are all posting only what our brains compel us to.

Well, not counting the part I keep missing in an actual free will world.

His hard determinism certainly has the appeal of simplicity. It does away with the need to think deeply about what choice and responsibility really, could, or should mean, and thus obviates the difficulty of reconciling determinism with free will and moral responsibility — such ideas are just metaphysical fictions.

On the other hand, is his determinism hard enough? It would seem that determinism can't get any simpler than this: everything that we do, we are never able to opt freely not to do.

Or perhaps not; things get a bit murky in Harris’s philosophy on this point. One the one hand, Harris poses and answers the following question:

"If we cannot assign blame to the workings of the universe, how can evil people be held responsible for their actions? In the deepest sense, it seems, they can’t be. But in a practical sense, they must be. I see no contradiction in this. In fact, I think that keeping the deep causes of human behavior in view would only improve our practical response to evil. The feeling that people are deeply responsible for who they are does nothing but produce moral illusions and psychological suffering."

Deep causes? Though it's not for nothing that, with regard to many, this takes them around to God and religion. And, sure, if Harris wants to speculate "philosophically" about deep causes here and in regard to neuroscience then, perhaps, someday -- of his own volition? -- he will nail these "internal" deep causes down chemically and neurologically. It might even encompass QM interactions.

How about this...

If you think you grasp Sam's point here, note how you imagine it might be applicable "in a practical sense" to Mary aborting her unborn baby. Or how you imagine it is applicable to your own chosen, "chosen" or "chosen" behaviors.

[iambiguous]

Why Sam Harris is confused about free will
Dan Jones

On the other hand, Harris ties to establish a notion of personal responsibility that “fits the facts”, which, in this case, are the facts of determinism — specifically, that human behaviour is as determined as the weather, and humans are essentially “neuronal weather patterns”.

Again, however, what does that encompass or not encompass? Does it include the arguments that he makes regarding the arguments that others make? Does it include me typing these worlds and you reading them?

For instance, there's the part where over time weather becomes climate. And those like Al Gore arguing that because we do have free will, we are responsible for the greenhouse gases which some predict will result in catastrophic climate changes. Some insisting that we have already gone past the "tipping point"...the "point of no return". Whereas, if human brains are no less an inherent manifestation of determinism, there's only what could never have not unfolded in regard to climate change.

Harris’s solution is quite simple.

If his solution is just one more set of dominoes toppling over chemically and neurologically in the only possible reality, what does it mean to differentiate between simple and hard? How are they too not entirely -- essentially, materially, phenomenologically -- interchangeable?

In The Moral Landscape he observes that the last time he went to the market he was fully clothed, did not steal anything, and did not buy anchovies. “To say that I was responsible for my behaviour is simply to say that what I did was sufficiently in keeping with my thoughts, intentions, beliefs, and desires to be considered an extension of them.”

Back again to those "internal" components of our motivations and intentions. As though, either scientifically or philosophically, a definitive distinction can be made between the internal and the external factors in a wholly determined universe.

Which, in comparison with other animals, revolves around the distinction between genes and memes?

[phyllo]

In The Moral Landscape he observes that the last time he went to the market he was fully clothed, did not steal anything, and did not buy anchovies. “To say that I was responsible for my behaviour is simply to say that what I did was sufficiently in keeping with my thoughts, intentions, beliefs, and desires to be considered an extension of them.”

Back again to those "internal" components of our motivations and intentions. As though, either scientifically or philosophically, a definitive distinction can be made between the internal and the external factors in a wholly determined universe.

As soon as one says there is a object, it has been separated from the background and assigned characteristics and actions.

It can be a rock, a tree, a cat, a person. I, you, he, she, it. Harris, Dan Jones.

That is the difference between internal and external.

If, instead, one says that there are no objects, for example that all is atoms and energy, then there is no internal/external distinction with respect to rocks, tree, cats or people. (There are different atoms and energy but there are no rocks, trees, cats or people.)

[iambiguous]

In The Moral Landscape he observes that the last time he went to the market he was fully clothed, did not steal anything, and did not buy anchovies. “To say that I was responsible for my behaviour is simply to say that what I did was sufficiently in keeping with my thoughts, intentions, beliefs, and desires to be considered an extension of them.”

Back again to those "internal" components of our motivations and intentions. As though, either scientifically or philosophically, a definitive distinction can be made between the internal and the external factors in a wholly determined universe.

As soon as one says there is a object, it has been separated from the background and assigned characteristics and actions.

It can be a rock, a tree, a cat, a person. I, you, he, she, it. Harris, Dan Jones.

That is the difference between internal and external.

If, instead, one says that there are no objects, for example that all is atoms and energy, then there is no internal/external distinction with respect to rocks, tree, cats or people. (There are different atoms and energy but there are no rocks, trees, cats or people.)

Well, going back to how on Earth all of that fits into the ontological understanding of the existence of existence itself, of course.

And if that "somehow" involves internal components as libertarians understand them, a teleological understanding as well?

As, say, either Christians or pantheists understand that?

Or compatibilists?

[phyllo]

Libertarians, Christians, pantheists and compatibilists are free to comment.

As well as anyone else.

Add something. Point out my errors.

[iambiguous]

Libertarians, Christians, pantheists and compatibilists are free to comment.

As well as anyone else.

Unless, of course, everything that any of us do comment on we were never able not to comment on...and were never able not to comment on it other than as our brains compel us to.

Add something. Point out my errors.

What on Earth are errors in a world where everything unfolds only as it every could have? Including the manner in which you yourself connect the dots between objective morality and God?

And, of course, pertinent to both of us, this part:

All of this going back to how the matter we call the human brain was "somehow" able to acquire autonomy when non-living matter "somehow" became living matter "somehow" became conscious matter "somehow" became self-conscious matter.

Then those here who actually believe that what they believe about all of this reflects, what, the ontological truth about the human condition itself?

Then those who are compelled in turn to insist on a teleological component as well. Usually in the form of one or another God.

Meanwhile, philosophers and scientists and theologians have been grappling with this profound mystery now for thousands of years.

Though -- click -- this part is clearly wasted, "wasted", "wasted" on those of your ilk here.

[Iwannaplato]

Then those here who actually believe that what they believe about all of this reflects, what, the ontological truth about the human condition itself?

And you believe you can view their belief with incredulity. So, somehow you believe, to the level of incredulity about other beliefs or the beliefs of others, you know something about ontology or epistemology or the implications of determinism.

You imply your beliefs via questions in a tone of incredulty.
Other people state them.

I'm not sure what the difference is to you.

Let's draw a parallel with racism:
Objectivist racist: Black people are inferior.
Supposedly non-objectivist racist using Iambiguous rhetorical approaches: Then there are those who actually believe that black people aren't inferior?????
Objectivist racist: Oh, come on, you believe the same thing I do.
Supposedly non-objectivist racist using Iambiguous rhetorical approaches: I'm the first person to admit my beliefs are formed by dasein and that I don't know.
Objectivist racist: Oh, yeah, you do that ALSO. But, for some reason, despite asserting that, you are utterly incredulous that anyone doesn't think that black are inferior.

Idisingenous, you have the answer. Some people are so sure of their positions they simply state them. Other people are so sure of their position they express incredulity that anyone could have a different opinion.

Yes, it's a different approach to expressing near certainty. But how they got to their belief...well, it's not so different to how you got to yours.

Though -- click -- this part is clearly wasted, "wasted", "wasted" on those of your ilk here.

And all the other statements that make

IT ALL ABOUT THE OTHER PEOPLE.

But this is all clearly wasted wasted wasted on those of your ilk here. Which means on you.

Here's the believe: If determinism is true, we can't know anything. (which is a problematic belief so I can understand why someone might avoid being direct about it.

And then again and again that crap about the brain being autonomous and outside of determinism. Sure, there are some people who believe that. I'm not sure how many are, for example, on this page in the discussion. But toss it out in a spray at everyone and no one in particular.

Saves having to have a coherent discussion.

[iambiguous]

Then those here who actually believe that what they believe about all of this reflects, what, the ontological truth about the human condition itself?

And you believe you can view their belief with incredulity. So, somehow you believe, to the level of incredulity about other beliefs or the beliefs of others, you know something about ontology or epistemology or the implications of determinism.

You imply your beliefs via questions in a tone of incredulty.
Other people state them.

I'm not sure what the difference is to you.

Incredulity: "the state of being unwilling or unable to believe something."

Of course, for the truly hardcore determinists, the state of being unwilling or unable to believe anything at all is interchangeable with the state of being willing and able to believe it instead. And that is because whatever we believe is inherently a manifestation of the only possible reality.

As for my own beliefs in regard to things like morality and religion and the Big Questions, I have no capacity whatsoever to determine whether or not I do in fact have free will. The distinction I make here, given some measure of autonomy, is in regard to what I believe about things in the either/or world [I'm either right or wrong] and what I believe about things in the world of conflicting value judgments ["I" being rooted existentially...historically, culturally, experientially...in dasein].

Let's draw a parallel with racism:
Objectivist racist: Black people are inferior.
Supposedly non-objectivist racist using Iambiguous rhetorical approaches: Then there are those who actually believe that black people aren't inferior?????
Objectivist racist: Oh, come on, you believe the same thing I do.
Supposedly non-objectivist racist using Iambiguous rhetorical approaches: I'm the first person to admit my beliefs are formed by dasein and that I don't know.
Objectivist racist: Oh, yeah, you do that ALSO. But, for some reason, despite asserting that, you are utterly incredulous that anyone doesn't think that black are inferior.

Again, no doubt, "in your head" this is pertinent to my point above. "In my head", however, I don't see the connection at all. My point is that, from the entirely compelled perspective of the hardcore determinists, whatever anyone believes about race they believe because they were never able to freely opt to believe anything else instead. And that certainly includes my belief about dasein and the Benjamin Button Syndrome.

It's not whether black people are superior or inferior to white people -- intellectually, athletically etc. -- but that these distinctions themselves are subsumed in the only possible reality. So, to the extent that you construe me to be incredulous and to the extent that I am is six of one, half a dozen of the other in the only possible world.

Yes, it's a different approach to expressing near certainty. But how they got to their belief...well, it's not so different to how you got to yours.

Click.

From the perspective of the racial objectivists, their beliefs are derived from science, from biological imperatives, from nature itself. From the perspective of the racial subjectivists, their beliefs are derived from the personal experiences that they have had given the life they have lived. Then it comes down to whether science can in fact determine if racism is reasonable or unreasonable. But in a wholly determined universe none of this unfolds other than how it must unfold.

Though -- click -- this part is clearly wasted, "wasted", "wasted" on those of your ilk here.

And all the other statements that make

IT ALL ABOUT THE OTHER PEOPLE.

But this is all clearly wasted wasted wasted on those of your ilk here. Which means on you.

That's not the distinction I make.

Wasted = free will
"Wasted" = determinism
"Wasted" = compatibilism

With the compatibilists, someone is a racist because they were never able not to be...but they are still responsible for being one. Those mysterious "internal components". Though they are mysterious because we are not privy to grasping a complete understanding of this:

All of this going back to how the matter we call the human brain was "somehow" able to acquire autonomy when non-living matter "somehow" became living matter "somehow" became conscious matter "somehow" became self-conscious matter.

Here's the believe: If determinism is true, we can't know anything. (which is a problematic belief so I can understand why someone might avoid being direct about it.

No, we know what we know, but we were never free to know otherwise. Just as you were never free to understand what you think you do "here and now" any other way.

And then again and again that crap about the brain being autonomous and outside of determinism. Sure, there are some people who believe that. I'm not sure how many are, for example, on this page in the discussion. But toss it out in a spray at everyone and no one in particular.

Well, if someone is convinced that their own brain is autonomous and outside of determinism then, the hardcore determinists insist, they were never able to be convinced otherwise in turn.

Only the determinists themselves are no less hapless in actually being able to demonstrate that. Given "the Gap" and "Rummy's Rule", we are all in the same profoundly problematic boat. Again, going back to what we don't have a clue regarding insofar as grasping where human existence itself fits into the existence of existence.

Why on Earth do you suppose there have been so many Gods invented? Because, given some degree of autonomy, we need them to at least take comfort in believing that we fit into some Divine Plan.

[phyllo]

No, we know what we know, but we were never free to know otherwise. Just as you were never free to understand what you think you do "here and now" any other way.

And how would it work if there was free-will?

With free-will, one could know things which one has not learned or been exposed to. One would have knowledge of things to which one has had no access.

With free-will, one could understand things which are beyond one's capability to understand.

None of that makes sense.

So how can one be "free to know otherwise" and "free to understand"?

[iambiguous]

No, we know what we know, but we were never free to know otherwise. Just as you were never free to understand what you think you do "here and now" any other way.

And how would it work if there was free-will?

Well, if we do have free will then those like Satyr and Peter Kropotkin here...

https://ilovephilosophy.com/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=198634

...have the capacity to explore the subject of race and diversity of their own volition. If not, then they exchange posts there that were never able not to be exchanged. After all, how can either one of them be right or wrong if neither one of them was free to think what they do other than in how their brains compel them to think?

With free will, science can probe the subject of race in order to pin down the...objective truth? Without it, science itself is just another inherent manifestion of the laws of matter.

With free-will, one could know things which one has not learned or been exposed to. One would have knowledge of things to which one has had no access.

With free-will, one could understand things which are beyond one's capability to understand.

None of that makes sense.

With free will, one can choose to research race and racism here -- https://www.google.com/search?q=race+an ... s-wiz-serp -- and come to believe one thing rather than another.

Though, sure, even with free will, "the gap" and "Rummy's Rule" and this part...

All of this going back to how the matter we call the human brain was "somehow" able to acquire autonomy when non-living matter "somehow" became living matter "somehow" became conscious matter "somehow" became self-conscious matter.

Then those here who actually believe that what they believe about all of this reflects, what, the ontological truth about the human condition itself?

Then those who are compelled in turn to insist on a teleological component as well. Usually in the form of one or another God.

Meanwhile, philosophers and scientists and theologians have been grappling with this profound mystery now for thousands of years.

...don't go away.

Again, without free will, Mary aborts Jane and that's the end of her. With free will Mary is convinced not to abort her and she is now among us.

So how can one be "free to know otherwise" and "free to understand"?

Well -- click -- if "somehow" we did acquire free will, we are able to explore things like racism and abortion here and elsewhere of our own volition. And thus free to misunderstand them as well.

But...

What does it mean to understand race and abortion in a free will world? Are they things that can be understood by scientists and philosophers and ideologues and biologists?

Objectively?

Sure, maybe. But from the perspective of the hardcore determinists any understanding that any of us arrive at is the only understanding we were ever able to arrive at. If, in other words, the "internal components" of the human brain are necessarily interchangeable with all of the external components involved.

[Iwannaplato]

...have the capacity to explore the subject of race and diversity of their own volition. If not, then they exchange posts there that were never able not to be exchanged. After all, how can either one of them be right or wrong if neither one of them was free to think what they do other than in how their brains compel them to think?

How can one clock work and another clock not work? Both are utterly determined, but one is missing a battery. Or one fell and was damaged and one of the gears doesn't always move another, so it tells the wrong time.

How can a calculator work? It is utterly determined. How could it be right?????????????

You've spoken of animals and seemed confident they at least don't have free will.

How the heck do they find food? How have some species managed to survive for millions of years?

Surviving requires finding solutions to all sorts of problems? How...... they are determined?

But I would guess Phyllo has already used similar arguments and examples, but it's always as if none of this has every been said.

Nietzsche's eternal return, the banal version. It's Iambiguous Day, in the sense of a version of Groundhog Day.

Though if this means that Phyllo gets to be with Andie McDowell, this could be worth it. But so far it seems like he gets to be with you.

[phyllo]

With free will, one can choose to research race and racism here -- https://www.google.com/search?q=race+an ... s-wiz-serp -- and come to believe one thing rather than another.

Without free-will, one can be compelled to research race and racism ... and come to be believe one thing rather than another.

You see that they are doing the same thing but one you call 'chosen' and the other you call 'compelled'.

The only difference is that word "compelled".

Again, without free will, Mary aborts Jane and that's the end of her. With free will Mary is convinced not to abort her and she is now among us.

This again.

We can conclude that the laws of nature compel women to have abortions.

We can conclude that women with free-will like to have babies and raise children.

We can conclude that women with free-will like their traditional gender roles.

What else? Let's brainstorm this.

[iambiguous]

...have the capacity to explore the subject of race and diversity of their own volition. If not, then they exchange posts there that were never able not to be exchanged. After all, how can either one of them be right or wrong if neither one of them was free to think what they do other than in how their brains compel them to think?

How can one clock work and another clock not work? Both are utterly determined, but one is missing a battery. Or one fell and was damaged and one of the gears doesn't always move another, so it tells the wrong time.

Or, why does one small storm fizzle out while another becomes a category 5 hurricane?

The laws of matter.

Now, the human brain that creates a clock that works and a clock that doesn't work?

Well, if the human brain functions as a result of exactly the same laws of matter that create inconsequential and devasting storms, then the clock working or not working is also an inherent manifestation of those same identical laws of matter.

Only we all know that human brains are like no other matter around. We just don't know a way [yet] to pin down how brain matter might have acquired the autonomy that storms do not possess. The profoundly problematic mytery of it all going back to....what exactly?

We "just know" that brains are "different".

Phyllo's God perhaps?

You've spoken of animals and seemed confident they at least don't have free will.

How the heck do they find food? How have some species managed to survive for millions of years?

Surviving requires finding solutions to all sorts of problems? How...... they are determined?

On the other hand: https://sentientmedia.org/which-animals ... telligent/

How many of them come closest to being as "self-conscious" as we are?

And the fact is that they go about their own trek from birth to death by way of instinct...biological imperatives. Talk about the brute facticity embedded in laws of matter! Only this matter is living matter. And that in and of itself is a profound mystery.

Phyllo's God perhaps?

But I would guess Phyllo has already used similar arguments and examples, but it's always as if none of this has every been said.

Again -- click -- that's your take on our exchange. From my frame of mind, he is as much a Mr. Snippet and a Mr. Wiggle as you are with me.

Nietzsche's eternal return, the banal version. It's Iambiguous Day, in the sense of a version of Groundhog Day.

No, Groundhog Day was Hollywood's attempt to teach Phil [the asshole] how to be more like Rita [the ideal human being]. And eternal return almost certainly has nothing to do with, say, reality?

[iambiguous]

With free will, one can choose to research race and racism here -- https://www.google.com/search?q=race+an ... s-wiz-serp -- and come to believe one thing rather than another.

Without free-will, one can be compelled to research race and racism ... and come to be believe one thing rather than another.

You see that they are doing the same thing but one you call 'chosen' and the other you call 'compelled'.

Click.

Again, I will flat out admit that even though "here and now" I'm still convinced your arguments completely avoid the points that I am making above and are, well, ridiculous, you may in fact be making the more reasonable point...a point that I keep missing.

Others here can decide "decide" or "decide" for themselves.

I just keep coming back to your conversation with Jane. You note what you do to her above...even though, in a world where Mary does not have free will not to abort her as some determinist understand it, she wouldn't even be around to react to it.

The only difference is that word "compelled".

No, the difference is between a brain that really does compel everything that we think, feel, say and do, and a brain that "somehow" -- your God? -- acquired the capacity to choose what we think, feel, say and do. The part in the is/ought world I root in dasein.

Again, without free will, Mary aborts Jane and that's the end of her. With free will Mary is convinced not to abort her and she is now among us.

This again.

Of course. After all, what could possibly be more important to Jane?

We can conclude that the laws of nature compel women to have abortions.

We can conclude that women with free-will like to have babies and raise children.

We can conclude that women with free-will like their traditional gender roles.

What else? Let's brainstorm this.

Well, my point is that in a way that neither scientists nor philosophers fully grasp, we conclude things, "conclude" things or "conclude" things about abortion and race.

As for the theologians? Click. You tell me.